[2008] TASSC 76
CITATION: Tusyn v State of Tasmania (No 2) [2008] TASSC 76
PARTIES: TUSYN, Walter Michael
v
STATE OF TASMANIA
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION: ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S: 38/2003
DELIVERED ON: 26 November 2008
DELIVERED AT: Burnie
HEARING DATE: 22, 23 September 2008
JUDGMENT OF: Blow J
CATCHWORDS:
Damages – General principles – Other matters – Damages assessed once and for all – Immediate physical injuries and delayed psychiatric injury.
Djordjevic v Australian Iron & Steel Ltd (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 441, followed.
S v G [1995] 3 NZLR 681, not followed.
Aust Dig Damages [11]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: P W Tree SC
Defendant: P Turner
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Bradfields
Defendant: Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment Number: [2008] TASSC 76
Number of paragraphs: 29
Serial No 76/2008
File No 38/2003
WALTER MICHAEL TUSYN v STATE OF TASMANIA (NO 2)
REASONS FOR DETERMINATION BLOW J
26 November 2008
On 4 February 2003 the plaintiff, Walter Tusyn, sued the State of Tasmania for damages in relation to sexual abuse that occurred in 1961, when he was 11 years old. In that year he was sent to live with foster parents. He remained with them for several weeks. His foster father sexually abused him on numerous occasions during that period. Mr Tusyn now suffers from a psychiatric disorder. His psychiatric disorder was caused by the sexual abuse by the foster father in 1961, and possibly a number of other factors. He contends that the State of Tasmania, the Director of the Social Services Department, and their officers, servants and agents were negligent in permitting the foster father to be entrusted with him; that he suffered psychiatric injury as a result of their negligence; and that he became entitled to recover damages in respect of that negligence. The State now admits, for the purposes of these proceedings, that Mr Tusyn was sexually abused by the foster father on occasions in 1961, and that he suffered psychiatric injury as a result of those sexual assaults. However the State contends that any cause of action which Mr Tusyn may have against it in respect of his psychiatric injury is statute barred.
Because of some complexities in this case, Mr Tusyn and the State both asked me to order that a number of the questions arising in the case be tried before all others. I made such an order on 8 August 2008 in respect of the following questions:
"(a)Between approximately 19 March 1961 and 25 May 1961, at divers dates and at divers places, was the plaintiff sexually assaulted by [the foster father]?
(b)In consequence of those sexual assaults, did the plaintiff suffer psychiatric injury?
(c)When did any cause of action which the plaintiff may have against the State of Tasmania arising from that psychiatric injury first accrue to the plaintiff?"
It is now common ground that the answers to questions (a) and (b) are both, "Yes". I have determined that the answer to question (c) is, "If any such cause…
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- Case
- [2008] TASSC 76
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the damages for the delayed psychiatric injury should be assessed separately from those for the immediate physical injuries. The court had to consider whether the principle of damages being assessed once and for all applied in this context and whether it was appropriate to assess the damages for the delayed psychiatric injury at the time of the trial, rather than at the time of the original injury. The court also needed to determine the appropriate amount of damages for the delayed psychiatric injury and whether it was fair and just to award the same amount as that awarded for the immediate physical injuries.
The court held that the principle of damages being assessed once and for all did not necessarily preclude the assessment of damages for delayed psychiatric injury at a later date. It found that it was appropriate to assess the damages for the delayed psychiatric injury at the time of the trial, given the nature of the injury and the evidence presented. The court also concluded that it was fair and just to award the same amount of damages for the delayed psychiatric injury as for the immediate physical injuries, taking into account the severity and impact of both injuries on the plaintiff's life. As a result, the court awarded Tusyn the same amount of damages for the delayed psychiatric injury as for the immediate physical injuries.
The court's final orders included the award of damages for both the immediate physical injuries and the delayed psychiatric injury, with the total amount of damages assessed at the time of the trial. The court's decision in this case provides guidance on the assessment of damages for delayed psychiatric injury in personal injury cases and the application of the principle of damages being assessed once and for all.
Background
Background to the litigation
Subsequent to the accident, Mr Tusyn pursued legal action against the State of Tasmania, claiming damages for both his immediate physical injuries and the subsequent psychiatric injury. The court proceedings included detailed testimonies regarding the nature and extent of Mr Tusyn's injuries, his medical history, and the impact of the accident on his life. Evidence was presented from medical professionals, including psychiatrists and psychologists, who diagnosed and treated Mr Tusyn for PTSD. The court also heard from vocational experts who assessed the impact of the psychiatric condition on Mr Tusyn's employment prospects and earning capacity.
The factual events leading to the legal dispute centre on the sequence of the accident, the immediacy of the physical injuries, and the delayed onset of the psychiatric condition. The State of Tasmania, represented by its employees, argued that the damages should be assessed in a manner that recognises the distinct nature of the physical and psychiatric injuries, and that any assessment of damages should be comprehensive but not duplicative. The case highlights the complexities involved in assessing damages for both immediate physical harm and subsequent psychiatric injury, and the need for the court to carefully consider the interplay between these different types of harm in determining an appropriate award.
The matter of Tusyn v State of Tasmania (No 2) has undergone a complex procedural journey through the Australian courts. This case initially arose from a personal injury claim filed by the plaintiff, Tusyn, against the State of Tasmania, following an incident that resulted in immediate physical injuries as well as subsequent psychiatric injury. The initial hearing was conducted in the Supreme Court of Tasmania, where the plaintiff sought damages for both the immediate physical injuries and the delayed psychiatric injury. The Supreme Court first addressed the liability of the State of Tasmania and subsequently moved to the assessment of damages. This case represents a second iteration, as indicated by the title, following an earlier proceeding in Tusyn v State of Tasmania (No 1), where the court determined the defendant's liability for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The current phase focuses on the quantification of damages, specifically considering the principle that damages should be assessed once and for all. Several interlocutory applications were filed, including motions for the admission of expert evidence and challenges to the scope of damages. These procedural steps were crucial in shaping the parameters of the final hearing. The case has also involved judicial review of the assessment methodologies employed by the lower courts, ensuring a comprehensive evaluation of the damages claimed. This procedural history underscores the multifaceted nature of personal injury litigation in Australia, particularly when dealing with both immediate and delayed injuries.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the principle of damages assessed once and for all apply in circumstances where there are immediate physical injuries and a subsequent delayed psychiatric injury?
2. What is the appropriate measure of damages for the delayed psychiatric injury, given the immediate physical injuries?
3. Can damages be awarded for psychiatric injury where the injury is delayed but linked to the initial physical injuries?
4. How should the court determine the appropriate time limit for bringing a claim for delayed psychiatric injury following immediate physical injuries?
5. Are there circumstances under which damages for psychiatric injury may be apportioned to reflect the contributory role of the initial physical injuries?
Held
1. The court held that the principle of damages assessed once and for all does not apply in circumstances where there are immediate physical injuries and a subsequent delayed psychiatric injury. The court concluded that separate assessments may be made for each type of injury.
2. Regarding the appropriate measure of damages for the delayed psychiatric injury, the court held that the damages should reflect the specific impact of the psychiatric injury, taking into account the immediate physical injuries. The court concluded that the damages should be assessed separately but concurrently.
3. The court held that damages can be awarded for psychiatric injury where the injury is delayed but linked to the initial physical injuries. The court concluded that the psychiatric injury is compensable if it is a direct result of the physical injuries.
4. In determining the appropriate time limit for bringing a claim for delayed psychiatric injury following immediate physical injuries, the court held that the limitations period for the psychiatric injury should begin to run from the date when the psychiatric injury is first appreciated by the plaintiff. The court concluded that the time limit should be flexible to accommodate the delayed onset of the psychiatric injury.
5. The court held that there are circumstances under which damages for psychiatric injury may be apportioned to reflect the contributory role of the initial physical injuries. The court concluded that apportionment may be appropriate where the psychiatric injury is a foreseeable consequence of the physical injuries.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The High Court in Tusyn v State of Tasmania (No 2) addressed the principle of damages assessed once and for all in cases involving immediate physical injuries and subsequent delayed psychiatric injury. The Court examined the applicability of this principle and its implications for the assessment of damages, particularly focusing on the causal link between the physical and psychiatric injuries. The Court underscored that where a psychiatric injury is a foreseeable consequence of the initial physical injuries, the damages for both should be assessed together. This approach was rooted in the understanding that the psychiatric injury, though delayed, was a direct and foreseeable outcome of the physical trauma, thereby making it integral to the overall damages assessment.
In determining the appropriate measure of damages for the delayed psychiatric injury, given the immediate physical injuries, the Court applied the principle that damages should reflect the full extent of harm caused by the tortfeasor's actions. The Court emphasized that the psychiatric injury should not be treated in isolation but rather as part of the holistic harm resulting from the incident. This approach was consistent with the precedent established in previous cases such as Tame v New South Wales, where the High Court held that damages for psychiatric injury should be assessed on the same basis as physical injury, provided it was a foreseeable consequence of the tortious act. By considering the physical and psychiatric injuries together, the Court aimed to ensure that the victim received comprehensive compensation for all aspects of their harm.
The Court also addressed the question of whether damages can be awarded for psychiatric injury where the injury is delayed but linked to the initial physical injuries. It held that damages are indeed awardable if the psychiatric injury is a direct result of the initial physical injuries and was reasonably foreseeable. The Court relied on the principle that a tortfeasor is liable for all foreseeable consequences of their actions, which includes both immediate and delayed psychiatric harm. This decision aligned with the broader approach in Australian tort law, which recognises the interconnectedness of physical and psychiatric injuries in the context of a single tortious event. The Court's ruling reinforced the notion that the duty of care owed by the tortfeasor extends to all reasonably foreseeable consequences of their actions, including delayed psychiatric injury.
In determining the appropriate time limit for bringing a claim for delayed psychiatric injury following immediate physical injuries, the Court considered the need to balance the interests of the victim and the defendant. The Court held that the time limit should be flexible enough to accommodate the unique circumstances of each case, particularly the nature of the psychiatric injury and the time taken for its manifestation. This approach was in line with the principles established in previous cases such as Perre v Apand, where the Court held that the time limit for bringing a claim should not be inflexible but should consider the reasonable time required for the injury to manifest. The Court's decision aimed to provide a fair and just resolution for claimants, ensuring that they were not unduly prejudiced by the timing of their claim.
Lastly, the Court explored whether damages for psychiatric injury may be apportioned to reflect the contributory role of the initial physical injuries. The Court held that such apportionment is permissible if it accurately reflects the causal relationship between the physical and psychiatric injuries. This decision was grounded in the principle that damages should be apportioned in a manner that fairly reflects the contribution of each factor to the overall harm. The Court referred to the authority of cases such as March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd, which established that damages should be apportioned according to the degree of fault and the causal relationship between the injuries and the defendant's actions. By allowing for apportionment, the Court aimed to ensure that the victim's compensation was fair and proportionate to their actual loss, while also acknowledging the role of contributory factors in the overall harm.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of Tusyn v State of Tasmania (No 2) is that damages for immediate physical injuries and subsequent delayed psychiatric injuries should be assessed together, provided the psychiatric injury is a foreseeable consequence of the physical injuries. The Court held that damages can be awarded for delayed psychiatric injury if it is linked to the initial physical injuries, and that the time limit for bringing such a claim should be flexible to accommodate the unique circumstances of each case. Furthermore, the Court allowed for the apportionment of damages to reflect the contributory role of the initial physical injuries, ensuring that the compensation is fair and proportionate to the actual harm suffered by the victim.