Turner v Keegan

Case [2001] WASCA 9


JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

CITATION:   TURNER -v- KEEGAN [2001] WASCA 9

CORAM:   MILLER J

HEARD:   12 JANUARY 2001

DELIVERED          :   31 JANUARY 2001

FILE NO/S:   SJA 1114 of 2000

BETWEEN:   STEVEN PAUL TURNER

Appellant

AND

TED THOMAS KEEGAN
Respondent

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Offence against Firearms Act 1973, s 23(9)(d)(ii) - Whether regulations prescribing requirements as to security for ammunition related to ammunition "of a prescribed kind" - Whether all ammunition could properly be categorised as "ammunition of a prescribed kind"

Legislation:

Firearms Act 1973, s 8, s 11B, s 23(9)(d)(i), s 23(9)(d)(ii), s 34(2)

Firearms Amendment Act 1996
Firearms Regulations 1974, reg 11A

Interpretation Act 1984, s 5

Result:

Appeal allowed
Decision of learned Magistrate set aside and conviction recorded against respondent
Matter remitted to learned Magistrate for determination of penalty

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr R M Mitchell

Respondent:     Mr R K Williamson

Solicitors:

Appellant:     State Crown Solicitor

Respondent:     Williamson & Co

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Nil

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

  1. MILLER J: The respondent was charged in the Court of Petty Sessions, Fremantle that on 19 October 1999 at White Gum Valley he failed to keep four rounds of ammunition secured separately from a .308 firearm, serial number 3D387, contrary to the provisions of s 23(9)(d)(ii) of the Firearms Act 1973 ("the Act"). In its original form the complaint appears to have alleged a breach of reg 11A of the Firearms Regulations 1974 ("the Regulations") but amendments were apparently made to the complaint on 12 January 2000 to reflect an offence against the provisions of the Act rather than the Regulations. In the end, nothing turns on this, as no point is taken that the complaint was in any way irregular, it being at all material times understood that the offence alleged was created by the provisions of s 23(9)(d)(ii) of the Act when read in conjunction with the provisions of reg 11A(8) of the Regulations.

  2. The respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge and the matter was heard in the Court of Petty Sessions, Fremantle on 12 June 2000. The learned Magistrate then reserved his decision, which was delivered on 19 June 2000, when the charge was dismissed. The essential reasoning of the learned Magistrate which led to the dismissal of the charge was that an element of the offence charged had not been proven, namely, that the ammunition to which the charge referred was not ammunition "of a prescribed kind" as required by the provisions of s 23(9)(d)(ii).

  3. On 17 July 2000 Owen J granted to the appellant leave to appeal the decision of the learned Magistrate.  The grounds of appeal (amended at the hearing) contend that the learned Magistrate erred in law in dismissing the complaint for the following reasons:

    "(a)[in] finding that the firearm and ammunition which were the subject of the complaint were not 'a firearm or ammunition of a prescribed kind' for the purpose of section 23(9)(d)(ii) of the Firearms Act

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Turner v Keegan [2001] WASCA 9
Case
[2001] WASCA 9
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Turner v Keegan involved the respondent, Keegan, who was charged with contravening a regulation under the Firearms Act 1973. Specifically, the charge was related to failing to comply with a security requirement for ammunition. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The respondent, Keegan, contended that the regulation in question did not apply to all types of ammunition, as it only prescribed security requirements for ammunition of a prescribed kind. The court was tasked with determining whether all ammunition could properly be categorised as "ammunition of a prescribed kind" under the relevant legislation.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the regulations prescribing security requirements for ammunition encompassed all types of ammunition or only a subset categorised as "of a prescribed kind." This interpretation hinged on the precise wording of the regulation and whether it was possible to distinguish between different types of ammunition. The court needed to ascertain whether the term "ammunition of a prescribed kind" was sufficiently broad to include all forms of ammunition or if it was limited to specific types as potentially implied by the context and purpose of the legislation.

The court examined the relevant sections of the Firearms Act 1973 and the associated regulations. It found that the regulation in question did not explicitly limit its application to a specific type of ammunition. Instead, the regulation referred generally to "ammunition," without specifying any particular kind. The court concluded that the regulation was intended to apply broadly to all types of ammunition, not just a subset defined as "of a prescribed kind." Therefore, the court ruled in favour of the prosecution, finding that all ammunition was properly categorised as "ammunition of a prescribed kind" under the regulation. Consequently, the respondent's charge was upheld.

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