FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZUXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 688
Appeal from: SZUXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2508 File number: NSD 1895 of 2016 Judge: LEE J Date of judgment: 20 June 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court decision – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had engaged in jurisdictional error by not applying the principles explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317 – distinguished from SZSCA – held no expectation that the appellant would remain in a specified safe area – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 476 Cases cited: Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317
SZATVvMinister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 233 CLR 18
Date of hearing: 17 May 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 46 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Reynolds Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C Lenehan Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1895 of 2016 BETWEEN: SZUXT
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
LEE J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 JUNE 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent in relation to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
LEE J:
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal), which affirmed a decision of the delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) Visa.
The sole matter that falls for consideration is whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had engaged in jurisdictional error, by not applying “the principle identified in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317”.
Prior to understanding how this error is said to arise (and in order to provide some context), it is useful to set out, in summary terms, the long procedural history that has preceded this appeal and the nature of the claim for protection.
Procedural History
It was as long ago as August 2012 that the appellant first lodged an application for a protection visa which was refused by the Delegate and which was the subject of an application for review to the Tribunal. A hearing was held in May 2013 and the Tribunal…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 688
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal properly applied the principles from SZSCA and if the primary judge erred in distinguishing the present case from SZSCA. The court had to determine whether there was an expectation that the appellant would remain in a particular locality or area, which was a critical component of the principles in SZSCA.
The court found that the primary judge did not err in distinguishing the present case from SZSCA. The court clarified that the Tribunal’s decision did not involve the application of the internal relocation principle or the analogous principle identified in SZSCA. The court highlighted the differences between the facts of the present case and those in SZSCA, noting that there was no expectation in this case that the appellant would remain in a particular area. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent in relation to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As can be seen, the contentions of the appellant are interconnected. This is hardly surprising given the narrow nature of the appeal.CONSIDERATION The primary contention of the Minister is that it is a misconception to assert that the Tribunal’s decision involved the application of the internal relocation principle, or, more particularly, the analogous principle identified in SZSCA. It follows that the grounds of appeal proceed on a misapprehension and the appeal should be dismissed. At the outset of the hearing, I requested further, specific submissions focused on whether or not the Tribunal applied any expectation of the nature identified in SZSCA that the appellant would remain in any particular locality or area. The Minister submits that there is no such expectation in the present case, which is why it can be distinguished from SZSCA. Following the direction of focus to this issue, the appellant accepted that, in order to attract the operation of the principle in SZSCA, not only was it necessary for there to be an identified area in the visa applicant’s country of nationality where he may be safe from harm (as put in the written submissions), but also that it also must be demonstrated that there was “an expectation that the appellant would remain within a particular area, described as a safe area” (T 3) (emphasis added). This highlights the importance of understanding what is meant by expectation when it is used by the appellant (a matter to which I return below). I pause to note that, in SZSCA, the Court used expectation in the context of framing the question of what may reasonably be expected of an applicant in circumstances when considering relocation, or, in the facts of the case, restriction to a particular area within an applicant’s home country where the applicant could be safe from harm. As explained above, the reason this question arose was because the Court in SZSCA explained: (a) that although the respondent had lived in Kabul, he had not been confined to that area and his work had taken him outside it and the expectation that he now remain within Kabul raised considerations analogous to the internal relocation principle; and (b) the Tribunal had failed to consider the reasonableness of the expectation that the applicant would remain where he would be safe from harm. Returning to the Tribunal decision in the present case, the key passage for consideration is at [50], which is in the following terms: As I put to [the appellant], I consider it appropriate to assess his application on the basis that Kabul is his ‘home area’. He left his village in the Jaghori district when he was aged 10 in 1997 and since then he has only been back for three brief visits. At the hearing before the first Tribunal he said that when he had been deported to Afghanistan in 2010 he had been sick of Iran. He said that he had wanted to build a house on the land his father had bought in Kabul, to live in Kabul, to get married there and to pass the rest of his life there. He said that he had wanted to bring his mother and sisters and nephews to live in Kabul. At the hearing before me he was more equivocal about his intentions but he said that he had considered that it was not possible for him to settle in his village because the hospital in Jaghori was not a proper hospital and there were no good teachers at the local school. I find that Kabul is the place in Afghanistan with which [the appellant] has the strongest ties and that it is his ‘home area’ for the purposes of the assessment of his application. No question of relocation therefore arises in this review.