SZSOG v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSOG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2014] FCA 1053

Citation: SZSOG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1053
Appeal from: SZSOG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 769
Parties: SZSOG, SZSOH, SZSOI and SZSOJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 455 of 2014
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 12 August 2014
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: SZSOG v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 769 referred to
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 applied
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507 applied
SZJDB v Minister of Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 179 FCR 109 referred to
Date of hearing: 12 August 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the Appellants: Kinslor Prince Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson SC
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 455 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZSOG
First Appellant

SZSOH
Second Appellant

SZSOI
Third Appellant

SZSOJ
Fourth Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 AUGUST 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The first and second appellants pay the first respondent's costs.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 455 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZSOG
First Appellant

SZSOH
Second Appellant

SZSOI
Third Appellant

SZSOJ
Fourth Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

12 AUGUST 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court that dismissed the appellants’ application for judicial review from the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal given on 11 January 2013 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision of 16 March 2012 not to grant the appellants protection visas:  SZSOG v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 769.

    The issue on appeal

  2. What happened at the hearing before the Tribunal and the use it made of three items of evidence given orally and in writing to it by the husband and wife led to the present question as to whether the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by failing to comply with either of ss 424A or 424AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in relation to its use of that evidence. The appellants contended that the three items of evidence amounted to…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1053
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellants, SZSOG, sought judicial review of the decision made by the Tribunal under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellants argued that the Tribunal failed to provide particulars of certain evidence as required by s 424A(1) and s 424AA(b)(iii) of the Act. Specifically, they claimed that the Tribunal did not provide particulars of evidence given by the wife concerning three telephone calls and her statement that the attackers belonged to the MQM, as well as evidence of the husband's political activities. The appellants further argued that the Tribunal failed to provide particulars of the husband's evidence that they had been receiving threatening communications "all the time," that the attackers could have been from either the MQM or the Taliban, and that the husband had been targeted due to his political activities.

The legal issues in this case centred around the interpretation of s 424A(1) and s 424AA(b)(iii) of the Act, particularly what constitutes "information" for the purposes of these sections. The appellants contended that the evidence in question constituted "information" that the Tribunal was required to provide particulars of, while the Minister for Immigration argued that the evidence was not "information" but rather evaluative conclusions by the Tribunal. The trial judge had previously rejected the appellants' claims, holding that the evidence did not constitute "information" under the statutory provisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, agreeing that the evidence in question did not constitute "information" within the meaning of s 424A(1) or s 424AA(b)(iii). The Court referred to the jurisprudence on these sections, including the High Court's decisions in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, to support its conclusion. The Court held that "information" under these sections refers to evidentiary material or documentation, not to doubts, inconsistencies, or the absence of evidence. Therefore, the evidence provided by the husband and wife did not constitute "information" that required particulars to be given to the parties.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the first and second appellants were ordered to pay the Minister for Immigration's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The first and second appellants pay the first respondent's costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of SZSOG v Minister for Immigration involves a couple who had applied for protection visas. The appellants, SZSOG and his wife, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) regarding their protection visa applications. They alleged that the MRT did not comply with statutory provisions that required particulars of evidence to be provided to them. The husband argued that the Tribunal failed to provide particulars of the evidence given by his wife about three telephone calls, the identity of the attackers, and the lack of reference to his political activities. The wife claimed that the Tribunal did not provide particulars of the husband's evidence about receiving threats, the identity of the attackers, and being targeted by the Taliban due to his political activities. The trial judge dismissed their claims, holding that the items of evidence were not "information" under the relevant statutory provisions but rather reflected inconsistencies in their testimonies and were part of the Tribunal's evaluative process.

The case originated from an application for judicial review brought by the appellants in the Federal Court of Australia, challenging the decision of the MRT. The appellants argued that the Tribunal had contravened statutory provisions by not providing particulars of certain evidence. The trial judge dismissed the application, and the appellants subsequently appealed to the High Court of Australia. The appeal was heard and determined by the High Court, which upheld the trial judge's decision, dismissing the appeal and ordering the appellants to pay the respondent's costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The grounds of appeal in this Court exactly reflect the two grounds on which the appellants had earlier sought judicial review in the Court below. They claimed that:(1)the Tribunal contravened s 424A(1) by failing to provide particulars to the husband in compliance with s 424AA(b)(iii):·of the evidence given by his wife of the three telephone calls at the Tribunal hearing that were also described in her written statement attached to her protection visa application;·that the wife had told the Tribunal in the hearing that the people who attacked him in Karachi in 2008 belonged to the MQM; and ·that neither her statement in support of her claims forming part of her protection visa application nor the Taliban letter that she produced made any reference to his political activities. (2)the Tribunal had failed to provide particulars to the wife of the oral evidence given by her husband in compliance with s 424A(1) that he said that:·the couple had been receiving threatening letters and telephone calls “all the time”;·his attackers in 2008 could have been from either the MQM or the Taliban; and ·he had been targeted by the Taliban because of his political activity.The trial judge’s decision The trial judge rejected all three bases of the challenges put forward respectively by each of the husband and the wife. She held that, in substance, none of the items of evidence was “information” to which either of the statutory provisions applied. Her Honour held that each item was reflective simply of inconsistencies or gaps in the evidence of each of the husband and wife and reflected an evaluative process by the Tribunal. The parties argued the same grounds in the appeal.Consideration The particular way in which something might be characterised as “information” for the purposes of either s 424A or s 424AA is not pellucid in either the Act or the jurisprudence that has considered those sections. In SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294, the majority comprised McHugh J and Hayne J, with the latter of whom Kirby J agreed on the material issues to which I will refer at 341 [154] and 345-346 [173]. Their Honours held that the Tribunal had committed a jurisdictional error by not giving a notice to the applicant for review under the only relevant provision at that time, s 424A, of certain evidence given to the Tribunal by her daughter. In the words of Hayne J (228 CLR at 348 [184] and see too per McHugh J at 308 [37]):“The information which the Tribunal obtained from the evidence given by the eldest daughter, and which it gave as a reason to affirm the decision under review, was specifically about the first appellant and members of her family. It therefore did not fall within the exception provided by s 424A(3)(a). On its face, s 424A(1) required the Tribunal to give particulars of the information to the appellants and to ensure, as far as practicable, that they understood why it was relevant to the review.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Next, the High Court decided SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190. There, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ analysed s 424A in a slightly different context, as their Honours made clear. They pointed out that the majority in SAAP 228 CLR 294 determined two points about the operation of s 424A namely that, first, its effect was mandatory so that a breach amounted to a jurisdictional error and, secondly, its temporal effect was not limited to the prehearing stage of the proceedings. They then turned to examine the application of the section to the facts of that particular case. They pointed out that, in SAAP 228 CLR 294, the relevant “information” was testimony of the appellants’ daughter that had been given in their absence. Their Honours contrasted that position with what was claimed to be the “information” in issue before them, that consisted of the appellants’ own prior statutory declaration to which the Tribunal explicitly drew their attention during the course of the hearing: 81 ALJR at 1195 [13]-[14]. Their Honours then examined the application of the Act to the facts of that case and in particular said: “17. Second, the appellants assumed, but did not demonstrate, that the statutory declaration “would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”. The statutory criterion does not, for example, turn on “the reasoning process of the Tribunal”, or “the Tribunal's published reasons”. The reason for affirming the decision that is under review is a matter that depends upon the criteria for the making of that decision in the first place. The Tribunal does not operate in a statutory vacuum, and its role is dependent upon the making of administrative decisions upon criteria to be found elsewhere in the Act. The use of the future conditional tense (would be) rather than the indicative strongly suggests that the operation of s 424A(1)(a) is to be determined in advance – and independently – of the Tribunal's particular reasoning on the facts of the case. Here, the appropriate criterion was to be found in s 36(1) of the Act, being the provision under which the appellants sought their protection visa. The “reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review” was therefore that the appellants were not persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Convention. When viewed in that light, it is difficult to see why the relevant passages in the appellants' statutory declaration would itself be “information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”. Those portions of the statutory declaration did not contain in their terms a rejection, denial or undermining of the appellants' claims to be persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations. Indeed, if their contents were believed, they would, one might have thought, have been a relevant step towards rejecting, not affirming, the decision under review.18. Third and conversely, if the reason why the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review was the Tribunal's disbelief of the appellants' evidence arising from inconsistencies therein, it is difficult to see how such disbelief could be characterised as constituting “information” within the meaning of para (a) of s 424A(1). Again, if the Tribunal affirmed the decision because even the best view of the appellants' evidence failed to disclose a Convention nexus, it is hard to see how such a failure can constitute “information”. Finn and Stone JJ correctly observed in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [(2004) 206 ALR 471 at 476-477, citing Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109 at [54]; Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 at 428; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1679 at [25]; WAGP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 276 at 282-284] that the word “information”. [sic]does not encompass the tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations … nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc.If the contrary were true, s 424A would in effect oblige the Tribunal to give advance written notice not merely of its reasons but of each step in its prospective reasoning process. However broadly “information” be defined, its meaning in this context is related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence. The appellants were thus correct to concede that the relevant “information” was not to be found in inconsistencies or disbelief, as opposed to the text of the statutory declaration itself.” (emphasis added)