FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WZAPH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2012] FMCA 773 |
| MIGRATION – Independent Merits Review report recommends applicant not be regarded as being owed protection obligations – application to review pursuant to s.476(1) of the Migration Act – nature of review – whether error identified must be jurisdictional. |
| Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 5E, 46A, 474, 476 & 477 Commonwealth Constitution, s.75 |
| Applicant: | WZAPH |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | CHRIS PACKER IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER |
| File Number: | PEG 244 of 2011 |
| Judgment of: | Lindsay FM |
| Hearing date: | 4 May 2012 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 4 May 2012 |
| Delivered at: | Perth |
| Delivered on: | 31 August 2012 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Hannan |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Case for Refugees |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Macliver |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
That the Application filed on 29 August 2011 be dismissed.
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
PEG 244 of 2011
| WZAPH |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| CHRIS PACKER IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant arrived by boat on Christmas Island on 18 August 2010. He made a request for a Refugee Status Assessment (hereinafter an “RSA”) on 23 September 2010.
The officer of the Department who carried out the assessment found that Australia did not owe the applicant protection obligations.
The applicant requested an Independent Merits Review (hereinafter the “IMR”).
The IMR reviewer is referred to hereinafter simply as “the reviewer”.
At the close of his review, the reviewer recommended that the applicant not be recognised as a person to whom Australia has protection obligations.
The applicant seeks order by way of declaration and injunction that would have the effect of preventing the Minister from relying upon that recommendation.
The application is made pursuant to s.476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (hereinafter “the Act”)…
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- Case
- [2012] FMCA 773
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether it possessed the jurisdiction to review the decision in question. The court had to consider the definitions and implications of privative clause decisions, as well as the exceptions to these clauses, particularly in relation to jurisdictional error. The court also had to examine the High Court's interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions in prior cases, such as Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia and Craig v The State of South Australia. Additionally, the court needed to assess the constitutionality of the legislative framework for processing offshore entry persons and their applications for protection visas, as established in Plaintiff M61/2010 v Commonwealth of Australia; Plaintiff M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth of Australia.
The court carefully considered the statutory language and the definitions provided in the Act, particularly sections 5, 474, and 476. It noted that while section 474(1) precluded review of privative clause decisions, the High Court had established that such decisions could still be reviewed if they were vitiated by jurisdictional error. The court also took into account the High Court's consideration of the constitutional adequacy of the legislative framework in the aforementioned cases. After weighing all these factors, the court concluded that it did not have the jurisdiction to review the privative clause decision in this case, as there was no jurisdictional error present.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the application filed by WZAPH on 29 August 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
That the Application filed on 29 August 2011 be dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
“Migration decision” is defined in s.5 of the Act which says:"migration decision" means: (a) a privative clause decision; or (b) a purported privative clause decision; or (c) a non-privative clause decision. All of those terms are in turn defined in the Act. Section 5 provides that a privative clause decision has the meaning given by s. 474(2). That subsection provides:(2) In this section: "privative clause decision" means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5). Subsections (4) and (5) of s.474 do not bear upon the circumstances of this case. Section 5 says that a non-privative clause decision has the meaning given by s.474(6) of the Act. That subsection simply refers back to subsections (4) and (5). In other words, they are decisions that are excluded by the very definition of privative clause decisions. Purported privative clause decision is defined in s.5E of the Act. It means:(1) In this Act, purported privative clause decision means a decision purportedly made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in purported exercise of a discretion or not), that would be a privative clause decision if there were not: (a) a failure to exercise jurisdiction; or (b) an excess of jurisdiction; in the making of the decision. (2) In this section, decision includes anything listed in subsection 474(3). Section 474(3) of the Act describes the varied array of acts and events that are included in the reference to a “decision” in s.474. Now, s.474(1) says as follows:(1) A privative clause decision: (a) is final and conclusive; and (b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and (c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. So, looking only at the text of the Act s.476(1) gives the Court a jurisdiction of which it is simultaneously deprived by s. 474(1). But the High Court made plain in Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 that s.474(1) would not prevent the Court exercising the jurisdiction to review privative clause decisions if the decision under consideration can be said to have been vitiated by jurisdictional error. Jurisdictional error is a concept best explained in High Court decisions such as Craig v The State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58. I do not propose to explicate further the meaning of jurisdictional error in these Reasons. The legal and constitutional adequacy of arrangements for the processing of off-shore entry persons and their applications for protection visas was considered by the High Court in Plaintiff M61/2010 v Commonwealth of Australia; Plaintiff M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 41.