SZSNJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No.2)
[2013] FCCA 260
•17 May 2013
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZSNJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR (No.2) | [2013] FCCA 260 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application in a Case – original application dismissed for non-appearance of the applicant – no satisfactory explanation for the applicant’s failure to attend previous Court date – not in the interests of the administration of justice – application in a case dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 65, 91R, 476 Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r. 13.03, 16.05 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) |
| SZSNJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2013] FCCA 40 SZIDH v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 369 Capital Webworks Pty Ltd v Adultshop.Com.Limited & Ors [2002] FCA 389 Wati v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 78 FCR 543; (1997) 148 ALR 578; 47 ALD 1 Smith v NSW Bar Association [1992] HCA 36 (1992) 176 CLR 256 Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) [1993] HCA 6; (1993) 176 CLR 300; (1993) 111 ALR 385 NAJN v Minister for Immigration [2003] FMCA 414 Clifford v Mountford [2006] FMCAfam 450 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164 NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No.2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1 Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630 SJSB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 225 NAST v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 208 NAVX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 287 Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 168 ALR 407 Minister for Immigration v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361; (2002) 194 ALR 749 VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; (2003) 131 FCR 102 Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425 SCAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 |
| Applicant: | SZSNJ |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 104 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Hearing date: | 17 April 2013 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 17 April 2013 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 17 May 2013 |
REPRESENTATION
| The Applicant: | In person |
| Appearing for the Respondents: | Ms L Weston |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Minter Ellison |
ORDERS
The Application in a Case, made on 5 April 2013, is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $1,300.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 104 of 2013
| SZSNJ |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Before the Court is an Application in a Case, filed by the applicant on 5 April 2013, pursuant to r.16.05(2)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“the Rules”), to set aside orders made by this Court on 27 March 2013, pursuant to r.13.03C(1)(c) of the Rules. One order made on that date dismissed an application made by the applicant on 21 January 2013, pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”), which sought review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), made on 20 December 2012, which affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse a protection visa to the applicant.
Background
The background to this Application in a Case is provided in SZSNJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor [2013] FCCA 40 (“SZSNJ (No.1)”). [Relevantly, the first Court date in this matter was scheduled for 3 April 2013. That was subsequently brought forward to 27 March 2013. The applicant did not attend on that occasion, nor did he seek an adjournment.]
Application to the Court
The applicant seeks to reinstate the application he initially made, that was dismissed for want of appearance on 27 March 2013. By affidavit made on 4 April 2013, and filed on 5 April 2013, the applicant sets out the reasons for his non-appearance at the first Court date as follows:
“1. I have not received the notice that my hearing date on 3 April, 2013 was rescheduled.
2. I went to Terrace Tower, 80 William St, Sydney to attend my hearing at 9:15 am on 3 April, 2013 and found no hearing that day.”
The Original Application
The grounds of the original application made on 21 January 2013 are set out at [43] below.
At the time of making his original application, the applicant also filed an affidavit to which is annexed the Tribunal decision record (“DR”). From that record the following is available as background.
Claims to Protection
The applicant is a national of the People’s Republic of China (“China”). He arrived in Australia on 7 August 2007 as the holder of a student visa ([20] at DR 4). He applied for a protection visa on 20 December 2011 ([2] at DR 2).
The applicant initially set out his claims to protection in a written statement attached to his protection visa application (see [21] at DR 5 to DR 6). Essentially, he claimed that he had been harmed in China for his Christian beliefs and practices (the unofficial “Local Church”). He feared persecution and harm on this basis if he were to return.
The applicant claimed that he attended a religious gathering on 19 November 2006 and was arrested by the police for “illegally Religious Gathering” and “Illegally Spreading Religious Materials” ([21] at DR 5). He claimed that he was detained for a period of 15 days, where he was “brainwashed”, beaten and coerced into signing an agreement to “never gather privately again” ([21] at DR 5).
After his release, the applicant claimed that he was harassed “every now and then” by the police ([21] at DR 5). He claimed that he did not want to give up his religion nor continue living in a country without human rights, and therefore, he left China for Australia.
Once in Australia, the applicant claimed that he sent his parents “Christian materials”, and that they then dispersed these materials “to other fellow believers” ([21] at DR 5). The applicant claimed that the police found the religious materials and arrested his parents. He further claimed that his parents were detained for a period of one month and were interrogated about the materials and beaten. According to the applicant, one of the members of the church group told the police that it was the applicant who sent the material to his parents in China.
He further claimed that, on 23 November 2009, the Chinese police issued him with a “writ of summons” and demanded that he report to their office within one month ([21] at DR 6). The applicant claimed that because he did not return home, his family were harassed “more seriously” and they asked the applicant not to return.
The Delegate
The applicant was interviewed by the delegate. The only account of that interview before the Court is the Tribunal’s account (having listened to a recording of the interview – [22] at DR 6), set out in its decision record ([22] at DR 6 to [29] at DR 7).
The Tribunal
The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 12 November 2012 to give evidence and present arguments ([32] at DR 7).
The Tribunal’s decision record contains its account of what occurred at the hearing ([32] at DR 7 to [63] at DR 14). Relevantly, I note that the applicant produced a document which, as translated, was headed “Detention Warrant” ([35](b) at DR 8) and a document headed “Summons Certificate” ([35](c) at DR 8). The applicant also produced other documents, including a letter from a “Senior Minister for the Christian Congregation at the Wesley Mission in Sydney”, in support of his claim to have attended church in Australia ([35](a) at DR 8).
The Tribunal accepted that the applicant was baptised and that he had attended various churches in Australia. However, it found the applicant “to be a very poor witness” and concluded that he was “not truthful about certain relevant matters” ([66] at DR 14).
The Tribunal found that the applicant struggled to answer fundamental questions about Christianity, noting that “he seemed most unsure” and his responses “were brief, appeared rehearsed, and given in a very hesitant manner” ([67] at DR 15). The Tribunal also noted that the applicant’s evidence regarding his distribution of religious material was “most vague” ([68] at DR 15) and that his evidence in relation to his claimed Christian faith lacked clarity ([69] at DR 15).
The Tribunal found inconsistencies between the applicant’s oral and documentary evidence. When these inconsistencies were put to the applicant (including inconsistencies concerning when he obtained his passport – [72] at DR 16), the Tribunal found that he was “not able to provide a plausible or satisfactory explanation for the discrepancies and instead changed his oral evidence” ([71] at DR 16). The Tribunal found that that “indicated that he was not being truthful” ([71] at DR 16).
As a result, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not a credible witness ([73] at DR 16). Due to his lack of credibility, the Tribunal decided “to give the warrant and summons no weight” ([73] at DR 16).
Further, as a result of the applicant’s lack of credibility and the fact that he was baptised two days before he lodged his protection visa application ([66] at DR 14), the Tribunal disregarded the applicant’s baptism and church attendance in Australia pursuant to s.91R(3) of the Act, because the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant engaged in that conduct for reasons other than to strengthen his claim to be a refugee ([74] at DR 16 to [75] at DR 17).
Given the applicant’s “lack of knowledge of Christianity, his inconsistent and vague testimony regarding the religious material he claims to have sent his parents from Australia, and his overall lack of credibility”, the Tribunal did not accept that he “attended church, read the Bible, prayed, or distributed religious material in China, or sent religious material to his parents from Australia” ([74] at DR 16). As a result, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant “is not, nor ever was a Christian, and that he was not arrested, detained or harassed in China for reasons of his religious practice nor been summoned for questioning by the Chinese authorities” ([74] at DR 16). Further, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant “will attend a Christian church or participate in any Christian religious activity in the reasonably foreseeable future if he returns to China” ([74] at DR 17).
Hence, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not have a
well-founded fear of persecution in China for a Convention reason, nor that he satisfied the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a) of the Act. For the same reasons, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa) of the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Application in a Case
As set out in SZSNJ (No 1), the substantive application was dismissed for want of appearance by the applicant. The issue raised for consideration by the Application in a Case is whether the orders made on 27 March 2013 should be set aside.
The exercise of the discretion as expressed in r.16.05(2)(a) of the Rules has a number of elements which can be derived from a number of judgments (see for example SZIDH v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 369, Capital Webworks Pty Ltd v Adultshop.Com.Limited & Ors [2002] FCA 389 for the corresponding order in the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), Wati v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 78 FCR 543; (1997) 148 ALR 578; 47 ALD 1, Smith v NSW Bar Association [1992] HCA 36 (1992) 176 CLR 256 – “ there is some matter calling for review” (at [27]); Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2) [1993] HCA 6; (1993) 176 CLR 300; (1993) 111 ALR 385 – “the interests of justice so require” at per Gaudron J at [1] and [18])
I note, and respectfully agree with, what was said in NAJN v Minister for Immigration [2003] FMCA 414 at [7] per Judge Barnes:
“This is not a case where both parties consent to the setting aside of the orders. The respondent opposes such a procedure. The court has a discretion under Rule 16.05(2)(a) to set aside a judgment. Such discretion must be exercised with caution having regard to the importance which the public interest has in the finality of litigation recognising the tension between the public interest in the expeditious conduct of litigation and the obligation of the court to ensure litigants have the opportunity to present a case where there is a real dispute. The power is generally not to be exercised unless the applicant can show that by accident and without fault on his part the order was made without his being heard. It is necessary to look at the whole of the circumstances. (Australian Fisheries Management Authority v P.W. Adams Pty Limited No.2 (1996) 66 FCR 349).”
In light of this, the elements for consideration in the present case are whether the applicant has presented a satisfactory explanation for his lack of appearance and whether there is an arguable case in the application calling for review, or the interests of justice require that the applicant should be given the opportunity to present his case where a real dispute exists. That is, whether there exist material arguments that might reasonably lead to a different order to the one already made by the Court. (In this latter regard see Clifford v Mountford [2006] FMCAfam 450 per Judge Jarrett at [34]).
At the hearing of the Application in a Case the applicant appeared in person. He was assisted by an interpreter in the Mandarin language. Ms L Weston appeared for the Minister. The Minister opposed the orders sought by the applicant to cause the reinstatement of his original application.
The following was in evidence before the Court:
1.The applicant’s affidavit of 15 January 2013 to which was annexed a copy of the Tribunal’s decision record.
2.The applicant’s affidavit of 4 April 2013.
3.A copy of a letter drafted by the Minister’s solicitors, dated 4 February 2013, and said to be addressed to the applicant at both the addresses for service he provided in his application. That letter advised the applicant that the first Court date in relation to his original application was re-listed for 27 March 2013 and that, if he failed to attend, the Minister may seek dismissal of his application (Respondent’s Exhibit 1 – “RE1”).
4.A copy of a letter from the Court’s Registry addressed to the Minister’s solicitors and the applicant at both of his addresses, dated 1 February 2013, notifying the applicant and the Minister’s solicitor of the relevant details for the first Court date (Respondent’s Exhibit 2 – “RE2”).
The Applicant’s Explanation for the Failure to Appear
The applicant’s evidence before the Court (initially, and briefly, in his affidavit and subsequently in cross-examination) was that he did not attend at the first Court date in this matter because he did not know of the change of the relevant date because he did not receive any of the four copies of the two letters referred above (RE1 and RE2).
For current purposes, the following emerged from the applicant’s (affidavit) evidence and his evidence in cross-examination. First, he was assisted in the making of his application to the Court (and for that matter the Application in a Case) by his migration agent.
Second, while the applicant produced a name for this agent he was unable to provide a business address, beyond stating that her office was in “Auburn NSW”. The applicant subsequently changed his evidence as to the agent’s name. It appears that the agent who assisted the applicant before the Tribunal (see [31] at DR 7 – “Jie Yu”) continued to assist and advise him before the Court.
The applicant confirmed that the residential address to which the two letters (RE1 and RE2) were addressed was his residential address at the relevant times. From his evidence, that address continues to be his residential address. However, it was the applicant’s evidence that the letter box was “broken” and that he was unable, and continues to be unable, to receive, or access, letters directed to it.
He also gave evidence that the post office box given as his postal address was registered with the Post Office in his name. His evidence varied as to who had access to this post office box and the occasions on which letters were retrieved from it. He variously said that he had access and later he said his uncle had access even though the post office box was in the applicant’s name. Still later, the applicant gave evidence that his uncle lived and worked in Brisbane and came to Sydney once every two weeks.
The applicant’s evidence was also that he checked the post office box infrequently, being only “once every two or three weeks”. It was not entirely clear from his evidence whether his uncle was in the practice of giving him any letters in the post office box if they were addressed to him.
The applicant’s evidence was that he had a number of conversations with his migration agent, both about his original application and the Application in a Case. He confirmed that the agent provided him with advice about both applications and assisted him in the drafting of both documents. He also gave evidence that the agent’s advice and assistance was done on the expectation of payment.
In relation to notice about the first Court date, the applicant claimed that the agent told him there was a letter for him in relation to the Court proceedings at about the relevant time. The applicant sought to explain that the agent knew about the existence of this letter despite not having access to the applicant’s post office box or the home letter box because there were letters “like this” at the agent’s office.
Therefore, on the best state of the evidence, the following can be said. The letters before the Court show that both the Minister’s solicitors and the Court’s Registry prepared two sets of letters each, one to each of the addresses provided by the applicant, notifying him of the change of date of the initial Court event.
There is no evidence before the Court that any of the letters from the Minister’s solicitors were actually despatched to either of the two addresses (for example evidence of a postal despatch record or postal log). However, the letter from the Court’s Registry (“RE2”), which was addressed to the parties, bears the address of the Minister’s solicitors, as well as the applicant’s residential and postal office box addresses, and, importantly, a date stamp (“6 February 2013”). That is to the effect that the letter was received by the Minister’s solicitors on 6 February 2013. In the circumstances I am prepared to draw the inference that the Court’s letter, at least, was sent to the applicant at the addresses for service.
His evidence was that he provided two addresses to his migration agent to put on his application form to the Court. One of the addresses was his home address. The applicant did not satisfactorily explain why he provided this as an address for service in circumstances where his letter box was “broken”, and therefore not fit for the purpose of receiving correspondence. This is particularly so when, given in his affidavit in support of his Application in a Case he asserts that he did not receive any relevant letter, he continued to give this as an address for service.
The other address was the post office box. There can be no dispute that an application for protection in Australia is a serious matter. This is particularly so for any applicant. In these circumstances the Minister submitted that at it would be expected that, and in circumstances where the applicant’s home letter box was “broken”, the applicant would have checked his post office box more frequently.
There may be some argument contrary to this that, having been given a first Court date, the applicant had in mind that that was the relevant date and may not have expected any change such as necessitated his checking his post office box with greater regularity. This of course still does not explain the matter of the giving of his “broken” letter box address.
In any event, and in relation to the post office box, the applicant’s evidence as to his uncle’s access to the post office box in Auburn NSW, while living in Brisbane, the uncle’s practice in some circumstances not to give him his letters, and the unexplained evidence that his agent told him that there may be, or may have been, a letter (in context possibly, or even probably, the relevant letter) leaves the applicant’s evidence in such a state that it cannot be said that he has provided a satisfactory explanation as to why he did not attend at the first Court date.
A Matter to be Heard – The Interests of Justice
Further to what is immediately above, I cannot see utility in granting the applicant’s Application in a Case. The purpose of setting aside the orders made earlier would be to allow consideration of the applicant’s grounds set out in that application. For the reasons that follow any opportunity for further consideration would serve no purpose given the paucity of the grounds in asserting, let alone establishing, jurisdictional error.
The grounds, which on the applicant’s submission were drafted with the assistance of a migration agent, are in the following terms:
“1. Judicial error of DIAC and RRT in failing to take into account a relevant consideration, namely the evidence given by the applicant, for example, the Summon Certificate and the Detention Warrant.
2. RRT’s over subjective and unreasonable suspect of the truthfulness of the applicant’s claims just because the evidence provided was not enough according to their thought. For example, RRT had concluded that the applicant had not been truthful about when he began attending church in Australia just because of the absence of the supporting letters from either the minister or other officials of his current church or from other members of the congregation there, even if the applicant already provided a copy of his baptism certificate and membership certificate of his church.
3. DIAC’s bias against the applicant and unreasonable suspect of the truthfulness of the applicant’s claims. For example, DIAC suspect the truthfulness of the applicant being in fact a Christian because the applicant was unable to state what had been altered in Bible in the official churches in China. In fact, the applicant was told by his father when he was a young child that the religious doctrines in official churches were all modified and distorted instead of what had been altered in Bible in China. And in China the applicant followed his parents to attend the underground church instead the official churches. As a result, that the applicant was unable to state what had been altered in Bible in the official churches in China is reasonable.”
[Errors in original]
The applicant’s grounds assert “judicial” error on the part of “DIAC” and the “RRT”. I understood “judicial” to be a mistaken reference to “jurisdictional” and “DIAC” to be a reference to the delegate’s decision.
This Court has no jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case to hear assertions of jurisdictional error on the part of the delegate. The delegate’s decision is not only reviewable under Pt.7 of the Act, but plainly has been so reviewed. This means it is a “primary decision” as explained in s.476(4) of the Act and this Court has no jurisdiction in relation to it as set out in s.476(2)(a) of the Act.
This immediately dispenses with part of ground one and the entirety of ground three. For the remainder of ground one the application complains that the Tribunal did not take into account a relevant consideration. Namely, the “Summons Certificate” and the “Defamation Warrant”. The Tribunal’s decision record reveals that the Tribunal did consider these two documents (see in particular [73] at DR 16). Therefore the ground cannot be made out at the factual level.
However, even if what the applicant really meant by this complaint was that the Tribunal should have given weight to these documents, and in that sense given them “consideration”, the ground still has no merit. It is the case that the weight to be accorded to such evidence is for the Tribunal (Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48; (2010) 243 CLR 164, NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No.2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1 and Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630). The Tribunal gave cogent reasons for its finding that it should accord no weight to the documents, a finding reasonably open to it on what was before it. This was within jurisdiction.
Ground Two
Ground two really complains that the Tribunal’s adverse credibility finding was unreasonable and “over subjective”.
The task statutorily set for the Tribunal in matters of this type was to reach, or not reach, the requisite level of satisfaction that, relevantly, the applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations such that the visa must, or must not, be granted (s.65 of the Act and SJSB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 225 at [15] to [16], NAST v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 208 at [4] to [5] and NAVX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 287 at [11]).
What the applicant has described as “over subjective” is in fact the Tribunal’s analysis of the evidence before it. In this regard, the applicant seeks to challenge the findings of fact, including findings on credibility made by the Tribunal in this regard. The Tribunal’s findings were all reasonably open to it and were within jurisdiction (Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 168 ALR 407).
The Tribunal accepted that the applicant had been baptised and attended church. Therefore, there was no need for the Tribunal to go further with the applicant’s baptism certificate and relevant letters of support. However, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not a Christian for reasons of lack of truth on his part (see [74] at DR 16). Therefore, the Tribunal disregarded the applicant’s baptism and church attendance in Australia pursuant to s.91R(3) of the Act. Again, no jurisdictional error is revealed.
Ground Three
Ground three asserts bias on the part of “DIAC”. (That is, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship.) The short answer to this is that the Federal Circuit Court of Australia has no jurisdiction in relation to decisions made by officers in the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (s.476(2) and (4) of the Act). Given the specific reference to “the Tribunal” in ground two, I can only assume that the applicant did not mean to challenge the Tribunal’s decision at ground three.
In any event, even if the Tribunal was the specific target in ground three then an allegation of bias, going as it does to the very integrity of the decision maker, must be distinctly made and clearly proven (Minister for Immigration & Cultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [69] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J, see also SBBS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361; (2002) 194 ALR 749 at [43] per Tamberlin, Mansfield and Jacobson JJ, VFAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 872; (2003) 131 FCR 102 and Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425). Neither requirement is satisfied in the current case. Indeed, the only evidence before the Court as to what occurred before the Tribunal is the Tribunal’s decision record and it is a rare case where bias can be made out on that record alone (SCAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 at [38] per von Doussa J)
No basis for the allegation of bias is evident, let alone can such an allegation be made out, in the circumstances presented. At best, the applicant’s complaint is an expression of his grievance at the Tribunal’s findings of fact and its conclusion.
Conclusion
I am satisfied that the applicant had reasonable notice of the Court event when the orders, the subject of this application, were made. I do not accept that his explanation for his absence is reasonable in the circumstances.
Further, I can see no utility in setting aside the orders to permit further consideration of his original application. I cannot see any material arguments available to the applicant that might reasonably lead to his success in revealing jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The interests of justice are not served by prolonging this matter. The Application in a Case should therefore be dismissed. I will make an order accordingly.
Postcript
The applicant’s allegation that his migration agent provided him with legal advice and assistance in making his application to this Court, and expected payment for this, is of concern. It appears the agent is not a lawyer in this country. It may be appropriate for those in the Minister’s department concerned with these matters to refer this to the appropriate authorities for further investigation. I ask the Minister’s solicitor to refer this matter to them for consideration.
I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Nicholls
Date: 17 May 2013
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