White v Designated Manager of IP Australia (No. 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

White v Designated Manager of IP Australia (No. 2) [2008] FCA 816

PATENTS – employment qualifications for a registered patent attorney under reg 20.3(3) of the Patent Regulations 1991 (Cth) and s 198(4) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) – whether employment as a sole practitioner advising clients on patent matters constitutes “employment in a company practising in patent matters on behalf of the company” under reg 20.3(3)(a)(ii) – whether a firm is a company for purposes of reg 20.3(3)(a)(ii) – whether a sole practitioner may be considered a technical assistant to himself under reg 20.3(3)(a)(i)

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – relevance of legislative purpose, context, and history when statutory text is unambiguous and plain meaning does not lead to an unreasonable result

JUDICIAL REVIEW – functus officio – whether decision-maker may substitute new decision if earlier decision is erroneous as a matter of law – natural justice – whether applicant was entitled to comment on adverse opinion materials where the materials were not “credible, relevant or significant” in that they could be dismissed from further consideration – apprehended bias – whether administrative decision-maker may express tentative opinion prior to making final decision – circumstances in which a ground not raised below may be raised on application for review

WORDS AND PHRASES – “patent attorney,” “registered patent attorney,” “technical assistant”  

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9, 50, 119
Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) ss 2.7.2, 2.7.4
Patents Act 1952 (Cth) ss 133, 134, 136, 137
Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 198(4), 200, 202

Patent Attorneys Regulations 1954 (Cth) reg 21
Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth) reg 20.3

Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 cited
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 cited
Biochem Pharma Inc v Commissioner of Patents (1998) 82 FCR 87 cited
Chiropedic Bedding Pty Ltd v Radburg Pty Ltd (2007) 74 IPR 398 cited
Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 cited
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 applied
Eli Lilly & Company v Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals (No 2) (2004) 137 FCR 573 cited
Eshetu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 71 FCR 300 discussed
Hill v Repatriation Commission (2005) 218 ALR 251 cited
Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1141 cited
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 cited
Kowalski v Domestic Violence Crisis Centre Inc (2001) 113 FCR 67 cited
Macleod v Queen (2003) 214 CLR 230 cited
Re Ministerfor Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairsv Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 cited
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 cited
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 applied
Saraswati v Queen (1991) 172 CLR 1 followed
Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 referred to
Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2007) 81 ALJR 525 cited

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 816
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of White v Designated Manager of IP Australia (No. 2) involved the applicant, White, who sought registration as a patent attorney in Australia. The applicant argued that the respondent, the Designated Manager of IP Australia, had made errors in interpreting the relevant legislation and regulations, particularly in relation to the requirements for registration and the recognition of qualifications obtained in New Zealand. The applicant also contended that the respondent failed to consider their application for registration under a specific regulation.

The court was required to determine whether the respondent had correctly interpreted the applicable legislation and regulations and whether the respondent had erred in failing to consider the applicant’s application under a specific regulation. The court also had to assess whether the applicant's claim regarding the recognition of New Zealand qualifications was valid, and if the applicant had properly raised and substantiated their claim of employment as a technical assistant.

The court found that the applicant's argument regarding the interpretation of the relevant legislation and regulations was without foundation. The court held that there was no requirement for the Australian court to interpret domestic provisions contrary to their express terms in favour of foreign provisions. The court further determined that the applicant had not properly raised the issue of their registration under the specific regulation, and the facts necessary to substantiate the claim had not been established beyond controversy. Consequently, the applicant's claims were rejected.

The court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GORDON J
Finally, the Applicant referred to the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act 1997 (Cth) (“the TTMRA”). In New Zealand, the requirements for registration are less onerous; a legal practitioner, upon passing the prescribed exams, is entitled to be registered as a patent attorney: s 100 of the Patents Act 1953 (NZ) and reg 154 of the Patent Regulations 1954 (NZ) (stating that legal practitioners are exempt from the employment experience requirement, which would otherwise be three years in the Patents Office, a patent attorney’s practice, or other employment deemed to be suitable by the Commissioner). Upon registration, that legal practitioner is immediately entitled to be registered as a patent attorney in Australia: s 18 of the TTMRA. The Applicant submitted that the Respondent committed a jurisdictional error because he failed to interpret the 1990 Patents Act and the Regulations consistently with the New Zealand provisions and the TTMRA. That contention is without foundation. There is no principle of statutory construction which requires a court in Australia to interpret a domestic provision of the law of the Commonwealth contrary to its express words but consistently with a provision of another country which is in different terms. The fact that the New Zealand provisions are different was referred to in the Johns Committee Report (see p 110). The Committee recommended that the relevant institutions in Australia (the then Commissioner of Patents and the Institutes of Patents’ Attorneys) work towards closer collaboration between the professions in the two countries and, if practical, develop a common set of qualifications for registration (Recommendation 31). All the Applicant’s submission establishes is that Recommendation 31 of the Johns Committee Report has not been adopted or achieved. There is no basis for the Applicant’s broader construction of Reg 20.3(3)(a), whether as alleged or all. Conclusion As noted earlier, a review of the statutory context, legislative history, and legislative purpose reveals an attempt to balance two competing objects: (1) the need to reduce barriers to entry and competition and thus reduce costs of patent attorney services; while (2) maintaining strict professional qualification requirements and thus safeguarding the public interest in receiving only high quality services. This understanding of context and purpose does not throw doubt on the construction of reg 20.3(3)(a) such as required by the High Court in Saraswati to justify judicial amendment of a statute or regulation that departs from the ordinary meaning. The legislative and regulatory scheme has hit on a compromise whereby in-house corporate patent practice (which would tend to be focused much more on out-of-court matters such as patent drafting and prosecution), but not ordinary law firm practice (which would tend to focus more on the giving of advice with respect to court-related matters such as validity and infringement proceedings), satisfies the registration requirements. This is entirely consistent with a legislative objective of partial deregulation while ensuring that high standards are maintained with respect to the complex technical arena of patent drafting and prosecution.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GORDON J

For the foregoing reasons, the Applicant’s construction point fails.(B) FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE APPLICANT’S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION UNDER REG 20.3(3)(A)(I) A few additional words should be said in relation to the Applicant’s argument under reg 20.3(3)(a)(i). The Respondent accepts that he did not consider the Applicant’s registration under reg 20.3(3)(a)(i). That is not surprising. He was not asked to do so. The fact that the Applicant did not ask to be registered under reg 20.3(3)(a)(i) undermines his assignment of error at both the administrative and judicial review levels. With respect to the administrative level, the rule is that the decision-maker is not obligated to make a party’s case for them: Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187]. The Applicant acknowledges this rule but submits that he did make his case in his application for registration that he had “been employed as required by paragraph 198(4)(c) of the [1990 Patents] Act.” I do not accept that this general statement was sufficient to put the Respondent on notice that the Applicant was making a case under reg 20.3(3)(a)(i). I also do not accept the Applicant’s submission that the “Respondent is required at law to consider each of the provisions of 20.3(3) before he can find that a person does not satisfy them.” In the absence of evidence or materials that would clearly put an administrative decision-maker on notice of an unarticulated claim, there is no affirmative burden on the decision-maker to scour the papers and the legislation sua sponte to see if there is a basis on which a party’s case may succeed: NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [58]-[60]; Hill v Repatriation Commission (2005) 218 ALR 251 at [105]-[107]. I am satisfied that neither the Applicant’s general statements that he had met the employment qualification nor any of the supporting materials he filed with the Respondent were such as to squarely raise his current claim that he was employed as his own (or anyone else’s) technical assistant. With respect to the Applicant’s attempt to agitate the reg 20.3(3)(a)(i) argument in this Court, “[i]t is well recognised that the Court may allow a ground of appeal even where that ground was not raised in the Court or Tribunal below but only where all of the relevant facts have been established beyond controversy or where the point is one of construction or a point of law”: SZIGW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 203 at [13] (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 (stating that failure to timely raise a point may be deemed waiver of that point). In the instant case, it is at best questionable whether all of the relevant facts that would establish beyond controversy that the Applicant has been employed as a technical assistant are before the Court. In particular, the record does not disclose that the Applicant has ever drafted a patent specification or prosecuted a patent (which is not surprising, given that evidence to that effect might also suggest that the Applicant had committed an offence under s 202 of the 1990 Patents Act): cf Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1141 at [31] (suggesting that a “technical assistant” is one who has the duty of prosecuting patent applications on behalf of clients, under the supervision of a registered patent attorney). Even accepting the Applicant’s statutory declaration at face value, it states only that he has “liaised with patent attorneys in relation to the preparation and filing of patent specifications on behalf of [his] clients.” Accordingly, the Applicant’s claim under reg 20.3(3)(a)(i) would ordinarily fail at the outset both because it was not clearly raised below and because not all of the facts necessary to make good the point have been established beyond controversy.