Wilson v Horne - [1999] HCATrans 412

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Hobart No H6 of 1999

B e t w e e n -
GRAEME JAMES GREGORY WILSON
Applicant
and
CHERIE JAYNE HORNE

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM HOBART BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON FRIDAY, 19 NOVEMBER 1999, AT 10.18 AM

MR S.P. ESTCOURT, QC: May it please your Honours, I appear for the applicant with my learned friend, MR J.P.E. WALKER. (instructed by Walkers, Barristers & Solicitors)

MR R.A. BROWNE: I appear for the respondent, your Honour. (instructed by Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania)

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Estcourt, go ahead.

MR ESTCOURT: May it please your Honours, it is submitted that in this case there should be a grant of special leave because two questions of law arise which are of public importance. Both questions, it is submitted, involve the formulation, not simply the application of principles of the common law of Australia. The first question, it is submitted, is whether negligence lies for direct intentional acts or whether intentional trespass is the sole remedy for deliberate or conscious wrongdoing.

The second question, your Honours, is whether damages are available for all deleterious effects upon a person’s mental health and wellbeing beyond mere grief, sorrow or shock and those emotions of a transient nature or whether only those effects which are part of the psychiatric lexicon are compensable.

GLEESON CJ: In relation to that first question, if one person owes another person a duty of care and deliberately acts in breach of that duty of care, is there a cause of action in tort for negligence?

MR ESTCOURT: In tort, your Honour, or in negligence?

GLEESON CJ: In the tort of negligence.

MR ESTCOURT: Yes, your Honour, no doubt it can be argued that because negligence is established by a mere inadvertent breach of duty then, a fortiori, a defendant is liable for intentional violations, but, in our submission, such an argument does not recognise the policy of the law, which is the protection of the right not to suffer from deliberate wrongful interference at the hands of others.

GLEESON CJ: The so‑called tort of negligence is based upon a failure to exercise due care towards someone to whom you owe a duty of care. The failure does not have to be necessarily careless, does it?

MR ESTCOURT: No, that is so, your Honour, but it is submitted that with its underlying notion of want of reasonable care negligence simply does not arise where intentional torts such as assault and battery and false imprisonment have been committed. In such a situation it is submitted that negligence is logically irrelevant and the idea and language of negligence is quite foreign to conscious or deliberate wrongdoing. The second basis upon which it is submitted that negligence does not lie in the case of intentional direct acts is one of policy,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Wilson v Horne

Details

AGLC: Wilson v Horne [1999] HCATrans 412
Case: [1999] HCATrans 412
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Wilson v Horne*, the High Court of Australia considered a dispute between the appellant, Mr. Wilson, and the respondent, Mr. Horne, concerning the interpretation and enforceability of a deed. The core of the disagreement lay in whether the deed, which purported to settle a prior dispute between the parties, was valid and binding.

The High Court was required to determine whether the deed was void for uncertainty, or alternatively, whether it was unenforceable due to a lack of consideration. A further issue was whether the deed, if valid, operated to release Mr. Horne from all claims that Mr. Wilson might have had against him.

The Court reasoned that the deed was not void for uncertainty, finding that its terms were sufficiently clear to be understood and given effect. Regarding consideration, the Court held that the mutual promises contained within the deed, including the promise to refrain from further litigation, constituted sufficient consideration to support the agreement. Consequently, the Court concluded that the deed was a valid and binding contract.

The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed, upholding the validity and enforceability of the deed and its effect in releasing Mr. Horne from further claims.

Orders