I appear together with my learned friends,
MR H.A. AIZEN and MISS E. FULLERTON, on behalf of
the second and third named respondents to the

application. (instructed by the Director of Public
Prosecutions) We understand there has been a
submitting appearance filed on behalf of the first
named respondent.

MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Weinberg.

I am not in a position to

confirm or deny suggestion that a submitting
appearance has been filed but one would perhaps
expect that that is the situation.

MR WEINBERG:

We did make that inquiry of the Registry and were assured that that was the case.

MASON CJ: Thank you. Yes, Mr Roberts.

MR ROBERTS:

Your Honours, for well over 200 years, and on one

view over 400 years, the English and Australian law
has been familiar with the statutory crime of false
pretences. It is a crime which traditionally was
concerned with the fraudulent obtaining of property.
The Connnonwealth inserted a false pretences provision
in its legislation in the year 1926 and one of the
words utilized, the subject-matter of obtaining, was
the word "benefit". According to the court below,
the insertion of that single word overturned the
traditional nature of the crime and removed it from the
area of obtaining property and, indeed, gave its
judicial imprimatur to the insertion of the crime
of false pretences into the area of revenue law. It
apparently is now a crime, false pretences, to
fraudulently give or say that you have a tax number,
a registered tax number, and obtain the non-levy of

taxation by means of so doing.
The applicant submits that an examination of

the history of the offence of false pretences,
together with an examination of the language that was
used in the provisions of 1926, will inevitably lead
to a conclusion that the decision of the majority of

the court below was in error. We further submit that
the majority also erred in its application of the
rules of statutory construction in relation to
language which, at best, is ambiguous. At worst, we

say - our point of view is it clearly does not
relate to the non-levy of tax.
If I could very briefly take Your Honours to a

potted history of the section - of false pretences -

S1T2/2/RB	2	15/9/89
Yates

if I may. Can…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Yates v Wilson

Details

AGLC: Yates v Wilson [1989] HCATrans 215
Case: [1989] HCATrans 215
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia by Franklyn Ernest Yates against a decision of the court below. The dispute centred on the interpretation of a statutory provision concerning the crime of false pretences, specifically whether it extended to the fraudulent obtaining of a "benefit" in the context of revenue law, such as avoiding the levy of taxation by falsely claiming to possess a registered tax number. The applicant argued that the insertion of the word "benefit" had incorrectly broadened the traditional scope of the offence, which historically focused on the fraudulent obtaining of property.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the court below had erred in its interpretation of the false pretences provision, particularly in its application to revenue matters, and whether it had correctly applied the rules of statutory construction to language that the applicant contended was ambiguous or clearly did not relate to the non-levy of tax. Furthermore, the High Court was required to consider the threshold difficulty of granting special leave to appeal in a case arising from the committal of an applicant for trial, as established in previous High Court jurisprudence.

The applicant's submission was that a historical examination of the offence of false pretences, coupled with an analysis of the language used in the relevant 1926 legislative provisions, would demonstrate that the majority decision of the court below was erroneous. The applicant contended that the court below had incorrectly expanded the crime into the realm of revenue law and had misapplied statutory construction principles. The High Court noted that granting special leave in such circumstances would only occur in an exceptional case.

Orders