Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd v Mackay Sugar Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wilmar Sugar Australia Limited v Mackay Sugar Limited [2017] FCAFC 40

Appeal from: Mackay Sugar Limited v Wilmar Sugar Limited (No 2) [2016] FCA 1179
File number: QUD 801 of 2016
Judges: DOWSETT, JAGOT AND WHITE JJ
Date of judgment: 2 March 2017
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – oppression – Queensland sugar industry – whether primary judge erred in determining that amendments to Constitution were not oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against a member
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 232 – 233

Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth)

Sugar Industry (Real Choice in Marketing) Amendment Act 2015 (Qld)

Cases cited:

Catalano v Managing Australia Destinations Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 55; (2014) 314 ALR 62

Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658

Ghosh v NineMSN Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 334; (2015) 90 NSWLR 595

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Mackay Sugar Limited v Wilmar Sugar Australia Limited [2016] FCAFC 133

Mackay Sugar Limited v Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 1179

Wilmar Sugar Australia Limited v Queensland Sugar Limited, in the matter of Queensland Sugar Limited [2016] FCA 20; (2016) 335 ALR 72

Date of hearing: 2 December 2016
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Economic Regulator, Competition and Access
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 112
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Giles SC with Mr S Fitzpatrick
Solicitor for the Appellant: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Mr M Hodge with Ms J O’Connor
Solicitor for the First, Second and Third Respondents: McCullough Robertson Lawyers
Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: The Fourth Respondent filed a submitting appearance

ORDERS

QUD 801 of 2016
BETWEEN:

WILMAR SUGAR AUSTRALIA LIMITED ACN 098 999 985

Appellant

AND:

MACKAY SUGAR LIMITED ACN 057 463 671

First Respondent

ISIS CENTRAL SUGAR MILL COMPANY LIMITED ACN 009 657 078

Second Respondent

BUNDABERG SUGAR LIMITED ACN 077 102 526 (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

JUDGES:

DOWSETT, JAGOT AND WHITE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

2 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.Orders 2 and 3 of the orders dated 3 October 016 be set aside.

3.The declaration made on 31 October 2016 be set aside.

4.In lieu thereof, the originating process filed on 15 June 2016 be dismissed. 

5.It be declared that the amendments to the Constitution of Queensland Sugar Limited (QSL) the subject of resolution at a general meeting of members of QSL on 5 July 2016 (the 5 July 2016 amendments) are oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, the plaintiff, as a member of QSL, within the meaning of s 232(e) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

6.The parties otherwise confer and file, within seven days, proposed orders for the deletion of the 5 July 2016 amendments from the Constitution of QSL.

7.The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceeding below. 

Note:    Entry of…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 40
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd appealed against a decision of the Federal Court that amendments to the Constitution of Mackay Sugar Ltd were not oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against Wilmar. The primary judge had dismissed Wilmar's claim for relief on the basis that the 5 July 2016 resolutions were oppressive, and thus should be removed from Mackay Sugar Ltd's Constitution. The appeal was expedited given the interest of the parties in knowing their respective positions as soon as possible. The central legal issue was whether the amendments to Mackay Sugar Ltd's Constitution made on 5 July 2016 were oppressive to Wilmar under s 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Court considered whether, objectively viewed, a hypothetical reasonable commercial bystander would regard the amendments as unfair. The Court concluded that the amendments were not unfair to Wilmar and dismissed the appeal. However, the appeal was subsequently allowed, and it was declared that the amendments were oppressive to Wilmar. The Court ordered that the amendments be deleted from Mackay Sugar Ltd's Constitution and that the respondents pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and of the proceeding below.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Orders 2 and 3 of the orders dated 3 October 016 be set aside.

3. The declaration made on 31 October 2016 be set aside.

4. In lieu thereof, the originating process filed on 15 June 2016 be dismissed.

5. It be declared that the amendments to the Constitution of Queensland Sugar Limited (QSL) the subject of resolution at a general meeting of members of QSL on 5 July 2016 (the 5 July 2016 amendments) are oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, the plaintiff, as a member of QSL, within the meaning of s 232(e) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

6. The parties otherwise confer and file, within seven days, proposed orders for the deletion of the 5 July 2016 amendments from the Constitution of QSL.

7. The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceeding below.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is also common ground that the 5 July 2016 resolutions are discriminatory against Wilmar. The BIM Mills’ case before the primary judge (and on appeal) was that the discrimination was not unfair given that Wilmar had terminated its RSSA with QSL, with effect from 30 June 2017, and therefore would compete with QSL for the supply of raw sugar into the international export market and was already competing with QSL for nominations of GEIS (which, as noted, is the sugar for which the grower will bear the price exposure). Wilmar’s case was (and is) that the 5 July 2016 resolutions unfairly discriminate against Wilmar by reason of, first, disenfranchisement, in that Wilmar’s rights have been diminished from having a right to vote in respect of all four Mill Owner Director positions to a right to vote in respect of one Mill Owner Director only and, second, entrenchment, in that the BIM Mills have obtained entrenched rights to appoint a director which, under QSL’s Constitution, requires a special majority to unwind.The primary judge’s decision It is accepted by the parties that the primary judge correctly identified the test to be applied at [96] of his reasons as follows:The test is whether, objectively viewed, the hypothetical reasonable commercial bystander having regard to all the relevant circumstances would regard the amendments as unfair. At [98] the primary judge made another uncontentious observation in these terms:I accept that the question of whether the hypothetical reasonable bystander would regard the amendments as unfair within the statutory language engages an objective consideration by that hypothetical commercial bystander or hypothetical member of the circumstances which conditioned the amendments to the Constitution. It is what follows which, according to Wilmar, involves error. The primary judge, also at [98], said:Those amendments did not come out of the ether. The Constitution contains an existing method or protocol for the appointment to the Board of QSL of Mill Owner Directors. Under that system, votes were allocated in proportion to the quantity of raw sugar supplied to QSL for export. That system no doubt had rationality about it as one method because it reflected a degree of influence over the appointment of Mill Owner Directors linked to the extent of the economic interest of a particular Mill Owner Member in QSL measured by the volume of sugar it supplied to QSL. The power of appointment was, understandably, placed in the hands of those who supplied the most export sugar over the relevant three year period. Smaller Mill Owners were left with no meaningful say in the appointment of Mill Owner Directors. That method itself operated to discriminate between and amongst Mill Owner Members based on what might rationally be regarded as the greater or lesser interest held between and amongst those Mill Owners according to the proportion of the raw sugar they supplied to the corporation for export sale. The primary judge continued:101 However, the future is not what it used to be, in this industry. Past commitment to QSL’s future over three previous years or otherwise has no relevance to QSL’s actual future. Once Wilmar, Tully and MSF gave a Notice to Terminate their respective RSSAs, the Mill Owner Members of QSL were confronted with two choices either of which or neither of which might have been best adapted to the changing circumstances. The first choice involved continuing with the existing system which would mean that a value judgement was being made that a Mill Owner Member which supplied more than 50% of the raw sugar to QSL for export in the preceding three years should continue to control 100% of the Mill Owner Director positions (or whether there would be any Mill Owner Directors) entirely regardless of, and detached from, its commitment to QSL in the future. The other choice involved selecting a new system which, objectively viewed, has the effect that each Mill Owner Member who remains committed to QSL for the future is entitled to appoint a director but only for so long as that commitment remains. 102 Mill Owner Members which remain committed to supporting QSL by seeking to make it capable (by restructure and other disciplines) of providing a competitive offering to the Growers with whom those continuing Mill Owner Members have relationships, and to the Mill Owner Members themselves, seek, on the evidence, to secure appointments to the Board of QSL to see whether QSL can endure in the new competitive environment.…104 I accept that, for the purposes of oppression, the question is not whether one particular approach or choice is correct or incorrect or whether one particular choice confers advantages on one group as opposed to another. The question to be asked is whether it is unfair to Wilmar to select the choices inherent in the new system reflected in the 2016 amendments over the old system. Would an informed reasonable hypothetical member or bystander have thought it unfair, objectively viewed, to adopt amendments which conferred benefits upon those Mill Owner Members who continue to support QSL as compared with those Mill Owner Members who do not and who have chosen to leave their support behind (with their substantial volumes essentially lost to QSL from 1 July 2017). It may be that QSL will, by its contestable conduct, secure nominations from Growers but as Mr Basile said, it may not. Those who stay “aligned” to QSL have a direct interest in ensuring that QSL is capable of conducting the remnant business undertaking in a way which is disciplined and useful to continuing Mill Owner Members and the Growers with whom those Mill Owner Members have historically had a strong relationship. 105 I also accept that the hypothetical fully informed reasonable bystander would be fully informed about the change to circumstances both in relation to the election by Wilmar, Tully and MSF to no longer supply raw sugar for export to QSL (subject to Grower nominations that might be won by QSL) and the changes in the environment after 1 July 2017. The question the hypothetical reasonable bystander or hypothetical member will ask themselves is this: Having regard to the preferences or choices before informed industry participants seeking to deal with QSL and its position in a forward-looking way, is it unfair, objectively viewed, to implement a system, by amendments to QSL’s Constitution, that will remove Wilmar’s absolute control over the appointment of Mill Owner Directors (or whether there will be any Mill Owner Directors appointed) in circumstances where Wilmar has chosen to take the volume of its sales away from QSL as from 1 July 2017, with no prospect of that volume ever coming back (subject to any Grower nominations QSL might contestably win), and allow other Mill Owner Members who remain to appoint directors and implement their decision-making over the management of the company for the future. 106 I am satisfied that no reasonable bystander would, objectively viewed, regard the amendments as unfair. I accept that in order to be oppressive, the reasonable bystander must consider, objectively viewed, the amendments to be unfair. It is not enough that minds might differ about the choices or that there are advantages and disadvantages in the choices made by the amendments or that the amendments might operate in a way which could be regarded as “harsh”, although I do not regard the amendments as operating in that way. The question is whether the amendments are unfair objectively viewed having regard to all the relevant circumstances, from the perspective of the hypothetical reasonable commercial bystander. 107 On what basis can it be said that Mill Owner Members who have chosen to no longer have a future supply relationship with QSL, should retain the right to control the appointments of Mill Owner Directors to the Board of QSL? Plainly enough, in the period up to 30 June 2017, the departing Mill Owner Members still have, in a limited temporal sense, a fully engaged relationship with QSL. Disregarding that aspect of the matter was the vice inherent in the 2015 amendments.…110 I am satisfied that the degree and measure of the difference in the commitment to QSL as between the BIM Mills and Wilmar, Tully and MSF is critical. It informs the objective view the hypothetical reasonable bystander would reach. No doubt, the BIM Mills are considering their position. A decision has to be made by 15 December 2016. Evidence has been given by Bundaberg, ISIS and Mackay. Plainly, in some cases, portions of the SEIS are being marketed through alternative marketers. Equally plainly, the BIM Mills are profit maximising entities. However, it cannot seriously be doubted, on the evidence, that the BIM Mills are committed to seeking to make QSL an effective enduring export seller of raw sugar. Plainly, some Mill owners have engaged with Alvean and Itochu [GEI sugar marketing entities] partly because of an apprehension that QSL might not endure and partly because they need to obtain the services and experience of another exporter. However, fundamentally, the BIM Mills remain committed to QSL. In a contest between the degree of commitment as between Wilmar, Tully and MSF on the one hand and the BIM Mills on the other, it is perfectly plain that the BIM Mills have a commitment and the others do not, as to the future of QSL. 111 I am satisfied that all of these considerations and the emergence of the contestable environment for GEIS are matters which the reasonable bystander would take into account in determining whether the 2016 amendments are unfair in the statutory sense. I am not satisfied that that decision is informed by construction questions going to Article 6 of the Constitution.Appellate review

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Earlier, on 3 October 2016, the primary judge had dismissed the cross‑claim of Wilmar seeking declaratory relief and orders under s 233(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act): Mackay Sugar Limited v Wilmar Sugar Australia Ltd (No 2) [2016] FCA 1179 on the basis that the resolutions were oppressive of Wilmar, and thus should be removed from QSL’s Constitution. During the course of the trial, Wilmar had abandoned an alternative claim that the 5 July 2016 resolutions constituted a fraud on the power of shareholders or were otherwise beyond the power of QSL. On this appeal, Wilmar challenges the primary judge’s finding that the amendments to QSL’s Constitution made at the meeting on 5 July 2016 were not oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against it for the purposes of s 232 of the Corporations Act. The hearing before the primary judge and this appeal were expedited given the interest of the parties in knowing their respective positions as soon as possible and, in the BIM Mills case, before the date on which they are required to nominate whether they will continue with their current agreements with QSL, which is 15 December 2016. We notified the parties after the hearing on 2 December 2016 that it would not be possible for judgment to be delivered before 15 December 2016 so that such arrangements as might be appropriate could be made. Nevertheless, these reasons have been prepared on an expedited basis. In earlier proceedings, Yates J found that amendments to the Constitution of QSL made at a general meeting on 8 December 2015 concerning the appointment of directors were oppressive, prejudicial or discriminatory within the terms of s 232(e): Wilmar Sugar Australia Limited v Queensland Sugar Limited, in the matter of Queensland Sugar Limited [2016] FCA 20; (2016) 335 ALR 72. An appeal against that decision by the BIM Mills was dismissed by the Full Court on 6 October 2016: Mackay Sugar Limited v Wilmar Sugar Australia Limited [2016] FCAFC 133. For the reasons which follow, we consider that the appeal must be allowed and the 5 July 2016 amendments ought to be declared to be oppressive of Wilmar in its capacity as a member of QSL. Statutory provisions and principles Section 232 of the Corporations Act provides (relevantly):232 Grounds for Court orderThe Court may make an order under section 233 if:(a) the conduct of a company’s affairs; or…(c) a resolution, … of members or a class of members of a company;is …:…(e)oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.… Section 233 of the Corporations Act indicates the orders which the Court may make on an application where the conditions under s 232 are satisfied, providing (relevantly):233 Orders the Court can make(1)The Court can make any order under this section that it considers appropriate in relation to the company, including an order:…(b) that the company’s existing constitution be modified or repealed;…