FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi S.R.L. v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2018] FCAFC 30
Appeal from: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi S.R.L. (No 12) [2016] FCA 822 File number: SAD 216 of 2017 Judges: MIDDLETON, PERRAM AND GRIFFITHS JJ Date of judgment: 13 March 2018 Catchwords: COMPETITION – alleged contravention of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – price fixing and market sharing – where relevant markets are for land cables and submarine cables in Australia – where alleged overarching international cartel arrangement or understanding – whether subsequent alleged arrangement or understanding relating to a tender on a specific project contravened Act – whether subsequent alleged arrangement or understanding gave effect to alleged overarching cartel arrangement or understanding – whether participation of one cartel member in a specific project was necessary for contraventions by other members – whether issuing a price guidance and submitting a tender gave effect to alleged arrangements or understandings
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – natural justice – whether findings of trial judge went beyond the case pleaded at trial
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
Cases cited: Betfair Pty Ltd v Racing New South Wales (2010) 189 FCR 356
Date of hearing: 26 February 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 96 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr C A Moore SC with Mr Daville Solicitor for the Appellant: Johnson Winter & Slattery Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N O’Bryan SC Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
SAD 216 of 2017 BETWEEN: PRYSMIAN CAVI E SISTEMI S.R.L.
Appellant
AND: AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION
Respondent
JUDGES:
MIDDLETON, PERRAM AND GRIFFITHS JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 MARCH 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
The appellant in this appeal is Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi (‘Prysmian’), part of a large group of companies operating at a global level as a major supplier of land and submarine energy cables.
Prysmian appeals certain orders of the primary judge made on 28 July 2017, the principal reasons for which were given in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi S.R.L. (No 12) [2016] FCA 822 (‘Reasons’).
The background to this proceeding is set out at [1]-[29] in the Reasons of the primary judge. In summary, it was alleged that Prysmian entered into an arrangement with a number of other companies involving market sharing and price fixing in the cable market (the ‘A/R Cartel Agreement’). One of the procedures envisaged by the A/R Cartel Agreement was…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 30
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Court, after considering the evidence, ruled that the allegations of price fixing and market sharing were substantiated. The court found that the evidence provided by Mr. Osada, who was involved in the arrangements, was generally reliable and supported by contemporaneous documentation. The court rejected arguments that the evidence should be excluded on various grounds, including relevance and prejudicial effects. The court held that the evidence was clear and had substantial probative value, particularly when considered alongside other documentation. The court also found that the evidence was admissible under section 78 of the Evidence Act because the facts underlying the opinions were too numerous and fleeting to be detailed in court.
The court ultimately dismissed the appeal, concluding that the ACCC's case was supported by the evidence and that the findings of the trial judge did not exceed the case pleaded at trial. The court found that the alleged cartel arrangements and understandings contravened the Trade Practices Act. The appeal was dismissed with costs, as detailed in the orders section of the judgment.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Certain paragraphs referred to in this ground are set out above in respect of ground 1, with the other paragraphs providing:[37]Mr Osada gave evidence and produced documents which the ACCC contended established the A/R Cartel Agreement and the Snowy Hydro Project Agreement. Certain aspects of his evidence were criticised by Prysmian and Nexans SA. For reasons I will give, I reject those criticisms. I find that Mr Osada was generally a satisfactory witness. There are certain matters about which Mr Osada was not able to give direct evidence and, with respect to those matters, the ACCC’s case depends on the drawing of inferences.…[55]Mr Osada described how the arrangement or understanding between the participants worked in practice in paragraphs 17-30 inclusive of his affidavit. He described the steps in the process, including the following: receipt of an inquiry as to a project; a request from the A Group or the R Group for preference; agreement at the Group level as to which group would receive preference; agreement within the Group as to who would be the allottee; factors taken into account in deciding who would be the allottee; notification of prices, and the scope of projects covered by the agreement. The respondents objected to this evidence on the ground that it could not be admitted because it was irrelevant (s 56(2) of the Evidence Act) and that it infringed the opinion rule (s 76(1) of the Evidence Act). In addition, the respondents submitted that it should not be admitted because the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to them, the evidence was misleading or confusing or would cause or result in undue waste of time (s 135 of the Evidence Act). I ruled that the evidence should be admitted and I said that I would give my reasons for that ruling in my reasons on the substantive application.[56]The evidence was plainly relevant because it went to the existence of the A/R Cartel Agreement. As I understood it, the gravamen of the respondents’ objection was that the statements by Mr Osada were expressions of opinion and were rendered inadmissible by the opinion rule. The statements were inferences from observed and communicable data (Lithgow City Council v Jackson [2011] HCA 36; (2011) 244 CLR 352 (“Lithgow City Council v Jackson”) at [27] per French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ). I accept that Mr Osada’s evidence in paragraphs 17-30 is expressed in very general terms and I think that it does contain a number of conclusions which are properly characterised as opinions. However, I considered that the evidence was admissible because it fell within the terms of s 78 of the Evidence Act. I accept that Mr Osada, albeit Mr Yamaguchi’s assistant, was the Japanese “window” for or in relation to the arrangement or understanding, and I accept that he had sufficient knowledge of the events about which he was to give evidence. The evidence fell within the terms of s 78 of the Evidence Act because the facts that form the basis of the opinion were so numerous and evanescent that they could not be held in the memory and detailed to the Court as they appeared to Mr Osada at the time (Lithgow City Council v Jackson at [46] per French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd and Another (2012) 207 FCR 448 at [71] and [72] per Perram J). I considered whether the evidence should be excluded by reference to one of the grounds in s 135 of the Evidence Act. I considered that the evidence was clear and, therefore, it should not be excluded on the basis that it was misleading or confusing. Nor did I think that the evidence would cause or result in undue waste of time. Although the evidence is very general, I considered that it had substantial probative value, particularly when the contemporaneous documentation was taken into account. I did not consider that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to the respondents.…[115]I accept Mr Osada’s evidence as far as it goes. As I have said, I think that he was generally a satisfactory witness and his evidence is supported by contemporaneous documentation. I say “as far as it goes” because a number of factual matters remain to be considered. For example, there are issues as to whether Prysmian and Nexans SA were parties to the A/R Cartel Agreement and whether it involved the necessary degree of commitment to be an arrangement or understanding within the Trade Practices Act. Similar issues arise in relation to the Snowy Hydro Project Agreement, particularly in light of Nexans SA’s submission that there is no evidence that it had anything to do with that agreement. The ACCC’s case involved me inferring in relation to the Snowy Hydro Project that the A Group agreed to seek an A preference, that the R Group sought an R preference, and that the A Group agreed to an R preference. I will return to these issues.CONSIDERATION