Weeks v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Weeks v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 342

Citation: Weeks v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 342
Appeal from: The Taxpayer and Commissioner of Taxation [2011] AATA 499
Parties: CHERYL WEEKS v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
File number: QUD 210 of 2011
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 4 April 2012
Catchwords:

TAXATION – whether a termination payment was a ‘genuine redundancy payment’ per s 83-175 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) – distinction between when redundancy of position and employee no longer being utilised in a position

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – objection to private ruling of Australian Taxation Office – merits review by Administrative Appeals Tribunal – appeal to Federal Court of Australia per s 44(1) Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – nature of an appeal under s 44(1) Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – need to identify a question of law – consideration of what constitutes a question of law – question of denial of procedural fairness before the Tribunal can constitute a question of law – no relevant question of law if issue not raised before the Tribunal

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – notice of appeal to state precise question or questions of law per Rule 33.12(2)(b) of Federal Court Rules 2011 – failure to identify a question of law – self represented litigant – construing questions of law – deviation from strict requirement to state question of law with precision

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011
Cases cited:

Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 76 ALD 321; [2003] FCAFC 232
Bishop v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] FCA 1118
Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143
Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522; [2006] FCAFC 27
Commissioner of Taxation v Glennan (1999) 90 FCR 538; [1999] FCA 297
Dibb v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 388; [2004] FCAFC 126
Hartnett v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2004] FCA 50
Lambe v Director-General of Social Services (1981) 4 ALD 362
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

The Queen v The Industrial Commission of South Australia; Ex parte Adelaide Milk Supply Co-operative Limited (1977) 16 SASR 6

SBBF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 358
SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749; [2002] FCAFC 361
TNT Skypak International (Aust) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 82 ALR 175

Date of hearing: 2 February 2012
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Brian Cronin
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 210 of 2011

APPEAL FROM THE…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 342
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Ms Weeks, sought a review of a decision by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) that a termination payment she received was not a genuine redundancy payment for the purposes of section 83-175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. The objection to the ATO's private ruling was reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), and the matter was appealed to the Federal Court of Australia. The central issue before the court was whether the termination payment was a genuine redundancy payment, which would have been tax-free under the statute. The court had to determine whether Ms Weeks' position had genuinely become redundant or if she was no longer being utilised in her position.

The court considered the distinction between a redundancy of position and an employee no longer being utilised in a position, as outlined in clause 97 of the ATO (Executive Level 2) Agreement 2009 and reflected in relevant authorities. The court noted that the letter from the Assistant Commissioner indicated a voluntary redundancy on the basis that Ms Weeks' services could no longer be utilised, but it was necessary to distinguish between a redundancy of position and the redundancy of the individual employee. The court examined the submissions and the authorities to determine whether Ms Weeks' situation constituted a genuine redundancy.

The court held that the question of whether Ms Weeks was genuinely redundant had not been properly raised before the AAT, and therefore, no relevant question of law existed for the court to consider on appeal. The court also noted that the notice of appeal did not precisely state a question of law, but the court construed the questions of law in a broad manner due to the self-represented litigant. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

The final order of the court was that the appeal be dismissed. The matter of entry of orders is governed by Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Weeks, an employee of the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), was terminated from her position. The ATO issued a termination letter, stating that her services could no longer be effectively utilised, all options for redeployment or retraining had been considered, and she had accepted an offer of voluntary redundancy. The ATO also noted that Ms Weeks' employment was terminated as she was excess to the requirements of the ATO. Ms Weeks sought a private ruling from the ATO regarding whether her termination payment was a 'genuine redundancy payment' under s 83-175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The ATO ruled that it was not, and Ms Weeks sought a merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The Tribunal Member reviewed the matter and concluded that while Ms Weeks was dismissed from employment, the critical question was whether she was genuinely redundant. The Tribunal Member considered authorities that distinguished between a redundancy occurring where a job no longer needed to be done by anyone and a situation where an employer no longer wanted a specific employee to do the job.

Ms Weeks initially sought a private ruling from the ATO regarding the tax treatment of her termination payment. After the ATO denied her request, she applied for merits review by the AAT. The AAT reviewed the matter and issued a decision that Ms Weeks' termination payment was not a 'genuine redundancy payment' under s 83-175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). Dissatisfied with the AAT's decision, Ms Weeks appealed to the Federal Court of Australia under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). The Federal Court was required to identify a question of law in the appeal, and Ms Weeks' notice of appeal needed to state precise questions of law per Rule 33.12(2)(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Then the Tribunal Member recorded the final step in the process as follows (at [22]):The final step in the process can be found in exhibit one at p 18. It is another letter from the assistant commissioner to the taxpayer. It says:I,...delegate of the Commissioner of Taxation:(1) being satisfied that you are, within the meaning of Clause 97 of the ATO (Executive Level 2) Agreement 2009, an employee whose services can no longer be effectively utilised;(2) having fully considered all possible options for redeployment or retraining that could allow you to be retained in gainful employment and whether it is in the interests of the efficient administration of the Office to assign new duties to you under s 25 of the Public Service Act 1999; and(3) having received your acceptance of an offer of voluntary redundancy;Given notice to you, ... EL2.1, that your employment as an APS employee in the ATO is terminated on the grounds that you are excess to the requirements of the ATO (s 29(3)(a) of the Public Service Act 1999).(Emphasis in original)THE TRIBUNAL DECISION In the first paragraph of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision, the Tribunal Member set out the question he was asked to consider as follows:I have been asked to decide whether [Ms Weeks’ termination] payment was a genuine redundancy payment for the purposes of s 83-175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 … The question is important because genuine redundancy payments within the meaning of that section are taxed more favourably than other payments that might be made to a person when they terminate their employment.(Emphasis in original) The Tribunal Member then recounted Ms Weeks’ employment history with the ATO (summarised above). Having done that, he turned to consider “the law”, under that heading. To begin that exercise, the Tribunal Member referred to the provisions of s 83-175(1) of the ITA Act and noted that a “genuine redundancy payment” within the meaning of that provision was “tax-free in the hands of the (former) employee”. The Tribunal Member then stated that he was “satisfied the taxpayer was dismissed from employment”, but identified the critical question as: “whether she was genuinely redundant”. The Tribunal Member noted that the letter from the Assistant Commissioner (see at [9] above) appeared to put the question beyond doubt because: “The correspondence expressly referred to a ‘voluntary redundancy’ on the basis that the taxpayer’s services could no longer be utilised.” However, the Tribunal Member then turned to consider a submission made by the Commissioner about the effect of cl 97 of the Agency Agreement. The Tribunal Member noted a distinction contained in cl 97 (particularly cl 97.2) that was reflected in various authorities on the issue, including The Queen v The Industrial Commission of South Australia; Ex parte Adelaide Milk Supply Co-operative Limited (1977) 16 SASR 6 and Dibb v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 388; [2004] FCAFC 126 at [33]–[44]. The Tribunal Member observed (at [29]) that those authorities:… make it clear that a redundancy occurs where an employer no longer requires that a job be done by anyone. That situation – where a job effectively disappears – must be distinguished from the situation in which the employer no longer wants a job done by the (former) employee in question.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court addressed the first issue by considering whether Ms Weeks' termination payment was a 'genuine redundancy payment' under s 83-175 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The court found that the payment was not a genuine redundancy payment because it was based on Ms Weeks' acceptance of voluntary redundancy due to her services no longer being effectively utilised, rather than the disappearance of the job itself. This distinction was highlighted in The Queen v The Industrial Commission of South Australia; Ex parte Adelaide Milk Supply Co-operative Limited (1977) 16 SASR 6 and Dibb v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 388; [2004] FCAFC 126, where the court made it clear that a redundancy occurs when an employer no longer requires a job to be done by anyone, which must be distinguished from a situation where the employer no longer wants a job done by the former employee. The binding legal principle established here is that a payment based on the employee's services no longer being effectively utilised, rather than the disappearance of the job, is not a genuine redundancy payment.

Regarding the second issue, the court examined the distinction between redundancy of position and the employee no longer being utilised in a position. The court found that the distinction applies in this case, and it relied on the letter from the Assistant Commissioner which stated that Ms Weeks' services could no longer be effectively utilised and that she had accepted voluntary redundancy. This reinforces the conclusion that the payment was not a genuine redundancy payment.

In addressing the third issue, the court considered whether the failure to identify a question of law in the notice of appeal could be construed given that Ms Weeks was self-represented. The court held that the notice of appeal did not strictly comply with Rule 33.12(2)(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011, which requires the precise question or questions of law to be stated. However, the court was willing to construe the questions of law given Ms Weeks' self-representation, which demonstrates flexibility in the application of procedural rules for unrepresented litigants.

Lastly, the court examined whether a question of denial of procedural fairness before the Tribunal could constitute a question of law if the issue was not raised before the Tribunal. The court found that it did not constitute a question of law as the issue was not raised before the Tribunal. This decision aligns with the principle that a question of law must be relevant to the matter before the court, and in this case, the denial of procedural fairness was not raised before the Tribunal.