SZSMD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSMD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2015] FCA 202

Citation: SZSMD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 202
Appeal from: SZSMD v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 2304
Parties: SZSMD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1116 of 2014
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 11 February 2015
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 applied
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 applied
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 applied
R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission;  Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 applied
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;  Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 referred to
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 applied
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 referred to
SZSMD v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 2304 referred to
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 referred to
Date of hearing: 11 February 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 63
Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr C McArdle, McArdle Legal
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1116 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZSMD
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 FEBRUARY 2015

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1116 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZSMD
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

11 FEBRUARY 2015

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellant constitutional writ relief from a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal given on 11 December 2012 that affirmed a decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the appellant a protection visa:   SZSMD v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 2304.

  2. The substantive issue argued before the trial judge and in this Court was whether the Tribunal’s decision record gave rise to an apprehension that, in its consideration of the appellant’s case, it might have been biased.

    Background

  3. The appellant is a citizen…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 202
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZSMD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a Chinese citizen, sought to challenge the Tribunal's decision regarding her application for a protection visa. The appellant alleged that the Tribunal might have been biased in its consideration of her case, leading to an unfair outcome. The Tribunal had conducted a hearing in which the appellant presented her claims, including allegations of her boyfriend’s death in custody due to torture and her subsequent mistreatment by the Chinese authorities.

The legal issues before the court involved whether the Tribunal's decision record indicated any apprehension of bias. The court needed to determine if the Tribunal's processes were fair and whether a fair-minded lay observer might think that the Tribunal might not bring an impartial mind to its decision. The principles of procedural fairness, as established in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, required that the appellant receive a fair hearing.

The court found that the trial judge correctly dismissed the application and appropriately applied the principles of procedural fairness and apprehension of bias. The court held that the relevant inquiry was about the Tribunal's processes, not the correctness of its factual conclusions. The test for apprehension of bias, as outlined in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH, was correctly applied by the trial judge, who recognised the seriousness of the allegation of bias and appropriately balanced it with the principles of judicial review.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs. This decision underscores the importance of ensuring fair processes in administrative decision-making, particularly in cases involving allegations of bias.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The substantive issue argued before the trial judge and in this Court was whether the Tribunal’s decision record gave rise to an apprehension that, in its consideration of the appellant’s case, it might have been biased.Background The appellant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China who arrived originally in Australia on 27 August 2011. She applied for a protection visa on 14 February 2012. The delegate refused to grant the visa on 31 May 2012. Next, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. The appellant was invited by the Tribunal to a hearing pursuant to s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Tribunal conducted a hearing at which the appellant gave evidence and was asked to make submissions during much of which she was assisted by, or in the presence of, her migration agent. In substance the appellant advanced five principal claims to the Tribunal. First, she claimed that her boyfriend’s property had been compulsorily acquired by Chinese authorities in 2009 and that he had been paid substantively inadequate compensation. She claimed that her boyfriend had been arrested because he had protested about the manner in which his property had been appropriated and the inadequacy of the compensation and that, about three weeks after his arrest, the police informed his mother and the appellant that he had died in custody. The appellant claimed that, when viewing his body, she saw that he was black and blue all over and concluded that he had been subjected to torture at the detention centre. She claimed that the police had not allowed the body to be taken by the family and that neither she nor the family were aware that he suffered from any condition relating to the cause of his death ascribed by the authorities, namely, heart failure. She believed that he had been tortured to death. Secondly, the appellant claimed that the next month she accompanied the deceased’s mother to the local area government to seek to have his death investigated and that, shortly after they had been interviewed, the mother passed away after asking the appellant to promise to do her best to seek justice for the death of her son. In November 2010, the appellant claimed that she had again approached the local area government to ask it to investigate her boyfriend’s death and was interviewed by other police officers who, having heard her account, warned her not to make any trouble with the local government or police. She claimed that she then pursued her quest with the provincial police and anti-corruption bureau and was interviewed by other officials, who promised to investigate it. Thirdly, she claimed that later in December 2010 she was unexpectedly arrested by police from her local area on her way home from work and was accused of framing government officials and the police in order to plan and start anti-government activities. She claimed that she had denied all of those allegations but that she was mistreated, tortured and received inhuman treatment from police and other criminals while in custody and became seriously ill so that, about a month later, she was released from prison but warned not to make any further trouble. As will appear below, she added to that account shortly before the hearing in the Tribunal. She claimed that she hated the police for what they had done to her and wanted them to be punished.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I am not satisfied that the trial judge erred in dismissing the application below. He was correct to have done so.Conclusion For these reasons, I am of opinion that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At one point in his written submissions, Mr McArdle also relied on the decision in WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 at [75] as requiring the Tribunal, in accordance with ss 424A or 424AA, or its other functions under the Act, to alert the appellant to any country information that was contrary to her case. However, Mr McArdle withdrew that submission on the basis that the proceedings with which North J was then concerned dealt with common law principles of procedural fairness on judicial review of a decision and not with the principles applicable to the statutory procedure under which the Tribunal operated.Consideration The principles of procedural fairness require that persons whose interests may be adversely affected receive a fair hearing by use of an appropriate procedure in the circumstances: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at 160 [25] where Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ that what is required by procedural fairness is a fair hearing, not a fair outcome and continued:As Brennan J said in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin [(1990)170 CLR 1 at 35-56]:“The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository's power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone.”It is, therefore, not to the point to ask whether the Tribunal's factual conclusions were right. The relevant question is about the Tribunal's processes, not its actual decision. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223 at 235 [37], Jagot J and I summarised the test for apprehension of bias in an administrative decision-maker in the following terms:An administrative decision-maker will be found to have given rise to an apprehension of bias if a fair-minded lay person might think that the decision-maker might not bring a fair and impartial mind to the making of the decision. The hypothetical lay person is an objective observer of the proceedings and will be assumed to be properly informed as to their nature, the matters in issue and the conduct complained of: Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 75 ALJR 982; 179 ALR 425 at [28]-[29] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ; NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264 at [14]-[21] per Allsop J, with whom Moore and Tamberlin JJ agreed. I do not consider that the trial judge’s reference to a heavy onus being imposed on a person who made an allegation of apprehended bias went beyond a recognition that, the allegation being of a serious nature if the Court were to find it proved, it should do so having regard to the principles discussed by Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-362. The trial judge correctly set out the principles applicable to determine such an allegation.