Vucemillo v Ambrose
[2019] WASC 411
•18 October 2019
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: VUCEMILLO -v- AMBROSE [2019] WASC 411
CORAM: ARCHER J
HEARD: 18 OCTOBER 2019
DELIVERED : Ex tempore
FILE NO/S: SJA 1067 of 2019
BETWEEN: STEVEN JOSEPH VUCEMILLO
Appellant
AND
CHARLES ARTHUR AMBROSE
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MAGISTRATE D M WEBB
File Number : NO 474/2018
Catchwords:
Appeal against conviction - Failing to take all reasonable precautions for the safe-keeping of a firearm - Turns on its own facts
Legislation:
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA)
Firearms Act 1973 (WA)
Result:
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | J G Kitto |
| Respondent | : | M E Hemsley |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Kitto & Kitto Barristers & Solicitors |
| Respondent | : | State Solicitor for Western Australia |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Wilson [2004] NSWSC 911
Doney v The Queen [1990] HCA 51; (1990) 171 CLR 207
Ninyette v Holmes [2015] WASC 287
NSW Commissioner of Police v Eykamp [2017] NSWSC 1723
Pham v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 47
Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473
Strahan v Brennan [2014] WASC 190, 5
Turner v Keegan [2001] WASCA 9
WS v Gardin [2015] WASC 97
ARCHER J:
(This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 18 October 2019 and has been edited from the transcript.)
Background
The appellant, Mr Vucemillo, was found guilty after trial of one charge of failing to ensure the safe‑keeping of a firearm contrary to s 23(9)(a) of the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (the Act). The trial occurred on 31 January 2019 before Magistrate Webb, and her Honour delivered her decision on 1 May 2019.
Mr Vucemillo seeks leave to appeal against his conviction. The application for leave was ordered to be heard at the same time as the appeal.
Mr Vucemillo admits that the police found a loaded rifle in his bedroom on 28 February 2018. Properly understood, the ground of appeal is that the magistrate erred in finding that throughout the two days preceding the police search:
(1)the rifle had been loaded;
(2)the location of the rifle (in his bedroom) meant that the rifle was in plain view;
(3)the house was unlocked;
(4)the rifle had been in the location in which the police found it, and it had not been stored at any time during that two day period (and for no valid reason).
The respondent submits that the magistrate was right to find that the rifle had not been stored for two days. However, the respondent concedes that the magistrate erred in finding that the rifle had 'sat, loaded, in plain view, in the appellant's bedroom for two days'.[1] The respondent contends that the appeal should nevertheless be dismissed pursuant to s 14(2) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA). The respondent submits, and the evidence established, that Mr Vucemillo decided not to put the rifle back in the locked cabinet after shooting it, intending to clean it. However, he 'got busy with other stuff' and had not yet done so by the time of the police search. By that time, the rifle had been out of the locked cabinet for two days.
[1] Respondent's Outline of Submissions and List of Authorities filed 27 September 2019 [32].
I do not accept the respondent's concession.
Appeals from magistrates' decisions
The grounds on which appeals may be brought against a conviction by a magistrate are that the magistrate made an error of law or fact (or both) or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or that there has been a miscarriage of justice.[2]
[2] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 8(1).
Leave to appeal is required.[3]
[3] Criminal Appeals Act, s 9(1).
The court must not grant leave to appeal on a ground of appeal unless it is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding.[4] That means that the ground is required to have a real, rational and logical prospect of succeeding.[5]
[4] Criminal Appeals Act, s 9(2).
[5] Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473 [56].
Unless leave to appeal is granted on one or more grounds, the appeal is to be taken to have been dismissed.[6]
[6] Criminal Appeals Act, s 9(3).
Even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, the court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.[7] Generally, an immaterial or inconsequential error will not give rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice. Where an error could not have affected the outcome, an appeal court will generally be able to conclude that there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice.[8]
[7] Criminal Appeals Act, s 14(2).
[8] Ninyette v Holmes [2015] WASC 287 [65]; WS v Gardin [2015] WASC 97 [239] ‑ [241].
Further, when considering a magistrate's reasons, it is necessary to keep in mind the nature of the work of magistrates. As was pointed out by Martin CJ in Strahan v Brennan,[9] magistrates are required to conduct cases efficiently and with a degree of informality given the large volume of cases they hear each day. Accordingly:[10]
[I]t is not appropriate to scrutinise the reasons for decision given by magistrates with a fine‑tooth comb or with an eye keenly attuned to the identification of error. Nor is it appropriate for the court to infer from infelicity of language that error is thereby demonstrated. That is because, of necessity, magistrates are required to perform their important functions in a different time frame to that which applies in the superior courts and in that context it is to be expected that some infelicity of language is likely to occur from time to time.
[9] Strahan v Brennan [2014] WASC 190 [89] ‑ [90].
[10] Strahan [90].
These observations may have less weight when, as here, a magistrate has reserved their decision after a hearing and delivered it at a later date. Nevertheless, a magistrate in such a case still has a large volume of cases to deal with daily and is still faced with the requirement to conduct cases efficiently and with a degree of informality. It remains inappropriate to scrutinise their reasons with a fine‑tooth comb and it is still to be expected that some infelicity of language is likely to occur from time to time, even with reserved decisions.
The trial
The alleged offence
Section 23(9)(a) of the Act provides that:
(9)A person who, -
(a)whilst carrying, or in actual physical possession of, or having the custody or control otherwise than by way of storage of, any firearm or ammunition, fails or omits to take all reasonable precautions to ensure its safe keeping;
…
commits an offence.
The prosecution notice relevantly alleged that Mr Vucemillo had failed to take all reasonable precautions to ensure the safe‑keeping of a Mossberg Rifle .22.
The issues at trial and admissions
At the beginning of the Magistrates Court trial, counsel for Mr Vucemillo formally admitted that the Mossberg .22 rifle was a firearm under the Act and that it was loaded.[11] Counsel advised that the only live issue was whether, in all of the circumstances, Mr Vucemillo had failed or omitted to take all reasonable precautions to ensure its safekeeping.[12]
[11] ts 3, 31 January 2019.
[12] ts 4, 31 January 2019.
In the submissions filed by Mr Vucemillo in the Magistrates Court proceedings, it was admitted that, when the rifle was located by the police, it had a bullet in the breach and two in the attached magazine.
The evidence at trial
The sole witness in the trial was Detective Senior Constable Ambrose. His evidence was unchallenged and was to the following effect.
On 28 February 2018, police officers attended Mr Vucemillo's property in Morangup. When the police arrived, Mr Vucemillo was approximately 25 m from the front door of his property, getting out of his vehicle.
The police entered his home through the front door. The front door was unlocked.
The police searched the house and property, filming at times. Videos of parts of the search were tendered in evidence.
The police found the rifle in the doorway of Mr Vucemillo's bedroom, leaning up against a set of drawers.[13] In his evidence, the detective said that Mr Vucemillo had 'wanted to show us that it was the gun, but in doing so he was clearing the firearm which a round was ejected out of'. The magistrate asked the detective whether there had been a round in the barrel. The detective said 'a round in the chamber'. The magistrate asked 'in the chamber?' and the detective said 'Yes. It was a magazine attached to the bottom of his rifle which is taped here and which I believe contained two x‑rounds'.[14]
[13] ts 6, 31 January 2019 and search video.
[14] ts 6, 31 January 2019.
It appears that the actions of Mr Vucemillo in ejecting the round was not filmed by the police. However, a conversation about the rifle, showing the rifle where it had been found, was filmed shortly afterwards, in the main bedroom.
While standing next to the rifle, the police asked Mr Vucemillo 'Why is it [the rifle] here?' He replied:
Well I … I was going to clean it. I shot it the other - you know like yesterday or the night before at a … at a kangaroo and I was going to clean it and I put it there to clean it when I ... (at which point the police began talking over Mr Vucemillo).
Mr Vucemillo agreed that, when he had pulled the bolt back (in the presence of the police), a round had ejected from the chamber. He then pulled the magazine off the rifle and told the police that there were two rounds in the magazine.
Mr Vucemillo told the police that he had used the rifle 'a couple of nights before'. He said it was not in the gun cabinet because he intended to clean it, but that he then 'got busy with other stuff'.
The firearms cabinet was located at the rear of the property, about 10 ‑ 15 m away from the house.[15] The detective said that when they inspected it, the cabinet was open and empty. The detective said that there were cobwebs within the cabinet itself and it did not appear to have been used very recently.
[15] ts 8, 31 January 2019.
Having myself watched the search video, the gun cabinet looks like a tall thin metal cupboard. The door of the cabinet was open about 80 degrees. There were cobwebs on the outside of the door and on the sides of the cabinet and there were multiple cobwebs inside the cabinet. There appeared also to be multiple spider eggs. The cobwebs inside the cabinet were not simply against the interior walls but also extended into the internal space. There was a substantial cobweb towards the bottom of the cabinet, commencing from the interior doorway of the open door of the cabinet. That cobweb extended and connected to a table that was leaning against the left‑hand side of the cabinet.
The following exchange, filmed by the police, occurred at the gun cabinet:
When was the last time you took the gun out? The other day when I went to use it.
When was that? A couple of days ago.
Closing address on behalf of Mr Vucemillo
In closing submissions, counsel for Mr Vucemillo said:[16]
What you got here is unwise behaviour by the accused, leaving a loaded firearm in the corner of his room. It's not - I'm not a firearm owner. I wouldn't do it. If your Honour has a firearm licence, I'm sure you wouldn't do it. But he's not on trial for making bad decisions or exercising that discretion. He's on trial for failing to keep it safe. Where is the evidence that it was unsafe? Where is the evidence that somebody else might have got hold of it? Where is the evidence it might have been used inappropriately? Who was it going to harm?'
The magistrate's reasons for convicting
[16] ts 25, 31 January 2019.
The magistrate said:[17]
As I've previously indicated, the evidence in this case was brief and only involved the evidence of Detective Ambrose and the search video. The accused readily and willingly answered the questions of the detective and told the police he had removed the rifle from the cabinet and intended to clean it but had not in effect got around to it. At the time the police arrived at his home, the loaded rifle had been out of the cabinet for two days, and that is on the statement of the accused in the search video. There is no evidence that the accused had left the house during that two day period. There is no evidence that anyone other than the police had attended his house during that two days or, in fact, that anyone else lived at the house.
However, on the statements to the police by the accused, the loaded firearm had been sitting in his house, leaning against a cupboard in plain view in his bedroom for two days. Further, on the day the police attended, the accused was not in the house and the house was unlocked.
The section refers to 'fails or omits to take all reasonable precautions to ensure its safekeeping'. These words should be given their ordinary meaning and interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the intent and purposes of the legislation as per the High Court decision in Blue Sky.
On the facts of this case, the accused had two days prior used the firearm and for no valid reason he failed to place it back in the secured statutory compliant storage contained [sic: container] that was located no more than 15 metres from his house. When I consider the evidence of this case, I find that the accused at the relevant time did have the possession of the Mossberg rifle and that in failing to store the firearm after having used it and in leaving it loaded and in plain view in an unlocked house has without any valid reason or impediment failed or omitted to take all reasonable precautions to ensure its safekeeping. Given this finding, I am satisfied and satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution have proved this charge and accordingly I find the accused guilty.
[17] ts 11, 1 May 2019.
Appellant's submissions
Loaded
Mr Vucemillo submits that the learned magistrate could not draw the inference or make the finding that the rifle had been loaded for the previous two days and could only infer that it was loaded when Mr Vucemillo 'cleared' it[18] (in the presence of the police).
[18] Appellant's Submissions [15].
I do not accept this.
Counsel for Mr Vucemillo referred to the ambiguous evidence of the detective in the exchange with the magistrate (extracted above). Further, although, in the presence of the police, Mr Vucemillo ejected a round from the chamber, counsel argued that this did not mean the rifle was loaded. Counsel said that the technical meaning of loaded meant more than simply a bullet in the chamber. While appreciating he was, and apologising for, giving evidence from the bar table, counsel advised that it would also require the breach to be closed and the bolt to be pushed forward and down. He candidly accepted, however, that once a bullet was in the chamber, the rifle was capable of being fired with minimal further input and without the need for any additional material or component.
The magistrate did not define what she meant by 'loaded'. Her Honour may have meant loaded in the sense outlined by counsel, or loaded in what might be thought to be the layperson's idea of loaded, being that a bullet was in the chamber. It does not matter. Although the evidence of the detective in the exchange with the magistrate was ambiguous, Mr Vucemillo formally admitted at the start of the trial that the rifle had been loaded.
Mr Vucemillo told the police that he had used the rifle two days before. When he was in the bedroom being asked about the rifle, and why it was 'there', he said 'I was going to clean it and I put it there to clean it when I …'. At this point, the police began talking over him. Later, he explained that it was not in the gun cabinet because he intended to clean it, but that he then 'got busy with other stuff'.
It is certainly possible that the rifle was unloaded when he took it into the house after shooting at the kangaroo and that he later, during that two day period, loaded a round into the shotgun. However, I do not accept this is a reasonable possibility. It is pure speculation, unsupported by any evidence and inconsistent with his stated intention to clean the rifle. Why would he load an unloaded rifle he intended to clean?
Counsel for Mr Vucemillo also argued something could have occurred in the interim that caused Mr Vucemillo to load the rifle before it was found by the police. He argued that, while Mr Vucemillo may have initially simply intended to clean it, something may have happened in the interim to hijack that intention. After deciding to clean it, Mr Vucemillo may have lent the rifle to another person, or taken aim at another kangaroo, and so on.
I accept these are possibilities, and there are many others. None of them are, however, reasonable, in my view.
I accept that, obviously, Mr Vucemillo bore no burden of proof and was not required to give evidence. I accept that the police could have asked him more questions.
However, Mr Vucemillo did not say to the police that the reason he did not put the rifle back in the cabinet was because he intended to clean it, but that he then used it again and then did not put it back in the cabinet because he still intended to clean it or for some other reason. He said it was not in the cabinet because he intended to clean it but that he then 'got busy with other stuff'. He said he put it 'there' because he intended to clean it, and 'there' is where the police found it two days later. This was what he told the police. This was the evidence before the magistrate. It is pure speculation that he may have used it, or handled it, in the interim.
In my view, the only reasonable inference[19] is that, immediately after bringing the rifle inside (after shooting at the kangaroo), Mr Vucemillo put the rifle in the spot in which it was found by the police and left it there. The only reasonable inference is that, having left it there intending to clean it, and not yet having found the time to do so, he did not move it, load it, unload it, or touch it in any other way until the police arrived. The only reasonable inference is that it remained in the same location and in the same condition (loaded) until it was found by the police.
[19] Pham v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 47 [36], citing Doney v The Queen [1990] HCA 51; (1990) 171 CLR 207, 211.
In other words, the only rational inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that the rifle had been loaded throughout that two day period. No other inference is reasonably open.
In plain view
Mr Vucemillo next submits that the learned magistrate was wrong to find that the rifle was 'in plain view' because he was the only person in a position to see it.
I accept that the rifle could not have been seen by anyone other than a person inside, or looking into, the bedroom. I accept that there was no evidence that anyone other than Mr Vucemillo had been into that bedroom in that two day period and that Mr Vucemillo's home was a rural property. However, I do not accept that, in finding the rifle was in plain view, the magistrate made an error.
On a fair reading of her Honour's reasons, her Honour was clearly referring to the fact that the rifle was not concealed from the view of any person who went into the bedroom. Such a finding is relevant to the risk that the rifle could fall into the wrong hands. In NSW Commissioner of Police v Eykamp,[20] N Adams J noted that it 'is not uncommon for persons to target rural properties in order to steal weapons, knowing that occupiers of such premises are more likely to have firearms'. The learned magistrate referred to her own experience of this during the sentencing proceedings, and her comments were emphatically endorsed by counsel for Mr Vucemillo.[21]
[20] NSW Commissioner of Police v Eykamp [2017] NSWSC 1723 [95]. See also, in relation to the stringency of the requirements generally, Turner v Keegan [2001] WASCA 9 [17]; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Wilson [2004] NSWSC 911 [13] ‑ [14].
[21] ts 16 ‑ 17, 1 May 2019.
Having the rifle in plain view of anyone who entered the bedroom was less safe than, for example, if it had been wrapped up and hidden in a cupboard. While it may not have been sufficient to discharge his obligation, wrapping it up and hiding it in a cupboard was a precaution Mr Vucemillo could reasonably have taken, yet failed to take.
Home unlocked
Mr Vucemillo next submits that the magistrate erred in finding that the home had been unlocked for a two day period. I accept that it was not proved that the house had been unlocked for that period. However, I do not accept that her Honour made that finding.
Mr Vucemillo relies upon paragraph two of page 12 of her Honour's reasons. In this paragraph, her Honour said:
On the facts of this case, the accused had two days prior used the firearm and for no valid reason he failed to place it back in the secured statutory compliant storage contained that was located no more than 15 metres from his house. When I consider the evidence of this case, I find that the accused at the relevant time did have the possession of the Mossberg rifle and that in failing to store the firearm after having used it and in leaving it loaded and in plain view in an unlocked house has without any valid reason or impediment failed or omitted to take all reasonable precautions to ensure its safekeeping.
Counsel for Mr Vucemillo submitted that the reference to the house being unlocked could only be read as a finding that it was unlocked for the two day period. He agreed that the reference to 'the relevant time' was the time at which the police attended, the date of the alleged offence. However, he said that the magistrate's use of that expression was limited to the finding of possession only. He said that followed from the magistrate's next words 'in failing to store the firearm after having used it', which showed the magistrate was then talking about two days before.
There is force in this argument. I accept that the extracted passage could be interpreted as a finding that the house had been unlocked for two days. However, on a fair reading of her Honour's reasons as a whole, I do not accept that that is what her Honour meant. This is particularly given the cautions expressed by the previous Chief Justice, cited above. In my view, this was merely infelicity of language and I would not infer that the alleged error was made.
In the paragraph immediately prior to this second paragraph, her Honour said:[22]
However, on the statements to the police by the accused, the loaded firearm had been sitting in his house, leaning against a cupboard in plain view in his bedroom for two days. Further, on the day the police attended, the accused was not in the house and the house was unlocked.
[22] ts 12, 1 May 2019.
Her Honour there clearly distinguished between her findings that the firearm was loaded and in its position in the bedroom for two days, and her finding that, on the day the police attended, the house was unlocked.
Taking her Honour's reasons as a whole, I consider that her Honour meant that:
(1)Mr Vucemillo had used the rifle two days before the police arrived;
(2)after using it, he put it in the location in which it was found by the police two days later (which her Honour described as being in plain view);
(3)it was loaded when he put it there (and it remained loaded until found by the police);
(4)and at the time at which the police found the rifle, the house was unlocked.
For completeness, I add that I do not accept Mr Vucemillo's submission that the house may have been unlocked when the police arrived because he was simply retrieving something from his car. The unchallenged evidence of the detective was that the accused was getting out of his vehicle when the police arrived and that the front door was unlocked. I accept it is possible that the accused had simply left his home moments before to retrieve something from his car and was seen by the police getting out of his car when they arrived. However, there was no evidence of this and it is no more than a speculative possibility. In my view, the evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that the house had been unlocked at least for some period of time, but I accept it did not establish it had been unlocked throughout the two day period.
Not stored and no valid reason
Mr Vucemillo next submits that the magistrate was wrong to find that the rifle had not been stored for that two day period and that there was no valid reason for that. However, his written submissions are not directed to those allegations. Rather, the written submissions are directed to whether or not storage is relevant to the offence charged.
In my view, her Honour did not err in finding that the rifle had not been stored for that two day period. I hold this view for the same reasons as rejecting Mr Vucemillo's submissions about the duration in which the rifle was loaded.
While the police and Mr Vucemillo were standing next to the rifle, Mr Vucemillo was asked why the rifle was 'here'. Mr Vucemillo's reply (extracted above) was to the effect that he put the rifle 'there' (where the police found it) intending to clean it. In my view, it would be pure speculation and nonsensical to consider that, having put it there initially, he later put it into the gun cabinet and then later took it out and returned it to its original position where it was found by the police, all within that two day period.
Further, when they were standing next to the gun cabinet, Mr Vucemillo said he had last taken it out of the cabinet 'a couple of days ago'.
I am also of the view that her Honour did not err in finding that there was no valid reason for not storing the rifle for that two day period. An intention to clean it does not justify keeping it out of the gun cabinet for two days.
In the discussion of the finding that the rifle was loaded, I referred to counsel's argument that Mr Vucemillo's intention to clean the rifle may have been hijacked. The argument was also made in respect of the finding that Mr Vucemillo had no valid reason not to return the rifle to the cabinet. It was submitted that he may have had any number of valid reasons why he had not returned the rifle to the cabinet. Again, I accept this, and accept the possible reasons are endless. However, in my view, again this is pure speculation, for the same reasons as I gave earlier.
Further, in making these findings, her Honour did not misunderstand the test.
During her Honour's reasons, her Honour noted the storage requirements in the regulations and the obligation on gun owners to store guns in accordance with them. Her Honour discussed cases dealing with s 23(9)(d)(i), which requires, among other things, persons responsible for the storage of a firearm to use adequate storage facilities. Her Honour noted that, while this was a different provision to the one she was considering, the cases discussing s 23(9)(d) illustrated that it would only be in exceptional circumstances that a person would be excused from the proper storage of firearms.[23]
[23] ts 11, 1 May 2019.
Her Honour then turned to the evidence, and then gave the reasons extracted earlier.
A fair reading of her Honour's reasons indicates that her Honour considered that storing the firearm in the secured gun cabinet would have discharged Mr Vucemillo's obligations to take all reasonable precautions to ensure its safekeeping. However, her Honour did not say, or imply, that anything short of this would mean he had committed the offence. Her Honour was clearly aware, and expressly stated,[24] that the alleged offence was a failure to take all reasonable precautions to ensure a firearm's safekeeping. It was this that her Honour found Mr Vucemillo had done.
[24] See ts 3 and 12, 1 May 2019. See also ts 9 ‑ 10.
No substantial miscarriage of justice?
If I am wrong, and the magistrate did err, it would be necessary to determine if, despite such errors, no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.
If the magistrate erred in making all of her factual findings, obviously, it could not be said there had not been a substantial miscarriage of justice. However, if the magistrate did not err in finding that the rifle had been in Mr Vucemillo's home, and not in the gun cabinet, for two days, a conviction was inevitable.
Obviously, s 23(9)(a) does not require a gun owner to keep a gun in a gun cabinet at all times, even where such a cabinet is readily available. A gun owner will, at times, reasonably be using the gun, cleaning the gun, or, for example, attending to its maintenance. All that s 23(9)(a) requires is 'all reasonable precautions'.
Mr Vucemillo's gun cabinet was a mere 10 ‑ 15 m from his home. There was nothing preventing him from putting the rifle in the cabinet at any time during the two day period. On the evidence, the only reason for not doing so was that he intended to clean it. Had he put it down for ten minutes before cleaning it, and then returned it to the gun cabinet, it would be a very different case. However, the gun was out of the cabinet for two days. It was a reasonable precaution to put the rifle in the gun cabinet until he was ready to clean it. Mr Vucemillo failed to take that precaution.
Accordingly, if the magistrate did not err in finding that the rifle had been in Mr Vucemillo's home, and not in the gun cabinet, for two days, I would have dismissed the appeal under s 14(2) even if the magistrate had made each other alleged error.
Conclusion
I would grant leave to appeal on the single ground as amended, but would dismiss the appeal.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
SW
Research Orderly to the Honourable Justice Archer12 NOVEMBER 2019
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