West v Blackgrove

Case [2012] QCA 321


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

West & Ors v Blackgrove & Anor [2012] QCA 321

PARTIES:

ROBERT JOHN WEST
(first appellant)
JOY LORRAINE WEST
(second appellant)
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE DORIS JEAN WEST
(third appellant)
v
BETTY JUNE BLACKGROVE
(first respondent)
KEITH WARREN WEST
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 5629 of 2012
SC No 8861 of 2009

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

23 November 2012

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 November 2012

JUDGES:

Holmes and Muir JJA and Daubney J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.    The appeal be allowed.

2.    The judgment of the primary judge be varied so that paragraph 7 thereof provides: “7.  There be no order as to the costs of the originating application.”.

CATCHWORDS:

SUCCESSION – ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE – DISTRIBUTION – MATTERS RELATING TO BENEFICIARIES – where first appellant and respondents surviving children of testatrix – where probate of will granted to first appellant – where second appellant wife of first appellant – where residential Thornlands property of testatrix registered in the name of second appellant at time of her death – where respondents filed an originating application in the Supreme Court claiming various matters against the first appellant with respect to the testatrix’s will, his power of attorney, and the Thornlands property – where application adjourned to civil list – where various legal correspondence was exchanged between appellants and respondents who made various allegations against each other – where interlocutory application came before Supreme Court – where orders made with respect to providing monetary figures and documentation – where appellants filed application claiming, inter alia, that respondents’ applications be struck out – where Supreme Court judge ordered matter be mediated – where no such mediation took place – where respondents applied for further orders in relation to revoking the grant of probate, removing the first appellant as trustee under the will, and disclosure – where matter set down for two day trial – where many issues where abandoned or simplified at trial – where appellants submitted respondents delayed sale of Thornlands property by, inter alia, threatening and lodging caveats – where appellants submitted this delay caused loss – where primary judge held that property could have been sold at any time as it was registered in second appellant’s name – where primary judge dismissed the respondents’ originating application with no order as to costs – whether the primary judge erred in dismissing first appellant’s claim for damages arising from the diminution in value of the property as a result of respondents preventing its earlier sale – whether the primary judge erred in hearing an application filed by the respondents rather than dismissing it peremptorily and ordering costs for the appellants

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 681(1)

Australian Transport Insurance Pty Ltd v Graeme Phillips Road Transport Insurance Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 177;

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West & Ors v Blackgrove & Anor [2012] QCA 321
Case
[2012] QCA 321
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of West v Blackgrove involved the first appellant, a son of the testatrix, who had been granted probate of his mother's will, and his wife, the second appellant. The respondents, also children of the testatrix, filed an originating application in the Supreme Court against the first appellant concerning the testatrix's will, his power of attorney, and a residential property at Thornlands that was registered in the second appellant's name at the time of the testatrix's death. The application was adjourned to the civil list, and various legal correspondence ensued, with allegations exchanged between the parties. The appellants subsequently filed an application seeking, among other things, that the respondents' applications be struck out. The Supreme Court ordered mediation, which did not occur. The respondents applied for further orders, including revoking the grant of probate, removing the first appellant as trustee under the will, and disclosure. The matter was set down for a two-day trial, with many issues abandoned or simplified. The appellants claimed that the respondents delayed the sale of the Thornlands property, causing a loss, but the primary judge dismissed the respondents' originating application with no order as to costs. The primary judge found that the property could have been sold at any time as it was registered in the second appellant's name. The appellants appealed, arguing that the primary judge erred in dismissing their claim for damages and in hearing the respondents' application without dismissing it peremptorily and ordering costs for the appellants.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the first appellant's claim for damages arising from the diminution in value of the Thornlands property and whether the primary judge erred in hearing the respondents' application rather than dismissing it peremptorily and ordering costs for the appellants. The court considered whether the primary judge applied the correct legal principles in dismissing the claim for damages and whether the primary judge erred in not dismissing the respondents' application peremptorily and ordering costs for the appellants. The court found that the primary judge erred in dismissing the claim for damages, as the appellants had established a prima facie case for damages due to the respondents' actions in delaying the sale of the property. The court also found that the primary judge erred in not dismissing the respondents' application peremptorily and ordering costs for the appellants, as the application was an abuse of process.

The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the primary judge was varied to provide that there be no order as to the costs of the originating application. The court found that the primary judge had erred in dismissing the first appellant's claim for damages and in not dismissing the respondents' application peremptorily and ordering costs for the appellants. The court held that the appellants had established a prima facie case for damages due to the respondents' actions in delaying the sale of the property, and that the respondents' application was an abuse of process. The final orders were that the appeal be allowed and that the judgment of the primary judge be varied to provide that there be no order as to the costs of the originating application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The judgment of the primary judge be varied so that paragraph 7 thereof provides: “7. There be no order as to the costs of the originating application.”.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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