R v Candy - [2023] NZHC 284

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NEW PLYMOUTH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA NGĀMOTU ROHE

CRI-2022-043-000914

[2023] NZHC 284

THE KING

v

WILLIAM MARK CANDY

Hearing: 7 February 2023

Counsel:

C E Clarke for Crown

P M Keegan for Defendant

Judgment:

23 February 2023

JUDGMENT OF ISAC J

[Special plea]

Introduction

[1] On 29 July 2022, Mr Jacob Ramsay was seriously assaulted by the defendant, Mr William Candy, and a co-offender, Mr Ethan Webster. As a result of the assault Mr Ramsay died and Mr Candy was subsequently charged with:

(a)his murder;1 and

(b)a separate charge of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.2

1 Crimes Act 1961, ss 167(6), 172 and 66; maximum penalty of life imprisonment.
2 Sections 188(1) and 66; maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment.

R v CANDY [2023] NZHC 284 [23 February 2023]

[2] Mr Candy has pleaded guilty to the charge of murder but sought to enter a special plea under s 46 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 in relation to the charge of causing grievous bodily harm. He argues that the wounding charge arises from the same facts as the murder charge. The question for me is whether that contention is correct.

Relevant principles

[3] Under s 17(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act a charge must relate to a single offence. In Mason v R, when discussing the predecessor to s 17(1), the Supreme Court observed:3
Section 329(6) of the Crimes Act says that:

Every count shall in general apply only to a single transaction.

The qualification “in general” and the relatively indefinite word “transaction”, which can encompass both a single event or a course of conduct, recognise the difficulty of application of any precise rule to the charging of the many different fact situations in which acts of offending may occur. They indicate the need for some flexibility. The essential requirement emerging from case law is that, if particular acts of alleged offending can sensibly be charged separately without undesirably lengthening the indictment (overcharging), then that should be done. It is necessary that distinctly identifiable acts of alleged offending be the subject of separate charges where the accused may be prejudiced either at trial or on sentencing if they are combined in a single count. On the one hand, the use of a multiplicity of counts is to be avoided where fewer would suffice for the interests of justice. On the other, overly complex counts may prejudice the defence or make it difficult to frame fair and accurate directions to the jury. If necessary trial judges should intervene if either problem arises.

We repeat what Anderson J said for this Court in R v Qui. The Court endorsed the practice of not charging as separate offences a continuing course of conduct which it would be artificial to characterise as separate offences. But the Court said that it was another thing to charge as a single count repetitive acts which can be distinguished from each other in…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Candy

Details

AGLC: R v Candy [2023] NZHC 284
Case: [2023] NZHC 284
Decision Date: 23 February 2023

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, the case of The King v William Mark Candy was heard and determined. Mr Candy was charged with the murder of Jacob Ramsay and with wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Mr Candy pleaded guilty to the murder charge but sought to enter a special plea under s 46 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 in relation to the wounding charge. He argued that the wounding charge arose from the same facts as the murder charge, and therefore, he should not be required to plead to the wounding charge. The court was required to decide whether the contention of Mr Candy was correct.

The court considered the relevant principles of law and held that a special plea was not available to Mr Candy. The court concluded that while there may be a causal connection between Mr Ramsay’s death and the Ōakura assault, that causal connection did not mean the charges arose from the same facts for the purpose of s 46(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The court further held that the facts giving rise to the charge of grievous bodily harm were not the same as those giving rise to the murder charge. There was not a "common punishable act" central to both charges. They occurred at different locations, separated by a significant period of time, and involved different physical assaults and states of mind.

The court held that it was not satisfied that there was any element of double jeopardy or unfairness arising from the Crown’s decision to charge the Ōakura assault separately. Mr Candy was required to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty to the charge of wounding with intent to cause Mr Ramsay grievous bodily harm. He was directed to enter his plea within five working days of the date of this Judgment.

In conclusion, the court dismissed Mr Candy's special plea and required him to enter a plea to the charge of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. The decision of the court was based on the legal principles of charging distinctly identifiable alleged offending under separate charges and the requirement that a charge must relate to a "single offence." The court held that the facts giving rise to the charge of grievous bodily harm were not the same as those giving rise to the murder charge, and therefore, the special plea was not available to Mr Candy.

Orders