FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZSMD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2015] FCA 202
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1116 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZSMD
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 FEBRUARY 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1116 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZSMD
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE:
11 FEBRUARY 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellant constitutional writ relief from a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal given on 11 December 2012 that affirmed a decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the appellant a protection visa: SZSMD v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 2304.
The substantive issue argued before the trial judge and in this Court was whether the Tribunal’s decision record gave rise to an apprehension that, in its consideration of the appellant’s case, it might have been biased.
Background
The appellant is a citizen…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 202
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved whether the Tribunal's decision record indicated any apprehension of bias. The court needed to determine if the Tribunal's processes were fair and whether a fair-minded lay observer might think that the Tribunal might not bring an impartial mind to its decision. The principles of procedural fairness, as established in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, required that the appellant receive a fair hearing.
The court found that the trial judge correctly dismissed the application and appropriately applied the principles of procedural fairness and apprehension of bias. The court held that the relevant inquiry was about the Tribunal's processes, not the correctness of its factual conclusions. The test for apprehension of bias, as outlined in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH, was correctly applied by the trial judge, who recognised the seriousness of the allegation of bias and appropriately balanced it with the principles of judicial review.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs. This decision underscores the importance of ensuring fair processes in administrative decision-making, particularly in cases involving allegations of bias.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At one point in his written submissions, Mr McArdle also relied on the decision in WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 at [75] as requiring the Tribunal, in accordance with ss 424A or 424AA, or its other functions under the Act, to alert the appellant to any country information that was contrary to her case. However, Mr McArdle withdrew that submission on the basis that the proceedings with which North J was then concerned dealt with common law principles of procedural fairness on judicial review of a decision and not with the principles applicable to the statutory procedure under which the Tribunal operated.Consideration The principles of procedural fairness require that persons whose interests may be adversely affected receive a fair hearing by use of an appropriate procedure in the circumstances: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at 160 [25] where Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ that what is required by procedural fairness is a fair hearing, not a fair outcome and continued:As Brennan J said in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [(1990)170 CLR 1 at 35-56]:“The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository's power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone.”It is, therefore, not to the point to ask whether the Tribunal's factual conclusions were right. The relevant question is about the Tribunal's processes, not its actual decision. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223 at 235 [37], Jagot J and I summarised the test for apprehension of bias in an administrative decision-maker in the following terms:An administrative decision-maker will be found to have given rise to an apprehension of bias if a fair-minded lay person might think that the decision-maker might not bring a fair and impartial mind to the making of the decision. The hypothetical lay person is an objective observer of the proceedings and will be assumed to be properly informed as to their nature, the matters in issue and the conduct complained of: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 75 ALJR 982; 179 ALR 425 at [28]-[29] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ; NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264 at [14]-[21] per Allsop J, with whom Moore and Tamberlin JJ agreed. I do not consider that the trial judge’s reference to a heavy onus being imposed on a person who made an allegation of apprehended bias went beyond a recognition that, the allegation being of a serious nature if the Court were to find it proved, it should do so having regard to the principles discussed by Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-362. The trial judge correctly set out the principles applicable to determine such an allegation.