JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- STOCKER [2022] WASCA 178
CORAM: BUSS P
MAZZA JA
VAUGHAN JA
HEARD: 24 MARCH 2022
DELIVERED : 17 NOVEMBER 2022
PUBLISHED : 30 DECEMBER 2022
FILE NO/S: CACR 64 of 2021
BETWEEN: THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Appellant
AND
MATTHEW PETER STOCKER
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: BARBAGALLO DCJ
File Number : IND 17 of 2021
Catchwords:
Criminal law - State appeal against sentence - Respondent convicted on his plea of guilty for one offence of possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply - Respondent convicted on his plea of guilty for one offence of possession of a trafficable quantity of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply - Respondent convicted on his pleas of guilty for two offences of possession of money reasonably believed to be unlawfully obtained - Where counts 3 and 4 committed while on bail for counts 1 and 2 - Respondent sentenced to total effective sentence of 5 years' imprisonment which was partly suspended - Whether partially concurrent sentences can be partly suspended - Whether judge erred in ordering that respondent was eligible for partly suspended sentence prior to serving immediate imprisonment for all counts - Whether judge erred in law by imposing manifestly inadequate sentence for counts 1 and 3 - Whether overall total effective sentence manifestly inadequate or breached first limb of totality principle
Legislation:
Criminal Appeals Act (WA), s 31(4)
Criminal Code (WA), s 417(1)
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(a), s 34(1)(aa), s 34(1)(a)
Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 4, s 6, s 9AA, s 39 pt 11, pt 12, pt 13
Result:
Appeal allowed
Respondent resentenced to total effective sentence of 6 years 6 months' imprisonment
Category: D
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Ms A L Forrester SC |
| Respondent | : | Mr S Vandongen SC |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
| Respondent | : | The Defence Lawyers |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Abdullah v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 21
Baker v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 117
BGR v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 82
Blasco v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 26
Bligh Consulting Pty Ltd v Ausgrid [2017] NSWCA 95
Brewerton v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 191
Cartwright v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 4
CJ v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 42
Cochrane v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 5
Dillon v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 24
EDU v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 55
Egan v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 182
Evans v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 73
Farquhar v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 49
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- Case
- [2022] WASCA 178
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the provisions of Part 13 of the Sentencing Act, which pertain to parole eligibility and the commencement of imprisonment, applied to sentences that were partly suspended. The appellant argued that because his sentence was partly suspended, the provisions of Part 13 should not apply, and thus, the sentence could not be backdated. The State contended that the backdating was permissible and that Part 13 provisions should apply to partly suspended sentences.
The court addressed the issue by referring to the earlier decision in SBJ, where it was determined that Part 13 provisions do not apply to partly suspended terms of imprisonment. The court found that the ruling in SBJ, which held that such sentences could not be backdated, was binding. The court reasoned that the provisions of Part 13 do not apply to partly suspended terms, and as such, there is no authority to backdate these sentences. The court concluded that the primary judge's decision to backdate the sentence was in error, as it contravened the legal principles established in SBJ.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the sentence, ordering that the sentence was to commence from the date of sentencing and not from the date backdated by the primary judge. The court's decision reaffirmed the principle that Part 13 provisions of the Sentencing Act do not apply to partly suspended terms of imprisonment, thereby prohibiting the backdating of such sentences.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The ratio decidendi of a judicial decision comprises any rule of law which is expressly or implicitly a necessary step in the court reaching its conclusion in the case having regard to the court's process of reasoning. See Cross R and Harris JW, Precedent in English Law (4th ed, 1991) 72; Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;[15] Klewer v Attorney General (NSW);[16] Bligh Consulting Pty Ltd v Ausgrid.[17] See also, in relation to the doctrine of stare decisis, the observations in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar.[18][15] Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1817; (2000) 105 FCR 39 [24] ‑ [28] (Heerey, Moore & Goldberg JJ).[16] Klewer v Attorney General (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 219 [18] ‑ [21] (McColl & Campbell JJA & Sackville AJA).[17] Bligh Consulting Pty Ltd v Ausgrid [2017] NSWCA 95 [121] (Sackville AJA; McColl & Basten JJA agreeing).[18] Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar [2000] FCA 1170; (2000) 102 FCR 595 [23] (Branson & Finkelstein JJ). It appears from the reasons for judgment in SBJ that a necessary step in Mazza, Beech and Pritchard JJA reaching their conclusion that s 87 of the Sentencing Act has no application to a partly suspended term of imprisonment, having regard to their Honours' process of reasoning, was their Honours' rulings that:(a)no provision of pt 11 of the Sentencing Act, in its terms, picks up any element of pt 13 of that Act in respect of the immediate component of the term of partly suspended imprisonment [132];(b)section 80(5) reinforces the conclusion that suspended imprisonment, of which partly suspended imprisonment is a subset, is not imprisonment under pt 13 [135]; and(c)the provisions of pt 13 do not apply to a partly suspended term of imprisonment [136] - [137]. It is unnecessary, however, to decide finally whether those rulings in SBJ form part of the ratio decidendi of that case. It is sufficient to note that the court in SBJ held expressly that the provisions of pt 13 do not apply to a partly suspended term of imprisonment under pt 11 and, by necessary implication, that the provisions of pt 13 do not apply to a wholly suspended term of imprisonment under pt 11. In Evans v The State of Western Australia,[19] Mazza JA, Mitchell JA and I allowed the appellant's appeal against sentence. The appellant had been convicted after trial of one offence. He was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. The primary judge ordered that the sentence be partly suspended. In particular, the appellant was to be released after serving 12 months' imprisonment and the balance of 2 years' imprisonment was to be suspended for a period of 12 months. The primary judge sentenced the appellant on 27 November 2018 and backdated the sentence to 26 October 2018. The appeal was allowed on the basis that his Honour had erred in backdating the sentence. The court referred to SBJ and said [74]:The court in SBJ … held that pt 13 of the Sentencing Act does not apply to a partly suspended term of imprisonment, and that there is no power to backdate the commencement of partly suspended imprisonment or to make a parole eligibility order (SBJ [136]).[19] Evans v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 73.