Gold v New Zealand Law Society
[2025] NZHC 3135
•21 October 2025
PURSUANT TO S 182 OF THE FAMILY VIOLENCE ACT 2018 AND
S 139 OF THE CARE OF CHILDREN ACT 2004, ANY REPORT OF THIS PROCEEDING MUST COMPLY WITH SS 11B, 11C AND 11D OF THE
FAMILY COURT ACT 1980. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE SEE
https:// court/restrictions-on-publishing-information/
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHE
CIV-2024-488-37
[2025] NZHC 3135
BETWEEN “MR GOLD”
Applicant
AND
NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY
Respondent
Hearing: On the papers Counsel:
Applicant in person
P N Collins for Respondent
Judgment:
21 October 2025
Reissued:
30 October 2025
JUDGMENT OF O’GORMAN J
[Without notice interlocutory application for recall of judgments and other orders]
This judgment was reissued by me on 30 October 2025 pursuant to r 11.10 of the High Court Rules 2016.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
…………………………………
Solicitors/Counsel:
New Zealand Law Society, Wellington
P N Collins, Shortland Chambers, Auckland
GOLD v NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY [2025] NZHC 3135 [21 October 2025]
Introduction
[1] By a document dated 21 August 2025 (the application), Mr Gold (not his real name) has applied without notice for the following orders:
(a)A stay of the admission order (or refusal thereof) and cost orders pending this application.
(b)Recall of the judgments of O’Gorman J dated 10 February 2025 and 13 August 2025.
(c)An order under the Evidence Act 2006 to strike out the Family Court judgment as evidence in this matter.
(d)A rehearing of the applicant’s character application before a different Judge.
(e)An order for a full, independent investigation into the conduct of the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) in this matter and a determination of compensation.
(f)Such further or ancillary orders as the Court considers necessary.
[2]In addition, he has filed but not served:
(a)his own affidavit in support dated 21 August 2025; and
(b)a memorandum in support emailed on 25 August 2025; and
(c)an email dated 9 October 2025 advising (among other things) that he “may file additional material to expand on the grounds for recall, including further legal authorities and supporting evidence”.
Procedural background
[3] Mr Gold commenced this proceeding on 21 May 2024. By way of originating application, he applied directly to the Court under s 52(2)(a) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the Act), seeking to be admitted as a barrister and solicitor. That procedure was necessary because the NZLS refused to give him a certificate of character since it did not consider Mr Gold to be a fit and proper person to be admitted as a barrister and solicitor.
[4]NZLS opposed the application.
[5] On 5 July 2024, Brewer J set the application down for hearing on 11 December 2024, with orders that Mr Gold be available for cross-examination at the hearing. The timetable for the exchange of written submissions was recorded in a subsequent minute dated 30 August 2024.
[6] On 11 December 2024 I presided over the hearing and reserved my judgment. My judgment was subsequently issued on 10 February 2025.1 I declined the application and made a timetable for memoranda to be filed on costs if they could not be agreed, for costs to be determined on the papers.
[7] The parties filed memoranda. Unfortunately, they were not referred to me for determination until 29 July 2025. On 13 August 2025, I issued my costs judgment.2 I awarded the respondent costs in the sum of $6,931 plus disbursements of $80.63. That costs judgment includes the following passages:
[7] Much of the applicant’s submissions repeat what he said in the substantive hearing and continue criticisms against the respondent. He contends that the Practice Approval Committee and the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) are seeking revenge. He continues to argue that he is the victim of bullying and discrimination and that he is being attacked for raising legitimate complaints. He alleges that the respondent has come to the proceeding “with dirty hands and its conduct has not been honest or entirely truthful” and this conduct should reduce the costs award. He also contends that the respondent and the Practice Approval Committee breached his rights under s 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. He argues that his various complaints and his application have been pursued in the public interest. He also contends that NZLS has a large pool of members to fund its
1 Gold v New Zealand Law Society [2025] NZHC 101 [substantive judgment].
2 Gold v New Zealand Law Society [2025] NZHC 2288 [costs judgment].
costs, whereas he and his daughter would suffer hardship if costs were imposed on him.
[8] In his further memorandum dated 10 July 2025, he seems to have interpreted the application for the orders to be sealed as an application to suppress the proceedings or prevent others from searching the Court file. He objects to any order sealing the Court file or suppressing this matter. He goes on to make further arguments about the merits of his complaints about conduct by other professionals and the NZLS, as well as repeating his allegations of financial and other forms of hardship. He concludes by seeking orders permitting referral of this matter to any appropriate body for further investigation, and to consider whether a re-hearing is warranted (including because of post-hearing developments).
…
[11] The determination of costs is not an occasion to revisit the substantive issues and the applicant’s ongoing grievances, nor do I accept there is any basis for a re-hearing. Also, the applicant has misunderstood the nature of sealing a Court order — it has nothing to do with sealing the Court file or suppressing information.
[8] On 14 August 2025, counsel for NZLS filed a memorandum along with a judgment for sealing.
[9] On 25 August 2025 at 5.25 pm, Mr Gold emailed the present application seeking a stay and recall, accompanied by a fee waiver application and other documents.
[10] On 26 August 2025 at 11 am, Registry emailed the sealed judgment to counsel for NZLS, recording the following orders:
1.The application for admission is declined.
2.The applicant must pay the respondent costs and disbursements in the amount $7,011.63.
Recall — legal principles
[11] Rule 11.9 of the High Court Rules 2016 provides that a “Judge may recall a judgment given orally or in writing at any time before a formal record of it is drawn up and sealed”.
[12] Rule 11.11(3) provides that, except with the leave of the court, a judgment must not be sealed until any application under r 11.9 for the recall of a judgment is determined.
[13] I do not have information about when the judgment was sealed, as opposed to the sealed copy emailed to counsel for NZLS. Assuming it may have been sealed shortly before it was emailed but after Mr Gold’s application had been received to the Court’s general email address (deemed under rr 3.1 and 5.1B(c)(ii) to be 9 am on 26 August 2025), I will address the recall application on the merits, on the basis that r 11.11 precluded sealing until the application is determined.
[14] It is well-established that an applicant seeking to recall a judgment faces a high threshold.3 There are three categories of cases where recall may be granted:4
(a)since the hearing there has been a change to a relevant statute or regulation, or a new judicial decision of relevance and high authority has been issued;
(b)counsel have failed to direct the court’s attention to a legislative provision or authoritative decision of plain relevance; or
(c)for some other “very special reason” justice requires the judgment be recalled.
[15] The jurisdiction to recall must be exercised with circumspection and must not be seen as a substitute for an appeal.5 It does not extend to a challenge of any substantive findings of fact and law in the judgment, to a party recasting arguments previously given and representing them in a new form, nor to a party putting forward
3 McKenzie v Co-Op Bank Ltd [2025] NZCA 427 at [3], citing Cummins v Body Corporate 172108
[2022] NZCA 153 at [12].
4 McKenzie v Co-Op Bank Ltd, above n 3, at [3], citing Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 (SC) at 633, approved in Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd (No 2) [2009] NZSC 122, [2010] 1 NZLR 76 at [2]. See also HG Metal Manufacturing Ltd v Navaratnam [2021] NZHC 2701 at [27]; Forster v Body Corporate 68792 [2025] NZHC 1094 at [6]; and FMI Building Innovation Ltd v Lyricist Ioane [2025] NZHC 826 at [4].
5 Faloon v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2006) NZTC 19,832 (HC) at [13]; and Slavich v Slavich [2025] NZHC 2097 at [6].
further arguments that could have been raised at the earlier hearing but were not.6 This approach reflects the principle of finality in litigation, and the policy that orders should stand as conclusive, unless overturned on such challenge as may be available to affected parties.7
[16]In Ngahuia Reihana Whanau Trust v Flight, Anderson P commented:8
It is becoming a matter of concern not just to this Court but to others in the western common law system that disaffected litigants, usually appearing in person, repeatedly make application for recall of judgments which they steadfastly refuse to accept. It is timely to characterise plainly unmeritorious applications of that sort as an abuse of the Court’s process and to reaffirm the rarity of legal justification for recalling judgments.
Recusal
[17] In section 8 of his memorandum, Mr Gold seeks that the application for recall is heard by a different judge. He advances the following reasons:
8.1 The principles of natural justice require a hearing to be both fair and impartial. When a judge has already formed and expressed a clear view on the substantive issues of a case, it creates an appearance of bias that compromises the integrity of the process.
8.2 The costs Judgment indicates that Her Honour has already formed a concluded view against recall. To preserve the appearance of impartiality, a different judge must hear this application.
8.3 A recall application, by its very nature, is a request to revisit the substantive issues. The judge's stated position makes it impossible for her to hear and rule on the merits of this application in a fair and open-minded manner given the issues this memorandum raises. It would be an affront to the right to a fair hearing to force the Applicant to present his case before a judge who has already ruled out a rehearing.
8.4 For these reasons, and to protect the Applicant’s right to a fair and impartial hearing, the matter must be heard by a different High Court Judge.
(footnote omitted)
6 HG Metal Manufacturing Ltd v Navaratnam, above n 4, at [28]; Erwood v Maxted [2010] NZCA 93 at [5]; Nottingham v Real Estate Agents Authority [2017] NZCA 145 at [9]; Slavich v Slavich, above n 5, at [6]; and McConnor v New Zealand Law Society [2025] NZHC 1727 at [28].
7 Gibson v Official Assignee [2019] NZHC 532 at [21]; Fitzgerald v IAG New Zealand Ltd [2019] NZHC 632 at [8]; and Gold v Green [2025] NZHC 265 at [14].
8 Ngahuia Reihana Whanau Trust v Flight CA23/03, 26 July 2004 at [3].
[18] The test for apparent bias is well-established. Section 171 of the Senior Courts Act 2016 required development and publication of recusal guidelines for the High Court. The resultant guidelines include:9
A judge should recuse him or herself if, in the circumstances, a fair-minded, fully informed observer would have a reasonable apprehension that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.
[19]This gives rise to a two-stage test:
(a)First, the Judge must identify the circumstances that may lead the Judge to decide a case other than on its merits.
(b)Second, the party alleging apparent bias must articulate a logical connection between the matter complained of and the feared deviation from impartiality.
[20] The question of whether a Judge is impartial is “one of possibility (real and not remote), rather than probability”.10 However, Judges “should not recuse themselves without sufficient cause”,11 and a Judge must apply the principles “firmly and fairly and not accede too readily to suggestions of bias”.12 A Judge exercising his or her judicial functions does not thereby become ineligible to hear the matter.13
[21] Applying the two-stage test to the facts of this case, I am satisfied that a fair-minded lay observer would not have had a reasonable apprehension of bias on my part.
9 Courts of New Zealand, “High Court recusal guidelines” (12 June 2017)
< at [1.2]. The guidelines refer to and reflect the principles in Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd [2009] NZSC 72, [2010] 1 NZLR 35 [Saxmere (No 1)] at [3]–[4], [20] per Blanchard J, [81] and [86] per McGrath J, recalled on the merits by Saxmere Co Ltd v Wool Board Disestablishment Co Ltd (No 2), above n 4.
10 Saxmere (No 1), above n 9, at [4] and [81]; and High Court recusal guidelines, above n 9, at [1.3].
11 A (SC 106/2015) v R [2016] NZSC 31 at [16], referred to in McConnor v Auckland Transport
[2025] NZHC 2819 at [4].
12 McConnor v Auckland Transport, above n 11, at [5].
13 Deliu v Auckland District Court [2024] NZCA 39 at [43].
[22] It is firmly established that recall applications must be determined by the Judge who delivered the judgment, subject to only limited exceptions:14
… Inevitably an application for recall … may call into question aspects of a Judge’s original decision. Judges are experienced at considering such matters fairly and impartially. Indeed, it is standard practice for recall applications to be considered by the Judge who made the original decision. As the learned authors of McGechan on Procedure observe, implicit in the three categories identified in Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) (which set out the circumstances in which a judgment may be recalled) is that recall must be by the Judge who delivered the judgment. This is also confirmed in O’Neill v Toogood. The only possible exceptions I am aware of are where a Judge has retired, died or (possibly) where the parties consent to another Judge dealing with the matter.
[23] None of the exceptions applies in this case, so it was and remains my duty to determine any application for recall concerning my judgments dated 10 February 2025 and 13 August 2025.
[24] In my costs judgment, of necessity I addressed the arguments set out in Mr Gold’s memoranda on costs, including the following final paragraph of his second memorandum:
8.1The Applicant respectfully requests that the Court:
• Decline any costs order in favour of the Respondent;
• Refuse to seal or suppress the file;
• Consider hardship, procedural fairness, and professional misconduct in the exercise of its discretion;
• Permit referral of this matter to any appropriate body for further investigation, including but not limited to disciplinary, regulatory, or judicial oversight bodies; and
• Consider whether a rehearing is warranted based on the above and raised in prior memorandum.
[25] Given the final bullet point quoted above, I summarised the nature of the matters addressed in both memoranda, and concluded that this did not warrant any rehearing. That was an exercise of my judicial functions. It does not thereby render me ineligible to hear a second application of the same type. My assessment applied
14 HG Metal Manufacturing Ltd v Navaratnam, above n 4, at [22] (footnotes omitted).
the principles summarised at [15], noting that much of the applicant’s submissions repeated what he said in the substantive hearing and continued criticisms against the respondent. Nothing referred to in that material fell within the categories justifying a rehearing. That was not a pre-determination of any future application for recall. It was a determination of costs issues, which required me to address Mr Gold’s suggestion that costs should not be awarded because a rehearing was warranted based on what he had raised in those two memoranda before me at the time.
[26] The fact that Mr Gold filed a subsequent application for recall does not change the position that recall applications must be determined by the Judge who delivered the judgment. To the extent that Mr Gold’s present application raises new matters, a fair-minded observer would not consider a Judge to be biased because they did not have regard to matters not raised at the time of their earlier decision. Otherwise a repetition of the same arguments in successive applications raises issues of abuse of process, rather than giving rise to any logical conclusion of impartiality.15
[27] There is accordingly no basis for recusal and Mr Gold’s request that I recuse myself is declined.
Procedure
[28] In Erwood v Maxted, the Court of Appeal set out the process for dealing with recall applications in that Court:16
Where a formal application is required in terms of these guidelines:
(a) it must be made on notice to all other parties;
(b) any party served with an application need not respond unless directed to do so by the Court;
(c) the Court will deal with the application on the papers or by oral hearing in terms of r 51(6);
(d) the Court will usually give only brief reasons for its decision on any application;
15 See [16] above.
16 Erwood v Maxted, above n 6, at [23(c)].
(e) any further application seeking to recall a decision refusing an application to recall will usually be dealt with summarily; and
(f) the Court will consider ordering increased or indemnity costs against parties and/or counsel bringing unmeritorious applications.
[29] Those principles have been applied to applications for recall in this Court. It is not unusual for recall applications to be considered on the papers.17 That is a matter for assessment depending on the nature of the application. If all matters requiring consideration are addressed by a detailed memorandum in support, then an oral hearing is not required.18
[30] In this case, the respondent is entitled to be served with the application. As a matter of natural justice, NZLS and its counsel are entitled to see copies of all the documents that have been filed and know about the allegations made against them. I nevertheless considered it appropriate to determine the application on the papers without service, because Mr Gold has set out his position in detail, and requiring service will only cause further costs for the respondent in circumstances where no response is required unless directed by the Court.
Stay
[31] A decision declining an application under s 52(2)(a) of the Act is non-executory, so it is not amendable to a stay.19
[32] In terms of the costs order, this judgment determines the recall application, and I understand there has been no appeal of either of my decisions, so there is no basis for a stay.20
Recall — analysis
[33] In his memorandum, Mr Gold explains the basis for his recall application under the following headings:
17 HG Metal Manufacturing Ltd v Navaratnam, above n 4, at [32].
18 McQueen v Penn [2016] NZHC 2700 at [27].
19 Mao v Buddle Findlay [2022] NZHC 2885 at [10]; and Lu v Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (New Zealand) Ltd [2021] NZSC 33 at [8] and n 9 of that decision.
20 Lu v Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (New Zealand) Ltd, above n 19, at [8].
(a)Ignored precedents and legislation: He alleges that I failed to understand and apply Orlov v New Zealand Law Society,21 which he says establishes that complaints against a regulator, when made in good faith and not excessive or vexatious, should not be treated as evidence of unfitness to practise.
(b)New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA): Under s 14 of NZBORA, good faith complaints to a regulator constitute a form of protected expression.
(c)Protected Disclosures Act: The Protected Disclosures (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act 2022 should also have applied to some of his complaints. Mr Gold alleges that using them as evidence of unsuitability for admission, which should be treated as a disciplinary-style proceeding, is a direct violation of this statutory immunity.
(d)Professional Rules: The judgment referred to the ability of Mr Gold to comply with rules that apply to practising lawyers, whereas those rules did not apply to Mr Gold as a non-lawyer. In any event, Mr Gold alleges I failed to weigh whether he demonstrated knowledge and ability to follow those rules.
(e)Failure to assess candour: Mr Gold says I failed to properly assess his candour and honesty. In particular he says that a finding that he had a “tendency to blame others” was unwarranted, taking into account the Stanleytest.22 He alleges that various matters should have been weighed in his favour rather than treated as neutral or against him, namely his disclosure of domestic violence, allegations of trauma from his family situation, his difficult dealings with NZLS, procedural irregularities and delays, personal stress, bereavement, duress, threats
21 Orlov v New Zealand Law Society [2013] NZCA 230, [2013] 3 NZLR 562.
22 New Zealand Law Society v Stanley [2020] NZSC 83, [2020] 1 NZLR 50.
made by a lawyer and medical issues (including undisclosed toothache on the day of the hearing).
(f)Tendency to blame others: Mr Gold denies any tendency to blame others. He says that this impression was caused by his KC, NZLS, and various other lawyers.
(g)Correct standard: He contends it was an error not to apply the criminal standard that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as affirmed in Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions.23
(h)Procedural unfairness and prejudice: NZLS relied upon restricted Family Court documents provided by Mr Gold’s former lawyer without verifying whether the requisite legal leave had been obtained under s 11B of the Family Court Act 1980. This contrasts with Stanley, where he did not disclose part of a decision on the grounds of confidentiality and was allowed to practise. This is alleged to breach s 21 of NZBORA. Mr Gold says he would not have consented had he known it would be used in the hearing. Furthermore, the Family Court decision lacked relevance and probative value and was prejudicial and therefore inadmissible. Mr Gold alleges that no proper assessment could be made about the nature of his various complaints against others without a full review of the evidence.
(i)Unfair cross-examination: He says cross-examination of him about the Family Court decision was therefore an abuse of process and unfairly prejudicial. Under s 50 of the Evidence Act, a civil judgment is not admissible in another civil proceeding to prove a fact that was in issue in the first proceeding.
(j)Internal contradictions: Mr Gold submits that it is not possible for some complaints to be upheld in part and others to be pursued irrationally, in an unduly aggressive manner, and/or vexatiously.
23 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462 (HL).
(k)Unjust enrichment: Mr Gold alleges that the law of unjust enrichment precludes costs being awarded in favour of NZLS.24
(l)NZBORA repugnancy and human rights: Mr Gold says an error was made because no assessment was made under s 5 of NZBORA to justify the intrusion concerning the Family Court material, as required by the Oakes test.25 Breaches of ss 14, 23, 25 and 27 of NZBORA are also asserted.
[34]Mr Gold’s memorandum concludes with the following:
The Judgment, together with the Cost Judgment, is fundamentally flawed and constitutes a miscarriage of justice. It is based on errors of law, errors of fact, and a procedurally flawed assessment that was prejudicial to me. I was unfairly penalised for being candid, and my legitimate complaints were dismissed as vexatious, while the NZLS’s own procedural and statutory failings were ignored.
The High Court must exercise its inherent jurisdiction to recall this judgment. A rehearing before a new judge is required to ensure that the principles of natural justice, procedural fairness, and the rule of law are fully upheld.
[35] I have reviewed all these grounds for recall raised by Mr Gold. I am not persuaded that any provides grounds for recall. As stated in his conclusion, he alleges that the substantive judgment is “…based on errors of law, errors of fact, and a procedurally flawed assessment that was prejudicial to me”. Those are matters for appeal, not recall under r 11.9. He challenges substantive findings of fact and law, seeks to recast arguments previously given and represent them in a new form, and puts forward further arguments that could have been raised at the earlier hearing but were not.26
[36]Briefly addressing each category of argument raised by Mr Gold:
(a)Ignored precedents and legislation: As stated above, any assertion that I failed to understand or apply the law is a matter for substantive appeal, not recall. In my judgment I stated the following:
24 He relied on Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd v The Crown (No 47) [1998] 2 NZLR 2.
25 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 .
26 See [15] above.
Naturally, I agree that a willingness to protect vulnerable people and pursue proper complaints would not undermine a person’s “fit and proper” assessment. Indeed, those characteristics are important for anyone admitted to practice law in New Zealand.
In Orlov (a decision about disciplinary action rather than an application for admission), the Court of Appeal stated:27
It is fundamental to the integrity of our legal system that counsel should be able to advance their client’s cause in court fearlessly. However, that is not an absolute right in the sense that counsel do not have carte blanche to behave in any way they please and to make scandalous allegations against others which are without any foundation. Counsel must conduct themselves in court so as to meet their obligations as officers of the court and their ethical obligations under the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008. We agree with Heath J that the provisions of the Bill of Rights must be read in light of the duties on counsel that are either articulated in the Act or implicitly recognised. Excessively aggressive or scandalous conduct that breaches those obligations will not qualify for protection under the right to freedom of expression.
The above passage recognises that, notwithstanding the Bill of Rights, lawyers may face professional consequences for excessively aggressive conduct that breaches their obligations under the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008.
(b)NZBORA: The above comments apply to this issue. While Mr Gold as a non-lawyer is not bound by obligations under the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, the nature of the task in an application for admission is to assess whether he is a fit and proper person who can be entrusted to meet the duties and obligations imposed on those who practise as lawyers (if admitted).28 My assessment was expressly forward-looking.
27 Orlov v New Zealand Law Society, above n 21, at [77].
28 New Zealand Law Society v Stanley, above n 22, at [54(a)].
(c)Protected Disclosures Act: Mr Gold has not substantiated that the Protected Disclosures (Protection of Whistleblowers) Act 2022 applies at all in terms of ss 7–9, given that I am not aware of any complaints by him about serious wrongdoing in “the discloser’s organisation”.
(d)Professional Rules: This has been addressed at subpara (b) above. Any assertion that the assessment was wrong is a matter for appeal, not recall.
(e)Failure to assess candour: Mr Gold’s disagreement with my substantive assessment of his character is a question for appeal, not recall. The substantive judgment expressly refers to matters of character that were to his credit, including honesty.29
(f)Tendency to blame others: In the substantive judgment, I concluded that the applicant suffers from a defect in character reflected in disproportionate and misguided aggravation against persons he perceives to have wrongly challenged him, coupled with the tendency to blame others.30 I observed this flaw was reflected in the grounds of his originating application, which still focused on attacking NZLS rather than the substantive merits of what must be established in an application made directly to the Court.31 The content of his recall materials only reinforces those concerns, rather than establishing any grounds for recall.32
(g)Correct standard: This is an appeal point. Mr Gold has not provided any authority to substantiate that a criminal standard of proof applies for an admission application, nor has he sought to reconcile this with the Supreme Court holding that the onus is on the applicant.33
29 At [29].
30 At [22].
31 At [25].
32 See also Gold v Green, above n 7, at [21]–[22].
33 New Zealand Law Society v Stanley, above n 22, at [53]–[54].
(h)Procedural unfairness and prejudice: Section 11B of the Family Court Act does not preclude the Family Court judgment being referred to in Mr Gold’s application for admission, because of its relevance to the issues for determination. Mr Gold’s lawyer was involved in him providing a copy to NZLS for the purposes of his admission application. As recorded in the minute dated 5 July 2025 in this proceeding, counsel for NZLS noted that this application involved disclosure of a judgment of the Family Court in matters decided under the Family Violence Act 2018 and the Care of Children Act 2004, so Brewer J made orders restraining publication of the Family Court judgment and preventing non-parties searching the Court file.34 The Family Court judgment has not been published. Subject to party anonymisation, the outcome is not confidential.35 Section 50 of the Evidence Act does not affect the law of res judicata.36 The admission application did not require any new determination of the Family Court matters, nor of Mr Gold’s various other complaints. Rather it was focused on Mr Gold’s ability to accept Court determinations, and whether his character is such that he can be entrusted to meet the duties and obligations imposed on those who practise as lawyers (if admitted). It was for Mr Gold to decide what material he wanted to include as supporting evidence for his application. No objection was taken to any evidence filed in opposition. Any answers in cross-examination at the hearing were his own. A challenge to my substantive assessment of his character based on the evidence at the hearing is a matter for appeal and not recall.
(i)Unfair cross-examination: The above comments apply.
(j)Internal contradictions: I do not see any illogical contradiction, nor would this be grounds for recall.
34 Gold v New Zealand Law Society HC Auckland CIV-2024-488-37, 5 July 2025 (minute of Brewer J).
35 See Gold v Green [2024] NZHC 2288.
36 Evidence Act 2006, s 50(2)(b).
(k)Unjust enrichment: Apart from reflecting a misconceived notion of unjust enrichment, this is a substantive challenge to the award of costs, which can only be pursued on appeal.
(l)NZBORA repugnancy and human rights: The comments in subparas (a), (b) and (g) apply. An application for recall cannot be pursued as a substitute for an appeal.
[37]Accordingly, I dismiss the recall application.
Investigation
[38] Mr Gold requests that the Court make a specific order for a full, independent investigation into the NZLS’s conduct in this matter. He says this is not for personal vindication but is a matter of public interest and procedural fairness. He asks for the proposed investigation to examine the following (at a minimum):
(a)NZLS’s loss of his initial application file stated in their affidavit.
(b)Inaccurate and misleading advice provided by the NZLS legal complaint service staff.
(c)NZLS’s failure to provide the Court with the full context regarding the dismissed complaints.
(d)NZLS’s failure to contact character referees.
(e)The financial and professional hardship suffered by the applicant as a direct result of these institutional failures, including lost income from a job he says he had lined up and hardship on his family.
[39] He says Magnum Photo Supplies v Viko New Zealand Ltd is authority for the Court having jurisdiction to order an investigation into the conduct underlying a costs order, and such a request was made in Mr Gold’s second cost memorandum.37
37 Magnum Photo Supplies v Viko New Zealand Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 395 (CA)
[40] The above case is about accord and satisfaction. Magnum had obtained a judgment against Viko for $275,450.95. Pending appeal, Viko posted a cheque for
$124,677.18 offering that sum in full and final settlement, saying that presentation of the cheque would constitute acceptance of the offer. By mistake, Magnum’s lawyers banked the cheque before obtaining client instructions. Once they discovered the error, Magnum’s lawyers wrote to Viko’s lawyers saying their client has not accepted the offer so they proposed to repay the funds. The High Court held that there has been accord and satisfaction by banking the cheque. That decision was overturned on appeal, with the costs order in the High Court quashed and a costs order made in favour of Magnum in the Court of Appeal. However, costs at the High Court level were ordered to lie where they fell because the issue in dispute only arose because of a mistake by Magnum’s lawyer.
[41] Magnum Photo Supplies v Viko New Zealand Ltd is not authority for the proposition advanced by Mr Gold. There is neither jurisdiction, nor factual grounds, for ordering any investigation into NZLS’s conduct in this proceeding. The costs award was made in its favour by a straightforward application of r 14.2(1)(a) (costs follow the event), but at less than scale because of Mr Gold’s financial hardship.
Result
[42]I decline the application for my recusal.
[43]The application is dismissed.
O’Gorman J
0
22
1