FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Zibara v Ultra Management (Sports) Pty Ltd [2021] FCAFC 4
Appeal from: Ultra Management (Sports) Pty Ltd v Zibara [2020] FCA 31
Ultra Management (Sports) Pty Ltd (No 2) v Zibara [2020] FCA 402
File number: QUD 102 of 2020 Judgment of: MCKERRACHER, DERRINGTON AND ANDERSON JJ Date of judgment: 2 February 2021 Catchwords: EQUITY – liability under the second limb of Barnes v Addy – whether it was open to the primary judge to find that the Third Appellant was liable to account to the Respondent on the pleadings and facts found by the primary judge – whether there was a need to expressly plead that the First and Second Appellants had engaged in a “dishonest and fraudulent design” – open to the primary judge to find that Third Appellant was liable to account to the Respondent
COSTS – discretion as to costs – whether primary judge’s discretion miscarried in ordering that the Appellants pay, on an indemnity basis, the Respondent’s costs of the days of the hearing of the trial – primary judge’s decision as to costs was within the bounds of the primary judge’s discretion as to costs
Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 76
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 79, 182, 183
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 16.02(1)(a), 40.02
Cases cited:
Argyle Building Services Pty Ltd v Mark Franek & Ors [2020] VSCA 196
Australian Careers Institute Pty Ltd v Australian Institute of Fitness Pty Ltd (2016) 340 ALR 580
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Online Dealz Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 732
Banque Commerciale SA, En Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279
Barnes v Addy (1874) LR9ChApp 244
Brecher v Barrack Investments Pty Limited (No 2) [2020] FCA 911
Clifton (Liquidator) v Kerry J Investment Pty Ltd trading as Clenergy (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 112
CMS Dolphin Ltd v Simonet [2001] 2 BCLC 704
Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373
Cornerstone Property and Development Pty Ltd v Suellen Properties Pty Ltd [2014] QSC 265
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Zibara v Ultra Management (Sports) Pty Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2021] FCAFC 4
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Appellants’ appeal is dismissed.
2. The Appellants will pay the Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
164.
1. … [J]udgment be entered for [UMS] against [Mr Zibara, Mr Angeli and Genesis], jointly and severally for the sum of $100,000 (Judgment Sum).
2. Execution of the judgment be stayed pending the determination of [Mr Zibara, Mr Angeli and Genesis]’s Applications for Leave to Appeal and Extension of Time filed on 8 April 2020 or further Order of the Full Court …
3. …
4. …
5. …
6. Interest shall not run upon the Judgment Sum until the determination by the Full Court of [Mr Zibara, Mr Angeli and Genesis]’s Applications referred to in paragraph 2 hereof.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
7. [Mr Zibara, Mr Angeli and Genesis]’s consent to these Orders shall not operate so as to prevent [Mr Zibara, Mr Angeli and Genesis] from challenging in the Full Court their liability to [UMS] pursuant to the Draft Notice of Appeal relied on in the Application to the Full Court referred to in paragraph 2 above.
165.
The Appellants further submit that a substantial discount should be made by allowing only a portion of the costs at first instance in favour of UMS, which should be expressed as a percentage of the costs incurred. The Appellants submit that 50% of those costs would be appropriate in the circumstances.
UMS’s submissions
166.
UMS submits that the exercise of the discretion by the primary judge was in the circumstances of the case appropriate given three matters. First, the Appellants’ defence constituted non-admissions or bare denials. Second, UMS submits no alternate or positive case was run by the Appellants at trial. Third, UMS submits that the Appellants must be taken to have been aware of their wrongful conduct yet determined to put UMS to proof of its case at trial, which UMS submits was inconsistent with the overarching purpose and the obligations of parties to litigation under ss 37M and 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
167.
UMS submits that an indemnity costs order, in circumstances where UMS should not have been put to the expense of having to proceed with the trial to judgment, was an appropriate exercise of the discretion as to costs. UMS submits that an indemnity costs order was not a form of punishment but rather compensation for being put to an expense which was unnecessary.
Principles
168.
This Court “has jurisdiction to award costs in all proceedings before the Court (including proceedings dismissed for want of jurisdiction) other than proceedings in respect of which [the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976] or any other Act provides that costs must not be awarded”: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (FCA Act), s 43(1). “Except as provided by any other Act, the award of costs is in the discretion of the Court …”: FCA Act, s 43(2).
169.
Rule 40.02 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides:
A party or a person who is entitled to costs may apply to the Court for an order that costs:
(a) awarded in their favour be paid other than as between party and party; or
(b) be awarded in a lump sum, instead of, or in addition to, any taxed costs; or
(c) be determined otherwise than by taxation.
Note 1: The Court may order that costs be paid on an indemnity basis.
Note 2: The Court may order that the costs be determined by reference to a cost assessment scheme operating under the law of a State or Territory.
170.
The phrase “costs on an indemnity basis” is defined in the rules as meaning:
costs as a complete indemnity against the costs incurred by the party in the proceeding, provided that they do not include any amount shown by the party liable to pay them to have been incurred unreasonably in the interests of the party incurring them.
171.
The High Court stated the following in Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; 265 CLR 164 at [24]-[25] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ):
It is well established that the power to award costs is a discretionary power, but that it is a power that must be exercised judicially, by reference only to considerations relevant to its exercise and upon facts connected with or leading up to the litigation …
A guiding principle by reference to which the discretion is to be exercised – indeed, “one of the most, if not the most, important” principle – is that the successful party is generally entitled to his or her costs by way of indemnity against the expense of litigation that should not, in justice, have been visited upon that party. The application of that principle may be modified or displaced where there is conduct on the part of the successful party in relation to the conduct of the litigation that would justify a different outcome. For example, a successful defendant may be refused its costs on the ground that its conduct induced the plaintiff to believe that he or she had a good cause of action.
(Citations omitted.)
172.
The High Court stated the following in Bell Lawyers Pty Ltd v Pentelow [2019] HCA 29; 372 ALR 555 at [33] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ):
… costs are a creature of statute. It has never been thought that any of the ubiquitous statutory provisions empowering courts to order costs are available to compensate a litigant for his or her time and trouble in participating in litigation. That is because costs are awarded by way of indemnity; they are not awarded as compensation for lost earnings, much less as a reward for a litigant’s success. The courts have long regarded the statutory power to make an order for costs as confined by the concern to provide the successful party with a measure of indemnity against the expense of professional legal costs actually incurred in the litigation.
(Citations omitted.)
173.
If “one thing is clear in the realm of costs, it is that, in criminal as well as civil proceedings, costs are not awarded by way of punishment of the unsuccessful party”: Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 (Latoudis) at 643 (per Mason CJ). “They are compensatory in the sense that they are awarded to indemnify the successful party against the expense to which he or she has been put by reason of the legal proceedings”: ibid; see also at 563 per Toohey J and at 567 per McHugh J. Thus, “in civil proceedings an order may, and usually will, be made even though the unsuccessful party has nearly succeeded or has acted reasonably in commencing the proceedings”: Latoudis at 567 per McHugh J.
174.
In Kazar (Liquidator) v Kargarian; In the Matter of Frontier Architects Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2011] FCAFC 136; 197 FCR 113, Greenwood and Rares JJ stated the following at [7]-[11]:
The operation of the pre-judicature system with respect to costs infuses the approach to the flexibility of the discretion in the post Judicature Act environment and particularly in the modern treatment of costs applications operating under rules which are the genetic descendents of the Judicature Act provisions (such as s 43 of the Federal Court Act). In reflecting upon the practice of the High Court of Chancery (as described in Daniell’s Practice of the High Court of Chancery, 5th Ed (1871), Vol 2, p 1239) and the discretionary nature of the award of costs in that court, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ observe at [34] in [Foots v Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd (2007) 234 CLR 52] that the discretion historically was not inflexibly constrained by the rule of awarding the costs of the suit to the successful party but that the court would, in exercising the discretion to award costs, take into consideration the circumstances of the particular case before it or the situation or conduct of the parties.
The practice guiding the exercise of the discretion [as to costs] was that the Court of Chancery did not regard the awarding of costs as a penalty or punishment but merely a necessary consequence of a party having created litigation in which the party had failed … [W]ithout subsuming the discretion within inflexible rules, the discretion would be exercised according to broad settled principle as described. Having observed these matters about the practice of the Chancery Court, their Honours concluded those remarks by observing at [34] that “[t]he similarity with the modern treatment of costs applications will be readily apparent”.
The exercise of the discretion takes account of all of the contextual circumstances of the litigation and the conduct of the parties. One aspect of the award of costs is a recognition that a party has been put to expense which, taking account of the merits as ultimately found on the trial of the action, might otherwise have been avoided. That consideration does not infuse the award of costs with any sense of penalty or punishment but simply recognises the compensatory nature of an award of costs, in context and according to principle. That is why an award of costs, although involving the exercise of a discretion, generally favours the successful party …
175.
These principles are generally reflected in this Court’s Costs Practice Note. It provides the following:
The purpose of a costs order is to compensate a successful party rather than punish an unsuccessful party. However, the Court will consider the appropriateness of the making of a special costs order in circumstances which may warrant it, including where parties have failed to comply with their pre-litigation “genuine steps” obligations, where the “overarching purpose” duty has not been met, where parties engage in an abuse of process, raise unmeritorious arguments before the Court or otherwise conduct themselves inappropriately in the litigation.
(Citation omitted.)
176.
In Clifton (Liquidator) v Kerry J Investment Pty Ltd trading as Clenergy (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 112, Besanko, Markovic and Banks-Smith JJ addressed briefly the relevant principles in relation to an award of indemnity costs at [30]-[31]:
In Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 801; (1993) 46 FCR 225, Sheppard J said (at 233–234):
4. In consequence of the settled practice which exists, the Court ought not usually make an order for the payment of costs on some basis other than the party and party basis. The circumstances of the case must be such as to warrant the Court in departing from the usual course. … Most judges dealing with the problem have resolved the particular case before them by dealing with the circumstances of that case and finding in it the presence or absence of factors which would be capable, if they existed, of warranting a departure from the usual rule. But as French J said (at p 8) in Tetijo, “The categories in which the discretion may be exercised are not closed”. Davies J expressed (at p 6) similar views in Ragata (supra).
5. Notwithstanding the fact that that is so, it is useful to note some of the circumstances which have been thought to warrant the exercise of the discretion. I instance the making of allegations of fraud knowing them to be false and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud (both referred to by Woodward J in Fountain and also by Gummow J in Thors v Weekes (1989) 92 ALR 131 at 152; evidence of particular misconduct that causes loss of time to the Court and to other parties (French J in Tetijo); the fact that the proceedings were commenced or continued for some ulterior motive (Davies J in Ragata) or in wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law (Woodward J in Fountain and French J in J-Corp (supra)); the making of allegations which ought never to have been made or the undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions (Davies J in Ragata); an imprudent refusal of an offer to compromise (eg Messiter v Hutchinson (1987) 10 NSWLR 525; Maitland Hospital v Fisher (No 2) (1992) 27 NSWLR 721 at 724 (Court of Appeal); Crisp v Keng (unreported, Court of Appeal, NSW, Kirby P, Priestley JA, Cripps JA, No 40744/1992, 27 September 1993) and an award of costs on an indemnity basis against a contemnor (eg Megarry V-C in EMI Records (supra)). Other categories of cases are to be found in the reports. Yet others to arise in the future will have different features about them which may justify an order for costs on the indemnity basis. The question must always be whether the particular facts and circumstances of the case in question warrant the making of an order for payment of costs other than on a party and party basis.
… We also refer to the discussion by Kenny J in Morad v El-Ashey (No 2) [2017] FCA 1612 at [6]–[10] and the detailed discussion of the relevant principles in Dal Pont at 16.46 and following. The point which we wish to emphasise is that to justify a special costs order, there must be conduct deserving of criticism and resulting in greater expense to the innocent party …
(Emphasis added.)
177.
Their Honours referred to the discussion by Kenny J in Morad v El-Ashey (No 2) [2017] FCA 1612 at [6]–[10]. Kenny J stated at [9]-[11]:
The principles relevant to an award of indemnity costs are well-established. In broad terms costs will be payable on a party and party basis, unless the circumstances of the case justify a departure from the normal course: see Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 (Colgate-Palmolive) at 233 (Sheppard J). The question is always whether the facts and circumstances of a particular case justify the making of an order for the payment of costs other than on a party and party basis.
Plainly enough, the categories in which indemnity costs may be ordered are not closed. Reference to some of the circumstances in which costs on an indemnity basis have been ordered is illustrative, however, of the occasions that have been thought capable of attracting such an award of costs. It has been held, for example, that indemnity costs may be awarded where “the applicant, properly advised, should have known that he had no chance of success” (Fountain Selected Meats (Sales) Pty Ltd v International Produce Merchants Pty Ltd (1988) 81 ALR 397 (Fountain Selected Meats) at 401; where an application is wholly untenable and misconceived (Henke v Carter [2002] FCA 492 at [22] (Goldberg J)); and where there is “evidence of particular misconduct on the part of a party that causes loss of time to the Court and to other parties” (Tetijo Holdings Pty Ltd v Keeprite Australia Pty Ltd [1991] FCA 225 at [22] (French J)).
The purpose of indemnity costs was explained in Hamod v State of New South Wales [2002] FCAFC 97; 188 ALR 659 (Hamod) at [20] by Gray J (with whom Carr and Goldberg JJ agreed) as follows:
Indemnity costs are not designed to punish a party for persisting with a case that turns out to fail. They are not awarded as a means of deterring litigants from putting forward arguments that might be attended by uncertainty. Rather, they serve the purpose of compensating a party fully for costs incurred, as a normal costs order could not be expected to do, when the court takes the view that it was unreasonable for the party against whom the order is made to have subjected the innocent party to the expenditure of costs.
(Emphasis added.)
178.
The principles enunciated in Colgate-Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 801; (1993) 46 FCR 225 were cited with approval in Dowling v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 28 at [42] (Graham J) and [140] (Logan and Flick JJ).
Application to this case
179.
The primary judge stated at [15]-[18] of the Second Reasons:
15 In this case, there can be no doubt, in the light of the findings, that UMS was needlessly put to the cost of vindicating its contentions and demonstrating that Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli had engaged in the contravening conduct. They elected to have their day in Court. They gave no evidence in the proceeding. They put on a pleading that in material respects took the position of saying “does not admit”. In other respects, they pleaded denials. They elected not to put on an affirmative case. They could have taken each allegation of contravening conduct pleaded against them and put on an affirmative factual contention in answer. They put the appellant to proof on each and every conduct allegation made against them. They offered no evidence in contradiction to the claims or the evidence put on by [UMS].
16 The tactical position adopted by Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli was twofold. First, they contended that there were no conduct breaches as alleged against them and that, on the evidence put on by [UMS], none were established, notwithstanding that at trial they gave no evidence in contradiction or answer to the evidence put on by [UMS]. Second, they contended that once the NRL gave notice of the introduction of the rule change (as discussed in the principal proceeding), every new contract entered into after the start date of the “break clause”, was required to contain the new clause. Whilst that was true, the introduction of the new break clause did not require, and nor was it the NRL’s position, that all existing contracts were required to be brought to an end prematurely and replaced with new contracts incorporating the new break clause. The discharge of existing contracts and their replacement with a new contract incorporating the break clause usefully provided Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli with an opportunity to enable players to leave their relationship with UMS (expressed in terms of the former contracts) and join with Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli in their new venture in the provision of services to rugby league players, however that venture might express itself in time.
17 It is difficult to see how Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli could resist the claims of UMS and the evidence put on by [UMS], without giving evidence in contradiction in the principal proceeding. It is also clear that the contention of [Mr Zibara, Mr Angeli and Genesis], as to the break clause, was misconceived if it was thought to provide an answer to the conduct allegations of breaches of the fiduciary duties owed by them to UMS.
18 Not surprisingly, UMS seeks an order that Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli pay its costs of and incidental to the principal proceeding. UMS has been vindicated in its claims and it was compelled to prosecute the principal proceeding to trial and judgment in order to do so. It ought not to have been put to the expense of proving its case. However, UMS contends that there are “special circumstances” which warrant an exercise of the discretion under s 43(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) … to depart from an order that Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli pay the costs on a party and party basis. UMS says that because Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli maintained an “utterly untenable” defence to the fiduciary duty claims and because they conducted the trial by seeking to amend their defence during the course of the hearing and then abandoned the proposed amended defence, electing not to call any evidence at all (and other matters relating to the conduct of the hearing), UMS ought to have its costs of the hearing against [Mr Zibara, Mr Angeli and Genesis] on an indemnity basis.
(Emphasis in the original.)
180.
His Honour observed (at [26]) that:
In this case, in the conduct of their defence to the claims made against them of breaches of fiduciary duty owed to UMS, Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli well knew and understood, throughout the entire proceedings, the precise content of their conduct …
181.
His Honour continued at [50]:
An order for costs ought to now be made as [UMS] has been vindicated in its proceedings and has achieved an order for primary relief that Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli account to UMS for the benefit they have received, through Genesis or otherwise (which can only be determined upon a proper taking of the account), arising out of the breaches of the fiduciary duties they owed to UMS. Ultimately, there will be a quantification of the benefit but it is clear that it amounts to at least $5,625. The order UMS obtained is an important protective beneficial order arising out of the unmeritorious and unconscionable conduct of Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli as found. The quantification of the remedy will, it seems, result in no less than $5,625. This may be a small sum but it is a benefit they have obtained. The seriousness of the conduct of Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli is not measured by whether the benefit they obtained by reason of the breaches turns out to be $10 or $100 or $1,000 or $5,625 or something more than that. The seriousness of the conduct is measured by the character of the conduct itself. The exercise of the discretion as to costs has very particular regard to the character of that conduct and the steps the applicant was forced to take to vindicate its claim. UMS has been put to very considerable expense in establishing a right to the relief it obtained in circumstances where the claims were resisted throughout. There is no good reason why UMS ought to be held out of an order for costs of the principal proceeding. Moreover, having regard to [certain matters set out at [11]-[17], [19], [26] and [40] of the Second Reasons], and having regard to the principles governing the exercise of the discretion under s 43(2) [of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)], I am satisfied that UMS ought to have an order for indemnity costs of the days of the hearing.
182.
It will be apparent that a basis for the primary judge ordering indemnity costs for the hearing days of the trial was the matters set out at [11]-[17], [19], [26] and [40] of the Second Reasons. By way of example, at [40] of the Second Reasons, the primary judge stated:
The applicant refers to a range of circumstances which are said to justify the making of an order for indemnity costs in relation to the hearing. In summary, the applicant says that the respondents proposed particular amendments during the course of the trial and then abandoned that position. It says that a “genuine steps” statement was filed on 27 December 2018 referring to correspondence in May 2018. In a letter dated 21 May 2018, the applicant set out the basis for the claims of breaches of fiduciary duty, well before the litigation was commenced. The respondents took the position that they would vigorously defend any proceeding. A statement of claim was filed on 27 December 2018. The respondents filed their last amended defence on 5 September 2019 containing many non admissions of matters central to any defence of the claims of breach of fiduciary duty. The applicant says that affidavits which were filed by the respondents established relationships which gave rise to the relevant fiduciary duties but also deposed to steps which were the subject of non admissions in the pleadings. The applicant says that para 20 of the defence is revealing because it asserts a construction of the NRL’s directive (the break clause directive) which is incorrect, as a matter of construction, and inconsistent with the affidavits of the respondents (which were not ultimately relied upon or read). The applicant says that the affidavits demonstrate that the respondents were engaged in the conduct of revising player contracts to insert the break clause thereby benefiting and advancing their own interests to the detriment of the applicant. The applicant also says that the proposed amended defence, advanced on the third day of the trial, sought to change the previous defence in ways which altered the character of the construction of the break clause; made admissions concerning the player, Crossland, to the effect that the contract was changed in October 2017 by Mr Zibara; and raised other contentions about the intention of Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli. Those amendments were later abandoned. The applicant says that Mr Ayoub was subjected to rigorous cross examination about matters which were not the subject of evidence by either respondent and were not matters relevant to any issue in controversy on the pleadings.
(Emphasis added.)
183.
Having reviewed the Second Reasons, particularly the matters set out at [11]-[17], [19], [26] and [40] of the Second Reasons, we are not persuaded that the primary judge’s discretion as to costs miscarried by ordering that the Appellants pay, on an indemnity basis, UMS’s costs of the days of the hearing of the trial of the action. Particularly in light of [40] of the Second Reasons, and in circumstances where the trial judge was uniquely positioned to observe the conduct of the Appellants at the hearing of the trial, it was not outside the bounds of the primary judge’s discretion as to costs to order that the Appellants pay, on an indemnity basis, UMS’s costs for the days of the hearing of the trial.
Disposition of the Second Reasons Grounds of Appeal
184.
For the reasons given, grounds 9, 10 and 11 must be rejected.
DISPOSITION OF THE APPEAL
185.
For the reasons set out above, the appeal will be dismissed, with costs.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and eighty-five (185) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices McKerracher and Anderson .
Associate:
Dated: 2 February 2021
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
UMS submits that, insofar as the Appellants contend that the fiduciary duties which they owed “ceased” upon their resignation from UMS in December 2017, that contention is untenable in light of particular findings made by the primary judge. UMS submits that the primary judge found that the strategy put in place by Mr Zibara and Mr Angeli, prior to the termination of their employment in December 2017, meant that UMS would not be able to obtain the benefit of the term remaining in the original contracts with the relevant players and protect UMS’s business relationship with those players: citing Foresters per Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ at [19].CONSIDERATION OF GROUNDS OF APPEAL – FIRST REASONS The Appellants’ grounds 1, 4, 6, 7 and 8 challenge the primary judge’s conclusion that Genesis had a liability to account to UMS on the pleading and upon the facts as found by the primary judge. It is therefore necessary to address the primary judge’s findings in some detail. Relevant to these grounds of appeal, the primary judge made the following findings in the First Reasons.Relevant findings of the primary judgeUMS’s business UMS is a sports management company incorporated on 6 February 1996 and its sole director is Mr Sam Ayoub. The core business of UMS consists of managing players in the Australian National Rugby League (NRL) and the competition known as the English Super League. UMS manages players in those leagues and players aspiring to play at the highest professional level in the sport: First Reasons, [15]. The activities undertaken by UMS involve, first, entering into management contracts with players under which UMS assumes obligations for a defined period to manage the interests of the players. The second aspect involves negotiating with clubs to seek to secure player contracts for the player with a particular club. As a sports management agent, UMS undertakes contract negotiations for the player with clubs and seeks to procure sponsorship arrangements and media opportunities for the player: First Reasons, [18] and [19]. The NRL has an “Accreditation Scheme” which is governed by “scheme rules”. UMS operates under those rules and, as an accredited agent, acts according to those rules: First Reasons, [20]. The Accreditation Scheme approves standard form contracts to be used between a player and a player agent where the player agent is a company and where the player agent is an individual: First Reasons, [21]. Mr Zibara commenced full-time employment with UMS on 1 November 2010 and his employment ceased on 15 December 2017. Mr Zibara’s role was to assist UMS with its business generally and, in particular, with player recruitment and management. Mr Zibara’s role involved scouting for, and securing the management by UMS of, new talented players for the NRL; supervising new and existing players on behalf of UMS; maintaining and fostering players; attending to the day to day liaison with UMS’s contracted players; and seeking to solve problems confronted by UMS’s contracted players: First Reasons, [22] and [23].