Vodafone Hutchison Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Consumer Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Vodafone Hutchison Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Consumer Commission [2017] FCA 1549

File number: NSD 868 of 2017
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 21 December 2017
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review challenge to validity of public inquiry by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission purportedly under Pt 25 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) into whether to declare a wholesale domestic mobile roaming service under s 152AL(3) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) – whether specification of eligible service is required at the outset of the public inquiry or, alternatively, at some later point but prior to the statutory public consultation process

Held: application dismissed

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5, 6, 16

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 152AB, 152AC, 152AI, 152AL, 152ALA, 152AM, 152AN, Pt XIC

Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) ss 3, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 505, 505A, Pt 25

Cases cited:

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; 187 CLR 384

Clissold v Perry [1904] HCA 12; 1 CLR 363

Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1981] HCA 26; 147 CLR 297

Esso Australia Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers’ Union [2017] HCA 54

Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2002] FCA 589; 173 ALR 362

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 91 ALJR 936

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2017] FCA 316; 344 ALR 511

Telstra Corporation Ltd v Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1160; 102 FCR 517

Telstra Corporation Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia [2008] HCA 7; 234 CLR 210

Date of hearing: 27 and 28 September 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Economic Regulator, Competition and Access
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 94
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr NC Hutley SC, Dr RCA Higgins and Mr BK Lim
Solicitor for the Applicant: Norton Rose Fullbright Australia
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr S Lloyd SC and Ms S Patterson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr AC Archibald QC and Mr S Free
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Gilbert + Tobin
Counsel for the Intervener: Ms K Morgan
Solicitor for the Intervener: MinterEllison

ORDERS

NSD 868 of 2017
BETWEEN:

VODAFONE HUTCHISON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 096 304 620)

Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION

First Respondent

TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED (ACN 051 775 556)
Second Respondent

OPTUS MOBILE PTY LIMITED (ACN 054 365 696)
Intervener

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 DECEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The originating application for judicial review filed on 1 June 2017 be dismissed. 

2.Within 28 days hereof the parties are to seek to agree on costs in the light of the reasons for judgment.  If they are unable to reach an agreement, within…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1549
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Vodafone Hutchison Australia Pty Ltd sought judicial review of a decision by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) to commence a public inquiry into the declaration of a wholesale domestic mobile roaming service. The dispute hinged on whether the ACCC was required to specify the eligible service at the outset of the public inquiry or at some later point before the statutory public consultation process. The court was required to determine the validity of the ACCC's public inquiry under Part 25 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 and whether the statutory requirements concerning the inquiry were properly discharged. The court found that Vodafone's challenge was based on an incorrect assumption that a Part 25 inquiry must conclude with a declaration of a specified eligible service or a decision not to declare a specified eligible service. The ACCC is empowered to terminate a public inquiry at any point during the inquiry process, and the statutory scheme did not support Vodafone's argument for a high degree of specificity in the description of the eligible service. The alternative case, which posited that specificity was required at some later point but before the statutory public consultation process, was also rejected as it found no support in the statutory scheme. Consequently, the court dismissed Vodafone's judicial review challenge, rejecting all grounds of review. The court ordered that within 28 days, the parties should seek to agree on costs. If they were unable to do so, they were to file written submissions not exceeding three pages setting out the orders for which they contended and brief reasons in support. The issue of costs would then be determined on the papers and without a further oral hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The originating application for judicial review filed on 1 June 2017 be dismissed.

2. Within 28 days hereof the parties are to seek to agree on costs in the light of the reasons for judgment. If they are unable to reach an agreement, within that time, each party should file and serve an outline of written submissions not exceeding three pages in support of their respective positions on costs.

3. Final orders as to costs will be heard and determined on the papers and without a further oral hearing.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before doing so, it is desirable to summarise the relevant background facts (which are not in dispute) and then describe the key relevant statutory provisions. Summary of background facts On 5 September 2016, the ACCC published a media release which announced that, on that day, it would commence “an inquiry into whether or not to declare a wholesale domestic mobile roaming service”. As will shortly emerge, the time when a Pt 25 inquiry commences falls to be determined by reference to s 152AI of the CC Act (see further at [37] below), and not merely by what is stated in the ACCC media release. On 26 October 2016, the ACCC released a discussion paper into whether to declare a wholesale domestic mobile roaming service. It stated that domestic mobile roaming would allow consumers to access mobile services through another operator’s network when outside the coverage area of their service provider. The discussion paper invited input from interested persons on several issues which were said to be relevant in determining whether to declare a mobile roaming service, including:Ÿthe current state of competition for mobile services and whether there are barriers to extending mobile networks in regional Australia;Ÿthe effect that declaring a mobile roaming service may have upon competition;Ÿthe extent and nature of investment which has taken place in mobile networks since the last declaration inquiry;Ÿthe effect the declaration may have on mobile network operators’ incentives to invest in extending and improving their networks; andŸthe importance of geographic coverage for consumers and mobile service providers’ ability to compete. It is desirable to say something more about the discussion paper. It described a mobile roaming service as one which “allows mobile subscribers of one network to use their mobile phones for calls, text messages and to access data services by means of another network in Australia when outside the coverage area of the network to which they subscribe”. It explained that a roaming service of itself does not increase mobile coverage in new areas, but, rather, increases the areas in which customers on networks with less coverage than other networks can use their mobile services. The discussion paper contained no more specific a description of the service that might be declared apart from the reference to a “wholesale domestic mobile roaming service”. The discussion paper mentioned that on two previous occasions the ACCC had considered whether to declare a mobile roaming service. The first inquiry was in 1998 and concluded with the ACCC deciding not to declare a mobile roaming service on the basis that, although there would be competitive benefits from mobile roaming services, those benefits would likely be achieved without regulatory intervention. The second inquiry was in 2005. The ACCC concluded then that regulation of mobile roaming services could be in the long-term interests of end-users and advance other relevant objectives, but the ACCC determined that it was satisfied at that time that declaration was not necessary to ensure a roaming service was provided on a commercial basis.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The alternative case should be rejected. It finds no support in the statutory scheme. Moreover, in common with Vodafone’s primary case, it is predicated on an incorrect assumption that a Pt 25 inquiry must end either with a declaration of a specified eligible service or a decision not to declare a specified eligible service. The ACCC is empowered to terminate a public inquiry at any point during the inquiry process. For example, as the ACCC pointed out, if the ACCC commences an inquiry but arrives at a view, prior to having formulated a detailed service description, that the subject matter of the inquiry, however, specified, is not appropriate for declaration, it can terminate the inquiry. Conclusion For these reasons, Vodafone’s judicial review challenge should be dismissed. All the grounds of review fail because of the rejection of Vodafone’s primary and alternative cases. Within 28 days hereof the parties should seek to agree orders as to costs. If they are unable to do so, within that time each should file and serve a written submission not exceeding three pages setting out the orders for which it contends and brief reasons in support. The issue of costs will then be determined on the papers and without a further oral hearing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Thirdly, the applicant emphasised that one of the purposes of a public inquiry is to inform the ACCC in arriving at its state of satisfaction under s 152AL(3)(d) as to whether the making of the declaration will promote the LTIE. It cited Foster J’s observations in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2017] FCA 316; 344 ALR 511 (Telstra Corporation) at [11], where his Honour described s 152AB as “a critical provision” which “specifies the overarching significance of the LTIE as the sole object of Pt XIC”. His Honour added that the specified objectives in s 152AB(2) (which give content to the LTIE) are considerations which the ACCC “is obliged to keep… in the forefront of its thinking and ultimately of its decision-making when making decisions under Pt XIC”. Fourthly, the applicant emphasised that the public inquiry required by s 152AL(3)(a) must be one “about a proposal to make the declaration”, being a declaration that a “specified eligible service” is a declared service. It submitted that there must be a “proposal” to declare a “specified eligible service” and that this is the “matter” to which the public inquiry is to relate. This, it said, is the inquiry which must be notified to the public so that submissions can be made, and which also informs the proper discharge of the ACCC’s powers to prepare a discussion paper and meet the other statutory requirements concerning the inquiry. The applicant submitted that “specified” should be construed according to ordinary principles of statutory construction and that its ordinary meaning connotes a degree of definition, detail, explication or particularisation that is more demanding than words such as “mention” or “identification”. It referred to the Full Court’s observations in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Seven Cable Television Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1160; 102 FCR 517 (Seven Cable) at [108]-[109] in relation to a similar provision, where it was stated that a service must be “adequately specified so that it may be identified”. The following matters were relied upon by the applicant in support of its submission that a “high degree of specificity is required”:(a)such specificity is contemplated in the statutory scheme because it is a precondition to the exercise of power under s 152AL(3) that there be a public inquiry under Pt 25 of the Telecommunications Act “about” a “proposal” to declare a specified eligible service;(b)such specificity is contemplated in order to give effect to the ACCC’s obligations to notify the public about the nature of the matter to which the inquiry relates (s 498 of the Telecommunications Act);(c)such specificity is required if the ACCC is to discharge its duty of affording a reasonable opportunity for the public to make submissions about the matter to which the public inquiry relates (s 500 of the Telecommunications Act);(d)such specificity is required for the purpose of the ACCC determining whether it is satisfied that the making of the declaration will promote the LTIE as required by s 152AL(3)(d); and(e)such specificity in the description of the eligible service is essential for the meaningful delineation of the scope and extent of the statutory consequences and obligations which flow from the making of a declaration, including in respect of such matters as access undertakings and access determinations.