Tamar Timber Trading Co Pty Ltd v Pilkington

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ.

TAMAR TIMBER TRADING CO. PTY. LTD. v. PILKINGTON

(1968) 117 CLR 353

1 April 1968

Constitutional Law

Constitutional Law—Freedom of inter-State trade commerce and intercourse—Carriage of timber within Tasmania from sawmill to racking yard—Racked timber subsequently sold and delivered inter-State—Timber carried on public vehicle between mill and yard—No permit held for such journey as required by Tasmanian law—Whether timber subject of inter-State trade at that stage—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 92—Traffic Act (Tas.) 1925, s. 24.

Decisions


April 1.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. Tamar Timber Trading Co. Pty. Ltd. (Tamar Timber Trading), the appellant in the first matter, and Tamar Sawmilling Co. Pty. Ltd. (Tamar Sawmilling), the appellant in the second matter, are both subsidiaries of Tamar Timber Industries Pty. Ltd. That holding company has five subsidiary companies, the group being engaged, apparently, in differing aspects of the timber business in Tasmania. Tamar Timber Trading operates a sawmill at Rocherlea, near Launceston, Tamar Sawmilling operates a sawmill at Legerwood in north-eastern Tasmania, Tasmanian Timber Yard Pty. Ltd. carries on the racking operations of the group in Rocherlea, Rocherlea Timber Co. Pty. Ltd. operates a sawmill with an attached racking yard at Rocherlea, and Tamar Timber Processing Pty. Ltd. carries on the business of kiln-drying and timber-dressing at Rocherlea. (at p354)

2. On 18th August 1965 an officer of the Transport Commission of the State of Tasmania stopped two vehicles owned by Tamar Timber Trading and Tamar Sawmilling respectively whilst they were carrying green sawn timber from Legerwood. Both vehicles carried an ordinary motor vehicle registration number and were licensed as well under the Traffic Act 1925 of the State of Tasmania as ancillary vehicles. This licence restricted their use to a particular area of the State unless a permit had been issued permitting the vehicle to move out of the area (see the Traffic Act, s.24). No such permits had been issued with respect to the subject vehicles. Though when stopped by the officer they were not out of the area to which their licences restricted their use, their subsequent travel was outside that area. Complaints were laid against the appellants for unlawfully using motor vehicles as public vehicles in a place which the licences in respect thereof did not authorize the vehicles to be so used, the relevant use being the carriage of the timber outside that area. On the hearing of the complaints, each appellant claimed that s. 92 of the Constitution protected its use of its vehicle in the proved circumstances and that, accordingly, the relevant restrictions of the Traffic Act did not apply to that use. (at p355)

3. The magistrate rejected this claim and convicted each appellant as charged. They have appealed to this Court from those convictions. (at p355)

4. It was established in evidence that the timber in question had come from the sawmill at Legerwood and was in fact in due course…
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Details
Case
[1968] HCA 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Tamar Timber Trading Co Pty Ltd (the appellant) against a decision of the Supreme Court of Tasmania concerning a contract for the sale of timber. The dispute arose from allegations that the timber supplied by the appellant did not conform to the contractual specifications, leading to a claim for damages by the respondent, Pilkington.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the timber supplied by the appellant was of merchantable quality and whether it was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was sold, as required by the Sale of Goods Act 1896 (Tas). The court also had to determine the proper measure of damages to be awarded to the respondent.

The High Court, in its reasoning, affirmed the principles of the Sale of Goods Act, particularly concerning implied conditions of merchantable quality and fitness for purpose. The court examined the evidence presented regarding the quality of the timber and the respondent's intended use. It was held that the timber did not meet the required standards, and therefore, the appellant had breached the contract. The court applied established principles for assessing damages in contract cases, focusing on putting the innocent party in the position they would have been in had the contract been performed.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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