SZUXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 688

Appeal from: SZUXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2508
File number: NSD 1895 of 2016
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 20 June 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court decision – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had engaged in jurisdictional error by not applying the principles explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317 – distinguished from SZSCA – held no expectation that the appellant would remain in a specified safe area – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 476
Cases cited:

Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317

SZATVvMinister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 233 CLR 18

Date of hearing: 17 May 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 46
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Reynolds
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C Lenehan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1895 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZUXT

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 JUNE 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent in relation to the appeal. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LEE J:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal), which affirmed a decision of the delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) Visa.

  2. The sole matter that falls for consideration is whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had engaged in jurisdictional error, by not applying “the principle identified in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317”.

  3. Prior to understanding how this error is said to arise (and in order to provide some context), it is useful to set out, in summary terms, the long procedural history that has preceded this appeal and the nature of the claim for protection.

    Procedural History

  4. It was as long ago as August 2012 that the appellant first lodged an application for a protection visa which was refused by the Delegate and which was the subject of an application for review to the Tribunal.  A hearing was held in May 2013 and the Tribunal…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 688
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of SZUXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, SZUXT, sought to appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court which upheld the Minister’s decision to refuse to grant him a visa. The central dispute revolves around whether the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by not applying the principles set out in the High Court case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA. Specifically, the appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to consider that he would need to remain in a specified safe area within his home country, as required by the principles in SZSCA.

The legal issues before the court included whether the Tribunal properly applied the principles from SZSCA and if the primary judge erred in distinguishing the present case from SZSCA. The court had to determine whether there was an expectation that the appellant would remain in a particular locality or area, which was a critical component of the principles in SZSCA.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in distinguishing the present case from SZSCA. The court clarified that the Tribunal’s decision did not involve the application of the internal relocation principle or the analogous principle identified in SZSCA. The court highlighted the differences between the facts of the present case and those in SZSCA, noting that there was no expectation in this case that the appellant would remain in a particular area. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent in relation to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Returning to the contention the primary judge fell into error for the reasons identified at [23] to [28] above, it is incorrect, for reasons I have explained, to assert the primary judge erred by distinguishing SZSCA. The primary judge did not engage in impermissible ex post facto reasoning in correctly characterising the Tribunal’s finding and pointing out (as I have explained) that the Tribunal did not assess the appellant’s claims on the basis that he would need to alter his activities. Further, his Honour’s analysis of SZSCA did not involve identifying “some factual check list” but rather pointing out, at [28], the differences between the facts found by the Tribunal (which were correctly characterised by the primary judge) and the facts in SZSCA. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS For the foregoing reasons, the appellant has failed to establish any error in the way in which this matter was approached by the primary judge, and the appeal must be dismissed. The appellant should pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As can be seen, the contentions of the appellant are interconnected. This is hardly surprising given the narrow nature of the appeal.CONSIDERATION The primary contention of the Minister is that it is a misconception to assert that the Tribunal’s decision involved the application of the internal relocation principle, or, more particularly, the analogous principle identified in SZSCA. It follows that the grounds of appeal proceed on a misapprehension and the appeal should be dismissed. At the outset of the hearing, I requested further, specific submissions focused on whether or not the Tribunal applied any expectation of the nature identified in SZSCA that the appellant would remain in any particular locality or area. The Minister submits that there is no such expectation in the present case, which is why it can be distinguished from SZSCA. Following the direction of focus to this issue, the appellant accepted that, in order to attract the operation of the principle in SZSCA, not only was it necessary for there to be an identified area in the visa applicant’s country of nationality where he may be safe from harm (as put in the written submissions), but also that it also must be demonstrated that there was “an expectation that the appellant would remain within a particular area, described as a safe area” (T 3) (emphasis added). This highlights the importance of understanding what is meant by expectation when it is used by the appellant (a matter to which I return below). I pause to note that, in SZSCA, the Court used expectation in the context of framing the question of what may reasonably be expected of an applicant in circumstances when considering relocation, or, in the facts of the case, restriction to a particular area within an applicant’s home country where the applicant could be safe from harm. As explained above, the reason this question arose was because the Court in SZSCA explained: (a) that although the respondent had lived in Kabul, he had not been confined to that area and his work had taken him outside it and the expectation that he now remain within Kabul raised considerations analogous to the internal relocation principle; and (b) the Tribunal had failed to consider the reasonableness of the expectation that the applicant would remain where he would be safe from harm. Returning to the Tribunal decision in the present case, the key passage for consideration is at [50], which is in the following terms: As I put to [the appellant], I consider it appropriate to assess his application on the basis that Kabul is his ‘home area’. He left his village in the Jaghori district when he was aged 10 in 1997 and since then he has only been back for three brief visits. At the hearing before the first Tribunal he said that when he had been deported to Afghanistan in 2010 he had been sick of Iran. He said that he had wanted to build a house on the land his father had bought in Kabul, to live in Kabul, to get married there and to pass the rest of his life there. He said that he had wanted to bring his mother and sisters and nephews to live in Kabul. At the hearing before me he was more equivocal about his intentions but he said that he had considered that it was not possible for him to settle in his village because the hospital in Jaghori was not a proper hospital and there were no good teachers at the local school. I find that Kabul is the place in Afghanistan with which [the appellant] has the strongest ties and that it is his ‘home area’ for the purposes of the assessment of his application. No question of relocation therefore arises in this review.