Woodside Burrup Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Woodside Burrup Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [2011] FCA 949

Citation: Woodside Burrup Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [2011] FCA 949
Parties: WOODSIDE BURRUP PTY LTD v CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION and JOSEPH MCDONALD and AUSTRALIAN BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER  
File number: WAD 16 of 2010
Judge: GILMOUR J
Date of judgment: 22 August 2011
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – orders for payment of compensation and penalties as well as injunctive relief by consent – whether penalties ought be paid to applicant or to the Commonwealth – construction of Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) s 49(5) – relevant considerations
Legislation: Building and Construction) s 23 Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) ss 4(1), 4(1), 38, 49(1)(b), 49(4)(a) and (c), 49(5) , s 69(1), 71
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss s 170NC, 187AB, 824
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth
Cases cited:

A & L Silvestri Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2008] FCA 466
Alfred v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2011] FCA 556
Alfred v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2011] FCA 557
Australian Building & Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) (2010) 199 IR 373
Australian Communications and Media Authority v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 178 FCR 199
Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560
Cahill v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 4) (2009) 189 IR 304
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Finance Sector Union of Australia (2007) 157 FCR 329
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v QR Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 652
Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd (No 2) (1999) 94 IR 231
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Williams (2009) 262 ALR 417
Cozadinos v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2011] FMCA 284
Cruse v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2009) 182 IR 60
Community & Public Sector Union v Telstra Corporation Ltd (2001) 108 IR 228
Draffin v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2009) 189 IR 145
Fair Work Ombudsman v Kentwood Industries Pty Ltd (No 3) [2011] FCA 579
Finance Sector Union of Australia v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2005) 224 ALR 467
Finance Sector Union of Australia v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2002] FCA 1035
Gibbs v Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of City of Altona (1992) 37 FCR 216
Hardwick v Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (2010) 198 IR 312
John Holland Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) (2009) 187 IR 400
Kelly v Fitzpatrick (2007) 166 IR 14
Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2006) 164 IR 375
McDonald v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2011] FCAFC 29
McIlwain v Ramsey Food Packaging Pty Ltd (No 4) (2006) 158…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 949
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Woodside Burrup Pty Ltd sought relief against the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) and a union official, Mr McDonald, following unlawful industrial action at Woodside's Pluto LNG Project. The dispute centred around the interpretation of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth) (BCII Act) and the appropriate recipient of the penalties and compensation awarded. The CFMEU had agreed to indemnify Woodside for certain costs and to pay Woodside compensation and penalties for the unlawful industrial action. The key legal issues were whether the penalties should be paid to Woodside or to the Commonwealth, as per s 49(5) of the BCII Act, and the appropriate quantum of penalties.

The court found that despite the respondents' cooperation in the proceedings, there was no evidence of contrition or remorse for their unlawful actions. The court considered the need for general and specific deterrence, which was underscored by the respondents' extensive history of similar conduct. The agreed penalties of $71,500 for the CFMEU and $14,300 for Mr McDonald were deemed appropriate and within the permissible range. The court rejected the Australian Building and Construction Commission's argument that the penalties should be paid to the Commonwealth, finding that the matter was for the court to decide under s 49(5) of the BCII Act. The court accepted the submissions that an order for payment to Woodside would be the usual order in such circumstances.

The court ordered that the CFMEU permanently restrain from engaging in industrial action related to specific LNG projects and indemnify Woodside for certain costs. It also ordered that the CFMEU pay Woodside compensation of $1,500,000 and penalties of $71,500, and that Mr McDonald pay penalties of $14,300. The court allowed liberty to the parties to apply regarding the costs of the issue concerning the payment of penalties.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first respondent, whether by itself, its employees or its agents or otherwise howsoever, and the second respondent, whether by himself or his agents or otherwise howsoever, be permanently restrained from:

(a) engaging in any industrial action; or

(b) threatening, organising, counselling, encouraging, procuring, or otherwise being involved in any industrial action by any person;

on or in connection with any of:

(c) the Pluto LNG Project;

(d) the North West Shelf Project; and

(e) the Browse LNG Project;

including construction and operations, and any future expansions of those projects.

Definitions

“the Browse LNG Project” means the project known by that name for the development, production and processing of petroleum and includes the off-shore and on-shore components of that project. The off-shore components of that project relate to the production of petroleum from the Brecknock, Calliance and Torosa fields located approximately 425 kilometres north of Broome, Western Australia and the on-shore components of that project relate to the on-shore processing of petroleum, currently anticipated to be located at James Price Point, near Broome, Western Australia.

“industrial action” has the meaning given in s 19 of the Fair Work Act 2009 as amended from time to time and any successor legislation but does not include protected industrial action.

“the North West Shelf Project” means the project known by that name for the development, production and processing of petroleum and includes the off-shore and on-shore components of that project. The offshore components of that project relate to the production of petroleum from various fields located in the region approximately 130 kilometres north west of Karratha, Western Australia and the on-shore components of that project relate to the on-shore processing of petroleum at the Karratha Gas Plant in Karratha, Western Australia.

“the Pluto LNG Project” means the project known by that name or by the name Pluto LNG Development Project for the development, production and processing of petroleum and includes the off-shore and on-shore components of that project. The onshore part of that project includes the construction of a single gas processing train and ancillary facilities between Onslow and the Burrup Peninsula in Western Australia.

“protected industrial action” has the meaning given in s 408 of the Fair Work Act 2009 as amended from time to time and any successor legislation.

“related body corporate” has the meaning given in s 50 of the Corporations Act 2001.

2. The first respondent indemnify the applicant for 25% of all liabilities, costs (including on an indemnity basis) and expenses which the applicant may incur as a result of or in relation to any and all claims by contractors against the applicant arising out of the industrial action at the Pluto LNG Project on 1 and 2 December 2009 to a maximum of $500,000.

3. The first respondent pay the applicant within 14 days of this order $1,500,000 as compensation for damages suffered by the applicant as a result of the above contraventions and a contribution towards its costs of and incidental to these proceedings.

AND THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT:

4. The first respondent pay the applicant within 14 days of this order a pecuniary penalty of $71,500 for (a) engaging in; and (b) being involved in unlawful industrial action in contravention of s 38 of the BCII Act.

5. The second respondent pay the applicant within 14 days of this order a pecuniary penalty of $14,300 for (a) engaging in; and (b) being involved in unlawful industrial action in contravention of s 38 of the BCII Act.

6. There be liberty to the parties to apply in relation to the costs of the issue as to whom the penalties ought be paid.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The CFMEU has also agreed to indemnify Woodside for 25% of all liabilities, costs (including on an indemnity basis) and expenses which Woodside may incur as a result of or in relation to claims by contractors against Woodside arising out of the industrial on 1 and 2 December 2009 to a maximum of $500,000. Conclusion on quantum of penalties In all the circumstances of the case, having regard to the matters set out above, including the deliberate and calculated nature of the conduct, the involvement of a senior official of the CFMEU, the large number of employees involved in the unlawful industrial action, the extent of the losses suffered by Woodside, the respondents' extensive history of prior relevant conduct, the objects of the legislation and the need for specific and general deterrence, significant penalties are warranted. Woodside and the respondents have agreed that each respondent should pay a single penalty for its contraventions of s 38 the BCII Act, by reason of the contraventions having arisen out of the same conduct. In accordance with s 49(2) of the BCII Act, the maximum penalty for each contravention of s 38 of the BCII Act is $110,000 for the CFMEU and $22,000 for McDonald. Having regard to the above matters, Woodside submits that the agreed penalties of:(a)$71,500 against the CFMEU; and (b)$14,300 against McDonald;are proportionate to the conduct and in each case in the upper range for the breaches. It submits that the quantum is thus within the permissible range for such breaches and reflects appropriately the gravity of the breaches and the other sentencing principles referred to above. The ABCC submits that the agreed penalties for each respondent is an appropriate penalty, within the permissible range of penalties for the contravention, and should be made payable to the Commonwealth. I accept these several submissions. Payment of penalties Section 49(5) of the BCII Act statesA pecuniary penalty is payable to the Commonwealth or some other person if the Court so directs. Pursuant to s 49(5) of the BCII Act, Woodside seeks an order from the Court that the respondents pay the penalty sums to it. The respondents consent to such an order. They jointly submit that an order that the penalties be paid to Woodside, in this case, would be the "usual order". The ABCC, by contrast, submits that pursuant to s 49(5), the penalties should be paid to the Commonwealth. I accept that the fact of consent of the respondents as to whom the penalties ought be paid is irrelevant. Section 49(5) of the BCII Act makes it clear that this is a matter for the Court. The ABCC submits that the "usual order" is not for the penalties to be paid to Woodside, but rather for them to be paid to the Commonwealth, as the embodiment of the public interest in vindicating the norms laid down in the BCII Act, and upholding and enforcing the law: Gibbs v Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of City of Altona (1992) 37 FCR 216 at 223. The ABCC cites, in support, the observations of Gray J that “Where a public official vindicates the law by suing for and obtaining a penalty, it is appropriate that the penalty be paid to the Consolidated Revenue Fund”: Plancor Pty Ltd v Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (2008) 171 FCR 357 at [44]. I will revisit these decisions later.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I accept that the respondents have, in the main, by their general conduct since the institution of these proceedings, demonstrated a willingness to facilitate the course of justice. They are entitled to an appropriate discount to reflect that fact. This is appropriately considered below under the rubric of ‘cooperation’. However, this conduct does not give rise to a conclusion that any of the respondents have demonstrated remorse or contrition for their unlawful actions. The respondents, whilst pragmatic, are not contrite. Cooperation The respondents have agreed facts, penalties and other remedial orders resulting in a considerable saving in resources and court time. The respondents' cooperation is a mitigating factor in the assessment of penalty. However, Woodside points out that both respondents initially filed defences not admitting any contravention of the Act. The CFMEU accepts that the whole of its conduct is relevant and that in determining the level of its co-operation the Court is entitled to note that defences were initially filed. However, it further submits as does McDonald that the mere filing of defences should not be taken as an aggravating factor in circumstances where: (a)the Rules allow for a short time in which to file a Defence (O11 rule 20) and where, in this case, the settlement involved complex multi-party negotiations which ultimately took many months to resolve; and (b)the ABCC commenced against the CFMEUW (a union registered under state industrial legislation) in WAD 27 of 2010, and where no contraventions or penalties formed part of the ultimate settlement involving that organisation. I consider that the respondents’ submissions in this regard have merit and find that there was, at a relatively early stage of the proceedings, overall, a significant degree of cooperation manifested by the respondents. Deterrence The need for general as well as specific deterrence is a major factor which requires consideration in every case. In Stuart v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2010) 185 FCR 308 Besanko and Gordon JJ said at [57]:. . . Deterrence, both general and specific, is the very reason why, at least in the case of the BCII Act, the statute imposes criminal liability on a corporation for the misdeeds of its officers of employees. It follows that deterrence lies at the heart of the imposition of a penalty on a corporate offender. In the present case, general deterrence is directed towards dissuading other corporations, unions and individuals in the industry covered by the BCII Act from engaging in similar conduct. The objects of the BCII Act also underscore the need for both general and specific deterrence. In this case the respondents' extensive history of similar conduct emphasises the need for specific deterrence to form part of the assessment of the appropriateness of the quantum agreed upon by the parties. In Cahill v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 4) Kenny J observed at [93]:The need for specific deterrence is underscored by the Union's history of similar conduct . . . and its continuing involvement in the building and construction industry.