Simons Pass Station Limited v Mackenzie District Council

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY

I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE

CIV-2019-409-191

[2020] NZHC 3265

BETWEEN

SIMONS PASS STATION LIMITED

Appellant

AND

MACKENZIE DISTRICT COUNCIL

Respondent

AND

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENCE SOCIETY INCORPORATED

Interested Party

Hearing: 17 August 2020

Appearances:

P A Steven QC, K G Reid and N D Daines for Appellant

D C Caldwell, A C Limmer and J D Silcock for Respondent R B Enright and C S S Woodhouse for Interested Party

Judgment:

10 December 2020


JUDGMENT OF OSBORNE J


This judgment was delivered by me on 10 December 2020 at 2.30 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

SIMONS PASS STATION LIMITED v MACKENZIE DISTRICT COUNCIL [2020] NZHC 3265 [10 December 2020]

Introduction

[1]        This is an appeal from a decision of the Environment Court (the Judgment).1 It raises a single question:

Did the Environment Court err in law by deciding that the word “granted” in r 15A.2.1 of the operative Mackenzie District Plan means both “granted and commenced” in the s 116 Resource Management Act 1991 sense?

[2]        In pt 6 of the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) which deals with resource consents, the terms “granted’ and “commenced” have distinct meanings when used in relation to resource consents. The consent authority, on application under s 88, must or may (depending on the provision) “grant” a resource consent. Such resource consent has then been granted, and notification of the decision follows (under ss 114– 115 of the RMA). Section 116 then prescribes when a resource consent “commences”, which applied to the facts of this case at the point the Environment Court (the Court) allowed appeals against the consent authority’s resource consent decision.

[3]        The Court stated its conclusion as to the interpretation of “granted” in these terms:

[100] Given the foregoing, we interpret “granted” in Rule 15A.2.1 as meaning ‘grant and commenced’ in the s 116 RMA sense. That is, by 14 November 2015 a permit is granted if the time for lodging appeals against a grant of consent have expired and no appeals have been lodged or the Environment Court has determined the appeals or appellants have withdrawn the same. …

[4]        Thus, the effect of the decision of the Court in this case is that a consent is not “granted” as that term is used in r 15A.2.1 until it has been both “granted” and “commenced” in the pt 6 RMA senses.

[5]        Simons Pass Station Ltd (Simons Pass), as the appellant in this case, asserts that in terms of r 15A.2.1, a consent is granted on the date the consent authority grants it in terms of pt 6 of the RMA, and not at the later date that the consent commences in terms of ss 114–115 of the RMA. The Regional Council had granted Simons Pass


1      Re Mackenzie District Council [2019] NZEnvC 56.

permits on 7 May 2012. That date, says Simons Pass, is the date they were granted consent…

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Details
Case
[2020] NZHC 3265
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal arises from a decision of the Environment Court in which the Court interpreted the meaning of the word “granted” in r 15A.2.1 of the operative Mackenzie District Plan. Simons Pass Station Limited (Simons Pass) appeals against the Environment Court’s interpretation of the word “granted” as meaning “granted and commenced” in the s 116 Resource Management Act 1991 sense. Simons Pass asserts that the Court erred in law by attributing a wider meaning to the word “granted” than that which it had previously held in other proceedings. Simons Pass further contends that the Court’s interpretation would have the effect of requiring it to “relitigate issues” in relation to its intended activities in a different forum with different parties. The appeal raises a single question of law: Did the Environment Court err in law by deciding that the word “granted” in r 15A.2.1 of the operative Mackenzie District Plan means both “granted and commenced” in the s 116 Resource Management Act 1991 sense? The Court found that the Environment Court did not err in law in its interpretation of the word “granted”. Simons Pass has not met the onus of demonstrating that the Court’s interpretation was erroneous. The Court’s interpretation of the word “granted” constituted an available meaning of the term “granted” both in terms of the text and in its broader context. In terms of Equus Trust v Christchurch City Council, it would not be for this Court, even had I preferred an alternative interpretation (which I do not), to substitute its own view. Further, the Court found that the Court’s interpretation of the rule accorded with the continuing concern for fairness that the rules (within the plan change) are to implement. The Court also found that the Court’s interpretation of the rule accorded with the overarching purposes of the plan change. Finally, the Court found that the interpretation proposed by Simons Pass would involve an absurd outcome. Accordingly, the Court holds that the Environment Court did not err in law in its interpretation of the word “granted”. The appellant is to pay to the respondent and to the interested party the costs of each (without a certificate for additional counsel) together with disbursements, reserving leave to counsel to file memoranda (three page limit) in the event there is disagreement as to quantum, with costs and disbursements then to be determined on the papers.