SZUXT v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUXT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2016] FCCA 2508
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Judicial review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) – whether the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by assessing an application for protection on the ground that the applicant would live in Kabul and only occasionally seek to leave Kabul – whether the Tribunal misunderstood or misapplied the “real chance” test – whether Tribunal failed to take into account relevant considerations – whether Tribunal required to give notice to applicant that it may not accept an aspect of the applicant’s evidence – no jurisdictional error.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.416(2), 425

Cases cited:

Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; (2003) 216 CLR 473
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs[1989] HCA 62; (1989) 169 CLR 379

Hamid Reza Jamal Jamalian Nejad v The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1997] FCA 1284; (1997) 79 FCR 153

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2013] FCAFC 155

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2014] HCA 45

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo Wei Rong [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang[1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; (2007) 233 CLR 18
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZGUW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 91
SZGUW v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] FCA 321

SZHKA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 138

SZSSY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1144

SZOBC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 712

Applicant: SZUXT
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 2284 of 2014
Judgment of: Judge Manousaridis
Hearing date: 1 September 2015
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 30 September 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Reynolds
Solicitors for the Applicant: Fragomen
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr C Lenehan
Solicitors for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The application is dismissed.

  2. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal is substituted for the Refugee Review Tribunal as the second respondent.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 2284 of 2014

SZUXT

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant, a national of Afghanistan, seeks judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) affirming a decision by a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa).

  2. An earlier decision of a differently constituted Tribunal (first Tribunal) affirming the delegate’s decision was quashed without contest after the Minister conceded the Tribunal…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCCA 2508
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for judicial review brought by SZUXT against the Minister for Immigration. The applicant contended that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) had committed jurisdictional error by failing to properly consider a claim that the security situation in Afghanistan would deteriorate following the withdrawal of international forces, and by failing to re-determine the matter in accordance with the law as previously ordered by the Court. The applicant argued that the Tribunal's approach in its most recent decision was substantively identical to a previous decision that had been quashed for failing to apply the correct legal test.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal had engaged in jurisdictional error by, in substance, repeating a previous error in its assessment of the applicant's claim regarding the future security situation in Afghanistan. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the Tribunal had failed to apply the "real chance" test as required, or if it had failed to adequately demonstrate on the face of its reasons how it had reconsidered the matter according to law, as directed by the Court. The applicant also raised a point of law concerning the correct citation of a previous case, SZGUW v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship, which was incorrectly attributed in the particulars of the ground of review.

The Court found that the Tribunal had not engaged in jurisdictional error. It reasoned that the Tribunal had correctly understood and applied the "real chance" test, distinguishing it from mere speculation or conjecture, as evidenced by its explicit findings that there was no real chance of persecution. The Tribunal had made a positive finding that the withdrawal of international forces did not provide a substantial basis for a well-founded fear of persecution, demonstrating that it had considered and answered the question posed by the legal test. The Court also noted that while the applicant had incorrectly cited the judge in the SZGUW case, this did not vitiate the Tribunal's decision, as the Tribunal had otherwise correctly identified and purported to apply the relevant legal principles.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ground 3 of the amended application is as follows:The Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error by failing to consider a claim, failing to take heed of the error identified in the orders quashing its earlier decision, or by failing to re-determine the matter in accordance with the law as ordered by the Court. Particularsa.The applicant had claimed that the situation in Afghanistan would deteriorate with the pull out of NATO troops. b. In its decision of 28 June 2013 (CB255-275), the Tribunal differently constituted dealt with this claim by finding that it was unclear how the pull-out of troops would affect security in Kabul and whether any change would occur in the reasonably foreseeable future (at [85]) (Earlier Decision). c. The Court quashed the Earlier Decision and directed the Tribunal to determine according to law the application for review to it with a note stating that the Minister conceded that the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional error by failing to apply the real chance test in considering the applicant’s claim that the situation in Afghanistan would deteriorate with the pull out of NATO troops (CB278).d.In its decision the subject of the present application, the Tribunal dealt with this claim by finding that it would be mere speculation to find that there was a real chance that the departure of the international forces from Afghanistan would lead to a significant deterioration in the security situation in Afghanistan or in respect of the position of the Shia Hazara community in Kabul (at [53], [56], [70], [76], [79], [92]). e. In the premises, the Tribunal’s approach in the decision the subject of the application is in substance identical to its approach in the Earlier Decision and the Tribunal accordingly engaged in the same jurisdictional error; f. Further and in the alternative, the Tribunal: i. failed to make it clear on the face of its reasons how it discharged its obligation to reconsider this matter according to law; and ii. failed to take heed of the previous error and determine the matter in accordance with the law as it was directed to do by the Court; andiii. accordingly, by virtue of the matters above, the Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error: SZGUW v MIAC (2009) 108 ALD 108 per Jacobson J at [13]-[19] and [28]. To understand this ground, it is necessary to consider the case on which this ground relies, namely, SZGUW v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship.[32] That is a decision of Reeves J, not Jacobson J, as stated in the particulars to ground 3. The Tribunal in SZGUW considered an application for review that had been remitted to the Tribunal after Jacobson J, exercising the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court, quashed the decision of a differently constituted Tribunal affirming the decision of a delegate not to grant the applicant a Protection visa.[33] Jacobson J held that the differently constituted Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s claims in their totality.[34] On remittal following Jacobson J’s orders, the Tribunal again affirmed the delegate’s decision. This Court rejected an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision but, on appeal, Reeves J held the Tribunal did not appear to have had any regard to the rulings made by Jacobson J. Reeves J concluded:[35]Having considered the third Tribunal decision carefully, I do not consider that the third Tribunal has clearly dealt with the unconsidered claims identified by Jacobson J in their full context. I therefore consider there is a strong inference that they have not been considered by the third Tribunal. It follows that I consider that the third Tribunal has not discharged its obligations to reconsider this matter according to law, specifically the law as ruled on by Jacobson J. [32] SZGUW v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] FCA 321[33] SZGUW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 91[34] SZGUW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 91 at [55]-[75][35] SZGUW v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2009] FCA 321 at [28]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The question, therefore, is whether the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the determination of whether or not an event might or might not occur in the future was a matter calling for speculation, and therefore, a matter about which the Tribunal should or could not make a finding. In my opinion, the Tribunal did not proceed on that basis. It was well aware of the difference between conjecture and surmise, on the one part, and the need to be satisfied whether a future event might occur or not occur. That is evident in the following passage:[46]As reflected in the submissions made by [the applicant’s] representatives, there is a vast amount of commentary on the future course of events in Afghanistan and the factors which may influence those events, including the departure of the international forces. As Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ said in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 572, conjecture or surmise has no part to play in determining whether a fear is well-founded and a fear of persecution is not well-founded if it is mere speculation. I consider it that it would be mere speculation to find on the evidence before me that there is a real chance that the departure of the international forces from Afghanistan will lead to a significant deterioration in the position of the Shia Hazara community in Afghanistan generally or in Kabul in particular. I do not accept that the departure of the international forces provides a substantial basis for a well-founded fear persecution on the part of the Shia Hazara community. As I put to [the applicant], I do not accept on the evidence before me that there is a real chance that the security situation in Afghanistan will deteriorate or that the risk of harm and attacks from the Taliban will increase following the withdrawal of the international forces in such a way or to such an extent as to expose him to a real chance of persecution in Kabul. [46] CB397, [53] This passage demonstrates two things. First, the Tribunal correctly understood the “real chance” test; and, second, it applied, or at least purported to apply, the correct test. (I explain below why I also use the words “purported to apply”). The Tribunal asked itself the very question the test required it to ask, and it answered the question in the negative. If, in truth, the Tribunal laboured under the mistaken view that it could or should not attempt to make a finding about the happening or non-happening of a future event, it would have elected to make no finding about whether there was a real chance the security situation in Afghanistan would deteriorate or other consequences would occur following the withdrawal of international forces. But it did make a finding; the Tribunal found there was no real chance of persecution. Finally, I refer to paragraph (f) of the particulars to ground 3. I do not accept the Tribunal failed to make clear on the face of its reasons how it discharged its obligation to reconsider this matter according to law, or that it failed to take heed of the first Tribunal’s previous error and determine the matter in accordance with the law as it was directed to do by the Court. As I have already concluded, the Tribunal correctly identified the law it was required to apply, and at the very least purported to apply that law.