Jindal v District Court at Auckland

[2025] NZHC 864

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2025-404-378

[2025] NZHC 864

UNDER

the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016, Declaratory Judgments Act 1908,
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990

BETWEEN

GAUTAM JINDAL

Applicant

AND

DISTRICT COURT AT AUCKLAND

First respondent

RICE CRAIG

Second respondent

Hearing:

3 April 2025

Appearances:

Applicant in person

S C Dench for second respondent B M McKenna as counsel assisting

Date of judgment:

10 April 2025

JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J

This judgment was delivered by me on 10 April 2025 at 3.00pm.

Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Counsel/Solicitors:

S C Dench, Barrister, Auckland

B M McKenna, Barrister, Auckland Crown Law, Wellington

Copy to:

Applicant

JINDAL v DISTRICT COURT AT AUCKLAND [2025] NZHC 864 [10 April 2025]

[1]                 As duty judge, I have Gautam Jindal’s 26 February 2025 interlocutory application for interim orders under s 15 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016, in support of his 14 February 2025 claim for judicial review of an 11 November 2022 decision of Judge D J McDonald in the District Court at Auckland.1

[2]                 Mr Jindal asserts his right to natural justice was breached by the Judge during a hearing on 9 November 2022 (the hearing) leading to the Judge’s decision. He contends such breach is to undermine the entirety of the decision, and seeks interim orders to the effect “[a]ll matters and proceedings which are connected to the decision [are] stayed”. His particular object is preventing the Lawyers & Conveyancers Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal) from relying on the decision in disciplinary proceedings against him.

Background

[3]                 The hearing was directed in a 10 June 2022 decision of Judge N R Dawson in the District Court at Papakura. That Judge addressed Mr Jindal’s 11 April 2022 interlocutory application (asserting the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Rice Craig’s claim against him) to hold Mr Jindal’s affirmative defence “does not establish that this court does not have jurisdiction”. The Judge then required the registry to set the matter down for a half-day hearing.2

[4]                 On 25 August 2022, I dismissed Mr Jindal’s appeal against Judge Dawson’s decision.3 I held the claim against Mr Jindal “plainly falls within the District Court’s civil jurisdiction”.4 Mr Jindal sought leave to appeal my decision.

[5]                 The District Court registry’s 7 September 2022 then “FIRM” notification of the directed half-day hearing on 9 November 2022 was titled “Notice of hearing of interlocutory application”. By memorandum, Mr Jindal sought the hearing be vacated. Meanwhile, on 3 November 2022, he asked the registry:

1      Rice Craig v Jindal [2022] NZDC 22625.

2      Sieprath v Jindal DC Papakura, CIV-2020-055-0748 (minute of Dawson DCJ), 10 June 2022.

3      Jindal v Sieprath [2022] NZHC 2130.

4 At [9].

May I Also confirm what the 09 Nov 2022 hearing is set for? Is it for the defendant’s interlocutory application dated 11 April 2022 ? Or is it set for the substantive matter.

to which the registry responded “The hearing on the 9th is a interlocutory hearing”.

[6]                 At the outset of the 9  November 2022 hearing  before Judge McDonald,    Mr Jindal sought to pursue his interlocutory application. The Judge responded:

I will say what I consider I am here to do today and that is to determine the proceedings. … It is a firm fixture which I will hear today, if I rule against you on your interlocutory matter.

Mr Jindal returned to his jurisdictional argument, and the Judge ruled against it.

[7]                 On turning to the plaintiffs’ substantive claim for Mr Jindal’s payment of legal fees, Mr Jindal said he was not prepared to argue against it, given the registry’s notification of an “interlocutory” hearing. But the Judge observed Mr Jindal recently had filed a comprehensive affidavit addressing the substantive claim, the timing of which Mr Jindal indicated was coincidental and not for that day’s hearing. The Judge rejected that proposition and proposed having the substantive hearing then, with the possibility of later written submissions, as the most efficient dispatch of the court’s time, with which Mr Jindal “reluctantly” complied. Mr Jindal later sought to adjourn the trial to call further evidence, which the Judge declined.

[8]                 The Judge ultimately found in the plaintiffs’ favour.5 Mr Jindal initially appealed against the decision but, on 24 April 2023, discontinued the appeal (and his application for leave to appeal my earlier judgment) as part of “full and final settlement” of that and two other proceedings between the parties.

Interim orders

[9]                 Under s 15 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016, I may make interim orders “if, in [my] opinion, it is necessary to do so to preserve the position of the applicant”. By “position” is meant a currently existing ‘right’ in law or fact, as may be

5      Rice Craig v Jindal, above n 1.

derived from the meaning of ‘statutory power’ open to challenge by judicial review.6 It is not to be confused with a mere interest in the outcome of the subject proceeding.

[10]             ‘Necessary’ means “reasonably necessary”.7 I then have wide discretion to consider all the circumstances of the case in deciding if to grant interim relief, from consideration of the applicant’s case for trial, the strength of that case, and the balance of convenience and overall interests of justice in “all the repercussions, public or private, of granting interim relief”.8

Discussion

[11]             Despite Mr Jindal’s object,9 the Tribunal is not party to this proceeding. That is a significant point, because Mr Jindal seeks to stay its proceedings as “connected to” Judge McDonald’s decision. (There may be other “connected” proceedings caught by the width of Mr Jindal’s expression for interim orders.)

[12]             But  this  proceeding  solely  relates  to  Mr  Jindal’s  substantive   claim Judge McDonald’s decision is “the exercise, refusal to exercise, or proposed or purported exercise by any person of a statutory power”,10 necessarily as made otherwise than “in accordance with law, fairly and reasonably”.11

[13]             Section 116(1) of the District Court Act 2016 specifies, subject to any provision of that or any other enactment, “[a] judgment or an order of the court is final and conclusive between the parties”. So, unless and until overturned,12 Mr Jindal’s position in respect of Rice Craig is as specified by Judge McDonald. That is the only position

6      Minister of Immigration v Kang [1993] NZAR 456 (CA), citing Nair v Minister of Immigration [1982] 2 NZLR 571; Walsh v Pharmaceutical Management Agency HC Wellington CIV-2007- 485-1386, 28 August 2007 at [22]; Internet Group Ltd v Attorney-General HC Wellington CP119/00, 4 July 2000 at [9].

7      Carlton & United Breweries Ltd v Minister of Customs [1986] 1 NZLR 423 (CA) at 430.

8      At 430, approved in Easton v Wellington City Council [2010] NZSC 10 at [4]–[5]. See also

Minister of Fisheries v Antons Trawling Co Ltd [2007] NZSC 101 at [3].

9 See [2] above.

10 Judicial Review Procedure Act 2016, s 4.

11 New Zealand Fishing Industry Association Inc v Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries [1988] 1 NZLR 544 (CA) at 552.

12 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Redcliffe Forestry Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 94, [2013] 1 NZLR 804 at [28].

Mr Jindal has open to protection by interim order in this proceeding brought only against the District Court and Rice Craig.

[14]             Section 117 provides “[a] technical defect or an irregularity does not invalidate a judgment, an order, or a proceeding”. The registry’s misstatement of the nature of the hearing thus is immaterial. In any event, Mr Jindal lacked all foundation for asking if it was for hearing his interlocutory application dated 11 April 2022; he knew perfectly well by then the application had been dismissed as had his appeal against that dismissal.

[15]             Neither does Mr Jindal’s claim to natural justice support the sought interim order. Natural justice’s requirements are “flexible, and vary depending on the circumstances”, for consideration “in light of the relevant statutory provisions [and] consistent[ly] with the purposes of the legislation”.13 The question is what form of procedure is necessary to achieve justice without frustrating the apparent purpose of the legislation.14

[16]             The District Court Rules 2014’s objective is “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of any proceeding or interlocutory application”.15 The Judge went to considerable lengths to ensure Mr Jindal’s concerns were accommodated. Natural justice here arguably only required the District Court’s procedures afford Mr Jindal an informed right to be heard by an unbiased tribunal.16 If that was so may be for decision on Mr Jindal’s substantive application for judicial review. But his ‘position’ remains as found by Judge McDonald, as the unsuccessful litigant.

13 Kaimai Properties Ltd v Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust [2024] NZCA 616 at [51], citing Webster v Auckland Harbour Board [1987] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) at 132, Combined Beneficiaries Union Inc v Auckland City COGS Committee [2008] NZCA 423, [2009] 2 NZLR 6 at [11], Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130 (CA) at 141 and Dotcom v United States of America [2014] NZSC 24, [2014] 1 NZLR 355 at [120].

14 Dotcom v United States of America, above n 13, at [120], citing Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration, above n 27, at 141 and Wyeth (NZ) Ltd v Ancare New Zealand Ltd [2010] NZSC 6, [2010] 3 NZLR 569 at [40]; Greenpeace Aotearoa Inc v Hiringa Energy Ltd [2023] NZCA 672, [2024] NZRMA 93 at [211].

15 District Court Rules 2014, r 1.3.

16 Dotcom v United States of America, above n 13, at [118], citing Ali v Deportation Review Tribunal

[1997] NZAR 208 (HC) at 220.

[17]             In my opinion, staying other proceedings connected to Judge McDonald’s decision is not necessary to protect Mr Jindal’s position as the unsuccessful litigant in the latter proceeding. The lack of necessity is amplified by Mr Jindal’s withdrawal of his appeal against the decision. The principle then of “finality in litigation” also militates against any necessity,17 and in any event on any discretion otherwise I might have exercised in Mr Jindal’s favour, even more so around two years after both determination of Judge McDonald’s decision and Mr Jindal’s discontinuance of any appeal against it. I will not make any interim order.

Result

[18]The application is dismissed.

—Jagose J

17     Marshall v R [2023] NZCA 625 at [14], citing R v Knight [1998] 1 NZLR 583 (CA) at 587; R v Lee [2006] 3 NZLR 42 (CA) at [96]–[99] and [103]; and Ellis v R [2019] NZSC 83 at [15].