Willcocks v Comcare

Case [2001] FCA 1315

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Willcocks v Comcare [2001] FCA 1315

GRAHAM K WILLCOCKS v COMCARE
A63 of 2000

FINN J
CANBERRA
13 SEPTEMBER 2001


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A63 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

GRAHAM K WILLCOCKS
APPLICANT

AND:

COMCARE
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 SEPTEMER 2001

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A63 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

GRAHAM K WILLCOCKS
APPLICANT

AND:

COMCARE
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE:

13 SEPTEMBER 2001

PLACE:

CANBERRA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (“the AAT Act”) challenging decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) that were adverse to the applicant, Graham K Willcocks, who was a claimant under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (“the SRC Act”) in respect of an injury to his lower back sustained in the course of his employment on 29 January 1996 when lifting a printer. The respondent, Comcare, admitted liability for that injury.

  2. The principal claims made by Mr Willcocks were that (i) the incident of 29 January caused, or materially contributed to, his degenerative lumbar spine condition;  and (ii) as a result of back pain and stress at work, he suffered a severe anxiety condition.

  3. Put in short form the Tribunal’s decision was that (i) the 29 January incident resulted in only a temporary aggravation of his then degenerative lumbar spine condition; (ii) Mr Willcocks’ current lower back condition was not materially contributed to by the 29 January incident; (iii) his current condition resulted from an incident in Perth in March 1996; (iv) the condition arising from that Perth incident was not materially contributed to by his employment generally or by the 29 January incident; and (v) his current psychiatric condition, likewise, was referable to the pain suffered since the Perth episode. In consequence the Tribunal concluded that, as Mr Willcocks current condition was no longer attributable to his employment, it was not compensable under the SRC Act.

  4. The Tribunal’s decision was one made on the facts as found by it.  That fact finding was made the more difficult a task not only because the applicant had both a degenerative back condition and a history of psychiatric illness which pre-dated both the 29 January and the Perth incidents, but also because of adverse findings concerning Mr Willcocks’ credibility and the reliability of the medical evidence he adduced.  In particular the Tribunal found that he consciously omitted to provide examining specialists with a full and complete history of his back condition.

  5. The challenges now made to the Tribunal’s decision proceed on a broad front.  They relate essentially to an attack on the Tribunal’s fact finding not, so it is said, for the purpose of securing (colourably) a merits…

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Details
AGLC
Willcocks v Comcare [2001] FCA 1315
Case
[2001] FCA 1315
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Willcocks v Comcare, the applicant contested the Tribunal's decision regarding the rejection of his claims for compensation related to his injury and subsequent medical condition. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had made errors in its findings of fact and had applied an unreasonable approach to the evidence presented. The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's findings were supported by the evidence and whether the reasoning was logical and reasonable.

The legal issues that the court had to address included whether the Tribunal properly characterised the 29 January incident as an injury or a disease, and whether the Tribunal's findings about the effects of the 29 January incident and the Perth incident were reasonable and supported by the evidence. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the Tribunal's rejection of certain medical evidence was justified and whether the Tribunal's reasons for its decision were adequate.

The court found that the Tribunal's findings were supported by the evidence and that the reasoning was logical and reasonable. The court dismissed the applicant's claims, stating that the Tribunal's reasons were adequate and that the applicant was attempting to re-litigate the facts. The court also noted that the practice of inflating questions of fact into questions of law is to be deprecated.

The court dismissed the application, and as a result, the applicant's claims for compensation were rejected. The court's order was that the application be dismissed, and no further legal action could be taken by the applicant regarding the rejected claims.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The second alleged error was that, in characterising the 29 January incident, the Tribunal failed to distinguish between whether it was an injury simpliciter or a disease. Given the causal significance attributed to that incident in any event – ie it was “not long lived” – the failure ascribed to the Tribunal (if failure there was) could have no operative effect.2.‘No Evidence’ and Wednesbury unreasonableness As I earlier noted, the applicant’s challenge to the Tribunal’s decision was directed primarily at its fact findings and this in the main for the purpose of suggesting that particular findings lacked probative foundation in fact and were unreasonable. The principal findings put in issue were (i) that the effects of the 29 January incident were short lived, this being in the face of “uncontradicted evidence” to the contrary; (ii) that the Perth incident was the cause of the disc prolapse that produced Mr Willcocks ongoing pain; and (iii) that the medical evidence be rejected that ascribed Mr Willcocks’ condition to the 29 January incident because of the incomplete and inaccurate histories provided to the medical practitioners. The second and third of the above can be dealt with together. For my own part I would have to say the claims made border on the astonishing. There was clear evidence of an acute episode in Perth; there was medical evidence that Mr Willcocks’ present condition could be ascribed to a degree of neural damage caused by a period of nerve compression; there was obvious reason for caution in accepting the views of the medical practitioners to the extent that they attributed the applicant’s condition to the 29 January incident; and one consultant, Dr Stevenson, who had previously provided reports based on what he described as a “seriously misleading” history, but who had later been provided by Comcare with further details of Mr Willcocks’ medical history, concluded that the 29 January incident was in line with “a minor temporary aggravation of his underlying condition” and it could not be regarded as “having in any substantial or material way contributed to his ongoing symptomatology”. In light of the above and of the evidence concerning the Perth incident and its effects, the finding made by the Tribunal in relation to the Perth incident was supported by some probative material. Neither could it be said that that finding and the partial rejection of the medical evidence were devoid of logical grounds. The distinct challenge to the finding that the 29 January incident produced a “short lived” and “temporary” aggravation of the applicant’s degenerative condition is totally without merit. It is premised upon at least some characterisations of the evidence before the Tribunal that are of doubtful accuracy – compare, for example, the assertion that Mr Willcocks was largely free of pain in 1994-1995 with his chiropractor, Dr Keynes’ notes of that period. And it challenges particular findings that were clearly open to the Tribunal, as witness its unexceptionable rejection of a brief certificate of Dr Keynes given on 30 August 1996 which was not supported by Dr Keynes’ own contemporaneous records or by his report of 14 March 2000.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J
The reasons, in my view, were more than adequate for their purpose. They ran to 25 pages; are clearly expressed; they adequately betray the Tribunal’s processes of reasoning; and they leave no doubt as to why the Tribunal considered the claims should be rejected. They well satisfy the requirements for reasons outlined by Finkelstein J in Comcare Australia v Lees (1997) 151 ALR 647 at 656.Conclusion This appeal was properly characterised by the respondent as an attempt to re-litigate the facts. The practice “of attempting to magnify and inflate questions of fact into questions of law” is to be deprecated: Blackwood Hodge (Australia) Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs (NSW) (1980) 47 FLR 131 at 145. The order of the Court is that the application be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FINN J

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