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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
SC 39/2006
[2007] NZSC 36
BETWEENCOMMERCE COMMISSION
Appellant
ANDFONTERRA CO-OPERATIVE GROUP LIMITED
Respondent
Hearing:12 December 2006
Court:Elias CJ, Blanchard, Tipping, McGrath and Anderson JJ
Counsel:D J Goddard QC and L Theron for Appellant
J A Farmer QC and A K Rawlings for Respondent
Judgment:30 May 2007
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A.The appeal is allowed and all relevant orders made in the courts below are set aside.
B.The Court declares that the capital referred to in reg 9(1) of the Dairy Industry Restructuring (Raw Milk) Regulations 2001 is the respondent’s equity capital.
C.The respondent is to pay the appellant costs of $15,000 plus disbursements to be fixed, if necessary, by the Registrar.
D.In the absence of agreement costs below are to be fixed by the courts below.
REASONS
(Given by Tipping J)
Introduction
[1] This case concerns the meaning of reg 9(1) of the Dairy Industry Restructuring (Raw Milk) Regulations 2001. These regulations were passed pursuant to the Dairy Industry Restructuring Act 2001 which implemented a substantial restructuring of New Zealand’s dairy industry. The Act facilitated the amalgamation of the three main dairy co-operatives in New Zealand. The amalgamated entity was named Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited and is the present respondent. Fonterra controls over 98% of milk produced by New Zealand dairy farmers. Its dominance in the relevant market was such that specific authorisation was required for the amalgamation. This was granted by s 7 of the Act. Some regulation of the new entity was seen as necessary. Among the measures introduced was an obligation on Fonterra to supply raw milk to independent processors[1] at a price which, absent agreement, was to be determined by a formula set out in the regulations. The ultimate question on the appeal concerns the meaning of the words “the cost of capital rate used by [Fonterra] in calculating the price of a co-operative share” which appear in reg 9(1) as an ingredient of the price-fixing formula.
[1] They being processors not associated with Fonterra.
[2] The 2001 Act expressly authorised the making of regulations requiring Fonterra to supply milk, prescribing the terms of supply and specifying the methodology for determining the prices to be paid.[2] This authorising provision reflects the general statutory purpose of promoting the efficient operation of local markets for dairy goods by regulating Fonterra’s activities in order to ensure contestability.[3] This expression of legislative purpose is reiterated in the statements of purpose and principles in subpart 5 of the Act, which deals generally with dairy market regulation and Fonterra’s obligations in that regard.[4] These provisions are all plainly directed towards creating a level playing field for all processors in relation to their raw milk costs. They form an important part of the legislative context in which the Raw Milk Regulations were made and against which the crucial provisions in those regulations must be interpreted.
[2]Sections 115(1)(a) and (b).
[3]Section 4(f).
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- Case
- [2007] NZSC 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was initially heard in the High Court, where MacKenzie J ruled in favor of Fonterra, stating that the WACC rate was a valid "cost of capital rate" for the purposes of regulation 9(1). The Commerce Commission appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. The Commission then appealed to the Supreme Court of New Zealand. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made in the courts below, and declared that the capital referred to in regulation 9(1) is Fonterra's equity capital.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What is the correct interpretation of the phrase "cost of capital rate" in regulation 9(1) of the Dairy Industry Restructuring (Raw Milk) Regulations 2001?
2. Does the phrase "cost of capital rate" in regulation 9(1) refer to Fonterra's equity capital or its weighted average cost of capital (WACC)?
Held
1. The appeal is allowed and all relevant orders made in the courts below are set aside.
2. The Court declares that the capital referred to in reg 9(1) of the Dairy Industry Restructuring (Raw Milk) Regulations 2001 is the respondent’s equity capital.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court's judgment focused on interpreting the phrase "cost of capital rate" in regulation 9(1) of the Dairy Industry Restructuring (Raw Milk) Regulations 2001. The court concluded that the phrase refers to Fonterra's equity capital, not its weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The court rejected Fonterra's argument that the plain meaning of "cost of capital rate" is the WACC rate because it was the rate used by Fonterra. Instead, the court held that the meaning of the phrase must be determined by its context and purpose in the regulations. The court reasoned that the phrase must refer to a specific type of capital and that the context and purpose of the regulations indicate that the capital referred to is equity capital. This conclusion was supported by the fact that the discount rate for calculating annualised share value must relate to a proper return on equity capital, as the return the shareholders receive on their shares is necessarily the cost to Fonterra of its equity capital. The court also noted that the purpose of the regulation is to establish the appropriate discount rate for calculating annualised share value, which is a rate applicable to equity capital. The court's decision was based on statutory interpretation principles, which require the meaning of an enactment to be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose. The court also considered the social, commercial, and other objectives of the enactment. The court's decision is binding on lower courts and sets a legal precedent for interpreting similar phrases in future cases.