SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Wassmuth v Commissioner of Police [2018] QCA 290
PARTIES:
WASSMUTH, Candice Louise
v
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
(applicant)
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
CA No 247 of 2017
DC No 337 of 2016DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)
Appeal against ConvictionORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Townsville – Date of Conviction: 22 September 2333017 (Durward SC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
26 October 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
31 May 2018
JUDGES:
Philippides JA and North and Henry JJ
ORDERS:
1. The applicant be granted leave to appeal the judgment of the District Court made on 22 September 2017.
2. The appeal be allowed and it is ordered that the order of the District Court made on 22 September 2017 be set aside.
3. The conviction entered in the Magistrates Court at Townsville on 16 November 2016 be quashed and a verdict of not guilty be entered.
4. The parties are directed to lodge with the registry and serve written submissions as to the costs of proceedings in this Court (not to exceed two A4 pages) within 14 days of the delivery of this judgment.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS – WARRANTS – SEARCH WARRANTS – GENERALLY, ISSUE AND VALIDITY – REASONABLE GROUNDS – where the applicant was ordered to provide the access information to her mobile telephone pursuant to a search warrant – where the applicant refused to do so and was convicted of disobeying a lawful order without lawful excuse under s 205 of the Criminal Code – whether the applicant had a lawful excuse for refusing to comply with the order – alternatively whether there was a failure on behalf of the police to comply with the mandatory requirement to give written notice to the applicant
Criminal Code (Qld), s 205, s 205A
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s 5, s 154, s 154B, s 157, s 158, s 397Ballis v Randall (2007) 71 NSWLR 282; [2007] NSWSC 422, cited
Black v Breen & Anor [2000] NSWSC 987, cited
Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39, applied
McDonald v Queensland Police Service[2017] QCA 255, cited
Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277; [1908] HCA 63, applied
R v LR [2006] 1 Qd R 435; [2005] QCA 368, considered
Wright v Queensland Police Service [2002] 2 Qd R 667; [2002] QSC 46, cited
X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29, appliedCOUNSEL:
J A Greggery QC for the applicant
M L Franklin for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Purcell Taylor Lawyers for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
PHILIPPIDES JA: I agree with North J’s reasons and the additional reasons of Henry J.
NORTH J: On 16 August 2016 a Magistrate at Townsville…
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- Case
- [2018] QCA 290
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the applicant had a lawful excuse for refusing to comply with the order, based on the principle of legality, which requires clear and unambiguous words before a statutory provision will be construed as displaying a legislative intent to achieve a particular result. The court found that the statutory language was not sufficiently clear to indicate an intention to abrogate the applicant's fundamental rights. Additionally, the court found that there was a failure on behalf of the police to comply with the mandatory requirement to give written notice to the applicant, as the notice provided was not in the required form.
In light of these findings, the court granted the applicant leave to appeal the judgment of the District Court, allowed the appeal, and set aside the order made by the District Court. The conviction entered in the Magistrates Court was quashed, and a verdict of not guilty was entered in place. The parties were directed to lodge and serve written submissions as to the costs of proceedings within 14 days of the delivery of the judgment.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant be granted leave to appeal the judgment of the District Court made on 22 September 2017.
2. The appeal be allowed and it is ordered that the order of the District Court made on 22 September 2017 be set aside.
3. The conviction entered in the Magistrates Court at Townsville on 16 November 2016 be quashed and a verdict of not guilty be entered.
4. The parties are directed to lodge with the registry and serve written submissions as to the costs of proceedings in this Court (not to exceed two A4 pages) within 14 days of the delivery of this judgment.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As their Honours point out the privilege is a substantive right or privilege not merely a rule of evidence.[15] The principle has been often quoted, approved of and applied.[16] The privilege was extensively considered in Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission[17] where, for example, Kiefel J said:[18]“The principle of legality[171]As Gleeson CJ observed in Al-Kateb v Godwin, the principle of legality is not new. In 1908, O’Connor J, in Potter v Minahan, referred to a passage from the fourth edition of Maxwell on Statutes which stated that “[i]t is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness”. Absent that clarity of expression, the courts will not construe a statute as having such an operation. In Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union, Gleeson CJ said “[t]he presumption is not merely a common sense guide to what a Parliament in a liberal democracy is likely to have intended; it is a working hypothesis, the existence of which is known both to Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be interpreted. The hypothesis is an aspect of the rule of law”. The principle has been cited and applied on many occasions as a rule of statutory construction. The principle was applied in X7.[172]In Coco v The Queen, it was explained that the insistence on express authorisation of an abrogation of a fundamental right, freedom or immunity must be understood as a requirement for a manifestation or indication that the legislature not only directed its attention to the question of abrogation, but has also determined to abrogate the right, freedom or immunity. General words will rarely be sufficient to show a clear manifestation of such an intention because they will often be ambiguous on the aspect of interference with fundamental rights. The same requirement must apply to any interference with fundamental principles or departure from the general system of law to which Potter v Minahan drew attention.[173]The applicable rule of construction recognises that legislation may be taken necessarily to intend that a fundamental right, freedom or immunity be abrogated. As was pointed out in X7, it is not sufficient for such a conclusion that an implication be available or somehow thought to be desirable. The emphasis must be on the condition that the intendment is “necessary”, which suggests that it is compelled by a reading of the statute. Assumptions cannot be made. It will not suffice that a statute’s language and purpose might permit of such a construction, given what was said in Coco v The Queen.”[Footnotes omitted, emphasis added][15]Ibid at [104] and [105].[16]See for example the cases referred to by Crennan J in Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196 at [126].[17](2013) 251 CLR 196 (‘Lee’).[18]Ibid at [171]-[173]. Further, in Lee, Gageler and Keane JJ said:[19][19]Lee (2013) 251 CLR 196 at [307]-[313].“[307] The principle of construction now sought to be invoked can be traced to a statement of Marshall CJ in the Supreme Court of the United States in 1805:“Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects.”That statement, amongst others, was relied on in successive editions of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, first published in 1875, in support of the existence of a “presumption against any alteration of the law beyond the specific object of the Act”.[308]In Australia, the principle is generally traced to the adoption and application in Potter v Minahan of a passage in the fourth edition of Maxwell, published in 1905. After stating that “[t]here are certain objects which the Legislature is presumed not to intend” and that “a construction which would lead to any of them is therefore to be avoided”, the passage as quoted and applied continued:“One of these presumptions is that the Legislature does not intend to make any alteration in the law beyond what it explicitly declares, either in express terms or by implication; or, in other words, beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute. In all general matters beyond, the law remains undisturbed. It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature would overthrow fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to give any such effect to general words, simply because they have that meaning in their widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in which they were not really used.”The passage concluded:“General words and phrases, therefore, however wide and comprehensive in their literal sense, must be construed as strictly limited to the actual objects of the Act, and as not altering the law beyond.”[309]Modern exposition of the principle in this Court is to be found in the joint reasons for judgment in Bropho v Western Australia and the joint reasons of four Justices of the Court in Coco v The Queen. The joint reasons for judgment in Bropho, after referring to the existence of various “‘rules of construction’ which require clear and unambiguous words before a statutory provision will be construed as displaying a legislative intent to achieve a particular result”, stated that “[t]he rationale of all such rules lies in an assumption that the legislature would, if it intended to achieve the particular effect, have made its intention in that regard unambiguously clear”. The joint reasons for judgment described the passage in Maxwell adopted and applied in Potter as articulating “the rationale of the presumption against the modification or abolition of fundamental rights or principles”.[310]The joint reasons for judgment in Coco repeated that rationale, adopting again the same quotation. Consistently with that rationale, the joint reasons for judgment in Coco introduced the principle by stating:“The insistence on express authorisation of an abrogation or curtailment of a fundamental right, freedom or immunity must be understood as a requirement for some manifestation or indication that the legislature has not only directed its attention to the question of the abrogation or curtailment of such basic rights, freedoms or immunities but has also determined upon abrogation or curtailment of them.”Reflecting again the same rationale, the joint reasons for judgment made the additional observation that “curial insistence on a clear expression of an unmistakable and unambiguous intention to abrogate or curtail a fundamental freedom will enhance the parliamentary process by securing a greater measure of attention to the impact of legislative proposals on fundamental rights”.[311]The additional observation in Coco was echoed in a later, and now frequently cited, statement of Lord Hoffmann which explains the principle of legality as meaning that “Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost” and goes on to explain that “[f]undamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words … because there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process”.[312]More recent statements of the principle in this Court do not detract from the rationale identified in Potter, Bropho and Coco but rather reinforce that rationale. That rationale not only has deep historical roots; it serves important contemporary ends. It respects the distinct contemporary functions, enhances the distinct contemporary processes, and fulfils the shared contemporary expectations of the legislative and the judicial branches of government. As put by Gleeson CJ in Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union, in terms often since quoted with approval, the principle “is not merely a common sense guide to what a Parliament in a liberal democracy is likely to have intended; it is a working hypothesis, the existence of which is known both to Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be interpreted”. Gleeson CJ pointed out that the principle is to be applied against the background that “modern legislatures regularly enact laws that take away or modify common law rights” and that the assistance to be gained from the principle “will vary with the context in which it is applied”.[313]Application of the principle of construction is not confined to the protection of rights, freedoms or immunities that are hard-edged, of long standing or recognised and enforceable or otherwise protected at common law. The principle extends to the protection of fundamental principles and systemic values. The principle ought not, however, to be extended beyond its rationale: it exists to protect from inadvertent and collateral alteration rights, freedoms, immunities, principles and values that are important within our system of representative and responsible government under the rule of law; it does not exist to shield those rights, freedoms, immunities, principles and values from being specifically affected in the pursuit of clearly identified legislative objects by means within the constitutional competence of the enacting legislature.”[Footnotes omitted, emphasis added]