JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: HSH -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2023] WASCA 113
CORAM: QUINLAN CJ
BUSS P
MAZZA JA
HEARD: 10 FEBRUARY 2023
DELIVERED : 14 JULY 2023
FILE NO: CACR 37 of 2022
BETWEEN: HSH
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: VERNON DCJ
File Number : IND [X] of 2020
Catchwords:
Criminal law – Appeal against sentence – Possession of a trafficable quantity of a prohibited drug namely methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply – Whether sentence partly concurrent with existing sentence – Whether sentence manifestly excessive – Impact of totality on sentence – Appeal dismissed
Legislation:
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA)
Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA), s 3, s 4, s 6, s 7
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 85, s 87, s 88, s 93, s 94
Result:
Leave to add additional ground of appeal granted
Leave to appeal on grounds 1 and 2 granted
Appeal dismissed
Category: D
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | E R Zillessen |
| Respondent | : | G N Beggs |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Legal Aid - Perth - Criminal Appeals |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Cases referred to in decision:
ATH v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 149
Aung v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 175
Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2; (2014) 253 CLR 58
Beasley v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 80
Blasco v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 26
Carlucci v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 37; (2019) 276 A Crim R 472
Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Corrective Services v Jackson [2009] WASCA 51
Cochrane v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 5; (2021) 57 WAR 262
Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321
Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428
FZA v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 124
Gelmi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 139; (2019) 89 MVR 443
Hayden v The Queen [2003] WASCA 210
HSV v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 5; (2020) 281 A Crim R 147
Ibbs v The Queen [1987] HCA 46; (1987) 163 CLR 447
Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44
Kirby v The Queen [2003] WASCA 164
KJL v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 65
Le v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 163
Mallet v Mallet [1984] HCA 21; (1984) 156 CLR 605
Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357
McConnell v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA
McGrath v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 118
Narkle v Hamilton [2008] WASCA 31
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- Case
- [2023] WASCA 113
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was how to interpret and apply the provisions of sections 87, 88, and 94 of the Sentencing Act. Specifically, the court had to determine whether time spent on remand could be taken into account in sentencing, how concurrent, cumulative, and partly cumulative terms should be handled, and how parole terms should be aggregated for calculating eligibility for parole release. These issues required careful consideration of the statutory language and the legislative intent behind the provisions.
In delivering its judgment, the court provided a detailed analysis of the statutory language and the context in which the provisions were enacted. The court concluded that section 87 allows for the reduction of a fixed term of imprisonment or the commencement of the term on a specified date, taking into account time spent on remand. Regarding section 88, the court held that concurrent, cumulative, and partly cumulative terms should be interpreted based on the explicit orders made by the sentencing court, with the court having the discretion to specify the periods to be served concurrently or cumulatively. Lastly, the court interpreted section 94 to mean that parole terms are aggregated for calculating parole eligibility unless specific conditions outlined in the statute are met. The court's interpretation ensured that the provisions were applied in a manner consistent with the legislative intent.
The court made orders consistent with its interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, ensuring that the sentencing court had the necessary discretion to order the terms of imprisonment and parole in accordance with the law. The decision clarified the interplay between the Sentencing Act and the Sentence Administration Act, providing guidance for future cases involving similar issues.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Part 13 div 2 of the Sentencing Act deals with imprisonment as a sentencing option. That part makes various provision for the commencement of terms of imprisonment and for their accumulation or concurrency. As will be apparent, those provisions must be understood in the context of related provisions in the Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA) (Sentence Administration Act). Section 87 of the Sentencing Act provides:87.Time on remand may be taken into account(1)If when an offender is being sentenced to imprisonment for an offence –(a)the offender has previously spent time –(i)in custody in respect of the offence for which the offender is being sentenced; or(ii)in custody in respect of another offence, while on bail for the offence for which the offender is being sentenced;and(b)the sentencing court decides that that time should be taken into account,the court may take that time into account –(c)if it imposes a fixed term, by reducing that term by an appropriate period; or(d)by ordering that the term it imposes is to be taken to have begun on a specified day being the day when that custody began or on some later date that is not later than the date of the sentence.(2)Subsection (1)(a)(i) does not apply if the time in custody has already been taken into account in sentencing for another offence under subsection (1)(a)(ii). Section 88 of the Sentencing Act deals with concurrent, cumulative and partly cumulative terms. It provides:88.Concurrent, cumulative or partly cumulative terms(1)An offender sentenced to a fixed term is to serve that term concurrently with any other fixed term that he or she is serving or has yet to serve, unless the sentencing court makes an order under subsection (3). (2)An offender sentenced at the one time to one or more fixed terms is to serve those terms concurrently, unless the court makes an order under subsection (3). (3)If at the time an offender is sentenced to a fixed term – (a)the offender is serving or has yet to serve another fixed term imposed previously; or (b)the offender is then also sentenced to serve another fixed term, the sentencing court may order that –(c)the fixed term is to be served cumulatively on the other fixed term; or (d)the fixed term is to be served partly concurrently with the other fixed term. (4)If under subsection (3)(d) a court orders that a term is to be served partly concurrently with another fixed term, the court must specify the period of the other fixed term that is to be served before the partly concurrent term is to begin, but that period must not extend beyond the earliest date on which the offender could be released (whether on parole or not) in relation to the other fixed term.(5)An offender sentenced to life imprisonment is to serve that sentence concurrently with any other term that he or she is serving or has yet to serve. Section 94 of the Sentencing Act, in turn, makes the following provision in relation to parole terms:94.Aggregation of parole terms for certain purposes(1)In the case of a prisoner serving 2 or more parole terms –(a)the time when he or she is eligible to be released on parole; and(b)the parole period for such a prisoner,are to be calculated by reference to the aggregate of those terms, but only if under subsection (3) or (4) those terms are to be aggregated.(2)If under this section the matters referred to in subsection (1) are not to be calculated by reference to the aggregate of 2 or more parole terms, the matters are to be calculated in respect of each of the 2 or more parole terms separately.(3)A parole term imposed at the same time as another parole term is to be aggregated with that other term for the purposes of subsection (1) unless it is to be served partly concurrently with that other term.(4)A parole term imposed at a different time to another parole term is to be aggregated with that other term for the purposes of subsection (1) unless –(a)it is to be served concurrently with that other term or partly concurrently with it; or(b)the other term was imposed before the commencement of Part 2 Division 4 of the Sentencing Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2003.(5)Subject to this section, a parole term, or an aggregate of parole terms, may be aggregated with the aggregate of 2 or more other parole terms, but a parole term, or an aggregate of parole terms, imposed before the commencement of Part 2 Division 4 of the Sentencing Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2003 is not to be aggregated with a parole term, or aggregate of parole terms, imposed after that commencement.(6)For the purposes of applying this section a reference in this Part or in the Sentence Administration Act 2003 to a prisoner serving a parole term is, where necessary, to be taken as including a reference to a prisoner serving more than one parole term and in such a case, if under this section the terms can be aggregated, the reference to the term is to be taken as being a reference to the aggregate of the terms.