Gold v New Zealand Law Society

[2025] NZHC 2288

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHE

CIV-2024-488-37

[2025] NZHC 2288

UNDER

the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006

IN THE MATTER OF

an application under r 6 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Admission) Rules 2008

BETWEEN

“MR GOLD”

Applicant

AND

NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY

Respondent

Hearing:

On the papers

Counsel:

Applicant in person

P N Collins for Respondent

Judgment:

13 August 2025

JUDGMENT OF O’GORMAN J

[as to costs]

This judgment was delivered by me on 13 August 2025 at 2 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 2016.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

…………………………………

Solicitors/Counsel:

New Zealand Law Society, Wellington

P N Collins, Shortland Chambers, Auckland

GOLD v NEW ZEALAND LAW SOCIETY [2025] NZHC 2288 [13 August 2025]

Introduction

[1] In a judgment delivered on 10 February 2025, I declined Mr Gold’s application under s 52(2)(a) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006. I made a timetable for the parties to file memoranda for costs, so that any disputed issues as to costs could be determined on the papers. Unfortunately, those memoranda were not referred to me for determination until 29 July 2025.

[2]The following documents have been filed:

(a)Memorandum of the applicant dated 14 February 2025 asking the Court not to award any costs.

(b)Memorandum of counsel for the respondent seeking costs on a 2B basis in the sum of $13,862 with disbursements of $80.63.

(c)Memorandum of counsel for the respondent dated 10 July 2025 accompanying draft order for sealing.

(d)Further memorandum of the applicant dated 10 July 2025.

Legal principles

[3]                 The Court has a general discretion to award  costs  under  r  14.1  of  the  High Court Rules 2016.

[4]                 Subject to such a discretion, r 14.2 provides the principles to be applied in most cases:

(a)Under r 14.2(1)(a), the party who fails with respect to a proceeding or an interlocutory application should pay costs to the party who succeeds.

(b)Under r 14.2(1)(b), an award of costs should reflect the complexity and significance of the proceeding. For those purposes, r 14.3 provides for three categories of proceeding (1, 2 or 3).

(c)Rule 14.2(1)(c) provides that costs should generally be assessed by applying the appropriate daily recovery rate to the time considered reasonable for each step reasonably required in relation to the proceeding or interlocutory application. The reasonable determination of time is set out in r 14.5 by band (A, B or C).

(d)Rule 14.2(1)(f) provides that an award of costs should not exceed the actual costs incurred by the party.

[5]                 Under r 14.7, the court may refuse to make an order for costs or may reduce the costs otherwise payable under those rules if (among other things):

…

(e)   the proceeding concerned a matter of public interest, and the party opposing costs acted reasonably in the conduct of the proceeding; or

(f)   the party claiming costs has contributed unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding or step in it by—

(i)failing to comply with these rules or a direction of the court; or

(ii)taking or pursuing an unnecessary step or an argument that lacks merit; or

(iii)failing, without reasonable justification, to admit facts, evidence, or documents, or accept a legal argument; or

(iv)failing, without reasonable justification, to comply with an order for discovery, a notice for further particulars, a notice for interrogatories, or other similar requirement under these rules; or

(v)failing, without reasonable justification, to accept an offer of settlement whether in the form of an offer under rule 14.10 or some other offer to settle or dispose of the proceeding; or

(g)   some other reason exists which justifies the court refusing costs or reducing costs despite the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.

[6]In terms of r 14.7(e), public interest has previously been found to exist where:

(a)A registered charity sought judicial review of advice given to, and consequent decisions made, by the Minister of Climate Change (raising questions of statutory interpretation).1

(b)Local community groups brought proceedings on issues of general importance for the community and the region without intention of personal gain against public decision-makers, such as the local council2 or the New Zealand Transport Agency.3

(c)A public body intervenor acted in performance of its statutory role and to vindicate rights and obligations imposed by statute.4

(d)A party acted in good faith in supporting comity between closely aligned countries such as Australia and New Zealand, honouring extradition treaties and bringing complaints in each country to trial.5

(e)A matter was novel. For example, a prisoner sought to exercise his right to self-representation and fair trial by requiring access to facilities such as legal research materials but was unable to meet the costs involved.6

Party submissions

Applicant’s submission

[7]                 Much of the applicant’s submissions repeat what he said in the substantive hearing and continue criticisms against the respondent. He contends that the Practice

1      Lawyers for Climate Action NZ Inc v Climate Change Commission [2025] NZCA 80 at [177]−[182].

2      Coro Mainstreet (Inc) v Thames-Coromandel District Council [2013] NZHC 1527 at [10], aff’d [2013] NZCA 665, [2013] NZRMA 73 at [72].

3      Save Kapiti Inc v New Zealand Transport Agency [2013] NZHC 3314 at [19].

4      Hotchin v KA No 4 Trustee Ltd [2014] NZHC 978 at [33].

5      Curtis v Commonwealth of Australia [2019] NZCA 126 at [9].

6      Taylor v District Court at North Shore (No 2) HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-2350, 13 October 2010 at [12].

Approval Committee and the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) are seeking revenge. He continues to argue that he is the victim of bullying and discrimination and that he is being attacked for raising legitimate complaints. He alleges that the respondent has come to the proceeding “with dirty hands and its conduct has not been honest or entirely truthful” and this conduct should reduce the costs award. He also contends that the respondent and the Practice Approval Committee breached his rights under   s 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. He argues that his various complaints and his application have been pursued in the public interest. He also contends that NZLS has a large pool of members to fund its costs, whereas he and his daughter would suffer hardship if costs were imposed on him.

[8]                 In his further memorandum dated 10 July 2025, he seems to have interpreted the application for the orders to be sealed as an application to suppress the proceedings or prevent others from searching the Court file. He objects to any order sealing the Court file or suppressing this matter. He goes on to make further arguments about the merits of his complaints about conduct by other professionals and the NZLS, as well as repeating his allegations of financial and other forms of hardship. He concludes by seeking orders permitting referral of this matter to any appropriate body for further investigation, and to consider whether a re-hearing is warranted (including because of post-hearing developments).

Respondent’s submissions

[9]                 The respondent seeks costs on the usual basis, namely that it was the successful party and that costs on a 2B basis are appropriate on ordinary principles. The amounts payable by applying schs 2 and 3 are set out in a table attached to the respondent’s memorandum dated 20 February 2025, producing a total sum of $13,862 plus disbursements of $80.63.

[10]              Leaving aside the applicant’s substantive arguments that are irrelevant for this costs decision, the respondent addresses what remains of his grounds for contending that costs should lie where they fall:

(a)Public interest: The respondent does not accept that r 14.7(e) applies. To qualify for a reduction in costs on the ground that the proceeding concerned a matter of public interest, it is necessary to show that the proceeding related to a matter of genuine public interest beyond the interests of the individual unsuccessful litigant.7 This case does not so qualify because it did not involve the determination of any controversial or uncertain area of the law, nor did it have any impact on a sector of the public. This proceeding was not a judicial review of the respondent’s statutory functions. Rather, this case concerned a question of admission, being a matter of the applicant’s private interest.

(b)Respondent’s contribution to unnecessary time or expense: Rule 14.7(f) does not apply on the facts. The respondent’s conduct was responsible, proportionate, in compliance with Court directions, and avoided any wasteful or distracting arguments.

(c)Financial hardship or impecuniosity: The applicant says that he is on job seeker support and claims relief against costs on the grounds of financial hardship. However, financial hardship is not an answer to a claim for costs,8 and costs should generally be awarded at a meaningful level, even against an impecunious party.9

Analysis

[11]              The determination of costs is not an occasion to revisit the substantive issues and the applicant’s ongoing grievances, nor do I accept there is any basis for a re-hearing. Also, the applicant has misunderstood the nature of sealing a Court order

— it has nothing to do with sealing the Court file or suppressing information.

7      At [9]; and New Zealand Climate Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water and Atmosphere Research Ltd [2013] NZCA 555 at [11].

8      Chesterfields Preschools Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2011] NZCA 640 at [7]: “Hardship is not usually regarded as a ground to resist an award of costs in circumstances where the opposite party has been put to unnecessary expense in responding to an application or appeal.”

9      Foni v Foliaki [2018] NZHC 3126 at [5].

[12] In contrast with the cases referred to at [6] above, this proceeding does not qualify as a public interest proceeding of the  type  envisaged  in  r  14.7(e).    An application seeking admission to the legal profession is pursued in the applicant’s private interests.

[13]              I also reject all allegations that the respondent acted inappropriately or contributed unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding. In fact, it exercised considerable restraint in focusing on the issues relevant for the application so that the hearing could be conducted economically.

[14]              For these reasons, I accept the respondent as the successful party is entitled to costs on a 2B basis applying the usual principles.

[15]              However, I also accept that the respondent is currently suffering financial hardship, so I am prepared to reduce costs  by 50 per cent solely for that reason.       I recognise that the requirement for predictable and expeditious determination of costs would be significantly undermined if a party’s financial circumstances became a matter of routine enquiry. However, I consider an award at that level is still meaningful and has a better prospect of being paid, balanced against the applicant’s financial and other problems.

Result

[16]I award the respondent costs in the sum of $6,931 plus disbursements of

$80.63.

O’Gorman J