Reported Decision: 46 NSWLR 207
106 A Crim R 339
New South Wales
Court of Appeal
CITATION: Vasil v National Australia Bank Limited [1999] NSWCA 161 FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40416/98 HEARING DATE(S): 05/05/99 JUDGMENT DATE:
28 May 1999PARTIES :
Stephen Vasil v National Australia Bank LimitedJUDGMENT OF: Meagher JA at 1; Stein JA at 7; Fitzgerald JA at 11
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S) : 11324/98 LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Dowd J
COUNSEL: C Jordan (Solicitor)(Appellant)
P L G Brereton SC (Respondent)SOLICITORS: Xenos Jordan (Appellant)
Mallesons Stephen Jacques (Respondent)CATCHWORDS: PRIVILEGE against self-incrimination; order as to assets disclosure; Mareva injunction; Evidence Act s128; Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1. CASES CITED: DECISION: Appeal allowed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40416/98
CLD11324/98
MEAGHER JA
Friday, 28 May 1999
STEIN JA
FITZGERALD JA
JUDGMENT
Stephen VASIL v NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
1 MEAGHER JA: I have had the honour of reading in draft the judgment of Fitzgerald JA. However, I find myself unable to agree with it. 2 The respondent’s submission was that all relevant authorities made it clear that, in the case of a subpoena ducas tecum and in the case of a subpoena ad testificandum, in the case of an order to give discovery or an order granting leave to interrogate, the objection that the answers or the documents might incriminate the person required to answer questions or produce documents should be taken at the time when the information was required to be taken or the documents produced, not earlier. 3 The authorities on this point are quite clear, and are in the respondent’s favour. They are mentioned in Fitzgerald JA’s judgment. Moreover those authorities have been applied to the case of a Mareva injunction, as has been held in the further authorities referred to by his Honour. 4 Against this tide of authority, Fitzgerald JA relies on the High Court decision in Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1. That case has nothing to do with the present case. It is authority for the proposition that:5 That is what the joint judgment of Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow said (at 12). But this principle arises when the privilege is claimed, not earlier. In that case there was no doubt the recipient of the relevant order wished to claim the privilege. In the present case one does not know to what Mr Vasil wishes to object. 6 I would dismiss the appeal with costs. 7 STEIN JA: At first blush I was seduced by the respondent’s argument that the disclosure order made by Dowd J did not abrogate or modify the privilege against self incrimination, but left it intact. According to the respondent, the privilege is still available to the appellant to claim in an…
“The privilege against self incrimination may be abridged by statute or waived but, that aside, it has generally accepted that it is without “real exception””.
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Details
- Case
- [1999] NSWCA 161
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales heard an appeal concerning the application of privilege against self-incrimination in the context of an order for disclosure of assets. The dispute arose from proceedings initiated by National Australia Bank Ltd (NAB) against Vasil, seeking to enforce a judgment and obtain disclosure of assets. Vasil sought to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination to resist disclosure, arguing that such disclosure might expose him to criminal liability.
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the privilege against self-incrimination, as codified in section 128 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (NSW), could be invoked to resist an order for disclosure of assets in aid of enforcing a civil judgment, particularly where the disclosure might reveal contraventions of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth) or other statutes. The Court was required to consider the scope and limitations of this privilege in such circumstances and its interaction with the court's power to compel disclosure for the enforcement of judgments.
The Court reasoned that while section 128 of the *Evidence Act* preserves the privilege against self-incrimination, it does not operate as an absolute bar to disclosure orders. The Court applied the principles established in cases such as *Reid v Howard* (1995) 184 CLR 1, which affirmed that the privilege is not a licence to frustrate the administration of justice. The Court found that the potential for criminal liability arising from the disclosure of assets, in this instance, did not outweigh the Bank's legitimate interest in enforcing its judgment. The Court determined that the privilege, if applicable at all, was not sufficiently engaged to prevent the disclosure order being made.
Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the primary judge were set aside.
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the privilege against self-incrimination, as codified in section 128 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (NSW), could be invoked to resist an order for disclosure of assets in aid of enforcing a civil judgment, particularly where the disclosure might reveal contraventions of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth) or other statutes. The Court was required to consider the scope and limitations of this privilege in such circumstances and its interaction with the court's power to compel disclosure for the enforcement of judgments.
The Court reasoned that while section 128 of the *Evidence Act* preserves the privilege against self-incrimination, it does not operate as an absolute bar to disclosure orders. The Court applied the principles established in cases such as *Reid v Howard* (1995) 184 CLR 1, which affirmed that the privilege is not a licence to frustrate the administration of justice. The Court found that the potential for criminal liability arising from the disclosure of assets, in this instance, did not outweigh the Bank's legitimate interest in enforcing its judgment. The Court determined that the privilege, if applicable at all, was not sufficiently engaged to prevent the disclosure order being made.
Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the primary judge were set aside.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal allowed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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