FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Weeks v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 2
Citation: Weeks v Commissioner of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 2 Appeal from: Weeks v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 342 Parties: CHERYL WEEKS v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION File number: QUD 210 of 2012 Judges: DOWSETT, BESANKO AND ROBERTSON JJ Date of judgment: 25 January 2013 Catchwords: TAXATION – appeal from primary judge dismissing appeal from Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether termination payment was a “genuine redundancy payment” as defined – whether appellant dismissed from employment because her position was genuinely redundant – whether Tribunal misconstrued ATO (Executive Level 2) Agency Agreement 2009 – whether inconsistency between clauses of agency agreement
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – notice of objection to competency – whether failure to identify question of law – self-represented litigant
Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 153
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 27F(1)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 83-175(1)
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) s 29(3)(a)Cases cited: Dibb v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 388 considered
Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 applied
Zegarac v Dellios [2007] FCAFC 58 referred toDate of hearing: 19 November 2012 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 37 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms M Brennan Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 210 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: CHERYL WEEKS
Appellant
AND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
JUDGES:
DOWSETT, BESANKO AND ROBERTSON JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JANUARY 2013
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO BRISBANE)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rule 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 210 of 2012
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: CHERYL WEEKS
Appellant
AND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
JUDGES:
DOWSETT, BESANKO AND ROBERTSON JJ
DATE:
25 JANUARY 2013
PLACE:
SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO BRISBANE)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
Introduction
This appeal is from the orders of the primary judge made on 4 April 2012 that the appeal be dismissed and the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
That “appeal” was brought in the original jurisdiction of this Court under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act), which provides for an appeal to this Court from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) on a question of law. It is well established that the presence of a question of law goes to the existence of, and delimits the scope of, the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by s 44 of that Act.
Shorn of impermissible attempts on the part of the appellant to revisit findings of fact made by the Tribunal, impermissible because there is “no error of law simply in making…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Weeks v Commissioner of Taxation and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] FCAFC 2
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Full Court were whether the AAT misconstrued the ATO (Executive Level 2) Agency Agreement 2009, and if so, whether this misconstruction led to an inconsistency in the application of the agreement's clauses. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the AAT had erred in its factual findings regarding the nature of Weeks' employment termination and the existence of her position post-termination. The crux of the appeal was whether Weeks' dismissal was due to her position being genuinely redundant, thus qualifying her termination payment for tax exemption under the relevant legislation.
The Full Court found that although the Notice of Appeal was defective, it was not incompetent. The court emphasised that the appeal was to be evaluated on its merits, particularly given Weeks was self-represented. The court dismissed the new grounds that were not properly raised before the AAT, noting that leave should have been sought to rely on these grounds. Regarding the main question of whether Weeks' payment was a "genuine redundancy payment," the Full Court upheld the AAT's decision, finding no error in the Tribunal's interpretation of the law or the agency agreement. The court also found that the AAT's factual findings were supported by the evidence and did not constitute an error of law.
In conclusion, the Full Court dismissed Weeks' appeal and ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs. This outcome underscored the importance of proper procedural steps in appeals and reinforced the need for self-represented litigants to adhere to the formalities of legal proceedings. The decision highlighted the court's role in ensuring that appeals are assessed on their substantive merits while maintaining the integrity of the legal process.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rule 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge held that questions 2 and 4 were not raised before the Tribunal, could not be properly stated as questions of law in the appeal and were misconceived. The primary judge then said that questions 1 and 3 failed to address the critical question in the appeal, namely whether the appellant’s payment was made in relation to a “genuine redundancy” within the terms of s 83-175. He then identified, at [26], the following as a question of law:If an employee is terminated under s 29(3)(a) of the Public Service Act 1999 or cl 97.1 of the Agency Agreement on the grounds that, as an employee, she is excess to the requirements of the ATO, in the sense that her services can no longer be utilised, does any payment made consequent upon that termination, fall within the expression “genuine redundancy payment” under s 83-175(1) of the ITA Act?The primary judge answered that question in the negative.Consideration The appellant’s contention that the Tribunal erred in law seemed to be put in a number of shifting ways, which we shall attempt to capture. One way in which the matter was put in the course of oral submissions by the appellant to the Full Court was that the Tribunal had been distracted by the terms of cl 97.2 of the agency agreement, which we have set out above, into making the findings of fact which it did. However, in our view, while the terms of that clause served as an introduction to the findings of fact they did not have the consequence that those findings were legally impeachable such as to give rise to a question of law within the meaning of s 44 of the AAT Act. Further, in our opinion, the underlying concept of cl 97.2 of the Agency Agreement is similar to the substance of s 83-175(1) and, in referring to the terms of cl 97.2, the Tribunal was there commencing its consideration of the distinction between redundancy as generally understood and the narrower class of redundancy dealt with by s 83-175(1). Another way in which the matter was put by the appellant in the course of oral submissions was that the Tribunal had failed to make sufficiently detailed findings of fact as to the nature of the appellant’s position, contrary to the approach of the Full Court in Dibb, and had thereby erred in law so as to give rise to a question of law within the meaning of s 44 of the AAT Act. In our opinion this is a criticism of the Tribunal’s fact-finding only. The Tribunal had written statements from the relevant officers and heard those officers’ evidence in cross-examination. In Dibb, the tax appeal came to the Court in the first instance and not by way of the Tribunal so that a fuller review of the facts by the Court at first instance and on appeal to the Full Court was appropriate. In the present case, in the circumstances to which we have referred, it was not an error of law for the Tribunal to make the findings of fact which it did and as it did. A related submission was that, as in Dibb, there had been a reallocation of the appellant’s duties such that her position no longer existed. Again, this is a factual matter. The Tribunal had evidence in the present case and found that the appellant’s position had not disappeared or been reorganised out of existence.