JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: UDR EQUIPMENT PTY LTD -v- AFKOS INDUSTRIES PTY LTD [2000] WASC 57
CORAM: STEYTLER J
HEARD: 25 JANUARY 2000
DELIVERED : 13 MARCH 2000
FILE NO/S: ARB 30 of 1999
BETWEEN: UDR EQUIPMENT PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
AFKOS INDUSTRIES PTY LTD
Respondent
Catchwords:
Arbitration - Application for leave to appeal from decision of arbitrator - Whether manifest error of law on face of award - Test to be applied - Application dismissed
Legislation:
Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA), s 38(4)(b) and s 38(5)
Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW), s 38(5)
Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 (Qld), s 38(5)
Result:
Application for leave to appeal dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr G R Hancy
Respondent: Mr C D Raymond
Solicitors:
Applicant: Phillips Fox
Respondent: Arthur Metaxas & Co
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Commonwealth v Rian Financial Services & Developments Pty Ltd (1992) 36 FCR 101
Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Kilpatrick Green Pty Ltd [1992] 2 VR 505
Leung v Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 477
Natoli v Walker, unreported; CA SCt of NSW; Library No 40351 of 93; 26 May 1994
Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd [1982] AC 724
Promenade Investments Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1992) 26 NSWLR 203
Qantas Airways Ltd v Joseland & Gilling (1986) 6 NSWLR 327
Tiki Village International Ltd, Re [1994] 2 Qd R 674
Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Water Corporation of Western Australia, unreported, SCt of WA (Parker J); Library No 970561; 28 October 1997
Case(s) also cited:
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99
Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64
Commonwealth v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (1991) 4 WAR 425
Forsayth NL v Australasian Gold Mines NL (1992) 8 WAR 176
Haines v Bendall (1991) 172 CLR 60
Maralinga Pty Ltd v Major Enterprises Pty Ltd (1973) 128 CLR 336
Pukallus v Cameron (1982) 180 CLR 447
Roberts v Roberts (1992) 8 WAR 170
Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex 840
Wing Luck Foods v Lay Choo Lim [1989] WAR 358
STEYTLER J: This is an application for leave to appeal against the decision of an arbitrator given in arbitration proceedings between the applicant and the respondent. By a prior order of the court the application for leave to appeal, if allowed, is to be taken as the hearing of the appeal itself.
The application is brought pursuant to s 38(4)(b) of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA). By virtue of s 38(5) leave may not be granted under that section unless the court considers that:
"(a)having regard to all the circumstances, the determination of the question of law concerned could substantially affect the rights of one or more parties to the arbitration agreement; and
(b)there is -
(i)a manifest error of law on the face of the award; or
(ii)strong evidence that the arbitrator or umpire made an error of law and…
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- Case
- [2000] WASC 57
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legislative intent behind section 38(5) and noted that the amendments to this section aimed to constrain the exercise of court control over arbitral awards. The court referred to the case of The Nema, where Lord Diplock emphasized that leave to appeal should not normally be granted unless it is apparent from a perusal of the award that the meaning ascribed by the arbitrator is obviously wrong. The court also considered the case of Promenade Investments Pty Ltd v New South Wales, where Sheller JA concluded that the added requirements of manifest error of law on the face of the award or strong evidence that the arbitrator made an error of law aimed to constrain court control over arbitral awards in the manner described by the House of Lords in The Nema.
Based on the reasoning provided, the court concluded that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed. The court found that there was no manifest error of law on the face of the award and that it was possible that argument might persuade the court that the arbitrator might be right. The parties were thus left to accept the decision of the tribunal. The court emphasized the importance of constraining court control over arbitral awards to maintain the integrity and finality of the arbitration process. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and no appeal was granted.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It follows of course that cases decided on the former provisions of s 38(5) of our Act as, for example, Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Water Corporation of Western Australia, unreported, SCt of WA (Parker J); Library No 970561; 28 October 1997 (to which I was referred in this application), are now of limited assistance. Greater assistance might be derived from cases decided on the equivalent (to our now s 38(5)) provisions in other States. One of these is Promenade Investments Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1992) 26 NSWLR 203. In that case Sheller JA (with whom Meagher JA was in agreement), after setting out something of the history of the legislation in New South Wales and considering what had been said by the then Attorney‑General of that State in the Second Reading Speech with respect to the amendment, concluded (at 222) that:"The added requirements of manifest error of law on the face of the award or strong evidence that the arbitrator made an error of law and that the determination of the question may add substantially to the certainty of commercial law suggest that the draftsman was seeking to constrain the exercise of court control over arbitral awards in the manner described by the House of Lords in The Nema." I should interpose that the case of The Nema (Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd [1982] AC 724) was decided in respect of legislation (s 1(4) of the Arbitration Act 1979 (UK)) which was in substantially the same terms as s 38(5) of the Commercial Arbitration Act prior to its amendment. Lord Diplock there said, with the concurrence of the other members of the House of Lords, at 740, that:"Except when all parties to the reference consent, the first part of section 1(4) placed an absolute bar upon the grant of leave to appeal unless the determination of the disputed point of law would substantially affect the rights of one or more parties to the reference; and this, be it noted, even though the point might have arisen under a standard form contract and be of outstanding importance to the trade generally. I find it impossible to infer from the inclusion of a power to impose conditions in the latter part of the same subsection a parliamentary intention that whenever that absolute bar did not operate leave to appeal should [italics in original] be granted, albeit that it might be made subject to conditions." As has been pointed out by Sheller JA (at 218) Lord Diplock went on to say (at 742 ‑ 743):"Where, as in the instant case, a question of law involved is the construction of a 'one‑off' clause, the application of which to the particular facts of the case is an issue in the arbitration, leave should not normally be given unless it is apparent to the judge upon a mere perusal of the reasoned award itself without the benefit of adversarial argument, that the meaning ascribed to the clause by the arbitrator is obviously wrong. But if on such perusal it appears to the judge that it is possible that argument might persuade him, despite first impression to the contrary, that the arbitrator might be right, he should not grant leave; the parties should be left to accept, for better or for worse, the decision of the tribunal that they had chosen to decide the matter in the first instance. … "