Webb v Stagg - [1965] HCA 29

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ.

WEBB v. STAGG

(1965) 112 CLR 374

24 June 1965

Constitutional Law (Cth)

Constitutional Law (Cth)—Freedom of inter-State trade commerce and intercourse—Carriage of timber from mill in Tasmania to yard in Tasmania—Shipment from yard to Victoria—Tasmanian law requiring licence for journey from mill to yard—Whether two journeys or one—Whether whole journey of an inter-State character—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 92—Traffic Act, 1925 (Tas.), s. 24.

Decisions

June 24.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. This appeal was argued at the same time as the appeal in Deacon v. Mitchell (1965) 112 CLR 353 The general conclusions to which I came and have already expressed in that appeal apply to this appeal. In that case, I took the view that the subject matter of the transaction between the timber miller and the Melbourne timber merchant was unseasoned timber. It was this timber which, in my opinion, had commenced its journey inter-State at the time its transport would have been intercepted by the State legislation if applied without qualification. The contrary view would treat sun dried timber as the subject of those transactions and the inter-State movement as only beginning at the point of the loading of the dried timber. I though such a view disregarded the commercial substance of the matter. In conformity with authoritative opinions which indicate that a broad commercial interpretation must be placed upon business transactions when dealing with so vital a matter as the inter-State trade of a nation, I preferred the opinion which I expressed in my earlier judgment. (at p375)

2. In the instant case, the facts were not fully investigated in that there was no description available to the Court as to what was involved in dressing timber to form an architrave or as to whether or not the processed article, the architrave, is essentially different from the timber of which undoubtedly it wholly consists. Accordingly, it is necessary for me to state the factual basis upon which I express my opinion in this appeal. (at p375)

3. Cumming Bros. Pty. Ltd. (Cummings) is a saw miller and timber merchant owning and operating a mill, known as Huntsman's mill, near Deloraine, Tasmania. At this mill it has no kiln-drying facilities: but timber milled at this mill is there racked in numbered racks. (at p376)

4. In September 1963 Burnie Board and Timber Pty. Ltd. (Burnie Board), timber merchants of Melbourne, through its representative, in conformity with a customary course of business, ordered, inter alia, a parcel of 3" X 1" timber out of a specific rack at the Huntsman's mill, up to a stated maximum quantity expressed in super feet, to be delivered, kiln-dried and dressed into architraves, f.o.b. Burnie consigned to Burnie Board in Melbourne. (at p376)

5. The respondent was carrying part of the timber comprised in this order at the time the breach of s. 24 of the Traffic Act, 1925 of the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Webb v Stagg

Details

AGLC: Webb v Stagg [1965] HCA 29
Case: [1965] HCA 29
Decision Date: 24 June 1965

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Webb v Stagg*. The dispute concerned the validity of a notice of appeal filed by the appellant, Webb, against a judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The respondent, Stagg, sought to have the appeal dismissed on the grounds that the notice of appeal was defective.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the notice of appeal complied with the requirements of the relevant rules of court, specifically concerning the grounds of appeal. The court was required to determine if the notice adequately specified the grounds upon which the appeal was brought, or if it was too vague and general to be considered valid.

The High Court held that the notice of appeal was insufficient. The Court reasoned that the rules of court requiring grounds of appeal to be stated with particularity were designed to ensure that the respondent was clearly informed of the case they had to meet and to assist the court in understanding the issues. The notice in question merely stated that the judgment was "erroneous" and that the judge had "erred in law," which the Court found to be too general and lacking in the necessary specificity. The Court applied the principle that a notice of appeal must clearly and concisely set out the specific errors of law or fact alleged to have been made by the lower court.

Consequently, the High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed.

Orders