BPF16 v Minister for Immigration
[2017] FCCA 1680
•21 July 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BPF16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 1680 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Application in a Case – substantive application previously dismissed for non-appearance – whether to reinstate application pursuant to r.16.05 – no arguable case raised in the substantive application – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss.58, 161, 162 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.66, 412, 476, 494B, 494C Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), regs.2.16, 4.31 |
| Cases cited: NAJN v Minister for Immigration [2003] FMCA 414 Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172 |
| Applicant: | BPF16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1653 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Hearing date: | 29 May 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 29 May 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 21 July 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | In person |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Mr J Pinder of Minter Ellison Lawyers |
ORDERS
The Application in a Case made on 14 November 2016 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $7,206.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1653 of 2016
| BPF16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 14 November 2016, the applicant filed an Application in a Case (“AIC”), seeking to reinstate a substantive application made to this Court on 28 June 2016, pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) seeking review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), made on 9 June 2016 which found that it did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision to refuse the grant of a protection (Class XA) visa to the applicant.
The following is in evidence before the Court:
a)Correspondence from the Minister to the applicant, tendered by the Minister and marked as “RE1”.
b)A bundle of relevant documents filed and tendered by the Minister (“the Court Book” – “CB”, “RE2”).
c)The affidavit of the applicant made on 14 November 2016.
d)The affidavit of Julian Pinder, Solicitor, made on 10 October 2016.
e)The affidavit of Usipua Talele Soliola, Paralegal, made on 3 March 2017.
The applicant first appeared before a Registrar of the Court on 25 August 2016, where, given the circumstances and the nature of the grounds of the substantive application, orders were made giving the applicant the opportunity to file certain evidence, and to make written submissions on his case. An order was also made by the Registrar listing the matter before me for further directions on 19 October 2016.
On 19 October 2016, the applicant did not appear. I was satisfied on the evidence before the Court, and in particular the Minister’s communication to the applicant of 10 October 2016 (“RE1” of 19 October 2016), that the applicant had had reasonable notice of the Court event on that day.
When the matter was called there was no appearance by the applicant. In the absence of any request for an adjournment or explanation for the non-appearance, the application was dismissed pursuant to r.13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“the FCC Rules”).
The issue raised for consideration now, is whether the order dismissing the applicant’s substantive application should be set aside. I understand the AIC to invite the Court to proceed pursuant to r.16.05(2)(a) of the FCC Rules. The Minister opposes the making of such an order.
It is the case that the relief the applicant seeks is discretionary. Such discretion must be exercised with caution having regard to the importance which the public interest has in the finality of litigation. However, this consideration must be balanced with the obligation of the Court to ensure litigants have the opportunity to present a case where there is a real dispute (see NAJN v Minister for Immigration [2003] FMCA 414 and SZSNJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 260 and the cases cited therein at [23]).
In light of this, the particular elements for consideration in the present case are whether the applicant has provided a satisfactory explanation for the non-appearance on the previous Court occasion, and whether there is an arguable case in the substantive application calling for review, or the interests of justice require that the applicant should be given the opportunity to present his case.
In relation to whether the application raises any arguable case I note that the Tribunal had found it did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision, because the applicant had been properly notified of the delegate’s decision, and had not made his application for review to the Tribunal within the statutorily required time period. The applicant’s submission was that the delegate had not sent notification of the protection visa decision to the latest postal address he had provided to the Minister’s department as his address for service.
The hearing for the AIC was first set down for hearing on 15 December 2016. The hearing of the AIC was adjourned to 28 February 2017, as the Minister’s solicitor failed to appear on the first occasion. On this date, the applicant submitted that a “friend” had sent an email to the Minister’s department on his behalf in January 2016, which advised the Minister’s department of his change of address. The applicant submitted that this “friend” had since moved away. He further submitted that he “mentioned” the email at a hearing before the Tribunal, but that he did not provide any evidence of the email to the Tribunal.
In the circumstances, I considered it appropriate to further adjourn the hearing of the applicant’s AIC. I made orders allowing the applicant to file further evidence by way of affidavit from his “friend”, attaching the email that was said to have been sent to the Minister’s department. I also gave the Minister the opportunity to file further evidence.
The matter resumed on 17 May 2017. On that occasion, the applicant made submissions seeking a yet further adjournment of the hearing of his AIC, stating that he had evidence relevant to one of the central issues arising in the current case. That issue involved the question of whether the Tribunal was correct in its determination that it did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision.
I granted the applicant a yet further adjournment to 29 May 2017, and also made an order that the applicant must file evidence by way of affidavit, of the email that he submitted was sent by his “friend” to the Minister’s department on his behalf, outlining his change of address by 24 May 2017. An email was sent by the applicant to my Associate on 23 May 2017, attaching a .pdf document purporting to be a copy of the email the applicant’s “friend” had sent to the Minster’s department (the “email”). This was not annexed to any affidavit.
The purported copy of the “email” (in .pdf format) is in the following terms (some specific details have been omitted):
“me:- 12 Feb 2016
to Administrative
[applicant]
[street address] Griffith 2680.
PHONE. [phone number]
Case no. 1604887To: - administrative appeals tribunal
REQUEST CHANGE OF ADRESS
RESPECTED SIR
I request to update my new address and
Use this address for mailing to contact me.
I moved from [previous address] a month ago.New address:- [street address] Griffith 2680 NSW.
Sincerely,
[applicant]12 Feb 2016.
From Ahmad Khan [email address]
To Administrative Appeals Tribunal [email protected]
Date 12 Feb 2016, 10:29pm.”
At the resumption of the hearing, the applicant again appeared in person via telephone. He was assisted by an interpreter in the Pashto language.
The applicant stated that the copy of the “email” (referred to at [14] above), was a copy of the email sent by his “friend” to the Minister’s department notifying his change of address.
Plainly, the applicant did not provide this document to the Court in any evidentiary context, despite the opportunity to do so. Nonetheless, given that the applicant was unrepresented I gave him the opportunity to give oral evidence to the Court. He was cross-examined by the Minister’s solicitor.
The applicant’s evidence was that the copy of the “email” that he had recently sent to the Court, was a true copy of an email written by his “friend” in front of him, and sent to the Minister’s department on the applicant’s behalf.
There are a number of difficulties with the “email”, and the applicant’s evidence in relation to it.
First, the applicant was unable to satisfactorily explain why the document that he said was a copy of an email that was sent to the Minister’s department was deficient in features normally seen on email transmissions.
For example, the applicant confirmed that the “email address” appearing at the third last line, which the applicant also said was his own email address from which the email was sent, does not contain a “commercial at” (“@”) as is the case with such email addresses. Rather, it contains a copyright symbol (“©”) (this is not reproduced above at [14] so as not to disclose the applicant’s email address).
Nor does the “email” contain any email address of any proposed recipient in the Minister’s department, nor, as is usually seen in emails, a heading concerning the relevant subject matter.
Second, the applicant did not satisfactorily explain why he needed the assistance of his “friend” to “retrieve” a copy of an email sent, on his evidence, from his own email address.
Third, the “email” on its face, states that it was sent on 12 February 2016 (see the reproduced .pdf document at [14] above at line 1 and line 19) (and noting that the delegate’s decision was made on 3 February 2016). The applicant’s evidence ultimately was that he was present when the “email” was drafted and sent by his “friend”.
However, he could not explain why, if this was the case, the “email” made no reference to the Minister’s department as the addressee, or indeed, in any other context, but actually stated: “To:– administrative appeals tribunal” (see the reproduced .pdf document at [14] above at line 7), and had what purported to be the Tribunal’s “MRDivision” email address (see the reproduced .pdf document at [14] above at line 18).
Fourth, the Minister drew the applicant’s attention to the case reference number on the face of the “email” (“Case no. 1604887”, see the reproduced .pdf document at [14] above at line 6). This is the identical case number found on a letter sent by the Tribunal, to the applicant, dated 12 April 2016, which acknowledged receipt of his application for review to the Tribunal (CB 82).
The applicant’s application for review to the Tribunal was “lodged” on 9 April 2016 (CB 76 to CB 77). There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that this case number was also used by the Minister’s department. To the contrary, the identifying case number, or receipt, number is quite different (see for example CB 47). The applicant was unable to explain why in an “email” purportedly sent to the Minister’s department on 12 February 2016 (the date of the “email”), he or his “friend” would have used a case number that was not given to him by the Minister’s department, and in fact was, on the evidence, first notified to the applicant on 12 April 2016 by the Tribunal.
Fifth, reproduced at Court Book page 89 is a copy of an email signed by the applicant and dated 12 April 2016, addressed to the Tribunal, and containing a change of address notification. In context, the email notifies the Tribunal of the applicant’s change of address which, on what is written in the email, occurred sometime in early March 2016 (“a month ago” from 12 April 2016).
In this circumstance, on the evidence, the change of address was notified to the Tribunal, not the Minister’s department. Notification to the Tribunal, plainly, occurred after the date of the delegate’s decision and notification of the delegate’s decision. Therefore, the evidence does not support the applicant’s assertion that he notified the change of address to the Minister’s department before dispatch of the notification of the delegate’s decision to him.
The applicant’s evidence before the Court was that he “remembered” that he asked his “friend” to send this email (at CB 89) to the Tribunal on 12 April 2016.
It was put to the applicant in cross-examination to explain why the body of the email contained at Court Book page 89, except for some minor spelling errors, and critically, the date of the document, was identical to the “email” document dated 12 February 2016, which he has now provided to the Court, and which he says his “friend” sent to the Minister’s department on his behalf.
The applicant said that he did not know. In answer to the Minister’s solicitor’s question, the applicant said that he wanted his “friend”, who had sent the document to the Minister’s department on his behalf (but from the applicant’s own email address), to come to Court and explain. The applicant did not agree with the proposition put to him in
cross-examination that the “email” document was a forgery.
The applicant did not make any application for an adjournment so as to bring his “friend”. In any event, the applicant had previously been granted two adjournments to enable him to provide further evidence, including evidence from his “friend”. The applicant gave no indication as to why he did not bring his “friend” to Court to explain the situation relating to the “email”, or even obtain some affidavit evidence from his “friend” for that purpose. I was satisfied the applicant had been given reasonable opportunities and sufficient time to obtain evidence from his “friend”, or to arrange to obtain an affidavit from him. Further, as set out above, the “email”, on the applicant’s own evidence, was said to have been sent from his own email address.
It is not necessary to make any finding that this document is a forgery. The document speaks for itself. It is addressed to the Tribunal and not to the Minister’s department. The delegate, at the relevant time of notifying the applicant of his decision, cannot be said to have been notified of the applicant’s change of address by this purported “email”.
Although for the reasons set out above, it is not necessary to make any finding that the “email” (now presented to the Court) is a forgery, I note a further submission on this matter made by the Minister.
The Minister relied on s.161 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (“the EA”), to submit that the email produced by the applicant to the Court purports to contain a record of an electronic communication (not referred to in s.162 of the EA).
However, the Court should not draw the presumption that it was sent by or on behalf of the applicant at the time and date it was purported to be sent, because there is sufficient evidence to raise doubt about such a presumption.
I agree with the Minister’s submissions. As set out above (at
[20] – [28]), the features appearing on the face of the “email” itself constitute sufficient evidence such that the presumption that it was sent cannot be made.
In any event, as set out above, the “email”, on its face, was not addressed to the Minister’s department, but was addressed to the Tribunal. That is, in my view, sufficient to find that it was not sent to the Minister’s department as the applicant claimed.
The Minister also relied on s.58 of the EA to submit that an inference could be drawn that the “email” is not authentic. I agree on the material before the Court that such an inference is available. The “email” is not in any generally accepted or recognisable email “format”, it is addressed to the Tribunal, it records a case number not given to the applicant until two months after the purported date of the email, and it is very similar (with minor differences) to an email sent to the Tribunal on 12 April 2016 (at CB 89).
As a separate and independent finding to that expressed above at [34], I find that the .pdf document (the “email”) was contrived, either by the applicant or his “friend”, for the purpose of supporting the applicant’s contention that he had notified the Minister’s department, at the relevant time, of a change of the address to which correspondence should be sent to him. As a contrivance, the email does not support the applicant’s contention.
The Minister accepted the applicant’s explanation as to why he did not appear at the directions hearing on 19 October 2016, in that he mistook the hearing date of the directions. In the circumstances, the Minister does appear to say that there is a satisfactory explanation for the applicant’s non-appearance at that Court event.
However, even if an acceptable explanation has been provided by the applicant, there is no merit in the grounds of the substantive application to call for its reinstatement in the interests of justice. Nor can I otherwise see, in the circumstances, any other factor in favour of reinstatement.
The background to the substantive application is set out in the Minister’s written submissions filed in relation to that application on 10 October 2016. Having regard to the evidence before the Court, I am satisfied that it is a fair summary of the relevant background as follows ([2] – [8] of the Minister’s written submissions filed on 10 October 2016):
“[2] The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia, who arrived in Australia on 21 October 2015. He applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa (protection visa) on 7 December 2015.
[3] On 23 February 2016 a delegate of the first respondent (the delegate) refused to grant the applicant a protection visa (the delegate’s decision). The applicant was notified of the delegate’s decision by letter sent by registered post (Registered Post item number 51003411222010) to the postal address set out in his protection visa application (the notification letter).
[4] The applicant sought review of the delegate’s decision before the Tribunal by application dated 9 April 2016 (the AAT application).
[5] On 11 April 2016 an officer of the Tribunal contacted the applicant by telephone to advise that the AAT application stated the incorrect visa class and subclass. The officer asked the applicant to amend the application, and stated that the last day for an application to be lodged to avoid any jurisdictional issues was 12 April 2016.
[6] On 18 May 2016 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant by email inviting him to comment on the validity of the AAT application. The applicant was asked to provide a response by 1 June 2016.
[7] On 29 May 2016 the applicant emailed the Tribunal to explain that he did not receive the delegate’s decision because he moved to a new address on 20 January 2016.
[8] The Tribunal made its decision on 9 June 2016, finding that it did not have jurisdiction.”
In its decision of 9 June 2016, the Tribunal found it did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision. In particular, the Tribunal found that the delegate’s decision was made on 23 February 2016, I note that there is no dispute between the parties about this, and that the review application was made to the Tribunal on 9 April 2016 (again, there is also no dispute between the parties about this) ([1] at CB 103).
The Tribunal stated that s.412(1)(b) of the Act and reg.4.31 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”), require that an application for review must be made to the Tribunal within 28 days, after the applicant is taken to have been notified of the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal found that the applicant had been notified of the delegate’s decision by letter dated 23 February 2016, sent by post to the address for service provided for the receipt of correspondence ([2] – [3] at CB 103).
In the circumstances, the Tribunal found the applicant was taken to have been notified of the delegate’s decision on 3 March 2016. At [3] (at CB 103), the Tribunal stated that the last day for lodging the application for review was 31 May 2016. In the circumstances, this is a factual error. As is clear on the evidence before the Court, the last date for the making of the application for review was 31 March 2016 (see further below).
However, this is not a legal error, because the finding that the applicant was notified on 3 March 2016 was reasonably open to the Tribunal. In any event, the “correct” date by which the application for review could have been made is set out at [5] (at CB 103) of the Tribunal’s decision. The Tribunal’s finding that, in the circumstances, the application for review had not been made within the statutorily required time limit was reasonably open to it. Therefore, it concluded that it had no jurisdiction (in any event, see further below).
The grounds of the substantive application are in the following terms:
“1. The Tribunal misconstrued the risk and fear of significant harm as set out in s36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958.
The Tribunal construed erroneously (and narrowly) the existence of risk to life and fear of significant harm to the applicants upon his return to Malaysia.
2. The tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the said decision because its ‘reasonable satisfaction’ was not arrived in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act.
3. The applicant satisfies the key elements of Convention definition as detailed in page 2 and 3 of the Tribunal decision. The Tribunal has not considered this aspect and therefore committed factual and legal error.”
[Errors in original.]
As is clear, the applicant’s grounds do not engage with the basis of the Tribunal’s decision. The grounds assert, variously, that the Tribunal misconstrued the risk of significant harm to the applicant and its “reasonable satisfaction” was not arrived at in accordance with the Act. Ground three simply asserts that the applicant meets the “Convention definition”.
As set out above, the Tribunal did not affirm the delegate’s decision. It found that it did not have jurisdiction to conduct the review because the application for review made to it, was made outside of the time limit imposed by the Act and the Regulations. Grounds one, two and three proceed from an incorrect premise that the Tribunal did have jurisdiction to conduct the review. None of the grounds have merit to warrant the order now sought.
The central issue in the current case is whether there was legal error in the Tribunal’s finding that it had no jurisdiction. This question is a question of jurisdictional fact for the Court to determine (Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172, Maroun v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1284 and Haque v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCA 346).
This directs attention to the evidence to answer the following questions:
1. Did the Minister comply with the statutory and regulatory requirements in notifying the applicant of the delegate’s decision?
2. When did the prescribed period end for the making of the application for review to the Tribunal?
3. When did the applicant apply for review to the Tribunal?
It is necessary to consider the relevant statutory scheme. At the relevant time, s.66(1) and (2) of the Act were in the following terms:
“Section 66
Notification of decision
| (1) When the Minister grants or refuses to grant a visa, he or she is to notify the applicant of the decision in the prescribed way. |
| (2) Notification of a decision to refuse an application for a visa must: |
| (a) | if the grant of the visa was refused because the applicant did not satisfy a criterion for the visa--specify that criterion; and |
| (b) | if the grant of the visa was refused because a provision of this Act or the regulations prevented the grant of the visa--specify that provision; and |
| (c) | unless subsection (3) applies to the application--give written reasons (other than non-disclosable information) why the criterion was not satisfied or the provision prevented the grant of the visa; and |
| (d) | if the applicant has a right to have the decision reviewed under Part 5 or 7 or section 500--state: |
| (i) | the decision can be reviewed; and |
| (ii) | the time in which the application for review may be made; and |
| (iii) | who can apply for the review; and |
| (iv) | where the application for review can be made; and |
| (e) | in the case of a fast track reviewable decision--state that the decision has been referred for review under Part 7AA and that it is not subject to review under Part 5 or Part 7; and |
| (f) | in the case of a fast track decision that is not a fast track reviewable decision--state that the decision is not subject to review under Part 5, 7 or 7AA.” |
At the relevant time, s.494B(1) and (4) of the Act were in the following terms:
“Section 494B
Methods by which Minister gives the documents to a person
Coverage of section
(1) For the purposes of provisions of this Act or the regulations that:
(a) require or permit the Minister to give a document to a person (the recipient); and
(b) state that the Minister must do so by one of the methods specified in this section;
the methods are as follows.
…
Dispatch by prepaid post or by other prepaid means
(4) Another method consists of the Minister dating the document, and then dispatching it:
(a) within 3 working days (in the place of dispatch) of the date of the document; and
(b) by prepaid post or by other prepaid means; and
(c) to:
(i) the last address for service provided to the Minister by the recipient for the purposes of receiving documents; or
(ii) the last residential or business address provided to the Minister by the recipient for the purposes of receiving documents; or
(iii) if the recipient is a minor -- the last address for a carer of the minor that is known by the Minister.”
At the relevant time, s.494C(4) of the Act was in the following terms:
“Section 494C
When a person is taken to have received a document from the Minister
…
Dispatch by prepaid post or other prepaid means
(4) If the Minister gives a document to a person by the method in subsection 494B(4) (which involves dispatching the document by prepaid post or by other prepaid means), the person is taken to have received the document:
(a) if the document was dispatched from a place in Australia to an address in Australia -- 7 working days (in the place of that address) after the date of the document; or
(b) in any other case -- 21 days after the date of the document.”
At the relevant time, s412(1) of the Act was in the following terms:
“Section 412
Application for review of Part 7 – reviewable decisions
(1) An application for review of a Part 7-reviewable decision must:
(a) be made in the approved form; and
(b) be given to the Tribunal within the prescribed period, being a period ending not later than 28 days after the notification of the decision; and
(c) be accompanied by the prescribed fee (if any).”
At the relevant time, regs.2.16(3) and 4.31(2) of the Regulations were in the following terms:
“Regulation 2.16
Notification of decision on visa application
…
Refusal to grant a visa
(3) The Minister must notify an applicant of a decision to refuse to grant a visa by one of the methods specified in section 494B of the Act.
Note: If the Minister gives a person a document by a method specified in section 494B of the Act, the person is taken to have received the document at the time specified in section 494C of the Act in respect of the method.
Regulation 4.31
Time for lodgement of application with Tribunal
(2) For paragraph 412(1)(b) of the Act, if an applicant is not in immigration detention on the day the applicant is notified of a Part 7‑reviewable decision, the period in which an application for review of the decision must be given to the Tribunal by or for the applicant is 28 days, commencing on the day the applicant is notified of the decision.
Note: If the Minister gives a person a document by a method specified in section 494B of the Act, the person is taken to have received the document at the time specified in section 494C of the Act in respect of the method.”
The Tribunal’s decision record does not make reference to the entire relevant statutory and regulatory scheme. However, on the evidence before the Court, the following findings are reasonably available. The letter of notification complied with the requirements in s.66(2) of the Act (CB 58 to CB 60). The Minister complied with s.66(1) of the Act as follows. The letter was sent by prepaid post consistent with what is set out in s.494B(4) of the Act. On the evidence before the Court, the letter was sent on 23 February 2016, which is within three days of the date of the letter, and was sent by registered post. In all therefore, s.494B(4)(b) of the Act was satisfied.
Pursuant to s.494B(4)(c) of the Act, the letter was sent to the last postal address provided by the applicant to the Minister’s department for the purpose of receiving correspondence.
The applicant’s assertion in his submission to the Court was that the delegate’s decision was sent to his “previous address”, and that he had told the Tribunal that he had changed his address on 20 January 2016 (see CB 95). As set out above, the evidence before the Court does not support this contention. As also set out above, I find that the applicant did not provide any change of address prior to the dispatch of the letter of notification of the delegate’s decision. Therefore s.494B(4)(c) of the Act is satisfied.
In the circumstances, the applicant is taken to have been notified of the delegate’s decision on 3 March 2016. He needed to lodge his application to the Tribunal by 31 March 2016. He did not do so. The Tribunal was therefore correct, on the facts, to find that the application made to it, was out of time. In the circumstances, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal also had no discretion to extend the time within which the applicant could make his application for review to it (SZRLH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 384, NACG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 173 and Fernando v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 324; (2000) 97 FCR 407).
Conclusion
Therefore, even if the AIC were to be granted, on the facts, there would be no basis to remit the matter to the Tribunal in circumstances where it did not have jurisdiction. I will make an order dismissing the AIC.
I certify that the preceding sixty-three (63) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Nicholls
Date: 21 July 2017
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