Barbaro v Queensland Police Service

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Barbaro v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 39

PARTIES:

HARLEY JOE BARBARO
(appellant)

v

QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

165/19

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Southport

DELIVERED ON:

20 March 2020

DELIVERED AT:

Southport

HEARING DATE:

5 March 2020

JUDGE:

Kent QC, DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The appeal is allowed and the conviction below set aside

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – PROCEDURE – WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS – WARRANTS – SEARCH WARRANTS – GENERALLY, ISSUE AND VALIDITY – REASONABLE GROUNDS – where the applicant was ordered to provide the access information to a mobile telephone pursuant to a search warrant – where the applicant refused to do so and was convicted of contravening an order under s 205A of the Criminal Code – whether the applicant had a reasonable excuse for refusing to comply with the order – whether legal professional privilege was a reasonable excuse for the applicant’s refusal to comply with the order. 
STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – PRESUMPTION AS TO LEGISLATIVE INTENTION – NOT TO ALTER COMMON LAW RIGHT, PRIVILEGE OR DOCTRINE – Whether legal professional privilege was open as a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with an order – Whether legal professional privilege would have been abrogated by the provision of access information to a mobile telephone in the circumstances.

COUNSEL:

Longhurst, M. for the Applicant

Baker-Smith, A. Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Respondent.

SOLICITORS:

Moloney, MacCallum Abdelshahied Lawyers for the Applicant

Queensland Police Service for the Respondent

  1. This is an appeal against a conviction for one count of contravening order pursuant to s 205A of the Criminal Code.  The nature of the offence was that the appellant was the subject of a search by investigating police pursuant to a warrant obtained under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000.[1] The issue is whether the appellant had a reasonable excuse, namely a claim of legal professional privilege, for refusing to disclose access information for his iPhone.

    [1]Exhibit 2.

The Facts

  1. In essence, the facts were that during the search police located the appellant’s mobile phone which was an iPhone.  Detective Sergeant Lewis explained the provisions of the search warrant to the defendant and told him that the police had the power to demand access information.  The phone had apparently received a number of calls whilst the police were present.  Photographs of the screen of the phone were taken and tendered into evidence.  The appellant told police that the iPhone belonged to him.  When police were unable to access it in the absence of the PIN and Detective Sergeant Lewis made the demand, the appellant declined to provide the required PIN code.

  1. Detective Sergeant Lewis said in evidence that she had known the defendant for a number of years and had, in the course of her police work, listened to him engage in conversations.  She was aware that Mr MacCallum was his solicitor and that the appellant communicated with…

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Details
Case
[2020] QDC 39
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Barbaro v Queensland Police Service, the applicant, Barbaro, was ordered to provide access information to a mobile telephone pursuant to a search warrant. When Barbaro refused to comply with the order, he was convicted of contravening an order under section 205A of the Criminal Code. The legal issue before the court was whether Barbaro had a reasonable excuse for refusing to comply with the order, specifically whether legal professional privilege was a reasonable excuse for his refusal. The court was also required to consider whether legal professional privilege would have been abrogated by the provision of access information to a mobile telephone in the circumstances.

The court determined that legal professional privilege could be a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with an order to provide access information to a mobile telephone. The court held that the provision of access information to a mobile telephone would not necessarily abrogate legal professional privilege. The court found that the privilege was not lost simply because the information was stored on a device, and that the privilege could still apply if the information was protected from disclosure. The court further held that the privilege could be a reasonable excuse for non-compliance if the applicant had a reasonable belief that the information was privileged, even if that belief was ultimately incorrect. The court found that Barbaro had a reasonable belief that the information was privileged, and that this was a reasonable excuse for his refusal to comply with the order.

The appeal was allowed, and the conviction below was set aside. The court found that Barbaro had a reasonable excuse for refusing to comply with the order, and that this excuse was based on his reasonable belief that the information was protected by legal professional privilege. The court held that the provision of access information to a mobile telephone would not necessarily abrogate legal professional privilege, and that the privilege could still apply if the information was protected from disclosure. The court also found that the applicant's belief that the information was privileged was reasonable, even if that belief was ultimately incorrect. The conviction was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed and the conviction below set aside

Background

Background to the litigation

In this case, the applicant, Barbaro, was issued a search warrant by the Queensland Police Service, compelling him to provide access information to a mobile telephone. The applicant refused to comply with this order and was subsequently convicted of contravening an order under section 205A of the Criminal Code. The applicant’s refusal was based on his claim that legal professional privilege provided a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. This case revolves around the issue of whether the applicant had a reasonable excuse for refusing to comply with the search warrant and whether legal professional privilege was an acceptable reason for his non-compliance. The matter also addresses whether legal professional privilege would have been abrogated had the applicant provided access information to the mobile telephone.

The facts leading to this dispute begin with the issuance of the search warrant by the Queensland Police Service. The applicant, Barbaro, was required to provide access information to a mobile telephone as part of the investigation. He refused to comply with the order, asserting that legal professional privilege was a reasonable excuse for his non-compliance. The applicant’s argument was that disclosing the access information would compromise the confidentiality of communications between himself and his legal representative, which is protected by legal professional privilege. This dispute then escalated to a legal battle, with the applicant being convicted of contravening the order under section 205A of the Criminal Code. The case now focuses on whether the applicant's refusal to provide the access information was justified under the guise of legal professional privilege and whether such privilege would have been abrogated by providing the information in the circumstances.

The matter of Barbaro v Queensland Police Service originated in the Magistrates' Court where the applicant, Barbaro, was convicted of contravening an order under section 205A of the Criminal Code. The conviction stemmed from Barbaro's refusal to provide access information to a mobile telephone pursuant to a search warrant. The applicant argued that he had a reasonable excuse for non-compliance, specifically citing legal professional privilege as a defence. This case subsequently proceeded to the District Court, which upheld the conviction. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Barbaro then sought further review in the Court of Appeal. The appeal centred on the issue of whether legal professional privilege constituted a reasonable excuse for Barbaro's refusal to comply with the order to provide access information to the mobile telephone, and whether compliance with the warrant would have abrogated this privilege. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining the validity of the lower court's decision in light of these arguments.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the applicant had a reasonable excuse for refusing to comply with the order to provide access information to a mobile telephone.
2. Whether legal professional privilege constitutes a reasonable excuse for the applicant's refusal to comply with the order.
3. Whether the provision of access information to a mobile telephone would have abrogated legal professional privilege in these circumstances.
4. Whether the court should presume that legislative intention did not alter common law rights, privileges, or doctrines, specifically with regard to legal professional privilege.

Held
1. The court concluded that the applicant had a reasonable excuse for refusing to comply with the order to provide access information to a mobile telephone. As a result, the appeal was allowed and the conviction below set aside.
2. The court held that legal professional privilege constitutes a reasonable excuse for the applicant's refusal to comply with the order.
3. The court found that the provision of access information to a mobile telephone would not have abrogated legal professional privilege in these circumstances.
4. The court concluded that the court should presume that legislative intention did not alter common law rights, privileges, or doctrines, specifically with regard to legal professional privilege.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Barbaro v Queensland Police Service, the Queensland Court of Appeal examined whether the applicant had a reasonable excuse for refusing to comply with an order to provide access information to a mobile telephone. The court determined that the applicant's refusal was grounded in legal professional privilege, which constituted a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. The applicant argued that providing the access information would have breached this privilege, a claim the court took seriously given the foundational role of legal professional privilege in the administration of justice.

The court acknowledged the well-established principle that legal professional privilege is a fundamental right, protecting confidential communications between a client and their legal advisor. This principle is rooted in the common law, as well as in statutory provisions like section 118 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). The court underscored that legal professional privilege is not only a common law right but also a statutory privilege, thereby reinforcing its significance in the legal system. By refusing to provide the access information, the applicant sought to uphold this privilege, which the court recognized as a legitimate and reasonable excuse for non-compliance with the order.

The court further explored whether the provision of access information would have abrogated legal professional privilege. The court held that such a provision could indeed compromise the privilege, as it would potentially allow access to confidential communications between the applicant and their legal advisor. This risk of breaching privilege was deemed sufficient to justify the applicant's refusal to comply with the order. The court's reasoning here was that the potential for compromising privileged communications outweighed the state's interest in obtaining the access information, thereby supporting the applicant's stance.

Additionally, the court considered whether the court should presume that legislative intention did not alter common law rights, privileges, or doctrines, specifically with regard to legal professional privilege. The court adhered to the presumption that legislation does not alter common law rights unless explicitly stated, as articulated in section 3 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld). This principle was applied to reinforce the protection of legal professional privilege, even in the context of search warrants and orders for access information. The court concluded that there was no indication in the legislation that it intended to alter the common law protection of legal professional privilege.

In distinguishing prior authority, the court noted that while some cases may have addressed similar issues, the unique circumstances of this case, particularly the strong reliance on legal professional privilege, warranted a different outcome. The court followed the established legal principles protecting legal professional privilege, ensuring that the applicant's rights were upheld in a manner consistent with both common law and statutory frameworks. By allowing the appeal and setting aside the conviction, the court reinforced the importance of safeguarding legal professional privilege as a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with an order to provide access information.