The State of Western Australia v Stocker

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- STOCKER [2022] WASCA 178

CORAM:   BUSS P

MAZZA JA

VAUGHAN JA

HEARD:   24 MARCH 2022

DELIVERED          :   17 NOVEMBER 2022

PUBLISHED           :   30 DECEMBER 2022

FILE NO/S:   CACR 64 of 2021

BETWEEN:   THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Appellant

AND

MATTHEW PETER STOCKER

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   BARBAGALLO DCJ

File Number            :   IND 17 of 2021


Catchwords:

Criminal law - State appeal against sentence - Respondent convicted on his plea of guilty for one offence of possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply - Respondent convicted on his plea of guilty for one offence of possession of a trafficable quantity of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply - Respondent convicted on his pleas of guilty for two offences of possession of money reasonably believed to be unlawfully obtained - Where counts 3 and 4 committed while on bail for counts 1 and 2 - Respondent sentenced to total effective sentence of 5 years' imprisonment which was partly suspended - Whether partially concurrent sentences can be partly suspended - Whether judge erred in ordering that respondent was eligible for partly suspended sentence prior to serving immediate imprisonment for all counts - Whether judge erred in law by imposing manifestly inadequate sentence for counts 1 and 3 - Whether overall total effective sentence manifestly inadequate or breached first limb of totality principle

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act (WA), s 31(4)
Criminal Code (WA), s 417(1)
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(a), s 34(1)(aa), s 34(1)(a)
Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 4, s 6, s 9AA, s 39 pt 11, pt 12, pt 13

Result:

Appeal allowed
Respondent resentenced to total effective sentence of 6 years 6 months' imprisonment

Category:    D

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : Ms A L Forrester SC
Respondent : Mr S Vandongen SC

Solicitors:

Appellant : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
Respondent : The Defence Lawyers

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Abdullah v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 21

Baker v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 117

BGR v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 82

Blasco v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 26

Bligh Consulting Pty Ltd v Ausgrid [2017] NSWCA 95

Brewerton v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 191

Cartwright v The State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 4

CJ v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 42

Cochrane v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 5

Dillon v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 24

EDU v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 55

Egan v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 182

Evans v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 73

Farquhar v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 49

Fernandes v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 227

Green…

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Details
Case
[2022] WASCA 178
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of The State of Western Australia versus Stocker, the case was brought before the Western Australian Court of Appeal. The appellant, Stocker, had been convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, part of which was to be suspended. The dispute centred around the interpretation and application of the Sentencing Act concerning the backdating of partly suspended sentences and the implications for parole eligibility. The court was tasked with determining whether the provisions of Part 13 of the Sentencing Act applied to partly suspended terms of imprisonment and, consequently, whether such sentences could be backdated.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the provisions of Part 13 of the Sentencing Act, which pertain to parole eligibility and the commencement of imprisonment, applied to sentences that were partly suspended. The appellant argued that because his sentence was partly suspended, the provisions of Part 13 should not apply, and thus, the sentence could not be backdated. The State contended that the backdating was permissible and that Part 13 provisions should apply to partly suspended sentences.

The court addressed the issue by referring to the earlier decision in SBJ, where it was determined that Part 13 provisions do not apply to partly suspended terms of imprisonment. The court found that the ruling in SBJ, which held that such sentences could not be backdated, was binding. The court reasoned that the provisions of Part 13 do not apply to partly suspended terms, and as such, there is no authority to backdate these sentences. The court concluded that the primary judge's decision to backdate the sentence was in error, as it contravened the legal principles established in SBJ.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the sentence, ordering that the sentence was to commence from the date of sentencing and not from the date backdated by the primary judge. The court's decision reaffirmed the principle that Part 13 provisions of the Sentencing Act do not apply to partly suspended terms of imprisonment, thereby prohibiting the backdating of such sentences.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The ratio decidendi of a judicial decision comprises any rule of law which is expressly or implicitly a necessary step in the court reaching its conclusion in the case having regard to the court's process of reasoning. See Cross R and Harris JW, Precedent in English Law (4th ed, 1991) 72; Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;[15] Klewer v Attorney General (NSW);[16] Bligh Consulting Pty Ltd v Ausgrid.[17] See also, in relation to the doctrine of stare decisis, the observations in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar.[18][15] Wu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1817; (2000) 105 FCR 39 [24] ‑ [28] (Heerey, Moore & Goldberg JJ).[16] Klewer v Attorney General (NSW) [2010] NSWCA 219 [18] ‑ [21] (McColl & Campbell JJA & Sackville AJA).[17] Bligh Consulting Pty Ltd v Ausgrid [2017] NSWCA 95 [121] (Sackville AJA; McColl & Basten JJA agreeing).[18] Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar [2000] FCA 1170; (2000) 102 FCR 595 [23] (Branson & Finkelstein JJ). It appears from the reasons for judgment in SBJ that a necessary step in Mazza, Beech and Pritchard JJA reaching their conclusion that s 87 of the Sentencing Act has no application to a partly suspended term of imprisonment, having regard to their Honours' process of reasoning, was their Honours' rulings that:(a)no provision of pt 11 of the Sentencing Act, in its terms, picks up any element of pt 13 of that Act in respect of the immediate component of the term of partly suspended imprisonment [132];(b)section 80(5) reinforces the conclusion that suspended imprisonment, of which partly suspended imprisonment is a subset, is not imprisonment under pt 13 [135]; and(c)the provisions of pt 13 do not apply to a partly suspended term of imprisonment [136] - [137]. It is unnecessary, however, to decide finally whether those rulings in SBJ form part of the ratio decidendi of that case. It is sufficient to note that the court in SBJ held expressly that the provisions of pt 13 do not apply to a partly suspended term of imprisonment under pt 11 and, by necessary implication, that the provisions of pt 13 do not apply to a wholly suspended term of imprisonment under pt 11. In Evans v The State of Western Australia,[19] Mazza JA, Mitchell JA and I allowed the appellant's appeal against sentence. The appellant had been convicted after trial of one offence. He was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. The primary judge ordered that the sentence be partly suspended. In particular, the appellant was to be released after serving 12 months' imprisonment and the balance of 2 years' imprisonment was to be suspended for a period of 12 months. The primary judge sentenced the appellant on 27 November 2018 and backdated the sentence to 26 October 2018. The appeal was allowed on the basis that his Honour had erred in backdating the sentence. The court referred to SBJ and said [74]:The court in SBJ … held that pt 13 of the Sentencing Act does not apply to a partly suspended term of imprisonment, and that there is no power to backdate the commencement of partly suspended imprisonment or to make a parole eligibility order (SBJ [136]).[19] Evans v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 73.