Triguboff v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Triguboff v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 845

File number: NSD 1462 of 2017
Judge: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 14 June 2018
Catchwords: DEFAMATION – interlocutory application seeking hearing of separate question or strike out of claim – is the matter complained of reasonably capable of being about the applicant – where publication only refers to company name – whether reference to company name without more can constitute reference to individual behind company – asserted notoriety of individual behind company – operation of s 9 of Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) – whether separate question hearings to be countenanced in Federal Court proceedings – asserted lack of jurisdiction or basis for strike out due to failure to identify readers in Australian Capital Territory or Northern Territory – whether imputations reasonably capable of arising or being defamatory of applicant or whether imputations are bad in form – held: article about company is not automatically article about owner unless link exists within publication – held: separate question granted and answered “no” – held: judgment entered for respondents with costs
Legislation:

Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 7A

Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 8, 9

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 13.01, 16.21, 30.01(1), 30.02

Cases cited:

Adeang v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2016] FCA 1200

Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; 239 CLR 175

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Whitebox Trading Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 100; 251 FCR 448

Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Parras [2002] NSWCA 202; [2002] Aust Torts Reports 81-675

Club La Costa (UK) Ltd v Gebbard [2008] EWHC 2552

Consolidated Trust Co Ltdv Browne (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 86

Corby v Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 227

Crosby v Kelly [2012] FCAFC 96; 203 FCR 451

Cross v Denley (1952) 52 SLR (NSW) 112

David Syme & Co v Canavan (1918) 25 CLR 234

Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135

E Hulton & Co v Jones [1910] AC 20

Expense ReductionAnalysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategies Management and Marketing Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 46; 250 CLR 303

Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Pedavoli [2015] NSWCA 237; 91 NSWLR 485

Favell v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 52; (2005) 79 ALJR 1716

Gardener v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 10

Gardiner v John Fairfax & Sons (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 171

Goodfellow v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1152

Griffith v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 300

Harvey v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 255

Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 652; 237 FCR 33

John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin [2003] HCA 50; 77 ALJR 1657

Jones v Skelton [1964] NSWR 485 at 491

Kruse v Lindner (1978) 45 FLR 412

Lee…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 845
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Triguboff v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd involved an interlocutory application by the respondents seeking a separate hearing on a specific question and the striking out of the applicant's claim. The applicant, Mr Triguboff, alleged defamation based on an article published by Fairfax Media that referred to his company, Meriton, without explicitly mentioning him. The legal issues centered around whether the article was reasonably capable of being about Mr Triguboff, given that it only referred to the company name, and whether the corporate veil could be pierced to hold the individual liable for defamation.

The court found that the article, while referring to Meriton, did not establish a link that would make it about Mr Triguboff. It held that an article about a company is not automatically about the owner unless there is a clear connection within the publication. The court further clarified that the notoriety of the individual behind the company does not suffice to advance an alter ego characterisation without showing that the company’s actions or conduct are connected to the individual. The court concluded that unless there was a proper reason to regard the publication as being about a natural person, the corporate veil remains intact under section 9 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW). Consequently, the court granted the separate question hearing and answered it in the negative, entering judgment for the respondents and awarding costs.

The final orders included granting the respondents’ application for a separate hearing on the question of whether the matter complained of was reasonably capable of being about Mr Triguboff. The court answered the separate question as “no”, entered judgment for the respondents, and ordered Mr Triguboff to pay the respondents' costs as assessed or agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondents’ application under r 30.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) that a question arising in the proceedings be heard separately from any other questions be granted in the following terms:

Is the matter complained of reasonably capable of being about the applicant?

2. The answer to the separate question in order 1 be “no”.

3. Judgment be entered for the respondents.

4. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs as assessed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

By reply submissions at the IA hearing, the respondents notably sought again to distinguish the submissions of Mr Triguboff as to notoriety. The respondents submitted that, in effect, the larger the company, the more precise the requirement is that the publication either refer to a person, the identity of whom is known notoriously by a subset of people, or, where no person and only a company is referred to, show that there is knowledge on the part of readers that connects a person with conduct referred to in the article. Effectively, it was submitted that it was not sufficient in this instance to assert notoriety to advance an alter ego characterisation for Mr Triguboff with respect of the identity of the company, without also establishing that as to the company’s actions or conduct. Plymouth Brethren (NSWCA) and further submissions on that decision If, contrary to the above, the article was “about” Mr Triguboff, it was not about him as part of any confined or identified class or group, but also about anybody who occupied any position of authority within the company who might be seen to contribute to its state of mind and conduct, itself a telling indicator that the article was “about” Meriton and no one else. The qualification in Parras at [30] reproduced at [69] above therefore applies to the effect that “where matter complained of as defamatory asserts that one member of a group or class was responsible for certain conduct and where there is nothing in that matter which points to any particular member of that group or class as the one who was responsible, the matter itself is incapable of conveying any imputation of guilt in relation to each member of that group or class”. If this measure of discipline is not observed in relation to assertions about the activities of corporations, and especially large corporations, independent corporate personality becomes meaningless in this context, contrary to the evident intent behind s 9 of the Defamation Act. Independent corporate personality is not a device of mere convenience to be applied or set aside at will. Unless there is a proper reason to regard a publication as being not just about a company, but about a person or class of persons at a company, the corporate veil remains intact and s 9 operates according to its terms. Section 9 is to be read as a real and effective immunity from a defamation suit brought by most companies, save only that if a publication is not just about such a company, but also about a natural person, the natural person may still sue. Section 9(5) contributes to the understanding of the meaning of s 9 as a whole. While Mr Triguboff may choose to conduct his affairs in a way which suggests that the corporate veil does not exist, and while media outlets may, at their peril, do the same, if care is taken not to lift the veil, it remains firmly in place by virtue of s 9. That degree of care is evident in relation to the article, which preserves the shield in s 9. It is only if Mr Triguboff is able to characterise the article as being “about” him, and not just about Meriton, that s 9(5) can apply. He has failed in that endeavour.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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