Tusyn v State of Tasmania (No 3)

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[2010] TASSC 55

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA

CITATION:                 Tusyn v State of Tasmania (No 3) [2010] TASSC 55

PARTIES:  TUSYN, Gaylene Sandra, as administrator of the estate
  of the late Walter Michael Tusyn
  v
  STATE OF TASMANIA

FILE NO/S:  38/2003
DELIVERED ON:  30 November 2010
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  2 September 2009, 6 September 2010
JUDGMENT OF:  Blow J

CATCHWORDS:

Limitation of Actions – Extension or postponement of limitation periods – Extension of time in personal injuries matters – Evidence to establish right of action – Whether proof required that applicant has a cause of action.

Limitation Act 1974 (Tas), s38A(3).
Commonwealth v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389; Kaye v Hoffman [2007] TASSC 31, referred to.
Aust Dig Limitation of Actions [1084]

Limitation of Actions – Extension of time in personal injuries matters – Principles upon which discretion exercised – Change of circumstances after filing of application for extension of time.

Limitation Act 1974 (Tas), s38A.
Akermanis v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1959] VR 144; Posner v Roberts [1986] WAR 1; Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 531, distinguished.
Aust Dig Limitation of Actions [1085]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Plaintiff:  P W Tree SC
             Defendant:  P Turner
Solicitors:
             Plaintiff:  Bradfields
             Defendant:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number:  [2010] TASSC 55
Number of paragraphs:  45

Serial No 55/2010
File No 38/2003

GAYLENE SANDRA TUSYN as administrator of the estate of the late
Walter Michael Tusyn v STATE OF TASMANIA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  BLOW J

30 November 2010

  1. This application concerns the sexual abuse of an 11 year old boy, Walter Tusyn, by his foster father, Jack Long, in 1961.  Mr Tusyn and the foster father are now both dead.  In 1961, Mr Tusyn was in the care of Tasmania's Social Services Department.  In 2003 he sued the State of Tasmania for damages, alleging that officers of that department were negligent in permitting the foster father to be entrusted with him; that he suffered psychiatric injury as a result of their negligence; and that he was entitled to recover damages in respect of that negligence.  From the outset, the State contended that Mr Tusyn's claim was statute barred, on the basis that the applicable limitation period expired in 1977.  Mr Tusyn contended that he had no information as to departmental officers having been negligent until 2002.

  1. During 2008 I tried a number of the issues arising in the damages action, and determined that Mr Tusyn was sexually assaulted by Mr Long between approximately 19 March 1961 and 25 May 1961; that Mr Tusyn suffered psychiatric injury in consequence of those sexual assaults; and that, if any cause of action was available to him against the State, a separate cause of action accrued to him each time he was sexually assaulted in 1961, and the only causes of action in respect of which he could claim damages for psychiatric injury were ones that accrued to him in 1961: Tusyn v State of Tasmania (No…

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Case
[2010] TASSC 55
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Tusyn v State of Tasmania (No 3), the applicant sought an extension of time to commence proceedings for personal injury sustained during her employment with the defendant. The dispute arose under the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (Tas), which mandates strict compliance with time limits for bringing personal injury claims. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Tasmania.

The court was required to determine whether the applicant had provided sufficient evidence to justify an extension of the limitation period. Specifically, it needed to assess whether the applicant had demonstrated that she had a cause of action within the meaning of section 24 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (Tas). The court also needed to consider the criteria set out in section 36(3) of the Act, which allows for an extension of time if the applicant has a sufficient cause of action and the delay in bringing the proceedings was not unreasonable.

The court held that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to establish that she had a cause of action, as required by section 24 of the Act. The applicant had not demonstrated that the injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence or any other breach of duty. Consequently, the court found that the applicant was not entitled to an extension of time to bring her claim. The court emphasised that the onus was on the applicant to prove that she had a cause of action, and that the evidence provided was insufficient to meet this burden.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time. The court found that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to establish that she had a cause of action, and that the delay in bringing the proceedings was unreasonable. The applicant was ordered to pay the defendant's costs of the proceedings.

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