New Zealand Parole Board v Attorney-General

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2022-485-0280

[2023] NZHC 1611

UNDER the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 and Part 18 of the High Court Rules

IN THE MATTER

of an application for a declaratory judgment in respect of the meaning of s 107K(3)(bb) of the Parole Act 2002

BETWEEN

THE NEW ZEALAND PAROLE BOARD

Applicant

AND

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

Respondent

Hearing: 20 October 2022 and 3 February 2023

Counsel:

M S Smith and V J Owen for Applicant M J McKillop for Respondent

A S Butler KC and D T Haradasa for The Human Rights Commission | Te Kāhui Tika Tangata (Intervener)

Judgment:

27 June 2023


JUDGMENT OF ISAC J

[Application for declaratory judgment]


THE NZ PAROLE BOARD v THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2023] NZHC 1611 [27 June 2023]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Para No

Introduction and the issues  [1]

Why this proceeding?  [11]

Legal framework  [20]

Issue 1: does s 107K(3)(bb)(ii) prevent an accommodation provider

from also providing rehabilitative programmes to offenders?  [34]

Submissions for the Human Rights Commission  [36]

Submissions for the Parole Board and Attorney-General  [45]

Consideration

Text, purpose and context  [58]

Legislative history of amendments to the ESO regime  [62]

The text of s 107K  [69]

The text of s 16  [79]

Conclusions  [83]

Issue 2: what is the scope of the prohibition in s 107K(3)(bb)(ii)?  [90]

Issue 3: does the Parole Board have the power to self-initiate review

hearings?  [92]

Submissions for the parties  [93]

Consideration  [99]

Conclusion and result  [104]

Introduction and the issues

[1]    Individuals who have completed a prison sentence are ordinarily free to return to the community and enjoy the same freedoms as everyone else. However, Parliament has decided that the community needs special protection from a small proportion of offenders: those who pose a high risk of serious sexual or violent reoffending upon release. It has created two types of court-imposed order to manage the risks these people present.

[2]    The first and most restrictive is a public protection order (PPO) made under the Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Act 2014. A person subject to a PPO is required to stay in a residence designated by the Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, which in practice are secure facilities within prison precincts.1 PPO recipients are under highly restrictive conditions which bear many similarities to a prison environment.2 In some cases, a PPO offender’s risk may be so serious that it justifies their detention in prison instead of within a residence.3

[3]    The second order is an extended supervision order (ESO) made under Part 1A of the Parole Act 2002, and is the focus of this judgment. In general terms, ESOs enable the Parole Board to impose restrictions and conditions on offenders to monitor and assist their rehabilitation and reintegration into the community.

[4]    Under the Parole Act a sentencing court may make an ESO where it is satisfied an offender has exhibited a pervasive pattern of serious sexual or violent offending and…

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Details
Case
[2023] NZHC 1611
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the High Court of New Zealand, the New Zealand Parole Board sought a declaration to clarify the scope of section 107K(3)(bb)(ii) of the Parole Act 2002. This section provides that conditions imposed on offenders subject to extended supervision orders (ESOs) must not require or result in the offender residing with any person, persons, or agency in whose care the offender is placed. The central issue was whether this provision imposed a blanket prohibition preventing a single agency from providing both accommodation and rehabilitative programmes to an offender. The Human Rights Commission intervened to argue that the provision should be interpreted broadly to prevent offenders from being subject to de facto 24-hour supervision by a single organisation. The Parole Board and Attorney-General argued that the provision should be interpreted more narrowly to only prohibit intensive monitoring, at all times residential restrictions, or in the care of conditions. The Court found that the provision should be interpreted as a middle-ground approach. It concluded that the provision did not impose a blanket prohibition on single agency arrangements but rather prohibited such arrangements where they would result in the offender being subject to intensive monitoring, at all times residential restrictions, or in the care of conditions. The Court found that the purpose of the provision was to prevent the imposition of conditions by stealth that would effectively amount to a second term of imprisonment. The Court rejected the broad interpretation argued for by the Commission as overbroad and inconsistent with the practical and resourcing difficulties raised by the Parole Board and Attorney-General. However, it found that the middle-ground interpretation was consistent with the text, purpose and context of the provision.

The Court also found that the Parole Board did not have the power to self-initiate review hearings of its decisions imposing special conditions on offenders. The Court noted that the Parole Board's power to impose special conditions is subject to the limitations set out in section 107K(3) of the Parole Act, but it did not find that the Act conferred on the Board a power to revisit its own decisions. As such, the Court found that the Parole Board could not self-initiate review hearings of its decisions.

In conclusion, the Court found that section 107K(3)(bb)(ii) of the Parole Act does not impose a blanket prohibition on single agency arrangements but rather prohibits such arrangements where they would result in the offender being subject to intensive monitoring, at all times residential restrictions, or in the care of conditions. The Parole Board does not have the power to self-initiate review hearings of its decisions imposing special conditions on offenders.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established