Woodforth v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Woodforth v State of Queensland [2017] QCA 100

PARTIES:

VERONICA WOODFORTH
(applicant)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 1323 of 2016
QCAT No 8 of 2015

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act

ORIGINATING COURT:

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal – [2016] QCATA 7

DELIVERED ON:

23 May 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

8 February 2017

JUDGES:

Holmes CJ and McMurdo JA and Bond J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   Grant leave to appeal.

2.   Allow the appeal.

3.   Set aside the decision of the Appeal Tribunal of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal dated 11 January 2016.

4.   Remit the matter to the Appeal Tribunal for rehearing.

5.   The respondent to pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal to this Court.

CATCHWORDS:

HUMAN RIGHTS – DISCRIMINATION – where the applicant, who had a severe hearing impairment, reported an assault allegedly committed by her housemates to police – where the applicant alleged that the police were unduly slow in responding to her complaint and failed to take necessary steps to organise AUSLAN interpreters – where the applicant alleged that the police discriminated against her because of her hearing impairment, in contravention of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) – where the applicant instituted proceedings in QCAT seeking orders including a public apology, training programs for the police and compensation – where s 10 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) requires a comparison between the treatment of a person with a protected attribute and a person without that attribute “in circumstances that are the same or not materially different” – where s 8 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) extends the definition of discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of a “characteristic” that is often imputed to a person with a protected attribute – where the tribunal member made the comparison required by s 10 by comparing the treatment of a person with a hearing impairment and communication difficulties against the treatment of a person without a hearing impairment but with communication difficulties – whether the appropriate comparison was between the treatment received by a person with a hearing impairment and communication difficulties and that of a person without a hearing impairment and without communication difficulties – whether difficulty in communication is a “characteristic” of a person with a hearing impairment within the meaning of s 8 or a “circumstance” in which the comparison is to be made under s 10

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 7, s 8, s 10, s 11, s 101

Lyons v The State of Queensland (2016) 90 ALJR 1107; [2016] HCA 38, cited
Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) (2003) 217 CLR 92; [2003] HCA 62, distinguished
Woodforth v State of Queensland [2014] QCAT 680, related
Woodforth v State of Queensland [2016] QCATA 7,…

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Details
Case
[2017] QCA 100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Woodforth v State of Queensland, the applicant, a woman with a severe hearing impairment, alleged that police had discriminated against her due to her disability when responding to a complaint she made about an assault. The applicant sought relief including a public apology, training for police, and compensation, claiming that the police were slow in responding to her complaint and failed to organise AUSLAN interpreters. The dispute was brought before the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT), and later the QCAT Appeal Tribunal, which ultimately dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The applicant now seeks leave to appeal to the Court on questions of law concerning the proper construction of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld).

The primary legal issues that arose in this case pertained to the correct interpretation of the Anti-Discrimination Act, specifically sections 8 and 10. Section 10 requires a comparison between the treatment of a person with a protected attribute and a person without that attribute in circumstances that are the same or not materially different. Section 8 extends the definition of discrimination to include characteristics that are often imputed to a person with a protected attribute. The key issue was whether the appropriate comparison should be made between the treatment of a person with a hearing impairment and communication difficulties and that of a person without a hearing impairment and without communication difficulties, or whether communication difficulties alone should be considered in the comparison.

The Court found that both the QCAT member and the Appeal Tribunal misconstrued the relevant provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act. The Court held that the Tribunal member failed to properly consider whether difficulty in communication is a "characteristic" of a person with a hearing impairment within the meaning of section 8 or a "circumstance" in which the comparison is to be made under section 10. Instead, the Tribunal member compared the treatment of a person with a hearing impairment and communication difficulties against the treatment of a person with communication difficulties but no hearing impairment, which the Court deemed to be an incorrect approach. This misconstruction led to an incorrect assessment of the applicant’s treatment in comparison to a person without a hearing impairment.

Based on the misconstruction of the ADA, the Court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and set aside the decision of the Appeal Tribunal. The matter was remitted to the Appeal Tribunal for rehearing in accordance with the correct interpretation of the Anti-Discrimination Act. Additionally, the Court ordered that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Grant leave to appeal.

2. Allow the appeal.

3. Set aside the decision of the Appeal Tribunal of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal dated 11 January 2016.

4. Remit the matter to the Appeal Tribunal for rehearing.

5. The respondent to pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal to this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant seeks leave to appeal against the decision of the QCAT Appeal Tribunal. An appeal lies to this Court from such a decision only on a question of law and with this Court’s leave.[3] Her proposed appeal is limited to questions of law which involve the proper construction of provisions of the ADA. This Court has heard full argument on the merits of that appeal. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the QCAT member and the Appeal Tribunal misconstrued the ADA and that leave to appeal should be granted, the appeal allowed and the case remitted to the Appeal Tribunal for determination according to law.[3]Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) s 150.Relevant facts Some of the relevant facts were found by the Tribunal member. Other facts were not the subject of findings apparently because of the Member’s understanding of what was relevant according to her construction of the ADA. In turn the Appeal Tribunal did no more than agree with such findings as the Tribunal member did make. Therefore the following are either the facts as found or the facts according to the applicant’s evidence. On the afternoon of 13 December 2011, the applicant and another resident, whom I will call C, argued with some of the other residents. The argument was about allegations that C had been defrauding one of those residents. A physical fight ensued and police were called. The applicant’s evidence was that C was assaulted by some of the others and that when the applicant tried to intervene one of the group pushed, punched and choked her and pulled her hair. One of the assailants was a woman whom I will call Mrs B. Her husband, Mr B, was the only resident of the house who did not have a hearing impairment. Mr and Mrs B were the owners and the other residents paid them rent. Four police officers arrived at the scene. Until then the police had been unaware that anyone in the house had a hearing impairment. Two of the officers attempted to speak to the applicant. Some communication was possible with the use of a police notebook. The police were assisted by Mr B who, of course, was married to one of the applicant’s alleged assailants. The applicant’s evidence was that she was able to use her own voice to ask the police whether she could have an interpreter and was told that it was too late in the night to call one. She said that the police officers at the scene were for the most part communicating with Mr B. Her evidence was that she had great difficulty communicating with the officers at the scene and did not understand what they were saying or indeed what was happening. After about an hour an ambulance arrived and the applicant and C were taken to hospital. The applicant’s brother came to the hospital and, when she was discharged about 10 hours later, took her to his house. On the following day, 14 December, the applicant wanted to return to the house to collect her possessions. She went to the Ipswich Police Station to seek assistance to do so. She went there with C. At the station, the applicant says that she tried to make a complaint that others in the house had prevented her from going back to the house to retrieve her belongings. She says that she spoke to a receptionist at the station who gave her a card with a phone number written on it. Her evidence was that she asked the receptionist to call this number using a telecommunications service called the NRS, which would have permitted the applicant, using Auslan, to communicate with the person answering the call. The receptionist said that she could not do that because it was not part of her job.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As already noted, the applicant’s case in QCAT was that in her case there had been both direct and indirect discrimination.The decision of the QCAT member After discussing the interactions between the applicant and police and setting out the arguments, the Tribunal member described the first issue as whether the applicant had been treated less favourably than a person without her impairment would be treated, in the same or similar circumstances. After making further references to the facts, the Tribunal member wrote:“[63] Notwithstanding that Ms Woodforth wanted the incidents that involved her directly dealt with instantly, she was caught up in a larger investigation involving multiple parties. The Tribunal has been provided with no evidence that the referral of the combined incidents to CIB was less favourable treatment or that hearing persons in the same or similar circumstances would have been treated more favourably to Ms Woodforth.[64]It is undisputed Ms Woodforth was advised, on a least three occasions, that the matter was being referred to the CIB and that an interpreter would be organised for a formal statement, and that it may take some time to organise.[65]On the evening of the original incident, the Tribunal accepts that the Police were unaware persons with hearing impairments were involved when they attended the scene. The description of the incident by Ms Woodforth and Police indicate that it was not unfortunately a particularly unusual incident, nor did it involve any serious injury to persons. Tribunal is satisfied the use of notebooks, and speaking with [Mr B], to communicate was appropriate in the circumstances. There was no evidence presented that the Police would not utilise other means of communication when dealing with others, who were not hearing impaired, but had communication difficulties, in the same or similar circumstances.”(my emphasis). I have emphasised those words because, as I will discuss, they reveal a critical error in the member’s reasoning. The comparison which she made was between a person with a hearing impairment and communication difficulties and another who had communication difficulties but no hearing impairment. There was no consideration of whether those communication difficulties, or more precisely, as the applicant put her case, her inability to communicate by conventional speech, was a characteristic of her impairment within s 8. That reasoning may well have affected the member’s factual findings that the applicant was treated no less favourably than a person without a hearing impairment. One of those findings was expressed as follows:[8]“Ms Woodforth attended the Police Station on a number of occasions. On her own account, on some occasions she even assisted her friend [C]. Although the Tribunal accepts Ms Woodforth made requests for an interpreter on multiple occasions, Ms Woodforth arrived unannounced and without appointment to the Police Station and had somewhat unrealistic expectations of immediate action in these circumstances. There was no evidence that a person without a hearing impairment would have received more favourable treatment than Ms Woodforth, as Ms Woodforth was dealt with by Police, they communicated with her using other means such as notes and providing phone contacts for Police Communications.”[8]Woodforth v State of Queensland [2014] QCAT 680 [66].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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