SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Wassmuth v Commissioner of Police [2018] QCA 320
PARTIES:
WASSMUTH, Candice Louise
v
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
(applicant)
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
CA No 247 of 2017
DC No 337 of 2016DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal) – Further Orders
Appeal against Conviction – Further OrdersORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Townsville – Date of Conviction: 22 September 2017 (Durward SC DCJ)
DELIVERED ON:
16 November 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
Heard on the papers
JUDGES:
Philippides JA and North and Henry JJ
ORDERS:
1. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal in this Court to be assessed on the standard basis if not otherwise agreed.
2. There be no further order as to costs.
CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – COSTS
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118, s 119
Wassmuth v Commissioner of Police[2018] QCA 290, referred to
COUNSEL:
J A Greggery QC for the applicant
M L Franklin for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Purcell Taylor Lawyers for the applicant
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent
THE COURT: On 26 October 2018 the parties were directed to lodge and serve written submissions with respect to the costs of the proceedings in this Court. For the reasons published that day the applicant was successful in obtaining a grant of leave to appeal and in the appeal under s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (“the Act”).[1]
In those premises the applicant sought an order for the costs of the appeal under s 119(2)(c) of the Act. But it is not necessary to consider this further as the parties have agreed on the orders. Accordingly it is ordered that:
(a)The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal in this Court to be assessed on the standard basis if not otherwise agreed.
(b)There be no further order as to costs.
- AGLC
- Wassmuth v Commissioner of Police [2018] QCA 320
- Case
- [2018] QCA 320
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Court of Appeal erred in its assessment of the oppressiveness of the delay and whether the appeal should be allowed on the basis of that error. The court had to consider the relevant legal principles governing oppressive pre-trial delay and whether the Court of Appeal had applied them correctly. The court also had to consider whether the delay in this case was oppressive, and if so, whether that oppressiveness justified a stay of proceedings.
In delivering the judgment of the Court, Keane JA found that the Court of Appeal had erred in its assessment of the oppressiveness of the delay. The Court of Appeal had failed to properly consider the factors relevant to determining whether the delay was oppressive, including the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and the effect of the delay on the applicant. The Court of Appeal had also failed to properly consider the effect of the delay on the applicant's right to a fair trial. The Court found that the delay in this case was oppressive and that the oppressiveness justified a stay of proceedings. The appeal was therefore allowed, and the conviction and sentence were quashed.
The orders of the Court were that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of the appeal in this Court to be assessed on the standard basis if not otherwise agreed, and that there be no further order as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal in this Court to be assessed on the standard basis if not otherwise agreed.
2. There be no further order as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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