Jindal v Sieprath t/a Rice Craig

[2022] NZHC 2130

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2022-404-1084

[2022] NZHC 2130

UNDER

District Court Act 2016, Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006

BETWEEN

GAUTAM JINDAL

Appellant

AND

J L SIEPRATH, N W WOODS,

S A HUNTER, P T O’HALLORAN,
H A HERMAN and P L NORTON (a law

firm partnership trading as Rice Craig) of 8-10 Queen Street Papakura AKL Respondents

Remote hearing:	25 August 2022
Appearances:	Appellant in person N W Woods in person
Date of judgment:	25 August 2022

JUDGMENT OF JAGOSE J

This judgment was delivered by me on 25 August 2022 at 2.00pm.

Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

………………………… Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Copy to:

Appellant

Rice Craig, Auckland

JINDAL v SIEPRATH [2022] NZHC 2130 [25 August 2022]

[1]                 Gautam Jindal appeals the 27 June 2022 decision of Judge N R Dawson in the District Court at Papakura, holding Mr Jindal’s affirmative defence “does not establish that this court does not have jurisdiction” and requiring the registry to set the matter down for a half-day hearing, now allocated a back-up fixture for 20 September 2022.

Background

[2] The respondents practice as a law firm, in which capacity they invoiced Mr Jindal. He has not paid the invoice. They issued proceedings in the District Court for payment. Mr Jindal’s defence included the allegation the respondents’ conduct was in breach of their professional obligations under the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 and the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, and therefore the respondents “should not be allowed to claim fee[s] for ‘regulated services’”. Mr Jindal contended such was effective to remove the proceeding from the District Court’s jurisdiction, on which basis he sought the proceeding be struck out.

[3]                 The Judge’s impugned decision illustrates he plainly disagreed. On appeal, Mr Jindal complains his application was not heard in accordance with the District Court Rules 2014; the Judge gave no reasons for his decision; and wrongly assumed jurisdiction to deal with matters arising under the 2006 Act and 2008 Rules.

Approach on appeal

[4]                 Appeals to this Court from the District Court are general appeals conducted by way of rehearing,1 in which the appellant bears the onus of satisfying me I should differ from the District Court’s decision. I only am justified in interfering with that decision if I consider the decision is wrong — in other words, the Judge erred.2

[5]                 I then am to come to my own assessment of the merits of the case afresh, without deference to the District Court (save for some caution in differing on witness credibility, when I have not had the advantage of observing the witnesses).3 I may rely

1      District Court Act 2016, ss 124 and 127.

2      Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2007] NZSC 103, [2008] 2 NZLR 141 at [13].

3 At [13].

on the Judge’s reasons in reaching my own conclusions, but the weight I give those reasons is a matter for me.4

[6]                 To the extent the decision involved exercise of the Judge’s discretion, I only may interfere with it if the appellant establishes the Judge acted on wrong principle, did not address relevant matters or took into account irrelevant matters, or was “plainly wrong”.5

[7]                 After hearing the appeal I may make any decision I think should have been made, or direct the District Court to rehear the proceeding or consider and determine any particular matter.6

Discussion

[8]                 As a substantive appeal, Mr Jindal’s complaints the Judge’s conduct procedurally  was  unfair,  for  failing  to  deal  with  his  strike  out  application      as “unopposed” or to give reasons, do not carry much weight. In any event, nothing before me indicates the respondents “stated on the application or in a memorandum filed in the court that the respondent consents to, or does not oppose, the orders sought in the application”.7 And absence of reasons is mitigated by my consideration “afresh”.

[9]                 I do not consider the Judge’s substantive decision is at all wrong. Although the bundle  of  documents  for  the   appeal   do   not  include  the   respondents’  claim, it abundantly is clear from the admissions in Mr Jindal’s defence the claim is one in debt for $999. That plainly falls within the District Court’s civil jurisdiction.8

[10]             By definition, an affirmative defence cannot be effective to oust jurisdiction. Rather, as a defence to a claim brought within jurisdiction, it relies upon facts beyond the admissions and denials of the facts pleaded in the claim, properly to define the

4      Kacem v Bashir [2010] NZSC 112, [2011] 2 NZLR 1 at [31].

5      May v May (1982) 1 NZFLR 165 (CA); and Blackstone v Blackstone [2008] NZCA 312, (2008) 19 PRNZ 40.

6      District Court Act 2016, s 128.

7      District Court Rules 2014, r 7.30

8      Section 74.

issues for the court’s determination.9 If Mr Jindal’s point instead is the District Court lacked jurisdiction to determine his allegations of the respondents’ breach of their professional obligations, he should not have raised them.10 The Judge did not err.

Result

[11]The appeal is dismissed.

Costs

[12]             As the unsuccessful party, Mr Jindal is liable to pay the respondents costs. The respondents generously seek only 2B costs and disbursements. I order their payment.

—Jagose J

9      Manukau Golf Club Inc v Shoye Venture Ltd [2012] NZCA 154, (2012) 21 PRNZ 235 at [21]– [22].

10     Bridgecorp Management Services Ltd (in receivership) v Roest HC Auckland CIV-2008-404- 3013, 14 September 2009 at [11].