FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZSOG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2014] FCA 1053
Citation: SZSOG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1053 Appeal from: SZSOG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 769 Parties: SZSOG, SZSOH, SZSOI and SZSOJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 455 of 2014 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 12 August 2014 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: SZSOG v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 769 referred to
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 applied
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507 applied
SZJDB v Minister of Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 179 FCR 109 referred toDate of hearing: 12 August 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 35 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr L Karp Solicitor for the Appellants: Kinslor Prince Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson SC Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 455 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZSOG
First AppellantSZSOH
Second AppellantSZSOI
Third AppellantSZSOJ
Fourth AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 AUGUST 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The first and second appellants pay the first respondent's costs.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 455 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZSOG
First AppellantSZSOH
Second AppellantSZSOI
Third AppellantSZSOJ
Fourth AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE:
12 AUGUST 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)
This an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court that dismissed the appellants’ application for judicial review from the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal given on 11 January 2013 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision of 16 March 2012 not to grant the appellants protection visas: SZSOG v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 769.
The issue on appeal
What happened at the hearing before the Tribunal and the use it made of three items of evidence given orally and in writing to it by the husband and wife led to the present question as to whether the Tribunal committed a jurisdictional error by failing to comply with either of ss 424A or 424AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in relation to its use of that evidence. The appellants contended that the three items of evidence amounted to…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1053
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case centred around the interpretation of s 424A(1) and s 424AA(b)(iii) of the Act, particularly what constitutes "information" for the purposes of these sections. The appellants contended that the evidence in question constituted "information" that the Tribunal was required to provide particulars of, while the Minister for Immigration argued that the evidence was not "information" but rather evaluative conclusions by the Tribunal. The trial judge had previously rejected the appellants' claims, holding that the evidence did not constitute "information" under the statutory provisions.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, agreeing that the evidence in question did not constitute "information" within the meaning of s 424A(1) or s 424AA(b)(iii). The Court referred to the jurisprudence on these sections, including the High Court's decisions in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, to support its conclusion. The Court held that "information" under these sections refers to evidentiary material or documentation, not to doubts, inconsistencies, or the absence of evidence. Therefore, the evidence provided by the husband and wife did not constitute "information" that required particulars to be given to the parties.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the first and second appellants were ordered to pay the Minister for Immigration's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The first and second appellants pay the first respondent's costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated from an application for judicial review brought by the appellants in the Federal Court of Australia, challenging the decision of the MRT. The appellants argued that the Tribunal had contravened statutory provisions by not providing particulars of certain evidence. The trial judge dismissed the application, and the appellants subsequently appealed to the High Court of Australia. The appeal was heard and determined by the High Court, which upheld the trial judge's decision, dismissing the appeal and ordering the appellants to pay the respondent's costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Next, the High Court decided SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190. There, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ analysed s 424A in a slightly different context, as their Honours made clear. They pointed out that the majority in SAAP 228 CLR 294 determined two points about the operation of s 424A namely that, first, its effect was mandatory so that a breach amounted to a jurisdictional error and, secondly, its temporal effect was not limited to the prehearing stage of the proceedings. They then turned to examine the application of the section to the facts of that particular case. They pointed out that, in SAAP 228 CLR 294, the relevant “information” was testimony of the appellants’ daughter that had been given in their absence. Their Honours contrasted that position with what was claimed to be the “information” in issue before them, that consisted of the appellants’ own prior statutory declaration to which the Tribunal explicitly drew their attention during the course of the hearing: 81 ALJR at 1195 [13]-[14]. Their Honours then examined the application of the Act to the facts of that case and in particular said: “17. Second, the appellants assumed, but did not demonstrate, that the statutory declaration “would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”. The statutory criterion does not, for example, turn on “the reasoning process of the Tribunal”, or “the Tribunal's published reasons”. The reason for affirming the decision that is under review is a matter that depends upon the criteria for the making of that decision in the first place. The Tribunal does not operate in a statutory vacuum, and its role is dependent upon the making of administrative decisions upon criteria to be found elsewhere in the Act. The use of the future conditional tense (would be) rather than the indicative strongly suggests that the operation of s 424A(1)(a) is to be determined in advance – and independently – of the Tribunal's particular reasoning on the facts of the case. Here, the appropriate criterion was to be found in s 36(1) of the Act, being the provision under which the appellants sought their protection visa. The “reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review” was therefore that the appellants were not persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Convention. When viewed in that light, it is difficult to see why the relevant passages in the appellants' statutory declaration would itself be “information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”. Those portions of the statutory declaration did not contain in their terms a rejection, denial or undermining of the appellants' claims to be persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations. Indeed, if their contents were believed, they would, one might have thought, have been a relevant step towards rejecting, not affirming, the decision under review.18. Third and conversely, if the reason why the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review was the Tribunal's disbelief of the appellants' evidence arising from inconsistencies therein, it is difficult to see how such disbelief could be characterised as constituting “information” within the meaning of para (a) of s 424A(1). Again, if the Tribunal affirmed the decision because even the best view of the appellants' evidence failed to disclose a Convention nexus, it is hard to see how such a failure can constitute “information”. Finn and Stone JJ correctly observed in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [(2004) 206 ALR 471 at 476-477, citing Tin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1109 at [54]; Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 at 428; Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1679 at [25]; WAGP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 276 at 282-284] that the word “information”. [sic]does not encompass the tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations … nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc.If the contrary were true, s 424A would in effect oblige the Tribunal to give advance written notice not merely of its reasons but of each step in its prospective reasoning process. However broadly “information” be defined, its meaning in this context is related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence. The appellants were thus correct to concede that the relevant “information” was not to be found in inconsistencies or disbelief, as opposed to the text of the statutory declaration itself.” (emphasis added)