FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Weeks v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 342
Citation: Weeks v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 342 Appeal from: The Taxpayer and Commissioner of Taxation [2011] AATA 499 Parties: CHERYL WEEKS v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION File number: QUD 210 of 2011 Judge: REEVES J Date of judgment: 4 April 2012 Catchwords: TAXATION – whether a termination payment was a ‘genuine redundancy payment’ per s 83-175 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) – distinction between when redundancy of position and employee no longer being utilised in a position
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – objection to private ruling of Australian Taxation Office – merits review by Administrative Appeals Tribunal – appeal to Federal Court of Australia per s 44(1) Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – nature of an appeal under s 44(1) Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – need to identify a question of law – consideration of what constitutes a question of law – question of denial of procedural fairness before the Tribunal can constitute a question of law – no relevant question of law if issue not raised before the Tribunal
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – notice of appeal to state precise question or questions of law per Rule 33.12(2)(b) of Federal Court Rules 2011 – failure to identify a question of law – self represented litigant – construing questions of law – deviation from strict requirement to state question of law with precision
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011Cases cited: Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 76 ALD 321; [2003] FCAFC 232
Bishop v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] FCA 1118
Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143
Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522; [2006] FCAFC 27
Commissioner of Taxation v Glennan (1999) 90 FCR 538; [1999] FCA 297
Dibb v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 388; [2004] FCAFC 126
Hartnett v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2004] FCA 50
Lambe v Director-General of Social Services (1981) 4 ALD 362
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16SBBF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 358
SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749; [2002] FCAFC 361
TNT Skypak International (Aust) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 175Date of hearing: 2 February 2012 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 32 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Brian Cronin Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 210 of 2011
APPEAL FROM THE…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 342
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the distinction between a redundancy of position and an employee no longer being utilised in a position, as outlined in clause 97 of the ATO (Executive Level 2) Agreement 2009 and reflected in relevant authorities. The court noted that the letter from the Assistant Commissioner indicated a voluntary redundancy on the basis that Ms Weeks' services could no longer be utilised, but it was necessary to distinguish between a redundancy of position and the redundancy of the individual employee. The court examined the submissions and the authorities to determine whether Ms Weeks' situation constituted a genuine redundancy.
The court held that the question of whether Ms Weeks was genuinely redundant had not been properly raised before the AAT, and therefore, no relevant question of law existed for the court to consider on appeal. The court also noted that the notice of appeal did not precisely state a question of law, but the court construed the questions of law in a broad manner due to the self-represented litigant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The final order of the court was that the appeal be dismissed. The matter of entry of orders is governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Ms Weeks initially sought a private ruling from the ATO regarding the tax treatment of her termination payment. After the ATO denied her request, she applied for merits review by the AAT. The AAT reviewed the matter and issued a decision that Ms Weeks' termination payment was not a 'genuine redundancy payment' under s 83-175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). Dissatisfied with the AAT's decision, Ms Weeks appealed to the Federal Court of Australia under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The Federal Court was required to identify a question of law in the appeal, and Ms Weeks' notice of appeal needed to state precise questions of law per Rule 33.12(2)(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court addressed the first issue by considering whether Ms Weeks' termination payment was a 'genuine redundancy payment' under s 83-175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The court found that the payment was not a genuine redundancy payment because it was based on Ms Weeks' acceptance of voluntary redundancy due to her services no longer being effectively utilised, rather than the disappearance of the job itself. This distinction was highlighted in The Queen v The Industrial Commission of South Australia; Ex parte Adelaide Milk Supply Co-operative Limited (1977) 16 SASR 6 and Dibb v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 388; [2004] FCAFC 126, where the court made it clear that a redundancy occurs when an employer no longer requires a job to be done by anyone, which must be distinguished from a situation where the employer no longer wants a job done by the former employee. The binding legal principle established here is that a payment based on the employee's services no longer being effectively utilised, rather than the disappearance of the job, is not a genuine redundancy payment.
Regarding the second issue, the court examined the distinction between redundancy of position and the employee no longer being utilised in a position. The court found that the distinction applies in this case, and it relied on the letter from the Assistant Commissioner which stated that Ms Weeks' services could no longer be effectively utilised and that she had accepted voluntary redundancy. This reinforces the conclusion that the payment was not a genuine redundancy payment.
In addressing the third issue, the court considered whether the failure to identify a question of law in the notice of appeal could be construed given that Ms Weeks was self-represented. The court held that the notice of appeal did not strictly comply with Rule 33.12(2)(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which requires the precise question or questions of law to be stated. However, the court was willing to construe the questions of law given Ms Weeks' self-representation, which demonstrates flexibility in the application of procedural rules for unrepresented litigants.
Lastly, the court examined whether a question of denial of procedural fairness before the Tribunal could constitute a question of law if the issue was not raised before the Tribunal. The court found that it did not constitute a question of law as the issue was not raised before the Tribunal. This decision aligns with the principle that a question of law must be relevant to the matter before the court, and in this case, the denial of procedural fairness was not raised before the Tribunal.