SZRJS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Link copied
Case Copied 44 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZRJS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 682

Citation: SZRJS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 682
Appeal from: SZRJS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FMCA 1143
Parties: SZRJS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 2215 of 2012
Judge: FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 11 July 2013
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – judicial review – Refugee Review Tribunal – Federal Magistrates Court – conversion to Christianity – non-Christian interpreter – ss 414 and 425 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – meaning of “real and meaningful hearing” – appeal dismissed

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – statutory duty of Refugee Review Tribunal – invitation to hearing “real and meaningful” – appeal dismissed

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 348(1), 360(1), 414, 425, Division 4 of Part 7
Cases cited: Appellant P119/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 230
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v SZFDE [2006] FCAFC 142
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553
NADH v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264
NAMJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 76 ALD 56
Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1992) 92 FCR 6
Soltanyzand v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1168
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189
SZRJS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FMCA 1143
WACO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 511
WALN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 131
Date of hearing: 4 March 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 61
Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr R Turner of Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr R White of Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2215 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZRJS
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 JULY 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2215 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZRJS
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE:

11 JULY 2013

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZRJS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] FCA 682
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZRJS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the Federal Magistrates Court considered an appeal against a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The appellant, a Lebanese citizen, applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa and alleged that he faced persecution if he returned to Lebanon due to his conversion to Christianity. The RRT found that while the appellant feared social isolation and ostracism from his family, there was no real chance of serious harm for a Convention reason if he returned to Lebanon. The Federal Magistrate dismissed the appeal, finding that the RRT's decision was lawful and reasonable.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the RRT complied with its statutory obligations under sections 414 and 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by providing the appellant with a "real and meaningful" hearing. The appellant argued that the RRT's failure to provide a Christian interpreter denied him a real and meaningful hearing. The court rejected this argument, noting that there was no evidence to suggest the appellant would be constrained in giving evidence by the presence of a non-Christian interpreter. The court held that the RRT's decision was in accordance with the statutory requirements and did not constitute a hollow shell or empty gesture.

The Federal Magistrates Court found that the RRT's reasons for decision were well founded and demonstrated a proper consideration of the appellant's claims. The court accepted the RRT's findings that the appellant's conversion to Christianity did not expose him to a real chance of serious harm for a Convention reason. The court concluded that the RRT had properly considered the evidence and made a lawful and reasonable decision. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In written submissions, the representative for the appellant set out the relevant statutory framework as s 348(1) and s 360(1) of the Migration Act. However, these provisions are relevant to the Migration Review Tribunal, not the Refugee Review Tribunal. The correlative sections are s 414 and s 425 of the Migration Act which provide so far as is relevant:414 Refugee Review Tribunal must review decisions(1)Subject to subsection (2), if a valid application is made under section 412 for review of an RRT - reviewable decision, the Tribunal must review the decision.…425 Tribunal must invite applicant to appear(1)The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.… It is common ground between the parties that to comply with s 425 the invitation to the appellant to attend an oral hearing for the purpose of giving evidence and presenting arguments must not be a “hollow shell” or an “empty gesture”; the invitation must be “real and meaningful” and this obligation exists whether or not the Tribunal is aware of circumstances which would defeat that obligation: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 at [33] and [37]. The representative of the Minister did not seek to raise the controversy suggested by Graham J in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v SZFDE [2006] FCAFC 142 at [212] that SCAR was wrongly decided in finding that s 425(1) required more than compliance with its plain terms. SCAR must still be accepted by me as the guiding principle in light of the comments of French J (as he was then) in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v SZFDE at [93]-[94] and Keane CJ and Perram J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575 at [32] and [73] respectively. It is also common ground between the parties that if a person does not adequately speak English the Tribunal must provide an interpreter of sufficient skill to perform the function of an interpreter. That function is to place the non-English speaker as nearly as possible in the same position as an English speaker. In other words an interpreter serves to remove any barriers which prevent or impede understanding or communication. An interpreter provides a means for communication between the applicant, the Tribunal and other participants in hearings in cases where the applicant’s only linguistic capacities are not, on their own, sufficient to that end: Perera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6 per Kenny J at [24]. The appellant does not claim that the interpreter was unprofessional, unskilled or inaccurate in performing his task at the Tribunal hearing. Rather, the appellant in paragraph (a) of the first ground contends that by failing to provide a Christian interpreter the Tribunal denied the appellant a real and meaningful hearing. Put this way, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance in which the appellant could be successful on this ground. There is nothing in the appellant’s evidence which would suggest that there is a basis for him to be constrained in giving evidence by the presence of a person who is neither Christian nor Muslim. There is no evidence that he had any concerns in relation to the Delegate, the Arabic speaking interpreter who assisted the appellant at the interview with the Delegate or the Tribunal member, in relation to whom there is no evidence as to religious affiliation.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant is a Lebanese citizen who last arrived in Australia on 7 August 2010 on his third Sponsored Family Visitor visa. On 5 November 2010 the appellant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa pursuant to s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act). The Federal Magistrate summarises, at [5]-[8], the appellant’s claims made in his visa application and attached statement (Visa Application), his claims before the delegate of the Minister (Delegate) at an interview on 14 October 2011 as set out in the Delegate’s decision record and his claims before the Tribunal at a hearing on 20 March 2012. There is no claim made that that summary is inaccurate. In its reasons for decision given on 21 March 2012, the Tribunal accepted that the appellant’s mother is Christian, his father Muslim, and that he had converted to Christianity in Sydney in 2010 and was baptised in the Antiochian Christian Orthodox Church in June 2011. However, the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant would face a real chance of serious harm for a Convention reason should he return to Lebanon. The Tribunal found that the appellant did not fear being physically harmed, but did fear being isolated, expelled from his family, ostracised and deprived of the opportunity to see his mother as a consequence of his conversion. It found that his evidence did not suggest that violence had ever been perpetrated in his family because of religion, while accepting that there had been serious violence between his paternal uncles as a result of a political dispute 20 years previously. The Tribunal accepted that the father treated the appellant and his siblings harshly and physically disciplined them, however, the Tribunal considered that his family profile and circumstances suggest that the appellant’s father had adopted a tolerant attitude towards religious difference by marrying a Christian woman, allowing his wife and children to associate freely with his wife’s Christian family and by not preventing them from attending church for social and other reasons. It found that his father had not been associated with the Muslim party Harkat Al-Tawhid Al-Islami for over 30 years and despite the violent political fight between his paternal uncles 20 years ago, there does not appear to have been further violence or significant ongoing repercussions for other members of the appellant’s family. The Tribunal said that it appreciated that the appellant’s circumstances as a convert may be different to the circumstances of his mother and her relatives who were born Christians. However, the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant would be forced to convert back to Islam or that he faced a real chance of being killed or severely punished for the reason of his religion if his father or paternal relatives became aware of his conversion. Although the Tribunal acknowledged that Christians are at times victims of sporadic violence, based on the sources it had before it, the Tribunal did not accept that there was a real chance that the appellant will be seriously harmed by way of a fatwa or otherwise by Muslims (armed or not) in his neighbourhood or local area. While the Tribunal appreciated and understood the appellant’s concerns in relation to the possibility of facing isolation and ostracism, the Tribunal was not satisfied that rejection or ostracism by one’s own family or community in this case constituted persecution.