Woodward v Australian Super Pty Ltd (formerly STA)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Woodward v Australian Super Pty Ltd (formerly STA) [2008] FCA 706

SUPERANNUATION – appeal from a determination of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal – where the SCT affirmed decisions of the first and second respondent that the applicant was not totally and permanently disabled – whether any questions of law raised on appeal – whether the SCT considered the relevant time in determining whether the applicant was totally and permanently disabled – appeal allowed.

Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth)

Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Saxby Bridge Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2003) 133 FCR 290 cited
Birdseye v Australian Securities & Investments Commission (2003) 76 ALD 321 cited
Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 considered
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 cited
Davis v Rio Tinto Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 170 followed
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 cited
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 cited
SAAP v Minister of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 cited
The Queen v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 cited
TNT Skypak International (Aust) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 175 considered
Samaras v Australian Retirement Fund Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1323 followed

NIGEL WOODWARD v AUSTRALIAN SUPER PTY LTD (FORMERLY STA), COLONIAL MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY LIMITED and SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL

QUD 114 OF 2007

LANDER J
22 MAY 2008
SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 114 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY JOCELYN FURLAN, CAROLYN RE, JANET MARTIN

BETWEEN:

NIGEL WOODWARD
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN SUPER PTY LTD (FORMERLY STA)
First Respondent

COLONIAL MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY LIMITED
Second Respondent

SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

LANDER J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 MAY 2008

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal made on 23 March 2007 be quashed.

3.The complaint to the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal be remitted to the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal for determination according to law.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 114 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY JOCELYN FURLAN, CAROLYN RE, JANET MARTIN

BETWEEN:

NIGEL WOODWARD
Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN SUPER PTY LTD (FORMERLY STA)
First Respondent

COLONIAL MUTUAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY LIMITED
Second Respondent

SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL
Third Respondent

JUDGE:

LANDER J

DATE:

22 MAY 2008

PLACE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (SCT) made on 23 March 2007. The Superannuation Complaints Tribunal is constituted by s 6 of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) (the Act). It has…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 706
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Woodward v Australian Super Pty Ltd (formerly STA), the applicant, Mr. Woodward, appealed against the decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (SCT) which dismissed his complaint against the insurer, ANZ Super. Mr. Woodward had originally lodged a claim for total and permanent disablement (TPD) insurance against ANZ Super, which was rejected. He then took his complaint to the SCT, which also dismissed his complaint. The applicant's appeal raised several questions of law, which the court was required to address. The key legal issues revolved around the admissibility of evidence, procedural fairness, and natural justice in the SCT's decision-making process.

The court considered the first issue regarding the admissibility of evidence. Mr. Woodward argued that the SCT had improperly admitted video footage and reports of private investigators, which he claimed were inadmissible due to their digital format and unsigned status. The court found that the SCT was not bound by the rules of evidence and was entitled to consider any relevant matter in any appropriate way. Therefore, the court held that the SCT did not err in admitting the evidence, and this did not constitute a question of law.

Next, the court addressed the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness and denial of natural justice. Mr. Woodward alleged that the SCT did not offer him procedural fairness and failed to provide him with natural justice. He claimed that he was not adequately informed about the proceedings, did not receive equal resources compared to the trustee and insurer, and was denied an oral hearing. The court found that none of these allegations amounted to a failure to provide procedural fairness or natural justice. The applicant had been provided with written submissions from the other parties, and the SCT had considered all submissions in making its decision. The court also noted that the SCT was not required to hold an oral hearing under the relevant legislation.

In light of the above findings, the court allowed the appeal, quashed the decision of the SCT, and remitted the complaint back to the SCT for determination according to law. The court's decision emphasized the importance of procedural fairness and natural justice in administrative tribunals, while also recognizing the flexibility that tribunals have in considering relevant evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal made on 23 March 2007 be quashed.

3. The complaint to the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal be remitted to the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal for determination according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

The SCT has been appropriately joined as the third respondent to the appeal: SAAP v Minister of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 at [43], [91], [153] and [180]. It has filed a submitting appearance which is also appropriate: The Queen v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13.The Facts The applicant was born on 1 September 1971. On 9 February 1999 the appellant joined the ANZ Super Advantage Superannuation Fund (ANZ) whilst employed by Bradflo Pty Ltd. He was in that employment from 4 January 1999 until 13 August 1999. He was a member of ANZ and was covered by the ANZ’s Insurance Policy which covered its members for TPD and death. His last insurance premium was deducted from his account on 9 September 2003. He withdrew all his superannuation on 26 September 2003 on the basis of financial hardship. On 6 November 1999 he joined the trustee as a member of its superannuation fund whilst employed as a sales representative for Ness Security Products Pty Ltd. He was covered by a Group Life Insurance Policy No. K003779 issued by the insurer. On 9 April 2001 he commenced employment with Rexel Australia Pty Ltd as a sales clerk. On Friday, 19 April 2002, whilst riding a motor cycle to his home from work, he was involved in an accident. He claims that as a result of that accident he suffered injuries to his ankles, right knee and lower back. He said he consulted a general practitioner on Sunday, 21 April 2002 and was prescribed painkillers and anti-inflammatory medication. He said he was advised by “GP doctors and took painkillers as well as muscle relaxants” and remained in his employment until 2 August 2002. He claims that he resigned on that day because of back pain, ankle pain, nightmares and “an extreme amount of pressure from management”. In October 2002, on his general practitioner’s advice, he says, he commenced employment at Mayne Armaguard. He said that that job involved very light duties and no stress. Nevertheless, he said he was unable to continue in the employment as his pain was too intense to handle even though he had been treated with painkillers and muscle relaxants. He resigned in November 2002. He became in receipt of a Disability Support Pension from Centrelink on 13 January 2003. The applicant claims that as a result of pressure exerted by Centrelink and as part of a placement by the Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service, he commenced work in August 2003 in paid employment with Northside Mini Mix. He said that he resigned from that employment on 30 June 2004 because of pain and suffering. He has not been employed since that time. On 6 August 2003, whilst the applicant was still a member of ANZ and covered by TPD Insurance, the applicant lodged a claim for TPD against ANZ which was rejected by Tower Australia Ltd (Tower), the insurer to ANZ, on 29 August 2005 and by ANZ on 26 September 2005. The claim against that trustee and insurer was for $81,000. The clause regulating a member’s entitlement under ANZ provided:3. “Total and Permanent Disablement” means the Life Insured.3.1is unable to follow his/her usual occupation with his/her employer by reason of accident or disease for the waiting period and in the opinion of [the Insurer], after consideration of medical evidence to [the Insurer’s] satisfaction is unlikely ever to be able to follow his/her usual occupation or any other occupation for which he/she could be reasonably considered qualified by education, experience or training; or3.2 has suffered the total and irrecoverable loss or the use of:a) both hands;b) both feet;c) one hand and one foot;d) the sight of both eyes;e) one hand and the sign of one eye; orf) one foot and the sight of one eye.The waiting period was defined as six months.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

However, even if there were inconsistencies between the two decisions, that would not, in my opinion, raise a question of law. It would, like the first two grounds, be an invitation to this Court to embark on a merits review.4. Inadmissible Evidence relied upon by SCT This would seem to be paragraphs 4b and 4e of the grounds in the notice of appeal but it is not a question of law in the notice of appeal. Presumably, the applicant is complaining as he says in the grounds that the Tribunal took the opinion of people with no medical qualifications. He also said in his oral submissions that the video footage was inadmissible because of its digital format. He said the reports of private investigators relating to this video footage were unsigned. There is nothing in either of those points. This is not a question of law. The SCT was not bound by the rules of evidence: s 36 of the Act. It is entitled to inform itself of any matter relevant to the review in any way it thinks appropriate: s 36(c) of the Act.5. Withholding of Natural Justice and 6. Denying Procedural Fairness I will deal with these two “grounds” together. They appear to be paragraph 2d of the questions of law and paragraph 4d of the grounds in the notice of appeal. If the SCT had denied the applicant procedural fairness, or did not offer the applicant natural justice, that could raise a question of law. The difficulty the applicant has is that he has not precisely identified the question of law which is said to be raised. During his oral submission he said that natural justice was withheld because the SCT watched the video and judged him on that. He said he was denied procedural fairness by the video being admitted. The SCT did not inform him that Australian Super Pty Ltd was to be joined and that it had changed its name. He said that he was not given the opportunity to state his case adequately. He said in his submissions:Also, I believe that the SCT denied procedural fairness to me by not giving me the opportunity to state my case adequately, compared to the opportunity that the trustee and the insurer was given. The SCT was aware and knew that I was on limited income, disability support pension, your Honour, and yet placed no limitations on the amount of money or resources that the trustee and insurer were able to use to make their submission. I believe that was not fair in that matter because I am on limited funds, and I don’t have the same resources that a big multi-national conglomerate does like that. None of the matters which the applicant identified in his submissions amount to denial of procedural fairness or a failure to provide the applicant with natural justice. In fact, the applicant made a written submission to the SCT. The SCT provided him with the submissions made by the trustee and by the insurer. The applicant’s submissions were provided to the trustee and to the insurer but neither made further submissions in reply. The applicant was notified accordingly. The submissions made by the parties were considered by the SCT in the course of making its decision. The applicant complained that he was not given an oral hearing. However, there is nothing in that complaint. The SCT had to proceed in accordance with s 34(1) of the Act and consider the matter without proceeding to an oral hearing.

Decision

Reasons for decision

LANDER J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LANDER J

Full text does not contain this section.