Owen v The State of Western Australia - [2024] WASCA 28

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION:   OWEN -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2024] WASCA 28
CORAM:   BUSS P
HALL JA

HEARD:   19 MARCH 2024
DELIVERED          :   27 MARCH 2024
FILE NO/S:   CACR 117 of 2023
BETWEEN:   NICHOLAS JOHN OWEN
Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram:   WALLACE DCJ
File Number            :   IND 1044 of 2021

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Attempt to possess trafficable quantity of methylamphetamine - Whether sentence manifestly excessive

Legislation:

Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(a), s 33(1), s 34(1)(a)
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 7(3)(a)

Result:

Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant	:	Mr T M Andrews
Respondent	:	No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant	:	Andrews Legal
Respondent	:	Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Carlucci v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 37
Cochrane v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 5; (2021) 57 WAR 262
Curry v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 36
Dillon v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 24
Gaskell v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 8
HSH v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 113
Humes v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 110
Kabambi v State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44
KJL v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 65
McGrath v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 118
Musulin v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 18
Nguyen v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 162
Stipanich v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 118
The State of Western Australia v Delaney [2020] WASCA 93
The State of Western Australia v Stocker [2022] WASCA 178
Vidich v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 171
YLT v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 217

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:

This is an application for leave to appeal against sentence.
The appellant was charged on an indictment with 13 counts of attempting to possess a prohibited drug, with intent to sell or supply it to another, contrary to s 6(1)(a), s 33(1) and s 34(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA). Count 1 alleged an attempt to possess methylamphetamine. Counts 2 - 13 alleged attempts to possess various quantities of human growth hormone and anabolic steroids.
The appellant initially pleaded not guilty to all counts. On the first day of his trial, he pleaded guilty to counts 2 - 13. He maintained his plea of not guilty to count 1. He was found guilty of that offence by the jury.
On 22 September 2023, the appellant was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment on count 1. Sentences of imprisonment were also imposed on counts 2 - 13. Those sentences added an additional 12 months' imprisonment to the total sentence, producing a total effective sentence of 7 years' imprisonment.
There is one ground of appeal. It is that the sentence imposed on count 1 was manifestly excessive. There is no challenge to the sentences imposed on counts 2 - 13 or to the total effective sentence.
For the reasons that follow, the ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of success. It is not reasonably arguable that the sentence of 6 years' imprisonment on count 1 was manifestly excessive. Leave to appeal should be refused and the appeal dismissed.

The facts

The facts as found by the learned sentencing judge are not in dispute. The following summary has been drawn from the sentencing judge's sentencing remarks.[1] It will be necessary to refer to some of the facts relating to counts 2 - 13 as they are relevant to count 1.
[1] Sentencing remarks ts 3 - 11.
In early to mid‑2020, the appellant was heavily involved in bodybuilding. He was using various human growth hormones and anabolic steroids to assist in building muscle mass. He also commenced selling or supplying human growth hormones and anabolic steroids to other bodybuilders.
At this time the appellant was the part owner of an investment property in Banksia Grove. The property had been leased to rental tenants through a property manager. The appellant was aware of the names of the tenants but had never met them or attended at the property whilst they were in occupation. The tenants were a couple and their two young children.
On the afternoon of 2 June 2020, an Australia Post delivery officer attended at the Banksia Grove house to deliver two packages. One was a small white parcel which required a signature on delivery, the other was a large box in a yellow Express Post satchel which did not require a signature.
The male tenant of the house accepted delivery of the smaller white parcel. However, he declined to receive the Express Post parcel because it was addressed to a person who was not known to him. The female tenant then said that she was expecting delivery of an item that fitted the size and shape of the parcel and said that the parcel could be for her and that the sender could have incorrectly addressed it. In these circumstances, the delivery officer permitted the female tenant to open the parcel. When she did so, she found a hard case containing a tray of makeup. The tray was removable, and underneath it was a vacuum‑sealed plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance. On seeing this, the female tenant returned the parcel to the delivery officer, told him that it did not belong to her and said that she believed that it contained drugs.
The delivery officer returned the parcel to the post office. The parcel was recorded as delivery declined on the Australia Post tracking system. A report was made to the police the following day. Police officers attended and seized the parcel and its contents.
The white crystalline substance was analysed and found to be methylamphetamine weighing a total of 133 g with a purity of 56%.
The Express Post satchel had a tracking number. This enabled the parcel to be tracked by those who knew the tracking number and had registered for an Australia Post Customer Number (APCN). Inquiries using various Australia Post databases revealed that the package was being tracked by two individual customers with separate APCNs. One of those numbers was registered to a John Sigaro. A person purporting to be John Sigaro made telephone calls to Australia Post Customer Services on 3 and 4 June 2020 regarding the parcel. The sentencing judge was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had made those calls or had registered the APCN in the name of John Sigaro.
The second APCN was registered in the name of an ex‑girlfriend of the appellant. Drivers Licence details had been used in setting up that APCN. The sentencing judge was satisfied that the appellant had set up that APCN without the knowledge or consent of his ex‑girlfriend and had used a scanned copy of her driver's licence, which he had retained. That APCN registration also listed a mobile telephone number for the customer. That number was connected to a SIM card that was used in a mobile telephone later found in the possession of the appellant.
The enquiries on the Australia Post databases also identified another two parcels addressed to the appellant's ex‑girlfriend that were being held at the West Perth Parcel Locker Suite. Two APCNs were linked to the first of those parcels for tracking purposes. One of the APCNs was the one registered in the name of the appellant's ex‑girlfriend. The second APCN was registered to the appellant at his home address.
The two parcels being held at West Perth were located and seized by the police. When examined, they were found to contain various smaller packages, each containing quantities of anabolic steroids or human growth hormone. These smaller packages were the subject of counts 2 - 12 on the indictment.
At approximately 11.00 pm on 4 June 2020, the appellant travelled by car to the West Perth Parcel Locker Suite and attempted to collect one of the packages seized by the police. The following day, he again attended the West Perth Parcel Locker Suite, where he collected a further Express Post package from a parcel locker which was addressed to his ex‑girlfriend. The police were unaware of that package until it was collected by the appellant. That parcel contained a box of vials of human growth hormone that is the subject of count 13 on the indictment.
After collecting the package, the appellant moved to a customer service window to make enquiries in relation to the other two packages. Australia Post staff identified the appellant to detectives who were present at the premises. The appellant was then arrested and found in possession of the package relating to count 13.
The appellant also had an Apple iPhone when arrested, which was unlocked and active. That telephone was seized. When analysed, it was found that that telephone contained a SIM card with a number that corresponded with the mobile telephone number associated with the APCN that the appellant had set up in the name of his ex‑girlfriend. Analysis of the telephone showed that the APCN in the name of the ex‑girlfriend had been used to track the Express Post parcel containing the methylamphetamine, the subject of count 1. The telephone also contained photographs of white crystalline or white powder‑like substances. The sentencing judge was unable to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that any of those images depicted methylamphetamine. The telephone also included photographs of the driver's licence of the appellant's ex‑girlfriend.
The sentencing judge found that the appellant's ex‑girlfriend had scanned her driver's licence details onto the appellant's computer when they were together for approximately four months in 2018. Whilst the appellant did not come into possession of the driver's licence details by way of deception or fraud, her Honour found that the details were used without the knowledge of the ex‑girlfriend in about early 2020 in order to fraudulently set up an APCN account in her name.
On 5 June 2020, police escorted the appellant to his home and executed a search warrant. A number of items were seized, but the only items of relevance to count 1 were the card/surround for the SIM card found in the mobile telephone. Police also downloaded data from the appellant's computer located in the study of his home, which contained another image of the ex‑girlfriend's driver's licence. Evidence was also located which showed that the appellant had fraudulently registered three other APCNs using false identities.
When interviewed by the police, the appellant made full admissions in relation to the human growth hormone and anabolic steroids (counts 2 - 13). However, he denied any involvement in relation to the methylamphetamine (count 1). Towards the conclusion of the interview, he did admit that he had been tracking the package that contained the methylamphetamine. However, he claimed that he had been asked to do so by an associate and that he was not aware of its contents.

Personal circumstances

The appellant was 35 years old when he committed the offences and 38 years old at the time he came to be sentenced. He was born and raised in Brisbane to a loving and supportive family, devoid of any trauma or abuse. He continues to have a good relationship with his sister and mother, who continue to reside in Queensland. The appellant's father has passed away.
The appellant relocated from Brisbane to Western Australia in 2008 because he had obtained work in the mining industry in Karratha. Between 2008 and late 2019, he worked at various mine sites, during which time he was subject to regular random drug testing. He did not use illicit drugs during that period and always returned negative tests. The appellant maintains that he has never consumed illicit substances, other than anabolic steroids and human growth hormones.
The appellant completed year 12 and commenced an apprenticeship as a mechanic. He gained qualifications as a mechanical fitter and a Microsoft Systems engineer. He worked in both of those vocations. He has been in gainful employment since leaving school. He was working as a workshop manager at the time of his conviction. A reference from his most recent employer described him as a dedicated and hard‑working employee.
The appellant developed an interest in bodybuilding at the age of 19. He started to engage in competitive bodybuilding in 2009. He first began to use hormones when he was prescribed testosterone by a doctor. He appreciated the benefits of the drug and continued to obtain it for personal use. He initially purchased steroids from a website. He later made an arrangement with the operator of the website to receive steroids for other customers which he would then forward to them. In exchange he received steroids for his own use at a reduced price or without cost.
The appellant purchased a property in Wanneroo in 2013 and then a second property at Banksia Grove in 2015. The second property is the rental property relating to count 1. That property had been sold by the time the appellant came to be sentenced.
The appellant is married and was living with his wife in a suburb of Perth at the time of the offences. The appellant is in sound physical health, though he experienced some anxiety and depression in the lead‑up to his sentencing. He had not sought treatment for those matters. After his arrest the appellant ceased all use of anabolic steroids and human growth hormones.
The appellant has a past criminal history both in this State and in Queensland. The Queensland offences include a conviction for unlawful possession of motor vehicles, for which the appellant received a sentence of 18 months' imprisonment, wholly suspended for a period of two years. His other convictions in Queensland are for traffic offences. His West Australian record consists of a conviction for importing prohibited imports contrary to s 233(1)(b) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), for which he received a fine of $3,500 and an offence of assault occasioning bodily harm, for which he received a fine of $200 and a spent conviction.

Sentencing remarks

It is unnecessary to refer to the learned sentencing judge's sentencing remarks in detail. No express error is alleged. It is, however, relevant to note the findings made by Her Honour regarding the seriousness of the offence.
The sentencing judge found that the explanation of the appellant that he was tracking the parcel on behalf of somebody else without any knowledge that it contained an illicit substance lacked credibility in circumstances where that parcel was addressed to a property owned by the appellant and that he was tracking its delivery by utilising an APCN that he had set up in a false name.[2]
[2] Sentencing remarks ts 11.
Her Honour then made the following findings:[3]
You took those actions in an attempt to distance yourself from the contents of that package and the illegality of it. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as indeed the jury must have been … that the package, the subject of count 1, contained a prohibited drug, and that you had an intention to exercise control over that prohibited drug by tracking it, and in my view, collecting it after it had been refused by [the tenants].
In my view, you were likely aware that the package contained methylamphetamine, although it is unnecessary for me to make that finding beyond reasonable doubt. You were certainly aware that it did not contain anabolic steroids or human growth hormones.
If it were either of those substances, there would have been no reason for you not to adopt your usual practice of arranging for those substances to be delivered to the Australia Post Parcel locker, tracked by you through one of your fraudulent identities registered to an APCN, utilised by you.
In my view, you must have been aware that the package contained, at least in your mind, a more serious illicit substance such that you endeavoured to have greater distance between yourself and that package. In my view, your role was that of a middleman or drug courier in a mid to high level drug operation.
I am not satisfied, as I have said, beyond reasonable doubt that you were aware that it was specifically methylamphetamine. I am also not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that you were aware of the specific quantity of it.
However, you were aware that it contained an illicit prohibited drug. You had an intention to exercise your control over it. And you were aware that given the nature of the illicit substance, it necessitated additional levels of secrecy and concealment in respect to your involvement.
[3] Sentencing remarks ts 11 - 12.
The sentencing judge found that the appellant did not act for altruistic reasons and that it was implausible that he would have undertaken such a risk for no reward. However, what reward he would have received was impossible to ascertain. Her Honour was satisfied that there was commerciality in the appellant's offending, though he would not have derived a significant profit.[4] Her Honour described the appellant's role as 'akin to that of a drug courier', although she said that that was 'slightly elevated' given some of the sophisticated elements of arranging to bring the methylamphetamine to Western Australia.[5]
[4] Sentencing remarks ts 12.
[5] Sentencing remarks ts 13.
Whilst the sentencing judge was satisfied that the appellant had displayed some remorse for the offences relating to the human growth hormone and the anabolic steroids, she did not have the same view regarding the methylamphetamine offence. As regards count 1, her Honour was unable to find that there was genuine remorse, given that the appellant had pleaded not guilty and continued to deny committing that offence.[6]
[6] Sentencing remarks ts 17.
The sentencing judge concluded that the only appropriate sentencing disposition was sentences of imprisonment.[7]
[7] Sentencing remarks ts 19.

Ground of appeal

There is one ground of appeal. It is as follows:
The appellant appeals against sentence on the ground that the sentence imposed on Count 1 was manifestly excessive in that a miscarriage of justice occurred.

Appellant's submissions

The appellant submits that the sentence of 6 years imposed on count 1 was manifestly excessive having regard to the fact that his role was limited to tracking the parcel online. It is suggested that it is also relevant that the appellant was unaware of the type of prohibited drug contained in the parcel or the weight of that drug. Further, whilst there was an element of commerciality, the profit that the appellant would have gained would have been nothing like that that those higher in the drug hierarchy would have derived.[8]
[8] Appellant's case, 10 - 11.
The appellant also points to matters in mitigation, including that he had relatively few prior convictions, had not previously been sentenced to an immediate term of imprisonment, had a supportive family, a positive and stable marriage and a history of gainful employment. He also has good prospects of rehabilitation.[9]
[9] Appellant's case, 11.
The appellant submits that the sentence is inconsistent with sentences imposed in comparable cases. In this regard, the appellant places particular reliance on McGrath v The State of Western Australia[10] and Humes v The State of Western Australia.[11] The appellant points to the fact that the amount of methylamphetamine possessed by him was less than that possessed by the offenders in those cases and was also of a lesser purity. It is suggested that the appellant's role was comparable to that of the offenders in those cases and the lesser sentences imposed on those offenders supports a conclusion that his sentence is manifestly excessive.[12]
[10] McGrath v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 118.
[11] Humes v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 110.
[12] Appellant's case, 7 - 10.

Merits of the appeal

The relevant sentencing principles relating to appeals against sentence where there is a claim that an individual sentence is manifestly excessive are well established. Those principles have been stated many times and have been conveniently summarised in Kabambi v State of Western Australia.[13] It is unnecessary to repeat them.
[13] Kabambi v State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44.
When considering whether a sentence is manifestly excessive it is relevant to take into account the maximum penalty for the offence, the seriousness of the offence (including any aggravating or mitigating factors), the personal circumstances of the offender and the guidance that is afforded by comparable cases.
The major sentencing considerations for offences of dealing in or trafficking dangerous drugs of addiction are general and personal deterrence. The weight of the drugs in question is not generally the chief factor to be taken into account in fixing a sentence, but it is a matter of importance. That is because it can be presumed that the greater the quantity and purity, the greater the harm which may be done to the community. Other matters to be taken into account include the nature and level of the offender's participation in drug dealing or trafficking within a particular organisation or generally, and whether the offending was committed for commercial gain. The degree of purity is often regarded as significant. Matters personal to an offender will almost always be subsidiary considerations, but they are not completely irrelevant.[14]
[14] Gaskell v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 8 [128].
The maximum penalty for the offence of attempting to possess a trafficable quantity of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply is life imprisonment. The increase in that penalty from 25 years' imprisonment became effective on 18 September 2017. An increase in the maximum penalty should be expected to cause an increase in sentences and that is reflected in the cases referred to later in these reasons.
The learned sentencing judge referred to the maximum penalty for this count as being imprisonment for 25 years and/or a fine not exceeding $100,000.[15] That may be because count 1 did not expressly state that the quantity involved was a trafficable quantity. However, the indictment contained sufficient information to enable the appellant to understand that he was being charged with the offence alleged in count 1 in circumstances of aggravation, namely that it involved a trafficable quantity of methylamphetamine. The indictment did so by referring under the heading 'Details of Charges' in the context of count 1 to s 34(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act. See Cochrane v The State of Western Australia.[16] The appellant was therefore 'charged and convicted of committing the offence' in circumstances of aggravation within s 7(3)(a) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). There was no dispute that the quantity of methylamphetamine involved in count 1 was well in excess of the trafficable quantity of 28 g. The appellant accepts that the sentencing judge made an error regarding the maximum penalty.[17] However, the error favoured the appellant.
[15] Sentencing remarks ts 2.
[16] Cochrane v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 5; (2021) 57 WAR 262 [75] - [82].
[17] Appeal ts 3.
As to the seriousness of the offence, the appellant's attempt to obtain the methylamphetamine was not a momentary aberration. His actions also involved some degree of sophistication. The appellant set up an APCN in a false name so that he could track the movement of parcels containing prohibited drugs. He used that APCN to track the parcel containing methylamphetamine. To do so, he must have been provided with the tracking number by the person who consigned that parcel. The parcel was delivered to a property part‑owned by the appellant.
The sentencing judge found as a fact that the appellant tracked the parcel with the intention of controlling it and of collecting it when it was delivered. There was no suggestion that the appellant was a user of methylamphetamine, and the sentencing judge found that he had a commercial motivation for his role. His reward may not have been capable of quantification, but it was nonetheless commercial. Whilst it was not established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the precise nature of the drugs or the quantity involved, it was found that he did know that it was a prohibited drug and a drug of a more serious nature than anabolic steroids or human growth hormones. It should be noted that to say that knowledge of the precise nature and quantity of the drugs was not proved beyond reasonable doubt does not equate with a positive finding that the appellant did not know these things. No such positive finding in the appellant's favour was made.
We have had regard to the cases referred to by the appellant. When the circumstances of those cases are considered, it is apparent that the sentences imposed in them do not support the claim that the appellant's sentence was manifestly excessive. In any event, where this court dismisses or allows an appeal against a sentence, that does not carry any implication that either the original sentence or the sentence imposed on appeal was the only correct one or that that sentence is to be taken to be a limit on the exercise of discretion. Furthermore, a sample of two cases could not possibly establish any discretionary range for offences of this type.
In Humes, the offender was convicted on his pleas of guilty of one count of possession of a trafficable quantity of methylamphetamine with intent to supply it to another and one count of possession of a thing reasonably suspected of having been stolen or unlawfully obtained, being $1,666 in cash. In relation to the first count, the offender was a passenger in a vehicle in which drugs were being conveyed. When the car was stopped by the police the offender picked up the drugs and tried to conceal them. Exactly how long the offender was in possession of the drugs was not known, but it was described as being brief, if not fleeting, and involved an intention to return them to the driver of the car. The quantity of methylamphetamine in that case was 166.3 g with a purity of between 80% and 81%. The cash the subject of count 2, was the money paid to the offender for his role in transporting the drugs. An appeal against a sentence of 6 years 2 months on the first count was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 5 years' immediate imprisonment. That sentence allowed for a discount of 20% for pleading guilty pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act.
The role of the offender in Humes cannot be meaningfully compared to that of the appellant. In Humes, the role of the offender was very limited, and his possession of the drugs was brief. In contrast, the appellant's role in registering a false APCN and then using it to track the parcel was not a momentary act and was comparatively sophisticated. It enabled the appellant to follow the movement of the parcel under cover of a false identity. Whilst the appellant did not come into possession of the drugs, that was because they were accidentally discovered rather than due to any lack of effort on his part. In any event, the offender in Humes pleaded guilty at a relatively early opportunity and received a 20% discount. That factor alone accounts for any difference in the sentences.
In McGrath, the offender was convicted on his plea of guilty of one count of possessing 985 g of methylamphetamine with a purity of 78%. He was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment. The offender was a passenger in a vehicle being driven by a friend which was stopped and searched by police. The offender was found to be in possession of a shopping bag that contained the methylamphetamine. The offender's role in the offending was to assist in the transportation of the methylamphetamine. A short time after the offender got out of the vehicle, as directed by police, he picked up the shopping bag and attempted to run. He then threw the bag over the car, where it landed on a footpath. At the time of the offence, the offender was 27 years old. His record comprised two prior convictions for possession of methylamphetamine, for which he received fines. The aggravating factors identified by the sentencing judge in that case were the quantity of methylamphetamine and that the offender was to receive a commercial benefit for his role in the offending. The offender's sole ground of appeal was that the sentence of 8 years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive. This court upheld the appeal, describing the offender's conduct as 'both fleeting and opportunistic', and considered that his criminality was appreciably lower than the criminality of the offending in other cases. The offender was resentenced to 5 years 9 months' imprisonment. That sentence allowed for a discount of 25% for pleading guilty pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act.
Unlike McGrath, the appellant's criminal conduct was not fleeting or opportunistic. He engaged in a deliberate course of conduct which was significantly more sophisticated than that of McGrath. Whilst the quantity of drugs was greater in McGrath, that is not the chief factor in sentencing - particularly where the role is as limited as it was in that case. Furthermore, the offender in McGrath pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity and received a 25% discount. That factor alone accounts for any difference in the sentences.
In addition to the cases referred to by the appellant, we have also had regard to the following cases: Musulin v The State of Western Australia;[18] Carlucci v The State of Western Australia;[19] Nguyen v The State of Western Australia;[20] The State of Western Australia v Stocker;[21] Stipanich v The State of Western Australia;[22] HSH v The State of Western Australia;[23] The State of Western Australia v Delaney;[24] Dillon v The State of Western Australia;[25] Vidich v The State of Western Australia;[26] YLT v The State of Western Australia;[27] KJL v The State of Western Australia[28] and Curry v The State of Western Australia.[29] A number of other cases are also referred to in Stocker. It is unnecessary to refer to the details of those cases other than to note that they do not support a conclusion that the 6‑year sentence imposed on count 1 in this case was manifestly excessive.
[18] Musulin vThe State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 18.
[19] Carlucci vThe State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 37.
[20] Nguyen vThe State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 162.
[21] The State of Western Australia v Stocker [2022] WASCA 178.
[22] Stipanich v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 118.
[23] HSH v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 113.
[24] The State of Western Australia v Delaney [2020] WASCA 93.
[25] Dillon v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 24.
[26] Vidich v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 171.
[27] YLT v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 217.
[28] KJL v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 65.
[29] Curry v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 36.
Having regard to the maximum penalty for the offence, the seriousness of the offending, the personal circumstances of the appellant and sentences imposed in comparable cases, there is no proper basis for arguing that the sentence imposed in this case was manifestly excessive.

Conclusion

The ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of succeeding. It is not reasonably arguable that the sentence of 6 years' imprisonment imposed for count 1 is manifestly excessive. Leave should be refused and the appeal dismissed.

Orders

1.Leave to appeal refused.
2.Appeal dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
AZ
Associate to the Honourable Justice Hall
27 MARCH 2024