THE LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT 1981 (SA) RE DUNCAN JAMES FOWLER, A PRACTITIONER

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

THE LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT 1981 (SA) RE DUNCAN JAMES FOWLER, A PRACTITIONER

[2019] SASC 64

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Nicholson

26 April 2019

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - LAWYERS - PRACTISING CERTIFICATES

The practitioner gave notice of a show cause event pursuant to section 20AH of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA). The relevant show cause event was the service on him by the Australian Taxation Office of a creditor's petition under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The practitioner subsequently entered bankruptcy and has been an undischarged bankrupt since 5 June 2018.

Each of the practitioner, the Law Society of South Australia and the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner were represented.  The Commissioner and the Law Society argued that the practitioner should only be permitted to continue in practice as an employee.  The practitioner contended that he was a fit and proper person to practise as a principal subject to a regime of quite restrictive conditions. 

Held:

1.  Where, following its consideration of a practitioner's show cause event, the Supreme Court is satisfied of fitness to practice subject to certain conditions, the Court has power to order that the practitioner's practicing certificate be endorsed to that effect.

2.  The practitioner is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate subject to conditions endorsed on his practising certificate as set out in paragraphs [8] and [114] of the reasons for judgment.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth); Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 5, s 20AH, s 20AI, s 20AJ, referred to.
The Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) re David Peter Andrew Moen [2018] SASC 136; The Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) re Roderic Jason Lindquist [2009] SASC 93; Re Read [2006] SASC 35; Re Jenner [2007] SASC 263; Barakat v Law Society of New South Wales [2013] NSWADT 271; New South Wales Bar Association v Murphy (2002) 55 NSWLR 23, considered.

THE LEGAL PRACTITIONERS ACT 1981 (SA) RE DUNCAN JAMES FOWLER, A PRACTITIONER
[2019] SASC 64

Civil: Application

NICHOLSON J.        

Introduction

  1. Duncan James Fowler is a legal practitioner who was admitted to practice in this Court in 2001.  On 11 May 2018, the practitioner was served by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) with a creditor’s petition under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The practitioner had failed to comply with a bankruptcy notice served on 7 March 2018 with respect to a judgment debt in the amount of $226,081.37. A sequestration order was made on 5 June 2018 and from that date the practitioner has been an undischarged bankrupt.

  2. Service of the petition by the ATO constituted a “show cause event” within the meaning of section 5 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) (LPA) and by affidavit affirmed by the practitioner on 16 May 2018, filed in this Court and subsequently served on the Law Society of South Australia (LSSA) and the Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner (the Commissioner), the practitioner provided notification of the show cause event…

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Details
Case
[2019] SASC 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involves Duncan James Fowler, a practitioner, and the Law Society of South Australia (LSSA) and the Commissioner of Taxation. The dispute centres on the practitioner's fitness to practice law, particularly in light of his bankruptcy and significant indebtedness to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia. The central issue before the court was whether the practitioner, who had been made bankrupt, was a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate and, if so, under what conditions.

The court had to determine if the practitioner's financial and professional conduct, particularly in light of his bankruptcy, demonstrated a level of competence and integrity required to practice law. The interveners argued that the practitioner should only be allowed to practice as an employee, which would mitigate risks to the public. The practitioner, on the other hand, argued that the conditions should be tied to his discharge from bankruptcy, expected in June 2021. The court considered whether imposing conditions "until further order" would be an appropriate exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA).

The court found that the practitioner's ongoing financial difficulties and the circumstances leading to his bankruptcy raised serious concerns about his competence and judgment. It concluded that conditions should be imposed to protect the public, but not necessarily tied to the date of his discharge from bankruptcy. The court reasoned that such conditions should remain in place until the underlying issues that led to the restrictions were resolved. The court ultimately decided to impose conditions on the practitioner's practising certificate "until further order," allowing for adjustments if the circumstances changed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Without purporting to be comprehensive at this stage concerning the submissions by the interveners in support of the position they have taken, I observe that a central concern of the interveners is that the practitioner’s indebtedness to the ATO is substantial which of itself, together with the circumstances in which it arose, raises a serious question as to the competence of the practitioner to practise. The Commissioner put the submission in these terms.It points to either serious financial incompetence or an inability to keep a proper oversight of his financial affairs or both. His income tax liability suggests a lack of financial judgment as well as lack of legal judgment. However, there is no suggestion there was dishonesty in any of his financial dealings. Further background and other matters raised in the evidence It is convenient to move to a summary of the practitioner’s professional background since his admission to practice in 2001, the circumstances in which the debt to the ATO arose and some of the matters raised by the evidence, material to the practitioner’s fitness to practice. After admission in 2001, the practitioner commenced practising as an employed solicitor with a Port Lincoln firm of solicitors. He became a partner of the firm in May 2002. The practitioner practised mainly in the areas of property, wills and estates and commercial law and deposes to having built a substantial client base within the Port Lincoln community. On 1 July 2007, the practitioner commenced practising on his own account in Port Lincoln by way of an incorporated practice, Duncan Fowler & Associates Pty Ltd. He closed the practice in March 2009 and advised the LSSA that he was doing so because of accrued debts. On 22 June 2009, with the consent of the practitioner, the LSSA resolved to appoint a supervisor to the practice to facilitate its proper closure on the grounds, as expressed in the notice of appointment, that:(i)the practitioner was not attending properly to the affairs of the practice;(ii)the practitioner had committed a serious irregularity in the course of practise; and(iii)other proper cause existed for the appointment of a supervisor. It should be noted that the practitioner was not subjected to disciplinary proceedings and no findings in terms of (i), (ii) or (iii) were made. These represent a description of the LSSA’s concerns following an internal review. The practitioner welcomed the LSSA’s intervention and assistance with the orderly closing of the practice. In his second affidavit, the practitioner asserted that he has never breached his trust account obligations. However, in his third affidavit he acknowledged that there had been irregularities in his trust account in 2009 and gave explanations endeavouring to suggest that the irregularities were not of particular significance. The Commissioner does not accept this characterisation.[9] The practitioner’s mental state, on the practitioner’s own assessment, was “fragile” in the early part of 2009. [9] The practitioner maintained that the irregularities occurred after the practice had been closed and suggested that a number of factors had affected his ability to operate the trust account. The practitioner was under the belief, now understood to be erroneous, that he was unable to access his trust account at the time because it had been frozen by the bank. The Commissioner makes the submission that a simple enquiry of the bank or the LSSA would have clarified this.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

NICHOLSON J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NICHOLSON J

The interveners contend that the public interest as described or characterised by Debelle J in Re Jenner would only be served by allowing the practitioner to practise as an employee. This would remove all risk to the public, or at least significantly limit the risk to the public arising from the demonstrated incompetence of the practitioner. It also would enable the practitioner to earn an income which might put him in a better financial position to contribute to his bankrupt estate.Consideration and conclusion The practitioner was made bankrupt on 5 June 2018. This event bookended (but has not necessarily brought to an end) a period of constant financial difficulty commencing in 2010. It is expected that, in the ordinary course of affairs, the practitioner will be discharged from bankruptcy in early June 2021, approximately two years hence. Initially, the interveners submitted that any conditions restricting the practitioner’s right of practise should be imposed until the practitioner was discharged from bankruptcy. However, as the argument progressed the position of the interveners changed to one where any conditions imposed should be “until further order”. On one view, the latter approach is faithful to a situation where, as here, the concern is as much the underlying causes of or circumstances revealed by the bankruptcy and what they indicate about the practitioner’s competence to conduct a legal practice, as it is the fact of bankruptcy itself. In a show cause case, the Court is being asked by the practitioner, in effect, to make a finding that the practitioner is a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. If such a finding were to be made unconditionally, that would be the end of the matter. Neither the mere fact of discharge from bankruptcy in the future nor the mere fact of when in the future that were to occur, would be of any moment. However, the position is different if the finding were to be that the practitioner is a fit and proper person to practise but only subject to conditions. In such a case, the practitioner’s rights will have been restricted for a particular reason and it is only when that reason no longer pertains that the position should change. The fact of bankruptcy coming to an end, ordinarily, will not of itself address the underlying reason for the restriction. Orders in the form of “until further order” are not necessarily prejudicial to the practitioner. Whatever the form of the conditions, whether those proposed by the practitioner or by the interveners or some other as fixed by the Court, the practitioner would be at liberty in the future, and even before any discharge from bankruptcy, to seek their amendment or complete removal if the underlying rationale for the conditions were to change. The practitioner submitted that in the circumstances of this case, to make an order “until further order” rather than until discharge from bankruptcy in June 2021, so as to tie it to the show cause event, would be to effect “a purpose extraneous to the power, namely a purpose for which the [LPA] makes separate and express provision”.[20] For the reasons just given, I do not agree that such an order would effect a purpose extraneous to the power. The fact that there are other provisions in the LPA specifically directed at assisting and protecting the public with respect to failed or failing legal practices does not mean that such a risk cannot or ought not inform the exercise of the Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, in response to a show cause event such as bankruptcy, as to the nature and duration of any conditions to be imposed. [20] Citing sections 44 (Law Society Supervision), 45 (Law Society Manager), 46 (Right of Appeals) and 47 (Supreme Court Directions) of the LPA.