Dibb v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dibb v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 126

TAXATION – termination of employment – payment made in settlement of litigation – whether an eligible termination payment under s 27A Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – was payment made as a consequence of termination – bona fide redundancy payments under s 27F Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – whether payment must be by reason of redundancy, or whether dismissal must be by reason of redundancy – whether redundancy refers to a job or an employee – consideration for personal injury under s 27A(n) of Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – allegation of personal injury – whether Commissioner must determine if injury suffered

WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘bona fide redundancy’

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 14ZAZA
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) subs 27A(1), par 27A(1)(ja), par 27A(1)(n), subs 27A(19), subs 27A(20), s 27CB, s 27F

Reseck v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1975) 133 CLR 45 followed
McIntosh v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 25 ALR 557 cited
Le Grand v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 195 ALR 194 followed
McLaurin v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1961) 104 CLR 391 considered
Short v F W Hercus Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 511 followed
South Australian decision, R v Industrial Commission (SA); Ex parte Adelaide Milk Supply Cooperative Ltd (1977) 16 SASR 6 followed
Jones v Department of Energy and Minerals (1995) 60 IR 304 followed
Quality Bakers of Australia Ltd v Goulding (95) 60 IR 327 followed

Explanatory Memorandum to Income Tax Assessment Amendment Bill (No 3) 1984 (Cth)

RAYMOND JOSEPH DIBB v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

Q 117 OF 2003

SPENDER, DOWSETT and ALLSOP JJ
13 MAY 2004
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 117 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

RAYMOND JOSEPH DIBB
APPELLANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, DOWSETT AND ALLSOP JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

13 MAY 2004

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be allowed.

2.        The orders made at first instance be set aside.

3.        The objection decision be set aside.

4.The matter be remitted to the respondent for re-consideration, having regard to the reasons of the Court.

5.There be no order as to costs unless, in the event that either party submits that a different order should be made, written submissions to that effect are forwarded to the other party and lodged with the District Registrar within fourteen days of the  date of publication of these reasons for judgment.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 117 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

RAYMOND JOSEPH DIBB
APPELLANT

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SPENDER, DOWSETT AND ALLSOP JJ

DATE:

13 MAY 2004

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

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Details
Case
[2004] FCAFC 126
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Dibb v Commissioner of Taxation, the appellant, Mr Dibb, was contesting the Commissioner's decision to vary in part and affirm a private ruling concerning his tax liability following his termination of employment and subsequent lump sum settlement. The appeal was from orders of a Judge of this Court dismissing an appeal pursuant to s 14ZAZA of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). The central issue before the court was the proper construction and application of Subdivision AA of Division 2 of Part III of the Assessment Act, specifically whether certain payments made to Mr Dibb as part of his termination settlement were eligible termination payments, and whether any part of the payment was a bona fide redundancy payment under s 27F of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.

The court examined the arguments presented by Mr Dibb, which were ultimately rejected by the primary Judge, concerning the definition of an "eligible termination payment" and the applicability of s 27F to any part of the payment. The court had to determine whether the payments, including salary, unused annual leave, and unused long service leave, were excluded from being an eligible termination payment. The court held that the appeal should be allowed, the orders made at first instance should be set aside, and the objection decision should be set aside. The matter was to be remitted to the respondent for re-consideration, taking into account the court's reasons.

The court's decision concluded with an order for the appeal to be allowed, the previous orders to be set aside, and the matter to be remitted to the Commissioner for re-consideration. The court also noted that there would be no order as to costs unless either party submitted that a different order should be made, with written submissions to be forwarded and lodged within fourteen days of the date of publication of these reasons for judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made at first instance be set aside.

3. The objection decision be set aside.

4. The matter be remitted to the respondent for re-consideration, having regard to the reasons of the Court.

5. There be no order as to costs unless, in the event that either party submits that a different order should be made, written submissions to that effect are forwarded to the other party and lodged with the District Registrar within fourteen days of the date of publication of these reasons for judgment.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from orders of a Judge of this Court dismissing an appeal pursuant to s 14ZAZA of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (the “Administration Act”) from a decision of the respondent on an objection varying in part, but otherwise affirming a private ruling under Part IVAA of the Administration Act. (See [2003] FCA 673.)RELEVANT FACTS The appellant, Mr Dibb, was for many years employed by AVCO Financial Services Ltd (“AVCO”) as a District Manager. On 12 August 1996 his employment was terminated. By a letter of that day AVCO advised the applicant he would receive a ‘termination payment’ totalling $118,860.21. This amount included salary, annual leave and accrued long service leave and also $88,296.00 described as ‘Compensation Payment (10 months)’. It was said that his 1996 bonus would be paid in March of the following year on a pro-rata basis. Mr Dibb protested at the termination on the basis that it was unlawful, harsh, unjust and unreasonable. He brought proceedings in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission seeking reinstatement under the relevant Queensland legislation. In June 1997, Commissioner Bechly refused that application, notwithstanding that, at the beginning of the hearing, AVCO had admitted that the process of termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, and that Mr Dibb did not have a reasonable opportunity to defend, contrary to relevant provisions of the Queensland Act. The Commissioner found that compensation was the appropriate remedy. He referred that matter back to the parties for negotiation, but they were unable to agree. In finding that reinstatement was not appropriate Commissioner Bechly observed:‘ The parties were referred to a further conciliation process in the charge of another member of the Commission to explore whether a mutually acceptable outcome could be reached between the parties. Although several hours were spent on this process a settlement could not be reached and the applicant determined to proceed with the formal hearing with the full knowledge of the remedies available viz reinstatement or in the event that I find that reinstatement would be impracticable, compensation as limited by the terms of the legislation, that is, that the amount must not be greater than the remuneration the employer would have been liable to pay the employee for the six months immediately following the dismissal.The evidence before me is that the respondent, for some time, has been reviewing its present operations and future direction and having determined a strategy to meet the future nature of the business, has decided that Mr Dibb did not fit the role determined as being necessary for a District Manager.This decision was made at a senior executive level in group discussions which included the Vice President Operations and Human Resources.The evidence also is that his senior group of executives cast about for an alternative position suited to the applicant’s talents but, short of creating an unnecessary role, were unable to find such a position.It appears, from the evidence, that the respondent, through acquisition of other business activities, has a variety of staff in excess of its business requirements and, like many other enterprises today, is reducing its workforce.Mr Dibb was called to Sydney to what he thought was a District Manager’s [sic] meeting. He was interviewed by the Vice President Operations Mr Colin McAllister and the Vice President Human Resources and informed of the respondent’s decision.’

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Dibb sought and obtained a private ruling (the “private ruling”) concerning his tax liability arising out of the lump sum settlement. He objected to the private ruling. It was amended slightly in response to that objection but otherwise affirmed (the “objection decision”). He then appealed to a single Judge of this Court. The private ruling and objection decision were summarised by the primary Judge at [18] and [19] of his reasons as follows:‘[18]The Commissioner in his Private Ruling dated 27 November 2001 gave the following rulings:“1.Is the payment received pursuant to a Deed of Release subsequent to dismissal from employment an eligible termination payment (ETP)? Yes.2.Does s 27F of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA 36) apply to any part of this payment? No.3.Is any part of the payment excluded from being an ETP under paragraph (n) of the definition as consideration for personal injury? No.”Objection Decision[19]On 17 January 2002 the applicant lodged an objection to the Private Ruling. In the Commissioner’s objection decision dated 18 March 2003 the same answer was given to the first three questions as in the initial Ruling. However the Commissioner varied the Ruling by deciding that the following amounts were excluded from being an ETP:$1,222.00 salary and wages$9,064.00 unused annual leave$25,472.00 unused long service leave’GROUNDS OF APPEAL Mr Dibb now appeals from that decision. Three propositions, all rejected by the primary Judge, were advanced on appeal. All three concern the proper construction and application of Subdivision AA of Division 2 of Part III of the Assessment Act (“Subdivision AA”). The phrase “eligible termination payment” is relevantly defined in s 27A(1) as follows:‘ “eligible termination payment” in relation to a taxpayer, means:(a)any payment made in respect of the taxpayer in consequence of the termination of any employment of the taxpayer, other than a payment: …(iv)of an amount to which section 26AC or 26AD applies; ...but does not include:…(ja)the tax-free amount of a bona fide redundancy payment, or of an approved early retirement scheme payment, made on or after 1 July 1994;…(n)consideration of a capital nature for, or in respect of, personal injury to the taxpayer, to the extent to which the amount or value of the consideration is, in the opinion of the Commissioner, reasonable having regard to the nature of the personal injury and its likely effect on the capacity of the taxpayer to derive income from personal exertion ...’ Subsection 27F(1) in effect defines a “bona fide redundancy payment”. It relevantly provides:‘Where: (a)an eligible termination payment is made in relation to a taxpayer in consequence of the dismissal of the taxpayer from any employment at any time (in this section referred to as the “termination time”) by reason of the bona fide redundancy of the taxpayer; (aa)if the eligible termination payment is made on or after 1 July 1994—the payment was not made to the taxpayer from an eligible superannuation fund; (b) the termination time was before: (i)if there was a date before the sixty-fifth anniversary of the birth of the taxpayer on which the termination of the employment of the taxpayer would necessarily have occurred by reason of the taxpayer attaining a particular age or completing a particular period of service—that date; or (ii)in any other case—the sixty-fifth anniversary of the birth of the taxpayer; (c)if the Commissioner, having regard to any connection between the employer and the taxpayer and to any other relevant circumstances, is satisfied that the employer and the taxpayer were not dealing with each other at arm's length in relation to the termination of the employment of the taxpayer—the amount of the eligible termination payment does not exceed the amount of an eligible termination payment that could reasonably be expected to have been made in relation to the taxpayer if the employer and the taxpayer had been dealing with each other at arm's length in relation to the termination of the employment of the taxpayer; and (d)there was, at the termination time, no agreement between the taxpayer and the employer, or the employer and another person, to employ the taxpayer after the termination time; so much of the eligible termination payment as exceeds the amount (in this section referred to as the “termination amount”) of an eligible termination payment that could reasonably be expected to have been made in relation to the taxpayer had he voluntarily retired from that employment at the termination time is a bona fide redundancy payment in relation to the taxpayer.’