Rams Logistics Limited v Director of Land Transport
[2025] NZHC 665
•27 March 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2025-404-291
[2025] NZHC 665
UNDER the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 IN THE MATTER
of a decision made pursuant to the Land Transport Act 1998
BETWEEN
RAMS LOGISTICS LIMITED
First applicant
BIPENDRA DHEERAJ RAM
Second applicantAND
THE DIRECTOR OF LAND TRANSPORT
Respondent
Hearing: 18 March 2025 Appearances:
S S Khan and M G Orange for applicants J P Papps and RJJ Wales for respondent
Date of judgment:
27 March 2025
JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J
This judgment was delivered by me on 27 March 2025 at 12.30pm.
Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
Fortune Manning, Auckland Chapman Tripp, Wellington
RAMS LOGISTICS LTD v THE DIRECTOR OF LAND TRANSPORT [2025] NZHC 665 [27 March 2025]
[1] The applicants—a goods transport service company (Rams Logistics), and its sole director (Mr Ram)—seek judicial review of the Director of Land Transport’s (the Director) 28 January 2025 determination to revoke the goods service licence (a transport service licence in terms of the Land Transport Act 1998 (the 1998 Act)) held by Rams Logistics. Revocation was on the basis the Director was satisfied Rams Logistics and Mr Ram were not fit and proper persons respectively to hold a transport service licence or to have control of the service. The applicants seek the determination be declared invalid and of no legal effect and an order quashing it.
Background
[2] Participants in New Zealand’s land transport system must ensure they hold appropriate land transport documents,1 meaning (among other things) licences issued under the 1998 Act,2 having “satisf[ied] the Director that the person is a fit and proper person”.3
[3] Holders of a transport service licence “must ensure”, among other things, no vehicle is used in the service unless and until all fees payable in respect of the vehicle and the service under any legislation (including bylaws) have been duly paid or appropriate arrangements have been made for payment.4
[4] Rams Logistics had a goods service licence, a form of transport service licence.5 It operated vehicles on which road user charges (commonly referred to as RUC) were payable,6 being charges in respect of distances travelled by those vehicles.7 As such, the vehicles were to have distance recorders,8 and be licenced in respect of specified minimum and maximum distances.9 For the purposes of the Road User Charges Act 2012 (the 2012 Act), “the reading of the distance recorder … must be more than the minimum reading, but not more than the maximum reading”.10
1 Land Transport Act 1998, s 4(1).
2 Section 2, definition of “land transport documents”.
3 Section 4(4).
4 Section 30A(1)(b).
5 Section 4, definition of “transport service licence”.
6 Road User Charges Act 2012, s 7.
7 Section 5, definition of “road user charges”.
8 Section 8.
9 Section 9.
10 Section 10(1).
It is an offence against the 2012 Act if “the reading of the distance recorder … exceeds the maximum reading … by more than 500 kilometres”.11
[5] In November 2023, the reading of distance recorders on two vehicles operated by Rams Logistics exceeded their relevant maximum distances by over 140,000 km. Following investigation, including by requiring Rams Logistics to produce for inspection information relevant to the use of its vehicles,12 the readings of many other distance recorders on vehicles operated by Rams Logistics—all told, 39, of Rams Logistics’ 51-vehicle fleet—also materially exceeded their relevant maximum distances. The readings enabled calculation of some $760,000 in road user charges payable by Rams Logistics on the excess.
[6] Rams Logistics brought the 39 vehicles into distance recorder compliance for the future. The New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) issued an assessment to Rams Logistics for an amount of unpaid road user charges.13 Such constitutes a debt to the Crown.14 On 1 March 2024, Rams Logistics entered an instalment arrangement with NZTA, agreeing to pay the amount specified in the assessment by instalment,15 and has paid accordingly ever since at a rate of at least $25,000 a month.
[7] NZTA’s continuing investigation established distance recorders on four of the remaining 12 of Rams Logistics’ vehicles also exceeded the relevant maximum distances, giving rise to over another $108,000 in unpaid road user charges. It issued a further assessment for an amount of unpaid road user charges. Rams Logistics’ provision of further information for inspection satisfied NZTA its fleet all then was in distance recorder compliance. In May 2024, in response to NZTA’s request, Rams Logistics explained how it would maintain compliance, including by having electronic distance recorder monitoring and anticipatory automated payment of road user charges through the EROAD facility, an approved electronic road user charges system.
11 Section 10(2).
12 Section 66.
13 Section 53.
14 Section 60.
15 Section 61.
[8]Nonetheless, in October 2024:
(a)distance recorders on four of Rams Logistics’ vehicles materially exceeded their relevant maximum distances, giving rise to NZTA’s assessment of some $11,000 in unpaid road user charges;
(b)information provided by Rams Logistics in (slow) response to NZTA’s further request to inspect established distance recorders on 19 of Rams Logistics’ vehicles again materially exceeded their relevant maximum distances, giving rise to NZTA’s assessment of more than
$90,000 in unpaid road user charges; and
(c)other information obtained by NZTA established distance recorders on another seven of Rams Logistics’ vehicles also materially exceeded their relevant maximum distances, giving rise to NZTA’s assessment of almost $70,000 in unpaid road user charges.
[9] After unresolved correspondence to address Rams Logistics’ future distance recorder and road user charges compliance and unpaid road user charges, on 4 December 2024, the Director notified Rams Logistics he was considering revoking its transport service licence. He wrote:
I have formed the view based on an assessment of the circumstances that [Rams Logistics] doesnt meet the necessary fit and proper person criteria, and that the person in control Bipendra Dheeraj Ram is not a fit and proper person to be in control of a transport service.
If I confirm this decision, this will mean that [Rams Logistics] will not be licenced to operate a transport service and Mr Ram won’t be able to be a person in control of a transport service.
Before I make a final decision, you can make submissions in reply to the matters in this notice. There are also steps you can take to avoid the [transport service licence] being revoked.
[10] The Director’s letter continued to explain why he was considering revoking the licence, under the headings “RUC Non-compliance” and “RUC debt”. He was satisfied Mr Ram was the person in control of Rams Logistics’ transport service. He summarised:
[Rams Logistics] has demonstrated a sustained unwillingness or inability to meet RUC obligations resulting in routine and ongoing non-compliance, offending, and amassing a very large debt through non-payment of RUC. Continued under-payment of RUC is having a cumulative effect on the level of debt.
[Rams Logistics] has been given ample opportunity to bring their vehicles into compliance and demonstrate they can maintain vehicles to a compliant standard. While it appeared this was achieved on one occasion (excluding debt under repayment), it hasn’t been sustained. It is clear to me that continued operation is only resulting in more offending and debt.
I have considered the alternative of suspending the [transport service licence] until compliance is achieved. I have discounted this option as the close monitoring has already achieved this on one occasion, but [Rams Logistics] have demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to sustain compliance.
Payment of RUC is a fundamental obligation when operating vehicles subject to RUC on public roads . It is vital that everyone that needs to pay RUC, does so. The revenue collected is used to fund the operation, maintenance, and improvement of our land transport system which includes safety treatments and improvements. Sustained failure to pay RUC therefore directly impacts road safety for all road users. [Rams Logistics] is gaining a significant unfair commercial advantage.
[11] The Director sought Rams Logistics’ compliance with the avoidant steps he identified or other response by 6 January 2025. On 18 December 2024, Rams Logistics sought an extension until March 2025 for the Director’s final decision. It explained
$100,000 had been deducted monthly by the Inland Revenue Department from its cashflow for some five months, Mr Ram’s financing application had been declined but Rams Logistics was “trying another bank and waiting for their decision” and emphasised “[its] peak was finishing this week and we will stop using trucks with higher run overrun and try to pay it down before it goes back out on road”. A further
$25,000 would be paid in addition to the $25,000 instalment. The Director declined the extension.
[12] Mr Ram responded on 6 January 2025, outlining ‘his’ situation. He indicated, while under threat of liquidation from Inland Revenue, possible sale of Rams Logistics’ vehicles for lease back would enable “paying the NZTA debt in full and bring everything current”. Such would not be known until the “end of January”. Mr Ram outlined the steps he was taking in response to the Director’s explanation of his requirements to avoid revocation. He emphasised he had “been operating
a transport company for over 20 years …[with] no issues with [road user charges] until recently”. He concluded:
There is no denial about the RUC revenue compliance and I am in a situation in fixing this for good or stop operation altogether.
All I need is two weeks to confirm where I am standing.
[13] On 28 January 2025, the Director notified Rams Logistics of his final decision to revoke its transport service licence with immediate effect, adding his reasons for making the decision were “the same as in” his 4 December 2024 notice and replying also to Mr Ram’s 6 January 2025 response to explain:
Your submissions have not convinced me otherwise and I remain of the view that [Rams Logistics] is not fit and proper to hold a [transport service licence] and Bipendra Dheeraj Ram is not a fit and proper person to be a person in control of a transport service. As a result, I have made a final decision to revoke the [transport service licence].
The Director’s reply included observations of Rams Logistics’ interactions with the land transport system subsequent to his 4 December 2024 notice: as at 17 January 2025, Rams Logistics’ unpaid road user charges amounted to
$632,189 ($403,057 of which was remaining under the instalment arrangement); Rams Logistics had been issued a further “[eight] invoices for non-payment of RUC totalling $23,809”; 24 and 27 January 2025 readings from distance recorders on 38 of Rams Logistics’ then 65 vehicles materially exceeded their relevant maximum distances, and “[i]nitial calculations indicate the additional value of unpaid RUC is more than $380,000”. The Director later purported to extend his determination’s effective date to 11 February 2025.
[14] On 11 February 2025, this Court made ‘interim’ interim orders pending determination of an on-notice application for interim orders.16 On 26 February 2025, this Court made conditional interim orders—again preventing the Director from revoking Rams Logistics’ transport service licence or prohibiting Mr Ram from holding any position of control or authority in Rams Logistics—pending further order of this Court.17
16 Rams Logistics Ltd v Director of Land Transport HC Auckland CIV-2025-404-0291, 11 February 2025 (Minute of Gault J).
17 Rams Logistics Ltd v Director of Land Transport [2025] NZHC 312 at [3(a) and (c)].
Statutory context
[15] Applicants for transport service licences must satisfy the Director they are fit and proper persons, which the Director must determine in accordance with subpart 2 of Part 4A of the 1998 Act.18
[16] Part 4A makes provision for transport services licensing. In its subpart 2, s 30C provides:
30C General safety criteria
(1) When assessing whether or not a person is a fit and proper person in relation to any transport service, the Director must consider, in particular, any matter that the Director considers should be taken into account—
(a)in the interests of public safety; or
(b)to ensure that the public is protected from serious or organised criminal activity.
(2) For the purpose of determining whether or not a person is a fit and proper person for any of the purposes of this Part, the Director may consider, and may give any relative weight that the Director thinks fit having regard to the degree and nature of the person’s involvement in any transport service, to the following matters:
(a)the person’s criminal history (if any):
(b)any offending by the person in respect of transport-related offences (including any infringement offences):
(c)any history of serious behavioural problems:
(d)any complaints made in relation to any transport service provided or operated by the person or in which the person is involved, particularly complaints made by users of the service:
(e)any history of persistent failure to pay fines incurred by the person in respect of transport-related offences:
(f)any other matter that the Director considers it is appropriate in the public interest to take into account.
(3) In determining whether or not a person is a fit and proper person for any of the purposes of this Part, the Director may consider—
(a)any conviction for an offence, whether or not—
(i) the conviction was in a New Zealand court; or
(ii) the offence was committed before the commencement of this Part or corresponding former enactment; or
18 Land Transport Act, s 4(4).
(iii) the person incurred demerit points under this Act or a corresponding former enactment in respect of the conviction; and
(b)the fact that the person has been charged with any offence that is of such a nature that the public interest would seem to require that a person convicted of committing such an offence not be considered to be fit and proper for the purposes of this section.
(4) Despite subsection (3), the Director may take into account any other matters and evidence as the Director considers relevant.
and s 30F provides:
30FAdditional criteria for goods service
Without in any way limiting the matters that the Director may have regard to under section 30C(2), when the Director is assessing whether or not a person is a fit and proper person in relation to any goods service, the Director must consider, in particular,—
(a) any criminal activity conducted in the course of any transport service or transport-related business or employment:
(b) any offending in respect of major transport-related offences, particularly offences relating to safety or to road user charges.
[17]Sections 30G and 30H then provide:
30G Director may require information for fit and proper person assessment
The Director may, for the purpose of determining whether or not a person is a fit and proper person for any of the purposes of this Act,—
(a) seek and receive any information that the Director thinks fit; and
(b) consider information obtained from any source.
30H Director’s duties concerning prejudicial information
If the Director proposes to take into account any information that is or may be prejudicial to the person, the Director must, subject to section 30I(1) and to subpart 5, disclose that information to the person and, in accordance with subpart 5, give the person a reasonable opportunity to refute or comment on it.
[18] Subpart 4 addresses revocation of transport service licences. Sections 30S and 30T provide:
30SWhen Director may revoke transport service licence
(1) The Director may revoke a transport service licence if the Director is satisfied that—
(a)the holder of the transport service licence is not a fit and proper person to be the holder of a transport service licence; or
(b)any person who has control of the transport service is not a fit and proper person to have control of the service; or
(c)any representative who lives in New Zealand is not a fit and proper person to be a representative; or
(d)any driver is not a fit and proper person.
(1A) Subsection (1)(c) does not apply in relation to drivers who are facilitated to connect with passengers under a facilitated cost-sharing arrangement.
(2) Subpart 5 applies to a decision to revoke a transport service licence.
30T Procedure Director must follow before revoking transport service licence
If the proposed revocation of a licence under section 30S is on the ground that a person other than the licence holder is not a fit and proper person,—
(a)the notice required to be given to the licence holder by section 30W must specify the steps that the Director will require to be taken if the licence is not to be revoked, which steps may include a requirement that the person concerned cease all involvement in the service within a specified period; and
(b)the licence must not be revoked where the licence holder complies with any such requirements of the Director.
[19] Mechanically, then—in relation to any decision of the Director (relevantly) a person is not a fit and proper person or to revoke a transport service licence— subpart 5, titled “Adverse decisions”, relevantly provides (after defining particular terms at s 30V):
30W Director to notify proposal to make adverse decision
(1) If the Director proposes to make an adverse decision under this Part in respect of any person, the Director must, by notice in writing,—
(a)notify the person directly affected of the proposed decision; and
(b)subject to subsection (3), inform that person of the grounds for the proposed decision; and
(c)specify a date by which submissions may be made to the Director in respect of the proposed decision (which date must not be less than 21 days after the date on which the notice is given); and
(d)if appropriate, specify the date on which the proposed decision will, unless the Director otherwise determines, take effect, being a date not earlier than 28 days after the date the notice is given; and
(e)notify the person of the person’s right of appeal under section 106, in the event of the Director proceeding with the proposed decision; and
(f)specify such other matters as in any particular case may be required by this Act or any other Act.
…
30X Procedure for consideration of information
If any notice or copy of a notice is given to any person under section 30W,—
(a) it is the responsibility of the person to ensure that all information that the person wishes to have considered by the Director in relation to the proposed adverse decision is received by the Director within the period specified in the notice under section 30W(1)(c), or within any further period that the Director may allow in any case:
(b) the Director may, but is not obliged to, consider any information supplied by the person after the expiry of the period referred to in paragraph (a), other than information requested by the Director and supplied by the person within such reasonable time as the Director may specify:
(c) the Director must consider any submissions made in accordance with paragraph (a), and any information supplied pursuant to a request referred to in paragraph (b), but is not obliged to hear any person on the matter.
30Y Director’s determination
After considering the matters referred to in section 30X(c), the Director must—
(a)finally determine whether or not to make the proposed adverse decision; and
(b)as soon as practicable thereafter, notify in writing to the person directly affected, and any other person of a kind referred to in section 30W(2)(a), of—
(i) the Director’s decision; and
(ii) if appropriate, the date on which the decision will take effect; and
(iii) if appropriate, the right of appeal under section 106.
[20] Section 106 affords Rams Logistics and Mr Ram a general right of appeal to the District Court. I understand they have exercised that right but the appeal remains to be heard. Section 106(3) provides:
Every decision of the Director appealed against under this section continues in force pending the determination of the appeal, and no person is excused from complying with any of the provisions of this Act on the ground that any appeal is pending.
Judicial review
[21] Judicial review is concerned with exercises of statutory (or otherwise public) power.19 The subject of judicial review is “the exercise, refusal to exercise, or proposed or purported exercise by any person of a statutory power”.20 ‘Statutory power’ is defined.21 Judicial review of other exercises of executive power also is available at common law.22
[22] On judicial review, this Court assesses if the power is exercised “in accordance with law, fairly and reasonably”.23 If not, there is limited relief the Court may grant,24 and it generally is discretionary,25 if presumed in circumstances in which a claimant is substantially prejudiced by a public decision-maker’s error on exercise of its power.26 ‘Fair’ and ‘reasonable’ are terms of art in judicial review, respectively broadly meaning procedurally regular and substantively rational.27 But the overlapping nature of the considerations makes discrete analysis unnecessary.28
[23] It is well recognised the right to natural justice in any case depends on the context: “[t]he question is what form of procedure is necessary to achieve justice without frustrating the apparent purpose of the legislation”.29 It is not a free-standing ground for review.
[24] Rams Logistics formally raised four grounds for review of the Director’s determination to revoke as: motivated by improper purpose; disproportionate and unreasonable; erring in law; and procedurally unfair. In submissions by its counsel,
19 Moncrief-Spittle v Regional Facilities Auckland Ltd [2022] NZSC 138, [2022] 1 NZLR 459 at [49].
20 Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016, s 4.
21 Section 5.
22 Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General [2018] NZSC 84, [2019] 1 NZLR 116 at [75], n 62, referring to Burt v Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672 (CA) at 676 and 678.
23 New Zealand Fishing Industry Association Inc v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries [1988] 1 NZLR 544 (CA) at 552.
24 Judicial Review Procedure Act, ss 16–19.
25 Ririnui v Landcorp Farming Ltd [2016] NZSC 62, [2016] 1 NZLR 1056 at [112].26 Air Nelson Ltd v Minister of Transport [2008] NZCA 26 at [61], referring to Murdoch v New Zealand Milk Board [1982] 2 NZLR 108 at 122 (HC) and Unison Networks Ltd v Commerce Commission CA284/05 19 December 2006.
27 Stafford v Attorney-General [2022] NZCA 165 at [67] and [87]; Dunstan v Credit Union South
[2021] NZCA 656 at [23(c)].
28 Official Assignee v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries [2002] 2 NZLR 722 (CA) at [85].
29 Dotcom v United States of America [2014] NZSC 24, [2014] 1 NZLR 355 at [118]–[120].
Shafraz Khan, those were addressed under six issues: the Director should have considered lesser sanctions than the “last resort” of revocation; the Director should have balanced his public interest considerations with those favouring Rams Logistics; the time for performance of the steps the Director required taken if the licence was not to be revoked was unreasonable; the Director improperly used powers under the 2012 Act; the Director lacked foundation for his satisfaction Rams Logistics and Mr Ram were not fit and proper people respectively to hold a transport licence or to have control of the service; and the Director otherwise failed to have regard for factors in Rams Logistics’ and Mr Ram’s favour.
[25] I will address those in the order of the assessment I have explained,30 as more conveniently providing a general overview of the Director’s determination and better facilitating the desired contextual intensity of its review.31
Discussion
—was the Director’s determination in accordance with law?
[26] Mr Khan forcefully submitted the Director’s power of revocation primarily is triggered by safety risks or criminality addressed at ss 30C and 30F, as drawn from s 30C(1)’s mandatory considerations. The argument relegates s 30C(2) and (3)’s permissive considerations essentially to a supporting role, as construed from s30C(1)’s “assessing” compared to s30C(2) and (3)’s “determining”. As I understood the submission, under s 30C, the Director’s task is to assess a person’s fitness and propriety primarily with reference to risks to public safety and of criminal activity, which his determinations are to achieve.
[27] I do not consider such construction sustainable. Rather, “assessing” here is the process leading to the Director “determining” if a person is fit and proper. Section 30C(1) makes plain, in coming to that determination (“[w]hen assessing whether or not a person is a fit and proper person”), the Director is to consider public safety and protection from organised criminal activity (and in the case of a goods service licence, under s 30F, transport-related criminal activity and major
30 At [22] above.
31 Kaimai Properties Ltd v Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust [2024] NZCA 616 at [46].
transport-related offending). The subsidiary nature of s 30C(1) is emphasised by s 30C(3) referring to the Director “determining whether or not a person is a fit and proper person”. It is further emphasised by ss 30D–30F which, in providing for additional criteria for consideration, caution the additional matters do not limit the matters for consideration under s 30C(2). Sections 30D–30F’s references to s 30C(2) considerations, but none to s 30C(1) considerations, is instructive. Such construction also is supported by coordinate judgments of this Court.32
[28] Section 30C(2)(f) entitles the Director to consider “any other matter the Director considers it is appropriate in the public interest to take into account”. Under that paragraph, subject only to substantively rational categorisation of any such matter as appropriately engaging the public interest, the Director may consider practically anything in determining a person’s fitness and propriety.
[29] Rams Logistics’ particular target is the Director’s emphasis on its unpaid road user charges, but the legitimacy of such a matter for consideration in Rams Logistics’ case is put beyond doubt by both ss 30A(1)(b) and 30F(b), which respectively prohibits use of vehicle in provision of a transport service “unless and until all fees payable in respect of the vehicle and the service under any legislation (including bylaws) have been duly paid or appropriate arrangements have been made for payment”, and endorses in particular the Director’s consideration of “any offending in respect of major transport-related offences, particularly offences relating to safety or to road user charges”. And, of course, s 30C(4) reinforces, in determining if a person is a fit and proper person for any purpose under the 1998 Act, “the Director may take into account any other matters and evidence as the Director considers relevant”. The result is, subject again to its substantive rationality, the Director may take practically anything into account.
[30] Section 10(2) of the 2012 Act establishes as an offence operation of a road user charge vehicle:
32 MAP Transport Ltd v Director of Land Transport [2024] NZHC 2253 at [89]; Rams Logistics Ltd v Director of Land Transport [2025] NZHC 326 at [32].
… on a road where the reading of the distance recorder fitted to the vehicle exceeds the maximum reading specified in the distance licence for the vehicle by more than 500 kilometres.
If there is room for debate whether any such offence constitutes “major transport-related offences” for the purposes of the 1998 Act’s s 30F, Rams Logistics’ some $1 million of unpaid road user charges at 17 January 2025 likely propels its consequential offending into contention, subject to the Director’s entitlement to take all of it into account.33 The Director’s evidence was Rams Logistics had been charged with 34 road user charge offences, 30 relating to exceeding a distance recorder’s maximum reading. No dispute was taken with the characterisation made in submission by counsel for the Director, Jared Papps, of Rams Logistics being the “among the worst” road user charges offenders.
[31] Mr Khan also challenged the Director’s reliance, in making his decision, on information obtained from Rams Logistics by notices issued under s 66 of the 2012 Act. Section 66 provides:
66 Inspection of records or other information
(1) For the purpose of issuing an assessment under section 53(1), or otherwise ascertaining whether the provisions of this Act have been, or are being, complied with by any person to whom this Act applies, the RUC collector may require that person to produce for inspection any records or other information in that person’s possession or control (including records required to be kept by a transport service operator under section 65) that are relevant to the use and maintenance of a RUC vehicle.
(2) The RUC collector may, in relation to any records or other information produced under subsection (1),—
(a)take extracts from the records or other information:
(b)make copies of the records or other information at the place of inspection:
(c)remove the records or other information if the RUC collector is satisfied that it is impracticable to copy the records or other information at the place of inspection.
(3) If the RUC collector removes any records or other information under subsection (2)(c), the RUC collector must—
(a)issue a receipt for the records or other information to the person from whom the records or other information was taken; and
(b)return the records or other information as soon as practicable; and
33 See [32]–[34] below.
(c)for as long as the records or other information is held by the RUC collector, allow the person from whom the records or other information was taken, at any reasonable time, to inspect, and obtain copies of, the records or other information at the premises where the records or other information is held.
…
[32] Mr Khan submitted the Director’s use of s 66 was confined by its express purpose at s 66(1). Thus he only could require Rams Logistics to produce records for inspection for the purposes of the 2012 Act. Accordingly, he could not rely on those records for other purposes.
[33] The submission does not make logical sense. There is nothing in the 2012 Act prohibiting reliance for any purpose on records produced for inspection on a s 66 notice. Section 30C(2)(f) and (4) of the 1998 Act make it clear, for the purpose of determining whether or not a person is fit and proper, the Director may consider “any other matter that the Director considers it is appropriate in the public interest to take into account” and “may take into account any other matters and evidence as the Director considers relevant”. For that same purpose, s 30G entitles the Director to “consider information obtained from any source”. Records produced for inspection for the purposes of the 2012 Act are not without his purview.
[34] I apprehend Mr Khan’s point rather is, given s 66(1), notices were not entitled to be issued under s 66 of the 2012 Act for the purpose of obtaining information for the Director’s assessment if Rams Logistics is a fit and proper person under s 30C of the 1998 Act. There may be something to that but, as I said to counsel at hearing, I am not about to be drawn by a sidewind into an inquiry of s 66’s operation here. There are material difficulties in doing so in the present proceeding, including that the notice is issued by the “RUC collector”—here, the “Agency”, being NZTA. The Director is a distinct entity, and notably is not NZTA’s chief executive.34 NZTA is not party to this proceeding; I do not have a basis to review its decision to issue s 66 notices to Rams Logistics. Nonetheless, NZTA appears to have had ample reason to issue s 66 notices to Rams Logistics to obtain information for its assessment of the amount of
34 Road User Charges Act, s 104A.
unpaid road user charges, or otherwise ascertaining Rams Logistics’ compliance with the 2012 Act.35 The s 66 notices are not obviously impugnable on their face.
[35] Last, I do not accept the Director only may have recourse to revocation as a “last resort” on being satisfied a person is not a fit and proper person to be the holder of a transport service licence or to have control of the service. Section 30S is express; those are the only preconditions for revocation. While s 30U entitles the Director to suspend or impose conditions on a licence, such is not predicated on such satisfaction. Rather, the Director may do so relevantly only if such people do not hold certificates required or do not comply with applicable requirements. The natural inference is the Director’s satisfaction a person is not a fit and proper person to be the holder of a transport service licence or to have control of the service leads only to prospective revocation. Whether that follows is a matter for the Director’s discretion. He is not excluded from that conclusion by the availability of licence conditions. And, as a matter of fact, in coming to his 4 December 2024 consideration, the Director expressly had regard for “the alternative of suspension” but “discounted this option”, given Rams Logistics’ continued non-compliance despite “close monitoring”. The Director cannot be said unlawfully to have exercised his discretion.
[36] The Director made no error of law in determining Rams Logistics and Mr Ram were not fit and proper people for the purposes of the 1998 Act.
—was the Director’s determination procedurally regular?
[37] There are two potential procedural irregularities claimed of the Director’s determination:
(a)under s 30T, if “the steps that the Director will require to be taken if the licence is not to be revoked” are required to be performed within a period specified by the Director; and
(b)under ss 30H, if the Director took into account prejudicial information without disclosing it to Rams Logistics and Mr Ram.
35 Section 53(1).
[38] On the former, because the Director proposed revocation of Rams Logistics’ licence on the ground Mr Ram also was not a fit and proper person,36 the Director’s 4 December 2024 s 30W notice explained:
RAMS can avoid revocation by taking all the necessary steps listed below:
1. Bipendra Ram to remove himself as director and person in control under the TSL and hold no position of control or influence in the transport service whatsoever. This action to include (but not limited to):
a.Notifying NZTA by submitting a change in persons in control notification (TL04).
b.Updating the NZ Companies Register
c.Any other structural, legal, or administrative changes needed within the company
2. Appoint a new director and person(s) in control, one of whom must hold a Certificate of Knowledge of Law and Practice (CKLP) for a goods service. This person must be approved by the NZTA as a fit and proper person to hold this position. This person is to assume all responsibility for the daily operation and compliance of the transport service. This action to include (but not limited to):
3.
a . Notifying NZTA by submitting a change in persons in control notification (TL04) - with evidence of the CKLP
b.Updating the NZ Companies Register
c.Any other structural, legal, or administrative changes within the company
4 . All vehicles are to be made compliant with RUC and display current RUC licences.
5. All vehicles to be on an approved electronic RUC system with electronic hubodometers, and RUC purchasing to be on an 'auto-pay' arrangement.
6. RAMS to submit a detailed plan outlining the management systems and processes that will be implemented to ensure monitoring and compliance so that vehicles deployed are compliant. That plan subject to approval by the NZTA.
7. Submit a financial statement from a chartered accountant demonstrating that RAMS has the financial resources to meet and ensure ongoing compliance, pay the company debt, and the revenue is sufficient for this to be sustained.
8. All debt to NZTA to be paid.
36 Land Transport Act, s 30S.
Evidence that these steps have been completed must be provided to me by 6
January 2025.
[39] Section 30T(a) provides such steps “may include a requirement that the person concerned cease all involvement in the service within a specified period”. The Director’s specification of steps in respect of Rams Logistics’ licence does not expressly include such a requirement in its terms or stipulate a specified period for its performance. Although the Director’s steps include a requirement Mr Ram cease all involvement, they did not expressly specify a period for that to occur within, except by default within the period for providing the Director with evidence the steps had been completed. And the overall requirement is permissive, so any partial requirement if only requiring Mr Ram cease all involvement may not be disqualifying in any event. But the construction most favouring Rams Logistics is the specified period expires on the Director’s date for provision of evidence.
[40] Perhaps more significantly, s 30T(b) provides “the licence must not be revoked where the licence holder complies with any such requirements of the Director”. Section 30T(b) clearly implies the Director must at least stipulate a time for overall compliance, otherwise any bright line to avoid revocation could not be established. The Director’s default date for provision of evidence the steps had been completed meets that requirement.
[41] For all those reasons, the Director’s s 30W notice complies with s 30T(a), in specifying “the steps that the Director will require to be taken if the licence is not to be revoked”. There is no procedural irregularity on this ground.
[42] In respect of the latter potential procedural irregularity—under the heading “Why has this decision been made?”, while saying his “reasons [were] the same as” proposed in his 4 December 2024 s 30W notice—the Director’s 28 January 2025 s 30Y notification of his decision to revoke Rams Logistics’ licence continued:
(a) Bipendra RAM has not been removed as a director and person in control, nor has a new person in control been appointed as required in the Notice of Proposal, despite ample opportunity to do so. Submissions indicate this step has been proposed as part of a possible future settlement with the IRD, however that is a separate matter unrelated to transport compliance.
(b) RAMS has continued to regularly operate RUC non-compliant vehicles.
a. Our records show that since the Notice of Proposal was served, RAMS has been issued 8 invoices for non-payment of RUC totalling $23,309.
b. Distance readings supplied by RAMS on 24 and 27 January 2025 show that out of 65 currently registered vehicles, 38 (58%) were non-compliant with RUC. Initial calculations indicate the additional value of unpaid RUC is more than $380,000. Final calculations and invoices for the unpaid amounts are pending separate to this notice.
(c) I acknowledge that most, if not all vehicles now appear to be on E-Road, which is an approved electronic RUC system. However, RAMS has not provided any evidence that they have entered an auto-pay arrangement with ERoad. The purpose of this requirement was to provide better management oversight and simplify RUC payments and compliance. Despite this system being put into place, non-compliance has continued. This demonstrates that the root cause of the non-compliance is with management failure, and not inadequate systems.
(d) RAMS has not submitted any information as required in the Notice of Proposal detailing how it proposes to improve the management system and processes to ensure compliance. The fact that the non-compliance has continued at scale demonstrates that the company has been unwilling or unable to make the necessary improvements to be compliant.
(e) All debt owed hasn’t been paid, however I acknowledge that RAMS has entered and is so far meeting the agreed payment arrangements for a portion of the historical debt. Concerningly new debt has continued to grow, the severity and regularity of non-compliance is generating more debt at a faster rate than the amount being paid. This represents a significant and unfair financial advantage.
(f) As of 17 January 2025, $403,057 owed is under payment arrangement. Invoices issued after that repayment agreement was reached totalling
$229,132 are not subject to any agreement. In total $632,189 remains payable. This amount will grow significantly once final calculations are completed and invoices issued for the new unpaid RUC amounts just revealed.
(g) In your submissions of 6 January 2025, you state that:
a.RAMS has monthly payments to the IRD to the value of $100,000
b.There is a ‘final decision’ coming up with the IRD on 5 February 2025.
c.There is a ‘proposal’ with the IRD which includes Bipendra Ram stepping down as Director. This appears to be based on a deal where a truck leasing company will purchase the fleet in a lease-back scheme, freeing up equity to repay debt, however no evidence of a contract or proposal has been provided.
d.If this isn’t successful, then it is expected the company will be placed into liquidation.
e.You included a financial forecast statement which had been produced for the IRD.
(h) On 8 January 2025 we contacted you seeking further information on your submissions to be received no later than 15 January 2025. That request has not specifically been responded to.
(i) On 17 January 2025 you forwarded an email chain appearing to be communication between RAMS, IRD, and Heartland Bank. While this still didn’t respond to the request of 8 January 2025, this appeared to show that:
a.Heartland Bank have declined any further funding with concerns around financial security
b.IRD intend to apply for an order to liquidate the company on 5 February 2025 unless the debt is resolved prior.
[43]Those paragraphs—(a) Mr Ram “not been removed” as a person in control,
(b) Rams Logistics “continued to regularly operate”, (c) its “non-compliance has continued”, (d) and “at scale”, (e) its “new debt has continued to grow”, (f) “this amount will grow significantly [due to] the new unpaid RUC amounts just revealed”,
(g) “your submissions of 6 January 2025”, (h) the absence of response to the Director’s request for further information by 14 January 2025, and (i) the forwarded “email chain”—refer to information obtained by the Director after issue of his 4 December 2024 notice. All is information “that is or may be prejudicial” to either Rams Logistics or Mr Ram. By reference to that information in his 28 January 2025 notice under the heading “Why has this decision been made?”, it is a fair inference the Director has taken it into account. The Director’s 28 January 2025 notice substantively ends:
Summary
Your submissions have not convinced me otherwise and I remain of the view that RAMS is not fit and proper to hold a [transport service licence] and Bipendra Dheeraj Ram is not a fit and proper person to be a person in control of a transport service. As a result, I have made a final decision to revoke the [transport service licence].
without distinguishing between the reasons set out in his 4 December 2024 notice and the additional detail specified in his 28 January 2025 notice (other than as contained in Rams Logistics’ submissions).
[44] There can be no dispute, in terms of s 30H, the Director did not disclose that information to either Rams Logistics or Mr Ram, less still gave them reasonable opportunity to comment on it, in or prior to his s 30W notice.
[45] However, along with the rest of the 1998 Act, s 30H needs to be construed “from its text and in the light of its purpose and its context”.37 First, any requirement for disclosure by the Director expressly is “subject … to subpart 5”. Under subpart 5, clearly the Director may take into account at least some information he obtains after giving his s 30W notice of his proposal to make an adverse decision. Section 30W(1)(c) identifies the recipient may make submissions to the Director in respect of the proposed decision, which s 30X(c) requires the Director to consider, before determining whether or not to make his decision.38 In such consideration, it entirely is possible some of that information potentially is prejudicial. But s 30H, being subject to subpart 5, then has no application. The uroboric circularity otherwise—if the Director was required to “disclose” the submissions received from the person back to the person, for their refutation or comment on any potentially prejudicial information in their own submissions—could be endless. The Director’s paragraphs (a) and (g)–(i)’s references to potentially prejudicial information are not subject to any requirement for disclosure under s 30H.
[46] Second, s 30H needs to be read with s 30G. Section 30H’s multiple references to “the person” clearly mean the person subject to the Director’s determination as described at s 30G. So, too, with s 30I’s references to “the person”. Notably, s 30H requires disclosure of potentially prejudicial information to the person “in accordance with subpart 5”. Subpart 5’s s 30W(3) provides:
No notice or copy of a notice given under this section may include or be accompanied by any information referred to in section 30H except to the extent that—
(a) the notice or copy is supplied to the person to whom the information relates; or
(b) that person consents to the supply of that information to any other person.
Thus—if proposing to make an adverse decision in respect of a person, including on grounds of potentially prejudicial information—under s 30W(1)(b), “subject to subsection (3)”, the Director is required to “inform that person of the grounds for the proposed decision”. Again, there is no requirement for prior disclosure of the potentially prejudicial information to the person.
37 Legislation Act 2019, s 10(1).
38 Land Transport Act, s 30Y.
[47] It may be arguable, by “disclose”, s 30H means to exclude information sourced from the person. Section 30H does not require disclosure of any reason for the information being potentially prejudicial, but only of the information to “give the person a reasonable opportunity to refute or comment on it”. For information sourced from the person—such as the information referred to in the Director’s paragraphs (b)–(f)—that “reasonable opportunity” arises in s 30W(1)(c)’s submissions and in terms of s 30X. But, for that opportunity realistically to be afforded, the Director must identify the potentially prejudicial information in his s 30W notice as giving grounds for his proposed decision. To be clear, s 30H does not require the Director’s prior disclosure of information to the recipient of a s 30W notice.
[48] As said,39 I infer the Director took into account the information specified at paragraphs (b)–(f) of his final adverse decision, without informing Rams Logistics or Mr Ram the information formed part of the grounds for his proposed decision. To that extent, the Director’s decision was procedurally irregular or ‘unfair’ in judicial review terms.
—was the Director’s determination substantively rational?
[49] I turn to the grounds claimed for the unreasonableness of the Director’s determination:
(a)the Director’s 4 December 2024 specification of 6 January 2025 as the date for evidencing completion of the steps identified by the Director was too short, particularly given the time of year, to complete those steps;
(b)the Director’s assessment of “public interest” beyond the statutory factors of public safety and criminal activity and otherwise failed to have regard for factors favouring Rams Logistics and Mr Ram; and
(c)in exercising his discretion to revoke Rams Logistics’ licence, the Director failed to have regard for sanctions other than revocation.
39 At [43] above.
[50] Because the Director’s proposed revocation of Rams Logistics’ licence in part was “on the ground that a person other than the licence holder is not a fit and proper person”, s 30T(a) required the Director’s s 30W notice:
… specify the steps that the Director will require to be taken if the licence is not to be revoked, which steps may include a requirement that the person concerned cease all involvement in the service within a specified period …
I have held that ‘specified period’ expired on 6 January 2025.40
[51] Notably, despite the Director’s specification of the date for provision of evidence his indicated steps had been completed, the ‘specified period’ relates only to any “requirement that the person concerned cease all involvement in the service”. Otherwise, the 6 January 2025 date is to meet s 30W(1)(c)’s:
… date by which submissions may be made to the Director in respect of the proposed decision (which date must not be less than 21 days after the date on which the notice is given) …
The Director’s 4 December s 30W notice recorded “[a]dditional time has been allowed for the holiday -shut-down period”. It also noted the Director would “consider any submissions received before making a final decision. That decision won’t be made until 7 days after the submissions period ends”.
[52] The only evidence before me of the period’s contended inadequacy is Mr Ram’s assertion “[m]y lawyers and accountants were not available to me for much of that period. I was unable to do as [the Director] required within the timeframe given to me”. He said in evidence:
I could not simply cease all involvement in RLL's transport service. It is my company. I own it and manage it and have done so ever since it was incorporated. I also faced financial difficulties that meant it was not possible for me to bring all vehicles up to date with their RUC in only a few weeks. … Ultimately, it was not realistic for me to meet the demands set out by [the Director] in his notice.
His evidence included the assertions:
The notice proposing to revoke RLL’s [transport service licence] was issued during the busiest time of the year and I was expected to respond by 6 January
40 At [39]–[40] above.
2025, when anyone who might be able to assist me was on holiday. My request for an extension was declined. I believe NZTA had already pre-determined the matter.
…
I have built this business over 20 years. It was impossible for me to sell my shares and remove myself from the Company within weeks, especially over the Christmas period. Anybody coming in would be required to have the certificate of knowledge and practice to qualify as a person in control. That also complicated things.
[53] Without citing any of that difficulty, by email of 18 December 2024 (that is, two weeks after the Director’s s 30W notice), Mr Ram asked the Director for “an extension till at least March to get a final decision”, explaining Rams Logistics’ financial circumstances.41 The Director responded the next day:
Thank you for sending in this information.
We had given you an extra 2 weeks with the possible revoke of your [transport service licence], allowing you further extensions is not acceptable.
Have you started with all the requirements needed to put a stop to taking Rams Logistics Limited[’s transport service licence]?
Have you found someone that can be the Director, that can complete the Certificate of Knowledge?
Are you willing to remove yourself as the Director and the person in control of the TSL?
You need to start correcting all you can such as making all vehicles compliant with RUC, I have checked your fleet and there are a number of vehicles where an invoice was issued for overrun RUC and no RUC has been purchased after the invoice was created.
Have you changed those hubodometers that are not on E-road yet? Have you put your vehicles on auto purchase with E-road?
Have you made contact with a chartered accountant to demonstrate that Rams has the financial resources to meet and esnure ongoing compliance?
Please know that our office is closed over Christmas with our last day being tomorrow and will return on the 06/01/2025.
The Director followed up with a telephone call to Mr Ram (the content of which is not in evidence) and confirmatory email on 20 December 2024:
41 See [11] above.
As explained over the phone with your request of an extension for our notice of proposal to revoke Rams Logistics Limited[’s transport service licence], this has been declined and remains due on the 06/ 01/2025.
[54] The Director’s response indicates his preparedness to view Rams Logistics’ commencement of the steps he had specified as potentially ameliorating his specification of the date for evidencing their completion. Such is consistent with ss 30W(1)(d)’s and 30X’s reservations to the Director to reconsider his position in light of further information.42 Particularly given that preparedness, and the absence of any objective evidence on which to assess completing the Director’s specified steps by 6 January 2025 was not practicably achievable, the Director’s specification of that date was not unreasonable.
[55] I already have dismissed Rams Logistics’ assertion the Director was constrained to considerations of public safety and criminal activity.43 Turning then to its claim the Director’s decision and assessment of the “public interest” should “more appropriately [have] balanced the competing interests”, the factors contended to afford it more favourable consideration are its broader interests in remaining holder of a transport service licence. Mr Khan submits Rams Logistics has an “impeccable” safety record and provides a critical service for substantial customers to remote towns across the North Island through its considerable resources (including over 40 vehicles and 50 employees). He notes, throughout Rams Logistics’ longstanding operation (but for present difficulties), it has paid and will continue to pay road user charges “if it can continue operating”.44 Mr Khan cites lower court and coordinate judgments to the effect such criteria are material to the Director’s decision.45
[56]Mr Ram’s primary evidence concludes:
[Rams Logistics] is not some cowboy transport operator. It is a well-respected, business. Yes, it has fallen on hard times recently, but it has a plan to get through it. I just need more time. If the company’s [transport service licence] is revoked, then the company will not survive.
42 Similarly, Land Transport Act, s 106(4).
43 At [27]–[28] above.
44 Mr Ram’s evidence was, without a transport service licence, “the company will breach its contract with [its customers] and will likely lose those customers. There will be no coming back from that. The company will also need to let go of all 52 of its staff”.
45 Chaparian v New Zealand Transport Agency DC Auckland CIV-2011-004-1685, [date]; Abraham v New Zealand Transport Agency [2017] NZHC 1483.
As I have said, NZTA's concerns ultimately just come back to the fact that [Rams Logistics] has an unpaid debt with NZTA that it has not yet paid in full. NZTA has used this process to force us into a payment plan that was rushed and did not allow for late payments from our own customers. We need to prioritise running costs of the business also. The issue of unpaid RUC is solvable and I have a plan as set out in this affidavit.
Mr Ram’s plan is to clear Rams Logistics’ debts by 28 March 2025, to which date the Inland Revenue Department’s liquidation proceeding has been adjourned. Mr Ram is relying on valuation of Rams Logistics’ fleet at some $8.6 million, exceeding its
$6.2 million debt, to enable sale and lease back of at least some portion of its fleet to enable its continued service of its contracts.
[57] To reiterate the statutory context, it was for Rams Logistics to satisfy the Director it is a fit and proper person to hold a transport service licence, which the Director is to determine “in accordance with subpart 2 of Part 4A, which applies with any necessary modifications”.46 Section 30C(2)’s permissive considerations:
… the Director may consider, and may give any relative weight that the Director thinks fit having regard to the degree and nature of the person’s involvement in any transport service, to the following matters …
if not entirely grammatical, extend to “any other matter that the Director considers it is appropriate in the public interest to take into account”.47 So the Director’s non-mandatory consideration of the public interest expressly is subject to the Director’s relative weighting “having regard to the degree and nature of the person’s involvement in any transport service”.
[58] Such means the degree and nature of Rams Logistics’ involvement in goods transport is not itself any aspect of the public interest the Director may take into account, but a distinct factor for any public interest’s weighting as the Director thinks fit. And s 30F(b) emphasises the Director must separately consider Rams Logistics’ road user charges’ offending in particular. So that also is not a factor for inclusion in the public interest.
46 Land Transport Act, s 4(4).
47 Section 30C(2)(f).
[59] From those perspectives, I cannot identify anything in the Director’s ss 30W and 30Y notices he took into account as appropriate in the public interest. It was only in evidence, in summarising his determination to revoke, he contended his determination also was made “in the public interest”. That is not evident in his ss 30W or 30Y notices. The question of ‘balance’ does not arise. There is nothing on this ground rendering the Director’s determination unreasonable.
[60] Last, consistently with my view the Director’s discretion to revoke is not conditional on his consideration of lesser sanctions than revocation,48 it cannot be said substantively irrational if the Director did not advert to those lesser sanctions. As I have explained, they arise on considerations other than if Rams Logistics is a fit and proper person to hold its transport service licence.49 But the Director nonetheless did consider the alternative of licence suspension.50 The Director’s determination was not unreasonable under this head either.
Result
[61] I have held the Director taking into account the information specified at paragraphs (b)–(f) of his s 30Y notice, without informing Rams Logistics or Mr Ram in his s 30W notice the information formed part of the grounds for his proposed decision, was ‘unfair’ in judicial review terms.51 To that extent, the Director’s determination erred. Rams Logistics’ and Mr Ram’s claim for judicial review otherwise is dismissed.
Relief
[62] Relief, as I have said, is discretionary. The question for exercise of my discretion is if Rams Logistics or Mr Ram is substantially prejudiced by the Director’s error.52 Beyond identification of the error itself, I find they are not. An indication of the threshold is, in circumstances of “a defect in form or a technical irregularity”, if
48 At [35] above.
49 Land Transport Act, s 30U.
50 At [35] above.
51 At [48] above.
52 At [22] above.
“no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has occurred”.53 That is a measure of ‘substantial prejudice’.
[63] The information specified at paragraphs (b)–(f) of the Director’s s 30Y notice each is factual, not materially susceptible to refutation or even mitigatory comment. Each and all amplifies the Director’s reasons for his proposed decision as set out in his s 30W notice. They run to the Director’s s 30Y conclusion “the root cause of the non-compliance is with management failure, and not inadequate systems”, the former of which his s 30W steps were to address. Rams Logistics and Mr Ram each is in no worse position than they would have been without the Director’s regard for those considerations. As the Director’s s 30Y notice advised, his reasons for making the decision are (at least) the same as set out in his s 30W notice.
[64] For completeness, contrary to Mr Papps’ submission, I do not consider the 1998 Act’s provision of a general right of appeal to trump availability of judicial review in the present case. The right to challenge decisions by way of judicial review is a fundamental right, affirmed by s 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Consistently, s 16(3)(a) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016 provides I may grant relief “even if … the applicant has a right of appeal in relation to the subject matter of the application”. Given my supervisory jurisdiction and the statutory interpretation required in review of the Director’s determination, the available appeal rights, by which the District Court “may confirm, reverse, or modify the decision appealed against”,54 are not “a more appropriate pathway to a remedy”.55
[65]I therefore:
(a)declare the Director erred in his determination Rams Logistics is not a fit and proper person under subpart 2 of the 1998 Act by taking into account the information specified at paragraphs (b)–(f) of his s 30Y notice but the determination otherwise is valid and enforceable; and
(b)discharge Venning J’s 26 February 2025 interim orders.
53 Land Transport Act, s 19(1).
54 Section 106(2).
55 H v Refugee and Protection Officer [2019] NZSC 13, [2019] 1 NZLR 433 at [78].
Costs
[66] In my preliminary view, Rams Logistics’ and Mr Ram’s muted substantive success does not warrant an award of costs in their favour. They have not been successful in their primary objective to have the Director’s determination set aside. I note Venning J reserved costs on the interlocutory application “to follow the outcome of the substantive hearing”.56 My inclination is to order costs lie where they fall.
[67] If any party disagrees, and the parties cannot otherwise agree, costs are reserved for determination on short memoranda each of no more than five pages— annexing a single-page table setting out any contended allowable steps, time allocation and daily recovery rate—to be filed and served by Rams Logistics and Mr Ram within 10 working days of the date of this judgment, with any response or reply to be filed within five working day intervals after service.
—Jagose J
56 Rams Logistics Ltd v Director of Land Transport, above n 32, at [43].
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