Easton v Wellington City Council

Link copied
Case Copied 7 min read

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND

SC 99/2009
[2010] NZSC 10

BETWEENBENJAMIN MORLAND EASTON


Applicant

ANDWELLINGTON CITY COUNCIL


Respondent

Court:Elias CJ, Blanchard and Wilson JJ

Counsel:Applicant in person


C M Stevens for Respondent

Judgment:26 February 2010 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

REASONS

[1]        

Mr Easton seeks leave to appeal a judgment of the Court of Appeal[1] dismissing an appeal from the High Court declining Mr Easton’s application for interim relief in judicial review proceedings filed in that court and allowing in part his appeal against the High Court’s order fixing security for costs in the judicial review proceedings.  The underlying judicial review proceedings in the High Court were brought in connection with a resolution by the Wellington City Council to undertake a special consultative procedure in respect of a proposal to revoke the status of a pedestrian mall.  It has been overtaken by events which transpired after




Mr Easton’s application for interim relief was declined.  Council then proceeded with the special consultative procedure under s 83 of the Local Government Act 2002 and ultimately decided on 11 December 2009 the status of the pedestrian mall.  In respect of that decision there is a right of appeal to the Environment Court under s 336 of the Local Government Act 1974.  Another party has appealed under s 336.  Mr Easton has not, perhaps because the present appeal seeking interim relief is still live pending determination of the present application or perhaps because, as counsel for the Council suggests, he is associated with the Incorporated Society which has taken the appeal.

[1] [2009] NZCA 513 (Arnold, Randerson and Allan JJ).

[2]        The matters of complaint in Mr Easton’s judicial review proceedings concern alleged deficiencies in the decision making processes of Council.  They include allegations of pre-determination, insufficient public involvement, and conflicts of interest.  All such matters, if valid, can be addressed in the appeal against the further decision of Council of 11 December 2009.  In the result, the present application is a challenge to preliminary processes which, if flawed, can be fully ventilated on appeal to the Environment Court if they have not been corrected by the subsequent decision of 11 December 2009 and the process there followed.

[3]        In the circumstances Mr Easton’s application for interim relief faced two formidable problems: the applicant could not show that he would be prejudiced if the consultation proceeded (because he could appeal the outcome which followed the consultation) and the interim relief would prevent participatory processes in local government.  In the High Court and on appeal to the Court of Appeal the lack of prejudice and prematurity of the proceedings was stressed.  The Court of Appeal, in particular, pointed out that it was inherent in the special consultative procedure that the Council put out a proposal for consultation.  The applicant’s position that any such proposal was pre-determined could not be reconciled with the statutory scheme.  As the Court of Appeal said:[2]

If the Council approaches the consultation…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Easton v Wellington City Council and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2010] NZSC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Easton v Wellington City Council involved an application by Benjamin Morland Easton for leave to appeal a judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. The underlying judicial review proceedings were brought by Mr Easton against the Wellington City Council in connection with a resolution to undertake a special consultative procedure in respect of a proposal to revoke the status of a pedestrian mall. The applicant sought interim relief, which was declined by the High Court and subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal also allowed in part Mr Easton's appeal against the High Court's order fixing security for costs in the judicial review proceedings.

The key legal issues the court had to decide were whether Mr Easton had shown a sufficient ground for interim relief, and whether the Court of Appeal was correct in ordering security for costs. The Court of Appeal had held that the application for interim relief was premature, given that Mr Easton could appeal the outcome of the consultation process and that interim relief would prevent participatory processes in local government. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal had considered the weakness of the substantive case and the availability of direct statutory remedies as factors in its decision to set security for costs.

The Supreme Court found that the conclusions of the lower courts on the appropriateness of interim relief were correct, as there was no point of public importance justifying further appeal. Regarding the security for costs, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal had discharged its responsibility under Rule 5.45 of the High Court Rules, and had made a proportionate and contextual assessment of the matter. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal's assessment, and declined the application for leave to appeal.

In summary, the Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, upholding the decisions of the lower courts that the application for interim relief was premature and the setting of security for costs was appropriate.

Background

Background to the litigation

Benjamin Morland Easton filed judicial review proceedings against the Wellington City Council in the High Court, challenging the Council's decision-making process in relation to a proposal to revoke the status of a pedestrian mall. Easton alleged deficiencies in the Council's processes, including pre-determination, insufficient public involvement, and conflicts of interest. The Wellington City Council proceeded with a special consultative procedure under section 83 of the Local Government Act 2002 and ultimately decided on 11 December 2009 the status of the pedestrian mall. Easton sought interim relief to prevent the consultation from proceeding, but the High Court declined his application. Easton appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal. Easton then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand.

Benjamin Easton initiated judicial review proceedings against the Wellington City Council in the High Court. He sought interim relief to prevent the Council's special consultative procedure regarding a proposed change to the status of a pedestrian mall. The High Court declined his application for interim relief. Easton appealed the High Court's decision to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal. Easton subsequently sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand. The Supreme Court heard the application for leave to appeal and considered the matter in light of the settled principles governing interim relief and security for costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether leave to appeal should be granted to challenge the Court of Appeal's dismissal of the appeal from the High Court's decision declining interim relief.
2. Whether leave to appeal should be granted to challenge the Court of Appeal's reduction of the security for costs set by the High Court.

Held
1. The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's dismissal of the appeal from the High Court's decision declining interim relief.
2. The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's reduction of the security for costs set by the High Court.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Supreme Court dismissed Mr Easton's application for leave to appeal on two grounds. Firstly, concerning the interim relief, the Court of Appeal had correctly concluded that Mr Easton could not show prejudice if the consultation proceeded and that the proceedings were premature. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's refusal of interim relief on the basis that Mr Easton had not established the grounds for interim relief under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. The Court of Appeal also found the substantive case weak due to the ability to appeal the eventual decision following consultation. The Supreme Court concluded that no point of public importance existed to justify further appeal, and the Court of Appeal's conclusions were correct.

Secondly, regarding the security for costs, the Court of Appeal had reduced the amount from $12,000 to $8,000 while acknowledging that the decision was discretionary. The Court of Appeal had balanced Mr Easton's genuineness and impecuniosity against the little or no prospect of success for his case. The Court of Appeal's assessment was proportionate and contextual, and the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal's decision. The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeal did not act on a wrong principle and that the setting of security for costs was not contrary to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The Supreme Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal and made no order as to costs.