Uber B.V. v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Uber B.V. v Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 110

File number: NSD 904 of 2015
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 17 February 2017
Catchwords:

TAXATION – whether a person supplying uberX services is required to be registered under Division 144 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) (the GST Act) – whether carrying on the enterprise of providing uberX services to passengers constitutes supply “taxi travel” within the meaning of s 144-5(1) (as defined in s 195-1) of the GST Act.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – whether the terms “taxi” and “limousine” in the definition of “taxi travel” in s 195-1 of the GST Act should be given an ordinary meaning or a trade meaning – whether the definition of “taxi travel” in s 195-1 of the GST Act should be construed as a composite phrase.

Held: application dismissed with costs.  

Legislation: A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 9-5, 9-10 23-5, 144-5, 195-1
Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; 239 CLR 27

Australian Gas Light Co v Valuer-General (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 126

Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; 248 CLR 378

Chaudhri v Commissioner of Taxation [2001] FCA 554; 109 FCR 416

Chubb Insurance Co of Australia Ltd v Moore [2013] NSWCA 212

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; 187 CLR 384

Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd [1996] HCA 36; 186 CLR 389

Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v ICI Australia Limited [1972] HCA 75; 127 CLR 529

The Council of the Shire of Lake Macquarie v Aberdare County Council [1970] HCA 32; 123 CLR 327

Dreamtech International Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 103; 187 FCR 352

Herbert Adams Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1932] HCA 27; 47 CLR 222

Hope v Bathurst City Council [1980] HCA 16; 144 CLR 1

Hore v Albury Radio Taxis Co-Op Society Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1130; 56 NSWLR 210

Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen [2015] HCA 14; 256 CLR 1

Lansell House Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 329; ATC 20-173

Lansell House Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCAFC 6; 190 FCR 354

NSW Associated Blue-Metal Quarries Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1956] HCA 80; 94 CLR 509

Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [1995] FCA 1655; 62 FCR 289

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; 194 CLR 355

Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wood Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541

Quikfund (Australia) Pty Ltd v Airmark Consolidators Pty Ltd (2014) 222 FCR 13

R v Brown [1996] AC 543

Residual Assco Group v Spalvins [2000] HCA 33; 202 CLR 629

Saga Holidays Ltd…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 110
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Uber B.V. initiated legal proceedings against the Commissioner of Taxation, contesting the Commissioner’s determination that the applicant's uberX services were subject to the special registration and reporting rules under Division 144 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth) (GST Act). The core dispute centred on whether the provision of uberX services constituted the supply of "taxi travel" as defined in the GST Act, specifically whether the terms "taxi" and "limousine" should be interpreted in their ordinary or trade meanings, and whether the definition of "taxi travel" should be viewed as a composite phrase.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the uberX services, provided through the Uber app, qualified as "taxi travel" under the GST Act. This required the court to interpret the definitions of "taxi" and "limousine" in section 195-1 of the GST Act, and to decide if these terms should be interpreted in their ordinary or trade meanings. The court also had to determine if the phrase "taxi travel" should be viewed as a composite term that encompasses specific features of taxi services.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that the provision of uberX services did constitute "taxi travel" under the GST Act. The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of the word "taxi" was sufficiently broad to encompass the uberX service, which involved transporting passengers for fares. The court noted that the legislature's intent, as outlined in the Explanatory Memorandum, was to ensure that taxis were registered for GST to prevent unfair competition from unregistered service providers. The court found that the features of the uberX service, such as the requirement for passengers to register and provide information in advance, did not preclude it from being considered "taxi travel". The court held that the applicant's services did not escape the scope of Division 144 of the GST Act due to their electronic booking system and the limitations on anonymous hiring.

The court ordered that the application be dismissed, with the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed. A declaratory order was also made, confirming that the uberX service supplied by Mr Fine on 11 September 2015 constituted "taxi travel" within the meaning of section 144-5(1) of the GST Act. This decision underscores the importance of statutory interpretation in determining the applicability of specific tax provisions to novel service models.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. The amended originating application dated 22 September 2015 is dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Table of Contents

Introduction

[1]

The services provided by uberX Partners to uberX Riders

[4]

Relevant provisions of the GST Act

[13]

The applicant’s submissions summarised

[17]

(a) The task of statutory construction

[18]

(b) The provision of uberX services is not “travel that involves transporting passengers, by taxi”

[31]

(c) The provision of uberX services is not “travel that involves transporting passengers, by … limousine,…”

[40]

The Commissioner’s submissions summarised

[44]

(a) Relevant principles of statutory construction

[48]

(b) “Taxi”

[55]

(c) “Limousine”

[59]

(d) The Relevant Supplies involved transporting passengers, by taxi, for fares

[63]

(e) The Relevant Supplies involved transporting passengers, by limousine, for fares

[64]

The applicant’s submissions in reply summarised

[67]

(a) Issues of construction

[67]

(b) Uber's use of the regulatory meaning of "taxi"

[74]

(c) Dictionary definitions of "taxi"

[76]

(d) Correct operation of s 9-10(3) of the GST Act

[79]

(e) Dictionary definition of "limousine"

[80]

(f) Factual matters

[81]

Rulings on evidence

[82]

Dr Abelson’s expertise

[86]

Consideration and determination on statutory construction

[118]

Conclusion

[144]

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In reply, the following submissions were made by the applicant concerning factual matters raised by the Commissioner.(a)The Commissioner’s contention that “the methodology used by Uber was not relevantly different” should be rejected. The point of a taximeter is that it is affixed to, and on display within, the vehicle to enable the customer to see at any time the running balance of the fare. Furthermore, there is no connection between the fixed minimum fare applied by Uber (for the benefit of uberX Partners) and the capped maximum time and distance rates that apply to taxi fares (for the protection of consumers). (b)The physical markings on taxis are important because it is what those vehicles do and it is the special entitlements of such vehicles which informs the ordinary meaning of the word “taxi”. The Commissioner’s contention that the State and Territory regulatory requirements with respect to those markings are not the issue. The contention that the car symbol displayed on the GPS map on the Uber app is equivalent to the marking on a physical vehicle is incorrect. The marking on a taxi vehicle facilitates street hails and indicates availability at kerbside ranks. That is peculiar to taxis and is absent in any other vehicles, including the uberX service.(c)As a result of what is referred to as the universal service obligation, taxis must (subject to limited exceptions) accept fares from any member of the public (passengers who are anonymous). Contrary to the Commissioner’s submission, Uber submitted that this is a significant feature of the ordinary meaning of “taxi”. Furthermore, uberX vehicles are not “available for hire by members of the public” in the same way as taxis, in that they cannot be hired anonymously by anyone through rank and hail services. uberX services are only available to those who register as a licensee of the Uber app, meet qualifying conditions (such as being 18 years of age or older), and provide information in advance of making any trip request, including credit card details.(d)There is a significant distinction between rank and hail services that taxis provide and the electronic booking for near immediate pick up through the Partner app to which uberX Partners are confined. Rank and hail services are a defining characteristic of taxis, and only taxis. While opening the Uber Partner app may be suggested as bearing similarities to waiting for an online booking, nothing that any uberX Partner does is the equivalent of waiting at a taxi rank for passers-by to enter without any booking at all, or the equivalent of accepting fares by a street hand gesture, again without any booking at all. uberX Partners are free at all times to accept or reject trip requests, unlike taxi drivers.Rulings on evidence An affidavit dated 31 July 2015 by the applicant’s solicitor, Mr Jackson was read (apart from paragraphs 17 and 19) without objection. An affidavit dated 15 October 2015 of Mr Fine, an uberX Partner, was read without objection. This was also the case with the two affidavits of Mr Robert Suttie, dated 12 and 17 February 2016, and the affidavit of Mr Nicholas Summers, dated 17 February 2016. The affidavits of Mr Suttie dated 12 February 2016 and Mr Summers described the features of limousine services in Sydney and Perth, respectively, and the deponents’ experiences of using those services in those cities. Mr Suttie’s affidavit dated 17 February 2016 described features of the Honda Civic motor vehicle driven by Mr Fine in his capacity as an uberX Partner. The applicant also tendered various industry and regulatory reports, which were admitted into evidence on a non-hearsay basis.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, I consider that some limited assistance is obtained from the mischief identified in the Explanatory Memorandum for inserting Div 144 (see [61] above). I accept the Commissioner’s submission that this mischief or purpose supports a broad construction of the relevant provisions, however, it does not dictate the resolution of the task of construction. Broadly construed, and having regard to other relevant matters of construction, I consider that the word “taxi” is sufficiently broad in its ordinary meaning to encompass the uberX service supplied by Mr Fine on 11 September 2015. Conclusion For these reasons, the amended originating application dated 22 September 2015 should be dismissed and the applicant ordered to pay the Commissioner’s costs. A declaratory order should be made to the effect that the uberX service supplied by Mr Fine on 11 September 2015 constituted supply “taxi travel” within the meaning of s 144-5(1) (as defined in s 195-1) of the GST Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Division 144 of Pt 4-5 of the GST Act provides (asterisks indicate a defined term):Part 4-5-Special rules mainly about registrationNote:The special rules in this Part mainly modify the operation of Part 2-5, but they may affect other Parts of Chapter 2 in minor ways.Division 144-Taxis144-1 What this Division is about Because it is at the heart of the proceeding, it is important to note s 195-1 of the GST Act, which includes the following definition:taxi travel means travel that involves transporting passengers, by taxi or limousine, for fares. There is no definition in the GST Act of “taxi”, “taxi operator” or “limousine”.The applicant’s submissions summarised The applicant’s submissions may be summarised as follows. (a) The task of statutory construction The applicant emphasised that, with the specific exception of taxi travel, there is a universal rule that enterprises with a turnover of under $75,000 do not need to register for GST. Moreover, Div 144 of the GST Act operates as a specific exception to this otherwise universal rule. This single exception reflects a concern, as recorded in the relevant Explanatory Memorandum, that taxis not registered for GST would charge a lower fare, or reflect the GST in the fare where it was not actually collected and remitted. Section 144-1 states that "[t]axi operators are required to be registered, regardless of turnover". The legislature did not seek to deal with this issue in any other industry where there are registered and unregistered service providers. In particular, Div 144 does not deal with other forms of point to point transport (a form of transportation service whereby passengers are taken from their chosen pick-up point at the time of their choosing directly to their chosen destination) involving transporting passengers for fares. The applicant submitted that these features of Div 144 are relevant to the principle of statutory construction to the effect that a statute is “always speaking” and to the related distinction which is drawn between “connotation” and “denotation” (see, for example, The Council of the Shire of Lake Macquarie v Aberdare County Council [1970] HCA 32; 123 CLR 327 at 331 per Barwick CJ). The applicant contended that there was an anterior question which needed to be addressed, relying upon what Campbell J said in Hore v Albury Radio Taxis Co-Op Society Ltd [2002] NSWSC 1130; 56 NSWLR 210 at [43]: …However, some caution must be applied in the exercise of this principle. There is still a question of construction which needs to be decided, about whether a particular expression ought to be construed, in the context of the particular legislation in which it occurs, as actually extending to some new state of affairs to which it might arguably extend. Thus, an exemption from stamp duty of a hiring arrangement relating to “a motion picture film” did not extend to exempt from stamp duty a hiring arrangement relating to a video cassette: Wilson v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1988) 13 NSWLR 77.